social construction by further coalescing the sacred and secular into a singularity.
As a result, ‘sacredness’, or religion, permeated all aspects of society, including
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its art, economics and politics. Iqbal eloquently articulates this Islamic premise
by suggesting ‘the Ultimate Reality is spiritual, and its life consists in its
temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material
and the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being’. 7
Contrarily, in Europe, the relationship between the secular and the sacred
was entirely different. So, too, was the role religion was to have upon society.
The initial persecution of Christians by the Romans resulted in the development
of the separate institutions of church and state. Ahmad says of Christianity,
‘Later, when it converted the Roman emperors and became the religion of the
Roman Empire, its role as a religion remained distinct from the state’.8 In other words, the initial growth and development of Christianity was characterized
by its isolation from political power. Even afterwards, when Roman emperors
embraced Christianity, a rationalization of estrangement persisted. Therefore, the
separation between church and state had clear, definable historical antecedents.
Yet what did this all imply, socially, for Europe?
Eventually, the implication of this dichotomy was the development of two
contradictory societal institutions and forces – led by a pope or emperor.
Both were powerful, yet they often clashed with one another – two entirely
separate, and diametrically opposed, value systems coexisting in society. The only
rationalization, then, was to propose the autonomy of the each sphere: religion
without power, and power without moral constraints. The ‘Enlightenment’
brought this battle for the soul of Europe to an end. Religion was stigmatized
as trickery and with it people witnessed the withering away of the hitherto
understood natural order. From this onslaught, religion retreated to the
domain of the private and a newfound utilitarian morality came to dominate the
public sphere. That, too, would eventually fade away in the cold, calculated
egotistical calculation of ‘bourgeois civilization left no other bond between man
and man but naked self-interest and callous cash-payment’.9 Nevertheless, the trajectory of sacred and secular forces in Europe remains distinct.
Clearly, the contrary opinions held concerning the sacred and the secular in
the Middle East and Europe led to different attitudes towards religion and
society. Recognizing that, this article examines those deep assumptions to
explain the unique fusion of religion, society and politics that led to the quest
for Pakistan. To do so, it follows a three-fold strategy: first, it elaborates upon
the role of religion and society, including notions of sacredness and secularism,
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in Islam. Second, it carefully examines Islamic axiology and its impact on
society, which, ultimately, led to the propagation of a ‘homeland’ for Muslims
living in the British Raj. Here, the demand for a separate homeland is
demonstrative of those very assumptions at the basis of conflicting Middle
Eastern and European attitudes towards sacredness and secularism. The fusion
of those forces, temporal and spiritual, negated the possibility of conceiving of a
society without a spiritual foundation. It is no wonder, then, that the vast
majority of people embraced the idea of Pakistan, since it offered a rationa-
lization reflecting those deeper aspirations resonating in people.10 Third, it examines the varied manner in which individuals reconcile the sacred and
The Pakistan movement and competing ideologies
99
secular, which thenceforth produces three variant political cultures. This
explains Malik’s assertion that a significant point of social tension in Pakistan
is ‘ideological’ since each of them impacts religion, the formation of society
and the political movement for Pakistan in their own ways. 11
The interaction of religion and society in Islam
Islam’s perspective on sacredness and secularism would shape its impact
on society and, in turn, affect notions of political power and leadership.
Markedly, it began on an entirely different premise from that of Christianity.
The Prophet Muhammad who was persecuted in Mecca became, in Medina,
both the spiritual and temporal head of society. The factor of territoriality was of secondary importance.12 Of primary importance, was the idea of the formation of a ‘faith-centric community’, or ‘ummah’, based on the interconnectedness,
or unity, of the world, truth and God. 13 The concept of the ummah is predominantly extraterritorial. It links people, first, in thought and belief,
then spatially. Therefore, Islam attempts to inculcate two twin loyalties, one
Universalist in scope and the other localizing in application. Of course the
extent of universalizing can range considerably from generous inclusion to
exclusivist paucity. Either as a wider ‘Ummah’ of humanity including all
peoples and their orthodoxies, or as ‘dhimmi’ or ‘People of the Book’, to a
restricted coterie alienating those within the Islamic tradition.14 Nonetheless, those twin loyalties are motivated by a belief in the fusion of sacredness and
secularism, which connects peoples in their temporal existence.
The establishment of the first political order of Muslims in Medina coincided
with their political domination, representing a sacred/secular fusion. 15 From that moment onwards, political leadership in Islam attempts to be both sacred and
secular. The ruler, according to Qur’anic exegesis, was a sacred leader in that he
was bound by his commitments to God and, thereby, to people. His authority
is rationalized on account of that commitment, which if broken is rendered
void. Likewise, the ruler was a secular leader in that he was concerned with
the sociopolitical and economic well being of the masses.16 This does not intend the leader to be a pope-like figure, since there exists no theologically
sanctioned mediator between an individual and God in Islam. Nevertheless,
there does exist a unique coalescing of the sacred ultimate reality needing to
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exist in the temporal, but being above it. This is, exactly, the high classicism
that defines the parameters of Islamic discourse.
Classical Muslim political theory emphasizes the close relationship of religion,
society and the prevailing political infrastructures. Al-Alwani concurs, citing
Islamic jurisprudence, which amalgamates religion, law, the political infra-
structure and society as a single totality, although with distinct spheres. 17
Ahmed, on the other hand, states: ‘the fusion of religion and political power
was and remains an ideal in the Muslim tradition. But the absence of such a
fusion is a historically experienced and recognized fact … the many manifes-
tations of this reality are important to comprehending Muslim polities’. 18
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This, precisely, is that upon which our examination dev
elops – the multiplicity
of those realities and how they reinforce different meanings to the role of
religion, politics and society.
Certainly, the practical situation in Muslim society is testament to this
ambiguity between ideals and reality. Throughout history the moral directives of
religion have perpetually wrestled and competed with the contextual realities
of ‘realpolitik’, and Pax Islamica was no different. During the early leadership of
the first four caliphs, the moral directives of Islam were coalescing with the
formation of the state, its political system and institutions. In other words,
religion and the state were integrated. Yet there are scholars that dispute this.
Shaban, for instance, points out that under the third caliph, Uthman, and the
fourth, Ali, temporal or contextual factors, including trade and commerce,
determined the principal state policies and religion became more a matter of
individual piety.19 He is not alone; often those looking from the ‘outside in’ at Muslim polities offer similar accusations. Yet what is missing in their analysis
is this: irrespective of whether moral directives were taking precedence or were
sincere, the rationalization of power was premised on a spiritual narrative.
The parameters within which legitimacy and authority were lost or gained
were religiously sanctified. This was exhibited by the justification for the
overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate.20 So, too, with the Abbasids, their successors, even though they were no Priest Kings. Individuals at the forefront
of rebellion justified their behaviour by claiming a better representation of the
ideal. So, even while religion may have influenced the state machinery only
through enfranchisement and the employment of theologians in the state’s
administration of justice, what is crucial is that the political leadership was
honouring tradition, elevating those ideals expounded in Islam.
During the rise of Muslim empires in South Asia, the same situation persisted.
Tension between the moral directives of religion, those ‘foundational’ principles
emanating from Islamic sources of legitimacy and the societal context of
Muslims in the British Raj, led to a struggle between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’.
This natural ambiguity led Ahmad to state that numerous ‘political theorists
of Medieval Muslim India glibly referred to the togetherness of religion and
the formation of society, including its political systems and institutions. In
actuality, except for the judiciary, the Mughal Empire ran the administration
in a civil and secular pattern’. 21 Here Ahmed mistakenly juxtaposes a Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 18:26 09 January 2017
European cultural dichotomy upon Mughal rulership by characterizing civic
activity as removed from religion. Since when was it agreed that sacredness
did not entail temporal activity? This is, exactly, what Islam does; it adds an
ethical dimension to the temporal, which shapes the narrative and consequent
institutions.
Certainly, only when a perceived threat occurs do Muslim politics often
enter into a stage of refocusing on ‘foundational’ moral directives. 22 Interestingly, it was not when Muslims ruled, but when they were threatened and
suffered an actual loss of power that there was a re-evaluation, which often
meant a reattachment to the moral directives of religious doctrine. Yet rather
The Pakistan movement and competing ideologies
101
than dismissing that motivation, is this type of soul-searching not true for any
society fearing decline? Does not an inability to effectively respond to challenges
compel people to critical self-examination? Is this not, similarly, occurring in
Europe today? That same fear of loss of social identity and increasing political
exclusion, in early eighteenth-century South Asia, permeates the thought of
Shah Waliullah. After the collapse of the Mughal Empire and the death of
Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, he initiated a movement essentially concerned
with purifying and protecting Muslim identity.23 He was a ‘saintly scholar’
whose influence on later Muslim thinkers is considered immense. 24 However, it is important to ask, what were those teachings that resonated so profoundly?
Specifically, he wished to reintroduce that long-standing rationalization that
blended the sacred and secular in society, and thereby mandated leadership
which would protect communitarian interests.
Leadership and the Pakistan movement
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the sentiments of many Muslims in
the British Raj reflected a deep insecurity, a keen awareness of their loss of power and the forced cultural encroachment by a hostile Hindu majority. 25 That fear was further compounded by British malfeasance that made them feel more
under threat. This led to Muslims holding ambivalent feelings toward their
place in society. In response, their political leadership offered a wide array of
options, ranging from a united non-communal stance to confront the colonizers
to a separate homeland for Muslims. According to Alavi, Muslim political
leadership produced ‘secular’, ‘modernist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ varieties. 26
Syed, alternatively, broadly classifies Muslim political leadership into Muslim
nationalists and their ideological counterparts, including Maulana Maudoodi. 27
Malik, with more precision, delineates eight classifications for Muslim poli-
tical leadership.28 Notwithstanding that, this book classifies Muslim political leadership into three types, based on their manner of reconciling the moral
imperatives of Islam and its impact on society. Admittedly, this simplification
does not cover the entire spectrum of Muslim leadership during the British
Raj. However, it is comprehensive enough to reveal stark distinctions that
broadly characterise the ambit of political leadership. First, the ‘traditionalists’, who focused on a permanence of both the moral directives and their concrete
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application. They ‘live in the past’, so to speak, ignoring context, and
embraced the nouveau Indian narrative since no ‘pure’ Islamic polity existed.
Second, the ‘secularists’, who were not overly concerned about Muslim identity,
Islam or its moral directives. They wished to ‘bury the past’ and often held
regional loyalties or a broader Indian one. Third, the ‘revivalists’, who
attempted to contextualize the moral directives of Islam in their new societal
circumstances. By doing so, they advocated a separate homeland for Muslims
and wished to ‘reconcile the past, in the present, for the future’. Those who
would contextualize the moral directives of Islam, recognizing the modicum
of social manoeuvrability, won this struggle for political leadership. In other
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words, the ‘revivalists’, with a vision that coalesced the sacred and secular in
society, found popular acceptance.
Traditionalist leaders
The traditionalist leadership type is described as such, primarily, by refusing
to consider a re-evaluation of Islamic principles in light of contextual realities.
For them, substance and form were both ‘unchanging’ and this included the
/> majority of ‘ulema’, or religious scholars, in the British Raj during the early
twentieth century. It is these aversions to adaptation that, by and large, have
seen traditionalists support the status quo – irrespective of whether or not it is
just. At this time, many, but not all, of the religious scholars were among one of
three dominant Islamic groups, namely the Barelvi, Deobandi and, eventually,
Jamaat-i-Islami. And, among those, the majority of religious scholars were
Barelvi Sunni Muslims who followed a moribund and anti-intellectual form
of Islam based on rudimentary mysticism and other superstitions. 29 The Barelvi had a largely ‘Sufi’ outlook and extensively mingled with other religious
communities.
Another group, characterized under the ‘traditionalist’ designation, is the
Deobandi. In 1867, an orthodox Sunni seat of learning was established in the city
of Deoband in Northern India. Deobandis, as they were known, were strict
followers of a historic understanding of Shari’ah (Islamic law), and resented
any Muslim political leader who indulged in reformulating Islamic principles to
adapt to present circumstances. As a consequence, ‘the Deobandis remained
loyal to the Congress which was deemed a nationalist organization struggling
for the liberation of the homeland’.30 Furthermore, for the Deobandis, the idea of Pakistan was dismissed as a ploy of the Muslim modernists, who
wanted to establish their own worldly power.
The Jamaat-i-Islami, founded by Maulana Maudoodi in 1941, remains the
most influential political religious party in Pakistan today.31 The ‘Jamaat-i-Islami was opposed to the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 and its Emir (chief) Maulana
Maudoodi, bitterly opposed the establishment of Pakistan as a Muslim national
state’. 32 Malik suggests that Maudoodi opposed the campaign for Pakistan because he believed it would not become an Islamic state. ‘He maintained
that 99.9 per cent of the Indian Muslims were thoroughly degenerate. They
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had little or no knowledge of Islam, their moral and intellectual orientations
were un-Islamic and in many cases, they could not tell right from wrong’. 33
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