Conclusion
161
first, the traditionalist – those who appreciate the ‘foundational’ values but
refuse to contextualise. Or, one who seeks a restoration and imitation of the
past, in its most idealised form, yet does not consider the contextual imperative
that necessitates thoughtful deliberation. Without exception, they have failed
to attract the majority of workers, peasants and intelligentsia and are vehe-
mently anti-Pakistan.18 Second, the secularists are those that consider ethics as cumbersome and unrelated to public life. They are rooted in either the
parasitic feudal or economically advantageous class and, therefore, are not
secular in the manner that term is descriptive in a liberal, democratic European
or North American ethos. 19 They, too, were unsympathetic to the request of supporting a separate Muslim identity. Third, the revivalists are those who
appreciate the ‘foundational’ values and struggle to re-assert it into their
contexts. For them, tradition is not through changelessness but continuity,
which is perpetuated by teaching the skills of the master, but does not require
imitations of his performance. Therefore, every generation can, indeed must,
make something new of what is learnt. Tradition lives through a stream of
individual interpretations and re-invention of what has gone before, what is
needed now and a vision for the future. This is the process of continuity that
permits it to be passed down and effectively re-invented generation to
generation. If societies are expected to mature, live and change in line with
cherished principles, the individuals who comprise those societies must permit
new applications to the ‘foundational’ values, consider contextual nuances,
and liberate themselves to introduce new interpretations. If this process of
re-invention and re-implementation of timeless and enduring values is accep-
table to the populace at large, then, the result will be political stability. This is precisely what occurred, since the entire concept of a having a nation-state was
new, but it was presented to people as a continuation of an ancient idea of
bringing the diverse Muslim community together.
What was evident was that among these rival political cultural variants,
competing for the hearts and minds of people, the revivalists were victorious.
Success went to the ‘revivalists’, such as Jinnah and Iqbal, since they sought
continuity of values with changing circumstances as necessary for effective
leadership. 20 It is for this reason that Jinnah, in particular, was able to galvanize the masses in a common direction and create a new nation-state – Pakistan.
Moreover, it is important to note that neither the ‘traditionalist’ ulama nor
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‘secularist’ leaders, both of whom had either economic or spiritual influence, were
able to sway the masses in a direction of their choosing. Rather, in the British Raj in South Asia, by 1946, as the elections proved, Muslim masses had identified
themselves with this specific type of Muslim leader. Muslim voters, supporting
the Muslim League, under the sagacious leadership of Jinnah, gave a clear
verdict in favour of Pakistan: ‘440 Muslim seats were won by the Muslim
League out of a total of 495. It won landslide victories in all the Muslim
majority provinces except the North-West Frontier’.21 A clear message was being sent to both secularists and traditionalists that even with their economic
and religious authority, they remained out of touch with their social reality.
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
To further highlight this contest of variant political culture typologies and
their corresponding ideologues this book went on to examine Pakistan’s con-
stitutional development and civil/military relations. All in all, the conflict
between the ‘traditionalists’ and ‘secularists’ plays itself out in contemporary
Pakistani politics as those factions continuously try to work out a compromise.22
Yet particularly telling was the fact that this tension is easily discernible when
studying the history of constitution-making in Pakistan. 23 The chronic antagonism and combative interplay between the variant political culture
types posed serious problems for constitutional development. In other words,
a major underlying factor for ongoing political instability in Muslim polities is
the inability of those societies to achieve ideological coherence. That inability
accentuates instability, which thereby affects the politics and propensity of
violence.
Final thoughts
Interestingly, over the last decade, the theoretical assertions of this book have
been proven true. The sweeping away of despotic political orders by the AKP
in Turkey, the lawyers’ movement in Pakistan, and the Arab awakening in
Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, all reveal the prevalence of Islamic-orientated
or ‘revivalist’ political forces. Yet, those political forces are still engaged in an ongoing combative contest for power with their adversaries. And this rivalry
is intensifying. On the one hand, this ‘revivalist’ political force has introduced
a democratic ethos in the region. On the other, they are cautioned to be wary
of the necessity to learn effective methods to manage this ideological compe-
titiveness. Sadiki, comparing Tunisia and Egypt, argues that Islamist poli-
tical forces swept to power following the Arab Spring, and that this trend will
continue elsewhere. Skilfully, he outlines four factors that these new political
forces need to come to terms with – namely, constituency, political recruitment,
change and maneuvering.24 More clearly, the persuasiveness of ‘civic Islamism’, to borrow Sadiki’s term, requires these political forces to secure their constituency discipline, seek out more recruits through plurality and inclusion, adapt
to their changing circumstances and negotiate with ideological counterparts. 25
In addition to that compelling insight, this study adds that their success and
longevity largely depends on how this civic Islamic force seriously and com-
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passionately considers the aspirations of its own people, penetrates and
impedes the effectiveness of the entrenched deep state with ruses, maintains its
own camaraderie in the face of setbacks, and is willing to give up power
to prevent violence. Besides, their responsibility is larger than securing power in
the state, since they must set down the rules of the game and rigidly adhere to
it, even if that requires a loss of power.
Looking closely, Pakistan today presents an image of a country plagued by
political, civil-military, ethnic, sectarian and, most importantly, ideological
divides. ‘Never before has public faith in the country’s future sunk so low.
There is widespread and growing cynicism among the people. The country as
Conclusion
163
a whole appears to be adrift, lacking confidence about its future’. 26 Yet, this book maintains a more optimistic outlook, since the Objectives Resolution
and Jinnah and Iqbal’s vision of a tolerant, progressive and egalitarian society
remain a point of consensus.27 Moreover, there is encouragement to be drawn from the opinion of ordinary P
akistanis on a host of central policy issues.
These ordinary Pakistanis were surveyed on some fifty critical issues facing
the nation, at domestic, regional and global levels. 28 The results counter the force of anti-democratic culture allowed to run riot on the populace by both
the civil and military leaders for the better part of Pakistan’s national history.
And those results bear directly upon the prospects of fostering a culture of
common citizenship and social solidarity in a country often perceived as riven
by fault lines of regionalism and ethnicity.29 Strikingly, in direct opposition to Pakistan’s intelligentsia and political leadership, the vast majority of the
respondents, 82 per cent, had a positive view of their country, and wanted to
remain there permanently.30 A clear majority, 75 per cent, ‘demanded a ban on the religio-sectarian parties that spawned hatred and violence, and a similar
proportion favoured restrictions on political sermons in the mosques. An
overwhelming majority expected the state to improve standards of health and
education. Overall, 58 per cent of Pakistanis felt that they were better off in
the 1990s then before partition’.31 Taken together, the surveys display an extraordinary level of consensus across divisions of region, class and gender
on the future vision of Pakistan. If only, Pakistan’s intelligentsia, civil society
representatives and elites would listen to their people. Of course, the growth
of a new political force in Pakistan, in the form of Imran Khan’s Pakistan
Tehreek Insaf (PTI) has also fundamentally altered the political playing field.
From championing the cause of transparency, fair elections and judicial
independence, Imran Khan’s political tsunami has been, irrespective of set-
backs, just that. Most prominently, by assisting the lawyers’ movement, it was
instrumental in the reinstatement of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. This represents a monumental moment in Pakistan’s history. Here,
clearly, the judiciary secured its independence from both civil and military
hegemonic forces attempting to manipulate it. In that regard, it was noted in
this study that judicial independence is a cornerstone of the ‘foundational’
values. Muslim polities, then, should seek its empowerment and reform in order
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of an independent judiciary, challenges persist. Attempts to reform the Election
Commission of Pakistan, to ensure fair elections, were extremely difficult and
only after numerous appeals was it revealed that 37.2 million bogus voters
were registered in 2007.32 Confronting such a massive and deeply entrenched level of corruption will, obviously, produce serious reactions by those who
wish to maintain the status quo. Still, change came and that hurdle was
overcome, with a thorough cleansing of the nearly 83 million eligible voters.
But this was only a small step to ensure enfranchisement of the people and
many serious challenges remain. This is where the revivalist forces need to be
strategic and long-term thinkers, by securing the sympathy of the masses, and
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
slowly, steadily confronting traditionalist or secularist extremists who will not
give up power quietly. Ultimately, people need to be convinced that too,
without coercion, and when and if that occurs, they will provide all the
legitimacy that the revivalist forces require.
The recent elections in Pakistan, in May 2013, brought Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif his third term in office, although they did not fulfil people’s high
expectations of transformation. Then again, real and lasting change is almost
always a painfully slow process. Against popular opinion, Imran Khan’s party
lost, yet irrefutable evidence proves that rigging took place and had, at times,
institutional support.33 Pitiable supervision by the Election Commission of Pakistan, which spent more time in self-flattery than in providing competent
observation, allowed several instances of wrongdoings. It is incumbent upon
the ECP to investigate these irregularities and respond to evidence-based
complaints. Granted, this may not have affected the overall outcome, but
readily responding to accusations of impropriety gives more legitimacy to the
process. Still, notwithstanding that, cheating did not prevent Pakistan Tehrik
Insaf (PTI) from becoming the country’s second most important political
party, with 35 MNAs. The eminent Dr Maleeha Lodhi, while commenting on
the election, persuasively writes that ‘it has been read as the triumph of old
politics, as reassertion of tradition rather than a break from the past, and as the
ascendancy of deep-seated electoral allegiances over new political alignments.
In fact, the election was a vote for experience as well as for change’.34 What that meant was that people voted for two-time former Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif due to his experience and Imran Khan’s PTI party on its promise of
change. Actually, The PTI beat the PPP – a 45-year-old party – into second
place at the national level by getting more votes (but fewer seats) and emerged
as the winning party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 35 In other words, the real success story belonged to Imran Khan’s PTI.
By motivating young voters, as well as the educated middle class and women,
to get out of their drawing rooms, Imran Khan encouraged a significant section
of urban Pakistanis to get involved in election politics. That extraordinary
politicization, of a hitherto uninterested segment of voters, is important to
acknowledge and accommodate. It would bode well for the country for Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to reach out to them. Of course, he does not need
anyone’s support following his remarkable election triumph. However, as Lodhi
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points out, ‘parliamentary numbers alone do not make a strong government. It
is leadership, vision and political will – traits absent in his predecessor – that
will empower Sharif to navigate the complex array of internal and external
challenges to chart a decisive way forward’. 36 Arduous, but essential, decisions are needed to reverse the downward economic trend in order to lift up
the country. To do so requires Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to build a national
consensus on the policy direction he will want the country to take, especially
concerning security challenges. Admittedly, he has got off to a welcome start
by his conciliatory gestures in visiting Imran Khan in hospital and declaring
his support for PTI’s right to form a government in Peshawar.
Conclusion
165
For the ‘secularist’ Pakistan People’s Party, the election was a disaster. ‘A once
mighty political force saw its position crumble as the electorate punished
party leaders for their disastrous and scandal-plagued record in office. The
PPP lost two thirds of the National Assembly seats it won in 2008. The party was
all but wiped out from Punjab, where it secured only two seats but none from its
traditional stronghold of southern Punjab’. 37 As for the PTI, its leaders had raised exceedingly high expectations, especially among its supporters, about the
ir
party’s first electoral test. The results did not live up to these expectations. But the party emerged as a significant national force. It polled more votes than
the PPP and swept Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it has formed its first
government. This, Lodhi adds, ‘represents the party’s coming of political age.
But it is how effectively and responsibly Khan plays his opposition role in
parliament that will determine his political future’.38
Furthermore, there were three other major lessons learned from this election,
which are the high voter turnout, rejection of dynastic politics and rejection of
secular or traditionalist politics. First, widely commented upon, was the high
voter turnout – around ‘60 per cent according to the ECP, which is 16 per cent
higher than in the last election. This matched the turnout of the historic 1970
election, a level never witnessed in any election during the 1990s or in 2008, when
turnout was a modest 44 per cent’.39 Second, voters scorned numerous influential political families at the ballot box, including that of former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. Of course, this in no means implies the end of dynastic politics, but it underscores the fact that a feudal surname is not enough to provide surety for
electoral triumph. Third, and most importantly, was the popular rejection of
extremists, be they secular or traditionalist. Millions of voters defied threats from militants and turned up at polling stations, braving and casting aside the environment of fear generated by the pre-election violence. In addition, the defeat of many secular politicians, in presumably safe constituencies, such as Asfandyar Wali,
Manzoor Wattoo and former Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, is striking.
Admittedly, the public generally shares a clearer view than many of their leaders
about the policies that could ultimately move their country towards a ‘revivalist’
vision. Evidently, with the rejection of extremists of all hues, ordinary Pakistanis see a future in democratisation and privileging of the social sector over competing ideological agendas – and remain a largely tolerant society supportive
of equal rights for women and minorities. With those closing thoughts, this study
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presented the requisites necessary for Pakistan to nurture a political system
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture Page 33