incorporate demands that would have mass appeal or would cut across more
than one group. Mass mobilization, then, becomes Pakistan’s protest method of
choice. However, such a strategy of ‘regime confrontation and mass mobilization
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may produce a crisis of regime legitimacy and may cause breakdown of the
military’s hegemony or even the dominant party system but offers no stable,
coherent and consensual alternative. Alternative institutions to replace the system
do not develop in that they require more time and consensus, amongst the
political leader’, which is not forthcoming, particularly in view of the ideological divergence between them.44 Because more energy is spent in mobilizing and demobilizing the masses, institution building that includes party building,
resolution of conflict within the parliament through negotiations and bargaining,
and tolerance of dissent does not occur, and they remain a low priority.45
Consequently, even after the regime breakdown, the coercive instrument of
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145
control, which evolved under the military-hegemonic system, is perceived to
be the only viable mechanism to ensure political stability and political order.
Nevertheless, once the military’s grip on power is broken, it withdraws to the
barracks, negotiates with civilian political leaders. This inaugurates the
‘dominant-party’ hegemonic system.
The ‘dominant-party’ political system
The origins of the civilian ‘dominant-party’ hegemonic dispensation in Pakistan
have their roots in the formation of the Muslim League political party. As
previously mentioned, those with a ‘revivalist’ perspective spearheaded the
cause for Pakistan. Successfully, they created a political party, galvanized the
masses and achieved a level of popular support, hitherto unknown. However,
this civilian-based political organization, while in place prior to and during
the independence movement for Pakistan, needed to change. Why? Since once
Pakistan was created, it was no longer a freedom movement. What was
required was it to become a national, inclusive and ideologically sound party.
This did not occur and Ahmed characterizes this as due to ‘the failure of the
Muslim League to develop as a national, Democratic Party’.46 Here, it is important to reiterate the reasons for that failure to transform and develop a
stable, democratic political order. It was the ideological clash between the
traditionalists and secularists that paralysed political action, which worked in
the aspiration and interest of the military and bureaucratic elite.
The failure of the Muslim League political leadership to transform into a
national, democratic and ideologically coherent party, following the indepen-
dence of Pakistan, led to serious consequences. As the founding and ruling
party, one of their first challenges was to establish a national political structure based on democratic ideals while remaining cognizant of the logistical quagmire
of maintaining control over a territory which was splintered into two geo-
graphical units and that contained powerful ethnic divisions.47 On the contrary, while ‘West Pakistan’ is represented by its striking heterogeneity, ‘East Pakistan’, present-day Bangladesh, is represented by its rich homogeneity. As Noman
states, at that time, ‘East Pakistan’ contained 54 per cent of the total Pakistani
population and was exclusively Bengali.48 Even though this ethnic demo-graphical reality may have posed some problems for the Muslim League,
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considering that they had overcome greater obstacles in the past, it was
assumed that they were capable of providing such an enlightened leadership.
Yet that did not take place, largely as a consequence of the imbalances and
hierarchies of power within the Muslim elites in the British Empire in South
Asia. The core leadership of the Muslim League came from the Muslim
minority provinces in North India and during the movement for Pakistan
they had controlled key positions in the political party.49 That core leadership was comprised of ethnic ‘Muhajirs’, whose authority was not challenged from
Muslim majority provinces, such as Bengal. 50 The support base of regional leaders was confined to their provinces. Following independence, the Muslim
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
League should have endeavoured to include those regional leaders into their
political fold, but this hardly occurred and, as a result, minority groups began
to feel alienated. This increased centrifugal forces. The only other ethnic
group well represented was the ‘Punjabis’, primarily on account of their
dominant representation in the military as part of the politicians and military
establishment’s rapprochement.51 Together, this ‘Muhajir-Punjabi’ nexus acquired key control over the decision-making posts at the apex of centralised
state power. This ethnic composition has now gradually evolved to include
others, but at that critical time following independence, the exclusion of other
ethnicities was striking. 52
What began to take shape in Pakistan was a form of hereditary politics in
which political parties were nothing more than family-based Mafias. In other
words, the ‘dominant-party’ system is a ‘family-mafia’ style of political dis-
pensation that is more oligarchic than democratic.53 It is an equally hegemonic civilian-based political system that mirrored the coercive mannerisms of the
military but lacked their organization, discipline and coherence.54 Added to this, the dominance by an unrepresentative centre, the Muhajir-Punjabi elite,
provoked dissension from the other regions, especially in the majority province
of Bengal. As a consequence, regional elites, antagonised by the denial of
heterogeneity in a multi-ethnic state such as Pakistan, mobilised popular
support for greater provincial autonomy.55
There are two primary hypotheses that shed light on the failure of the
civilian political leaders to consolidate democratic propensities in Pakistan.
First, that the success or failure of a democratic transition from military
hegemony is dependent on the culture and structure of society. 56 For that reason, the failure of securing a democratic propensity was a reflection of
culture in both the society and the state. Second, that the success or failure of
a transition to a democratic polity was dependent on leadership. 57 In other words, the manner in which the civilian political leaders and elites managed
the shift towards a democratic and participatory political system determined
the outcome. The first hypothesis has largely been discredited, as democracies
are not all similar and manifest themselves differently in different societies. As
Malik adds, the failure of civilian governance is abetted by the feudal nature
of the national economy, where bureaucrats and politicians operate as latter
day mai-bap (parents) dispensing largesse and ad hoc doses of administrative
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and land reform’.58 Thus, the failure of the civilian political leadership to firmly root participatory politics rests in their tendency to behave in an
equally hegemonic manner. Shafqat notes that the ‘initial
transition to
democracy was anti-authoritarian, but not necessarily pro-democratic. Such
a transition created an environment of political liberalism, encouraged
associational activity, challenged the declining authoritarian institutions,
but also relied on the same authoritarian institutions’. 59 Seen in this context, the political leaders espouse totalitarian methods for transitioning
towards a democratic polity. Thus, civilian political leaders failed by the
choices they made – which included radical usage of ideology, incapacity to
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147
build a coalition of interest groups, degenerative economic policies and poor
performance.60
In addition, the failure of the civilian political leaders, whether through the
‘dominant party’ or the opposition parties, is their strong tendency to attempt
to cripple the other powerful stakeholders in society. These hegemonic intentions
of political leaders have become pronounced and crucial whenever the issue
of appointments of top positions in the armed forces, higher judiciary, ambas-
sadorial postings and civil bureaucracy have arisen. 61 Thus the ‘dominant-party’ hegemonic system demands not only the dominance of the ruling party
over the opposition political parties, but also attempts to impose their supremacy
over elected officials, representative institutions and over non-elected offices
and non-institutions. In total, the ruling party attempts to secure its total
hegemony without any inclination to power sharing. As a result, the excluded
stakeholders of power resent this clear infringement on their sacred space and
react viciously to guard its political territory.62 These tensions between the adherents of two systems have prompted combative relations between the
proponents of the military-hegemonic and dominant-party systems.
Persistence of hegemonic forces
With hindsight, whenever the military-hegemonic system shows signs of decay or
weakness, the dominant party system resurfaces. And then, when the civilian
‘dominant-party’ superstructure pushes too far, it collapses, only to re-invite
the military. Shafqat elaborates, citing the period 1971–77, in which the pre-
occupation of the political leadership and aspiring urban middle classes was
how to contain the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial
groups in order to establish the dominance of the elected political leadership
and civilian political institutions. 63 Here the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the creation of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is important since he was the
first political leader to attempt to secure the supremacy of civilian institutions
and become partially successful. However, he too exhibited strong hegemonic
characteristics. Owing to his social status, his leadership style was uncom-
promising, dictatorial and the main supporters for his political party also
came from the large feudal classes in Sind. 64 Here, we notice that Bhutto’s leadership style was secularist, authoritarian and confrontational with regard
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to other opposition parties and the military rulers.65 Such a leadership style, rooted in confrontation and tyranny, could hardly bode well for Pakistan’s
political future.
Interestingly, that moment in Pakistan’s history revealed that the collapse
of the military-hegemonic political system and the emergence of civilian
political leadership does not necessarily entail the emergence of effective
political leadership, broadening of political participation and consolidation of
democratic processes and institutions. 66 As a matter of fact, the ‘dominant-party’ system functioned as an extension of the ‘military-hegemony’ political
system in that it discouraged the formation of associational groups and
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
opposition parties could not build consensus on ideology, vision or the
workings of parliamentary democracy.
Certainly, the political participation of aspiring urban middle classes
expanded, and was meant to establish the supremacy of elected political leader-
ship in the political system. This, though, initiated a process of resistance by the military-bureaucratic elites, the financial-industrial groups and a segment of
the feudal classes, who dominated the economy and were, therefore, reluctant
to support the process of building civilian democratic institutions. 67 Creating civilian institutions meant changing the nature of the economic structure and
dismantling the hegemonic position of the military in the political system.
Evidently, the hegemonic position of the military elites persisted and con-
strained the process of civilian-based political development. The continuity and
deeply entrenched nature of military-bureaucratic elites promoted suspicions
about the very nature of participatory politics, political parties and interest
groups. 68 As a result, the ambiguity about civilian institutions as viable alternatives to military hegemonic systems continued and led to the process of
returning to redemocratization in the latter years of General Zia’s rule.69
In the post-1985 phase of redemocratization, Pakistan continued to suffer
from similar disabilities and predicaments of the successor civilian regimes.
Despite greater political liberalization, most political parties, specifically in
power, show a propensity for the acquisition of unbridled power, in the form of
the ‘dominant-party’ system as a possible alternative to the military-hegemonic
system. 70 During this second period of redemocratization, especially after the mysterious sabotage of General Zia’s plane, which resulted in his death,
Pakistan’s civil society was making a gradual comeback with ‘a free and critical
press, freer judiciary, a comparatively assertive intermediate class, the emergence
of human rights groups, various non-governmental organizations and a growing
vigilance on socio-economic and regional issues were making it look difficult for
the military to contemplate a comeback’.71 However, the failure of the politicians in consolidating democratic institutions, respecting the demarcations
of political power and fostering a consensual and coherent ideology led to the
dismissal of four elected prime ministers. 72
It must be reiterated that regime change in Pakistan occurs as a con-
sequence of a decline in the military’s hegemonic capacity, which is a result of
the tactic of regime confrontation and mass mobilization utilised by political
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parties and other excluded segments of society. Constrained and conditioned by
the military-hegemonic political system, the political parties have continued to
reveal a preference for the dominant-party system, which exhibits partisanship
and confrontation as its political norms. ‘These conditions have put an enormous
responsibility on elites and political leaders, to expand areas of negotiation,
identify issues of agreements and disagreements, then negotiate and bargain,
minimize potential conflict and build consensus in a manner that the interests of
a large number of political contestants and economic competitors are pro-
tected’.73 However, so far the political leaders have failed t
o develop a consensus to restrict the military’s political role, while their actions and conduct has
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149
continued to solidify the trend towards a dominant-party system. In this
book, it is argued that the reason the political leaders are unable to achieve
consensus and restrict the role of the military is an inadequate balance
between the foundational, contextual and individual.
Regime change from military-hegemonic to possible democratic entails
changes at all levels – local, regional and national. Even decision-makers and
decision-making procedures at various levels also change, and yet authoritarian
structures remain intact, as the case of Pakistan reveals, although in a number
of countries regime change has resulted in readjustment of existing institu-
tions.74 It is equally important to recognize that, anticipating or conceding its hegemonic position, the military certainly attempts to disengage from the
political scene, but the degree of its disengagement is closely linked with the
ability of the political parties and their leadership to develop consensus on
developing civilian participatory institutions, effective management of political
conflict and credible economic policies.75 Therefore, the continuous fluctuation between a civilian-based ‘dominant-party’ and ‘military-hegemonic’ political
system has hampered consensus building between the ruling party and opposi-
tion political parties as well as with the military. It has promoted tendencies of
confrontation, violence and polarization in the political process and society. The
longer the civilian political leadership takes to build a consensus on the type of
political system, the easier it becomes for the military to retain its military
hegemony. Under such conditions, the Pakistani case amply demonstrates that
the military elites began to indulge in political manipulation and undercut the
political process and development of civilian institutions to return the political
structure towards the military-oriented power. Thus, it is a vicious cycle; for
the military establishment, democratisation implies ‘deviation’ from their vision
of society, which therefore leads to the return of the ‘reluctant’ generals.76
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