by John Buchan
But Sir Wilfrid was not the type of statesman who is deeply concerned with constitutional theories. A man who is leader of a party for thirty-two years and Prime Minister for more than fifteen must be something of an opportunist, and his theory must be elastic enough to take its shape from changing facts. If the principle of federation seemed to him attractive, he was not prepared to take any step towards its realization till compelled by an overwhelming pressure of circumstance, for he was aware how delicate was the imperial organism, and knew that the imposition of a new and rigid pattern might kill its growth. So accomplished a rhetorician could not avoid making play with the picturesque dream of a united Empire, but it did not lie close to his heart. The development of Canadian nationalism appealed more deeply both to his sentiment and his practical judgment.
Minto also was no lover of theories, and was chary of bold expansive constitutional novelties. He felt that the easiest path to Empire union was through executive co-operation, and that was why he flung himself into the question of defence. This identity of instinct made him read Sir Wilfrid’s mind with remarkable acumen, and incidentally the mind of Canada. “People at home,” he wrote to his brother Arthur, “do not appreciate the growing aspirations of the young nationalities we call colonies. . . . The more I see the more convinced I am that, whatever they may say, the strongest feeling of Canadians is a feeling of Canada’s national independence. On the slightest pretext they resent instantly anything they can twist into meaning imperial interference.” Of Laurier he was warmly appreciative. To the same correspondent he wrote: “Far the biggest man in Canada is Laurier. He is quite charming, and if there is a change I shall miss him more than I can say — and he is honest.” But he had no illusions about the ultimate policy of the Prime Minister or about the inner core of Canadian feeling, which the Prime Minister was bound to interpret. Men like George Parkin, the Principal of Upper Canada College, Toronto, with whom he maintained an affectionate intimacy, were imperial enthusiasts after the British type, and others, like Sir William Mulock and Mr. Israel Tarte, seemed to be convinced federationists; but Sir Wilfrid’s wary, non-committal opportunism was, he knew, in the last resort Canada’s attitude.
When Mr. Chamberlain in March 1900 mooted the idea of an Imperial Advisory Council Minto discussed the matter with Laurier and found him shy and unsympathetic. In a private letter to the Colonial Secretary in April 1900 he set out the facts as he saw them: —
“Sir Wilfrid’s own inclination towards an imperial federation of any sort is, in my opinion, extremely doubtful — in fact, though his recent speeches appear to have been taken in England as enthusiastically imperialist, I am convinced they guarantee no such opinion. His speech in the House was very eloquent, and the ‘call us to your councils’ phrase appears to have been accepted as indicating a wish to be called — the very last thing Sir Wilfrid would want, and the speech itself did not justify that interpretation of it. He recognized the strong British devotion to the motherland existent here, and the imperial feeling at home stronger perhaps than here, and got a chance for his great eloquence. But I should say that seriously he is devoid of the British feeling for a united Empire, that it has no sentimental attraction for him, and that a closer connection with the old country he would consider from a utility point of view and nothing more. He recognizes the fact that his Canadian fellow-countrymen must follow the Anglo-Saxon lead, and will do his best to educate them up to it; but I believe it to be much more with the idea of the welding together of a Canadian nation than of forming part of a great Empire . . . and though he has never actually said so to me, I suspect that he dreams of Canadian independence in some future age. He thinks the arrangement of tariff questions far more likely to bring about imperial unity than any joint system of imperial defence; the former may be made to appear magnanimous in an imperial sense, but it would hardly be advocated by a colonial Government except in a belief in some practical gain to the colony from it, whilst the latter, upon which the safety of trade must depend, probably appears before the public merely as a direct increase in military expenditure to meet an obscure danger not generally realized.”
Minto’s reading of Laurier’s mind found remarkable vindication at the post-war Imperial Conference of 1902. The Dominion representatives one and all — even the ardent Mr. Seddon — fought shy of Mr. Chamberlain’s Imperial Council, fearing lest it might conflict with their own parliaments. The Conference decided that the “present political relation was generally satisfactory under existing conditions.” The “bell-wether” declined to lead the way; he had lost his old federationism and was moving slowly to another view of imperial relationship. He wanted to let well alone, for of the two factors in Empire development, colonial nationalism and the imperial tie, he believed that the former must for long require the chief emphasis. His conception now was of Canada as a “nation within the Empire,” and he left the best machinery of co-operation to reveal itself. It is probable that at the back of his head he conceived of an ultimately independent Canada; Minto always thought so, and Sir Wilfrid’s biographer assents.* But independence at the moment was as futile as federation, for it did not fit the facts; and we may take his words in 1909 as the confession of faith of a man who was above all things a realist, and was determined to make dream wait upon fact. “We are reaching the day when our Canadian Parliament will claim co-equal rights with the British Parliament, and when the only ties binding us together will be a common flag and a common Crown.” This was likewise Minto’s conclusion — also based on observed facts — though he might have wished it otherwise. It is no disparagement of the idealists who from the ‘nineties on have preached organic imperial union to say that they misjudged the course of events, for their ideals, even if unrealized and unrealizable, have had a potent influence on political thought; but it was those who, like Minto, looked forward to alliance instead of federation, to executive co-operation rather than a legislative partnership, who judged most shrewdly the trend of Empire development.
* Skelton, II., page 292.
A statesman, it has been said, should be subtle enough to deal with things, and simple enough to deal with men.* Minto had that large secure judgment of his fellow-creatures, at once shrewd and charitable, which comes from mixing with every type of humanity. While imperialists in Britain and Canada tended to picture the French-Canadians as a race brooding darkly over ancestral hatreds and dreaming of separation, he laughed the bogey to scorn. There were elements, indeed, of danger, as he saw, in French Canada — the dregs of an ancient jacobinism and recurrent waves of clericalism — but the attitude of the vast majority was acquiescent and decorous. As a mere matter of self-interest the British Crown was their best protection. America had nothing to offer; an independent Canada would raise awkward questions for them; the Crown was the guardian of their Church, their language, and their peculiar traditions. They were a social enclave which could only maintain its particularism under the aegis of a tolerant Empire. Minto had no patience with the nonsense commonly talked on the subject. In November 1900 he wrote to Arthur Elliot: “The writing of the leading Opposition papers in Ontario has been positively willed, simply aiming at stirring up hatred of French Canada. It is perfectly monstrous . . . I believe myself that the French-Canadians are very much maligned as to their disloyalty. French Canada does not wish to be mixed up in imperial wars, and is lukewarm, but at home you do not call a man disloyal if he disapproves of the War. Here, if he is only lukewarm, and is a French-Canadian, he must be a rebel! That is the British bulldog argument.” And six months later he wrote: “I think pig-headed British assertiveness is much more to be feared than French sympathies.” The fault of the French-Canadian, as he saw it, was not disloyalty but parochialism, and this parochialism, in view of his past history, was intelligible and inevitable. How could men of another blood kindle to the racial mysticism of the imperial creed. For, be it remembered, the imperialism preached by Mr. Chamberlain had a strong racial tinge. As early as his visit to Canada in
1887 he had eulogized “that proud, persistent, self-asserting and resolute stock that no change of climate or condition can alter, and which is infallibly destined to be the predominating force in the future history and civilization of the world”; and he had added, “I am an Englishman. I refuse to make any distinction between the interests of Englishmen in England, in Canada, and in the United States.” The habitant could understand his own ancient loyalties, he might even be fired by Canadian nationalism, but it would have been a miracle if he had discovered enthusiasm for a creed which claimed the earth as an inheritance for men of another blood.
* The phrase is the late Sir Walter Raleigh’s.
Mr. Chamberlain, having failed in his plans of union on the constitutional and defence sides, turned in the summer of 1903 to the economic. Minto had never given much attention to fiscal and tariff questions, but Mr. Chamberlain’s arguments seemed to him to be on the face of them incontrovertible. In protection per se he had little interest, but retaliation appeared to him to be axiomatic, and imperial preferences looked like the method of executive co-operation, which he judged to be the right development of imperial relations. With Arthur Elliot, who as a free-trade Unionist felt himself obliged to resign his post in Mr. Balfour’s Government, he had lengthy arguments, and his letters reveal his difficulty in understanding any detail of his brother’s attitude. Minto hoped for an instant response from Canada, for Canada was a protectionist land and had already taken a first step in imperial preference, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Conference of 1902 had encouraged Mr. Chamberlain to turn to the economic side of imperial union. But he realized, too, certain difficulties in the situation, which he expounded to the Colonial Secretary in a letter of July 17, 1903: —
“Canada is in a state of evolution. At present I see no one in the Dominion capable of directing her future. Everything is in a state of drift. The chief attraction in public life is the so-called development of the country, meaning, I am afraid, to a great extent financial transactions not creditable to her public men; and influences and inclinations are, so to speak, aimlessly floating about, waiting for some power which will eventually control them. British sentiment is one such influence; it simmers quite honestly in the hearts of the English-speaking population, but there is no strong man here to put life into it. It has plenty of enemies, and, admitting its genuine existence, one has still to consider the mixed social characteristics which surround it, and the effect they may eventually have upon it. I do not doubt the loyalty of Canada, but I believe the strongest feeling of her people is that of Canadian nationality. There is no reason why, if Canada and the motherland share mutual interests, her national ambitions should be anti-imperial; if they do not, the tendency will be towards eventual separation. There is, too, even among the most British society of the Dominion, that disagreeable cavilling feeling towards the old country . . . and the exaggerated suspicion of anything that can be twisted into meaning imperial interference.”
Minto believed that Mr. Chamberlain’s proposals were the turning of the ways in British history. He thought that if Britain refused to develop a line of policy which Canada had herself inaugurated, the tendency would be for the Dominion to turn her mind to reciprocity with the United States. Here, as in the question of defence, he longed for qualities in the Prime Minister — qualities of dash and daring — which the Prime Minister did not possess. The response from the Laurier Government was polite, but tepid. On 27th July Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Minto a letter which frankly set out his policy so far as it concerned Canada: —
“I am not by any means entirely satisfied with the action of the Canadian Ministers. Seeing that in all these conversations they pressed for the adoption of the policy I am now advocating, I certainly hoped for a warmer and more indisputable welcome. I have been ready to sacrifice anything to secure what I believe to be a great imperial object. If I fail, of course my political career will be closed, but with proper co-operation I do not think I shall fail in the long run, although I may not win uno saltu. Colonial politicians, however, are more timid, and they do not seem to me to venture to put great questions on the highest level. They attach more importance to a few votes than to great principles, and the prospect of an imperial union, which they perhaps do not appreciate at its true value, is not sufficiently attractive to them to justify any risk of losing political support. . . . What I have to do is to convince my own people first. . . .
“The change will be carried, if at all, by mixed considerations of sentiment and interest. As to the former, I hope it is strong in Canada, and that there is some appreciation of what an Empire really means as contrasted with the parochial life and small ambitions of little states. If the Empire breaks up into atoms, each one will be comparatively insignificant, powerless, and uninteresting. If it holds together it will be the greatest civilizing influence in the world.
“As regards interest, the colonies will no doubt take steps to guard their growing manufactures from extinction. On the other hand, our people will not assent to a tax on corn and meat or other articles of primary necessity, unless they are satisfied that they will have something substantial in return in the shape of increased exports of manufactures. This cannot be secured entirely by the mere increase of differential rates against foreign nations. The business of foreign countries with Canada is either comparatively small, or it is in articles which we do not make or produce. We must, therefore, look to an expansion due to other causes than a mere reduction in the imports of other countries.
“It seems to me that what we both want is possible. Canada may preserve her present industries, but give us a full share in her future expansion. If she has, for instance, decided to establish, or has already established, the great primary industries such as iron-making and cotton-spinning, and requires a small protection against us to prevent them from being overwhelmed, such a course might be taken; while, at the same time, she might leave to us the smaller industries not yet established in Canada, in regard to which there is no vested interest, and which together will make up large sums. In other words, let Canada continue to protect what she has got, and adopt free trade, or nearly free trade, so far as we are concerned, in regard to all the industries that up to the present time have not been established.
“I feel strongly with you that we are at a parting of the ways, and, although I am not disposed to prophesy anything with confidence, I think that unless we succeed in doing something to unite our business interests more closely, sentiment alone will not keep the Empire together.”
Mr. Chamberlain resigned the Colonial Secretaryship and devoted himself to his crusade, but there was no such missionary zeal in the protectionist Government of Canada. Sir Wilfrid accepted the scheme in principle, but would take no overt step to show his approval. Minto summed up his attitude thus to Mr. Chamberlain: “Canada does not want to appear as a beggar, asking a favour of the motherland; she does not want to interfere in what is becoming a party fight at home; the matter is one which the old country must first settle for herself, and then Canada will know what to do. Canada believes that preferential trade between the motherland and herself would be advantageous to both parties, but the former, with whom the decision rests, must not put herself in the position of making, or appearing to make, sacrifices for Canada.”
It was a discreet and impregnable attitude, but it was not heroic, and to Mr. Chamberlain, prepared to hazard everything for what he believed to be a shining ideal, it seemed shabby and faint-hearted. Minto could not understand how those who accepted the end could be unwilling to urge the means, and Mr. Chamberlain wrote to him, in sadness rather than in bitterness, that Sir Wilfrid was clearly “not a man with whom to go out tiger-hunting.” Sir Wilfrid was not; he was little inclined to court danger, and his courage was reserved for the time when danger was present and inevitable. But there was more in the Government’s lukewarmness than the temperament of its leader. Canadian Liberals were influenced by the not very honest “dear loaf” campaign of their British n
amesakes. Canadian Conservatives were not enthusiastic about the free field claimed for British manufactures in Canada, and Canadian manufacturers were disinclined to admit that there were any articles which sooner or later somewhere in the country they could not produce. The British proposals seemed too much like a stereotyping of Canada’s present industrial position, and Canada, intoxicated with dreams of a vast future, was averse to any economic delimitation. Moreover, the imperial preference side began soon to fall into the shade, and Mr. Chamberlain’s campaign, as it developed, became more and more a plan for the protection of British industries. Sir Wilfrid judged truly the feeling of his countrymen. They were not greatly interested; there was no force of popular sentiment which would force the Government’s hand, and the Government was without inclination for imperial adventures. Minto, sharing to the full in Mr. Chamberlain’s views, set down Canadian apathy to Sir Wilfrid’s weakness; but it is not weak to refuse to be drawn into a course for which you have little zest. The man who is seeking new worlds to conquer will never see eye to eye with the man who is engrossed in the development of his township.
II
A Governor-General must play a large part in the foreign relations of the dominion where he represents the British Crown, since he is the exponent of the British point of view, which has of necessity to embrace a wider orbit than that of the local government. Canadian foreign policy was at the time confined to her relations with America, as to which there were many long-standing problems that at any moment might become acute controversies. Minto shared the view which Queen Victoria had expressed to him at Balmoral, that there was a great deal of cant in the current talk of kinship between the United States and Britain. He was of the opinion that Sir Wilfrid Laurier set down in a letter to him in 1899—”Our American friends have very many qualities, but what they have they keep, and what they have not they want. Perhaps,” Sir Wilfrid added, “we, too, are built up the same way.” The influence of the “big interests,” which everywhere he detested, seemed to Minto to have reached in America the dimensions of a scandal, and he found in her people a lack of that sporting equity which he valued above all other human qualities. In any controversy with the United States he was therefore likely to have a strong a “priori” leaning to Canada’s side.