few can cut across this divide’.67 Both leaders were wary of extremes, as
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
represented by leaders that did not consider the moral directives of Islam and
the traditionalists who refused to re-evaluate those values in their context. By
1946, as the elections to the assemblies proved, Muslim masses had identified
themselves with this specific type of Muslim leader. Muslim voters, supporting
the Muslim League, under the sagacious leadership of Jinnah, gave a clear
verdict in favour of Pakistan: ‘440 Muslim seats were won by the Muslim
League out of a total of 495. It won landslide victories in all the Muslim
majority provinces except the North-West Frontier’. 68
Conclusion
The unique relationship that the revivalist encourages between the foundational
and the contextual naturally led to the development of the Pakistan movement.
Its origins are traced to the linkages between religion and society, as well as
the sacred and secular, prior to the advent of Islam in the Middle East.
However, when Islam did rise, it did not reject that extant social rationalization.
Rather, it further developed it into a distinct coalescing of the sacred and
secular. This, in essence, spiritualized the entirety of the Islamic narrative.
Therefore, wherever Muslims found themselves, a similar holistic ethical and
spiritual narrative would develop. Generations later, among the Muslim minority
in South Asia, that narrative would develop along the lines of Muhammad Iqbal
and Muhammad Ali Jinnah – resonating with the majority of the people.
The situation in South Asia, from the late nineteenth century onwards, was
tense, with the Muslim minority feeling threatened. Political exclusion, dis-
empowerment and economic servitude crippled this once vibrant and regal
community. With the decision of the British to relinquish control of these
territories, a plethora of leaders arose advocating a wide range of paths. Three
leadership types, in particular, were presented, distinguished by their method
of interacting with the moral directives and foundational values of Islam and
their context. First, the ‘traditionalists,’ who refused to accept the concept of
the ‘nation-state’ since no such articulation, historically, existed in Islam and
it would be impious to rationalize it now. They stressed the universality of
Islam, and argued that too many Muslims would be left out of the map of
Pakistan for it to be credible. However, they did little to address the concerns
of the masses overwhelmed socio-economically and culturally. As a result,
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they ‘lived in the past’, so to speak, but not to recreate that utopia in the
present. Interestingly, they found a strange convergence of opinion with the
‘secularists’, who were, also, competing in the political arena. This powerful,
‘secular’ class ignored the Islamic narrative in their society and, frankly speak-
ing, belittled religiosity. In a way, they wished to ‘bury the past’. For them, it
was unimportant to fashion their narrative on the dominant social currency
in their surroundings. How could they? Their self-conception was pre-
dominantly based on how different they were, and continued to be, from the
masses. It is unsurprising, then, that those who were able to understand and
reapply the moral directives of Islam into their contextual realities succeeded
The Pakistan movement and competing ideologies
109
in obtaining political leadership. The ‘revivalists’ captured the imagination of
their constituency, reconciled their present, and connected it with their past.
Furthermore, they provided people with a vision for the future. By doing so,
they revealed, as the electoral victory of the Muslim League further supports,
that leadership which balances the forces of tradition and modernity would find
popular acceptance. The sweeping power of ‘civic Islamism’ following the Arab
Spring is symptomatic of this reality.
Overall, the conflict between the traditionalists – those unwilling to con-
textualize the moral directives and foundational values of Islam – and the
secularists – those that do not, essentially, care about Islamic social norms –
plays out in contemporary Pakistani politics, and the wider Middle East. By
using the formative phase of the Pakistan movement as an example, this study
attempted to shed light on the manner in which that ideological tussle was
resolved. In all likelihood, this tense ideological conflict will persist, and it
is firmly believed that, if the 1946 elections are an indication, the future
of Muslim polities will exhibit a similar pattern of success for ‘revivalist’
leadership if open, transparent elections are allowed.
Notes
1 Chak, Farhan Mujahid. ‘Islam, Religion and Society: The Movement for Pakistan’, in The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society, Volume 2,
Issue 1, pp. 59–70. This chapter is a heavily revised version of the author’s previous publication.
2 Ahmed, Akbar. Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin, (London: Routledge Publications, 1997) p. 2.
3 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Preface’, in State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology, and Ethnicity, (London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 1997)
p. xi.
4 Ibid.
5 Ahmed, Aziz. ‘Introduction’, in Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, Vol. 2, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971) p. 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Iqbal, Muhammad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989) p. 155.
8 Ahmed, Aziz. ‘Introduction’, in Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, p. 2.
9 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto, (Chicago, IL: Penguin Press, 2004) p. 21.
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10 Ahmad, Akbar. Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, p. 2.
11 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Preface’, in State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. xi.
12 Ahmed, Aziz. Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, p. 3.
13 Eltigani, Hamid. The Qur’an and Politics: A Study of the Origins of Political Thought in the Makkan Qur’an, (Herndon, VA: IIIT Publishing, 2004) p. 3.
14 Winter, Tim. ‘Religious Pluralism in Islam’. Lecture at Qatar Foundation, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies in Doha, Qatar. Nov. 28/2011.
15 Ahmed, Ishtiaq. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, (Stockholm: University of Stockholm Press, 1985) p. 46.
16 Beekun, Rafiq and Badawi, Jamal. Leadership: An Islamic Perspective, (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1999) p. 9.
110
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
17 Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir. Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, (London: Institute of Islamic Thought and Biddles Ltd. 2003) p. 4.
18 Ahmed, Eqbal. ‘Islam and Politics’, in Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience, (New York: Zed Books, 1986) p. 19.
19 Shaban, M.A. Islamic History: A New Interpretation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) p. 3.
20 Mottahadeh, Roy. Loyalty and Lea
dership in an Early Islamic Society, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) p. 180.
21 Ahmed, Aziz. ‘Introduction’, in Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, p. 3.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Abdul Rashid Bhat. The Political Thought of Shah Waliullah: An Analytical Study, (Delhi: Adam Publishers and Distributors, 1997) p. 8.
24 Ahmad, Akbar S. Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, p. 38.
25 Ibid., p. 45.
26 Hamza Alavi. ‘Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology’, in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1988) p. 79.
27 Syed, Anwar. Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) p. 30.
28 Malik, Iftikhar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 25.
29 Ishtiaq Ahmed. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, p. 71.
30 Ibid., p. 72.
31 Ahmad, Mushfiq, et al. ‘Preface’, in Jama’at-e-Islami and National and International Politics. Vol. 1, (Islamabad, Pakistan: Shirkat Printing Press, 1999) p. xix.
32 Qureshi, Saleem M. M. ‘Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan’, Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, Vol. 2, (Leiden, Netherlands:
E.J. Brill, 1971) p. 36.
33 Malik, Iftikhar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 47.
34 Khurshid Ahmed. ‘Interview’, in Islamabad, Pakistan. 16 July 2005.
35 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
36 Syed, Anwar. Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, 41.
37 Qureshi, Saleem M.M. ‘Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan’, p. 37.
38 Malik, Iftikhar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 45.
39 Muhammad Munawwar. Dimensions of the Pakistan Movement, (Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture Publications, 1987) p. 56.
40 Malik, Iftikhar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 48.
41 Ibid.
42 Gardezi, Hassan. A Re-Examination of the Socio-Political History of Pakistan, (London: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991) p. 25.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 26.
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45 Ayub Khan. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 189.
46 Malik, Iftikhar H. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 48.
47 Ahmad, Akbar S. ‘Introduction’, in Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin, p. xxi.
48 Ibid., p. 71.
49 Ahmed, Ishtiaq. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, p. 73
50 Mustansir Mir. Iqbal: Makers of Islamic Civilization, (London: I.B. Taurus, 2006) p. 122.
51 Ibid., p. 123.
The Pakistan movement and competing ideologies
111
52 Iqbal, Muhammad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 153.
53 Iqbal Academy of Pakistan. Accessed on August 9, 2010. ‘Political Ideas,’
www.allamaiqbal.com/webcont/16/poet2.html.
54 Feroze Hassan Parween. The Political Philosophy of Iqbal. PhD dissertation.
University of Punjab, 1967. Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (http://
eprints.hec.gov.pk/1945/1/1872.html) p. 256.
55 Iqbal, Muhammad. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 154–55.
56 Iqbal Academy of Pakistan. Accessed on 9 August 2010. ‘Allahabad Presidential Address,’ www.allamaiqbal.com/webcont/16/poet2.html.
57 Ahmed, Aziz. ‘Islam and Democracy in Pakistan’, in Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 2, p. 28.
58 Ahmad, Akbar S. Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, p. 71.
59 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Ishtiaq Ahmed. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, p. 79.
61 Jamil-ud-Din, Ahmad. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah. Vol. 1, (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1952) p. 180.
62 Abbott Freeland. ‘The Historical Background of Islamic India and Pakistan’, in Contributions of Asian Studies. Vol. 2, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971) p. 7.
63 Malik, Iftikhar H. State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 47.
64 Ali, Tariq. The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihad and Modernity, (New York: Verso Publishing Press, 2003) pp. 169–70.
65 Qureshi, Saleem M.M. ‘Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan’, in Contributions of Asian Studies, p. 37.
66 Jamil-ud-Din, Ahmad. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, p. 62.
67 Ahsan, Aitzaz. ‘Were Iqbal and Jinnah Secularists?’ in Tarik Jan, et al. (ed.), Pakistan Between Secularism and Islam: Ideology, Issues and Conflict, (Islamabad: Institute
of Policy Studies, 1998) p. 71.
68 Ahmed, Ishtiaq. The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, p. 79.
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7
Constitutional development in Pakistan
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the history, development and legal
transformations of Pakistan’s constitution. By selecting a few crucial con-
stitutional events for harder analysis, it evaluates the manipulation of the
constitution as symptomatic of Pakistan’s political culture. In other words,
constitutional manipulation is, often, a result of different ideological approaches
on managing the ‘foundational’ values and ‘contextual’ realities. Certainly, there
are numerous other factors that exacerbate that tension, including the divisions
of power and civilian–military relations. The military, especially, has always
been in the background, pulled between these conflicting polarities, overseeing,
and further complicating, the ideological tug-of-war. Mahmud goes as far to
categorize Pakistan as ‘a praetorian state, one in which the military tends to
intervene and potentially could dominate the political system … Constitutional
changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently
intervenes in the government’. 1 Yet, overall, Pakistan’s chronic constitutional crises are usually debated in either of three ways: first, Mahmud’s praetorian
model, criticizing the military; second, Newberg’s claim of ‘incomplete
constitution-making [that] has placed the burdens of constitutional interpretation
on state instruments ranging from the bureaucracy to the military to the judi-
ciary’;2 third, Khan’s thorough characterization of constitutional crises being a by-product of its manipulation by elites, whether economic, political or military. 3
This chapter, developing from Khan, proposes a fourth reasoning that explores
the ideological gradient of those ruling elites, irrespective of whether they are
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civilian or military. Actually, the confrontation between the secularists, tradi-
tionalists and revivalists, from the inception of the interim constitution until the removal of Nawaz Sharif’s second government and the military dictatorship of
General Musharraf, provides ample evidence of ideological incoherence.
History
To begin with, the creation of the nation-state of Pakistan was inspired by
‘revivalist’ Muslim political leaders who attempted to contextualize the
Constitutional development in Pakistan
113
‘foundational’ values of their society. Their aim was to guarantee, protect and
preserve their minority communities’ socio-cultural and economic rights. And
; they could not do that with the Government of India Act in 1935, which
effectively put complete political power in the hands of the majority Hindu
population without minority safeguards.4 This led to intense communal violence and ‘it was not merely a question of religious differences as that phrase is
generally misunderstood. The differences were even more pervasive and
created maladjustment between the two peoples in almost every situation of
their daily lives’.5
The Government of India Act in 1935 was an interim constitution in which
the British Empire retained control, while administration was relegated to the
Indian government. Official British concerns revolved around the method of
transferring administrative power. Actually, though, the British aspired to
maintain their suzerainty. But due to intense pressure from both rival political
groups, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Gandhi, it became apparent that the
British Raj would end. Therefore, they drafted an interim constitution that gave
the semblance of overlordship to Britain, but became an empowering document
signing the British bon voyage letter. Newberg states:
by the time the Government of India Act was passed in 1935, tensions
between colonizer and colonized had taken the forms of dialectic between
British constitutional experiments and (British) Indians’ reaction to them.
It was a document of partial self-rule for India, a constitutional outline
that … emphasized British parliamentary control … Local, communal,
and provincial politics could not conform to this kind of state. 6
Why not? What was preventing society from conforming to this kind of
political arrangement, which maintained a modicum of British authority with
significant local delegation? The answer was in the beneficiaries of the transfer
of administrative powers being, almost exclusively, the Hindu community.
Fearing for their rights, the Muslim League wanted assurances. Yet those
assurances were not forthcoming from the All India Congress Party (Congress
Party), who were administering for the British Raj. Then, in March 1940, the
Lahore Resolution was passed in which the Muslim league demanded their
sovereignty with explicit safeguards.7 Resultantly, violence became endemic.
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture Page 23