It is also noteworthy that the minister generally will depend on a 'cooperative' official only for so long; after a while the official is rewarded with a foreign posting or another 'plum' assignment. The reasons for this are two-fold – firstly, collaborating officers are to be rewarded, as a signal to others; more importantly, no official should be allowed to remain too close to the minister for too long, as he is likely to learn and understand the minister's tricks, his full modus-operandi after some time; and so has to be 'kicked upstairs'. Most ministers have complex game plans, like a mafia boss or 'don', and work their targets over a five-year span to milk them. While they want competent, cooperative officials to do their bidding, they don't want these people around long enough to fully understand the entire game plan, and all the methods used by them to sucker the victims.
There is clear evidence that the presidential form has made major inroads into our system. What used to happen in the states, has now got informally formalised in the Centre also. The question may be asked, legitimately, what is wrong with this? What is wrong if the minister wants to create a working milieu, where the decision-making process is smooth, quick and efficient – is that not in public interest? Yes indeed; with a huge IF; it is good if the intentions of the political executive is rapid decision-making in public interest. Alas, anyone familiar with the innards of the Central and state secretariat knows that practically no minister is an idealist, whose main interest is to process decision making purely in public interest; private interest is the primary goal of the political executive – if it is in conflict with public interest, there can be rethinking; however, if the inducement is large enough, public interest can remain quiet, while the 'deal' is done. The American system has allowed the decision maker to choose his lieutenants, without outside interference; however, there are strong checks and balances. It is an open administrative machinery where information is freely available to the general public. At the state level, most senior positions are elected, and generally decisions on local issues are taken by majority vote, in a transparent process. Besides, the inherent level of probity is much higher in the USA or UK than in India. Officials speak out openly and without fear, and 'do not tango' on dubious deals. The average politician's level of cleanliness, probity is in a different category from that of the average Indian minister. There are strong checks and balances in the US system to make the presidential form work.
Till the '80s or so, stable governments lasting a full term was still the norm in most states; most chief ministers generally were more pubic spirited, personally not corrupt, and practised more decent norms and standards than the legislators, and indeed their own ministers; and the civil service had not yet lost its élan. It was the practice, that the postings of a secretary to a particular department was done in close consultation between the chief minister and the chief secretary, with an eye to provide better management and reduce the level of corruption in each department. Indeed till the '80s, and in some states the '90s, the chief secretary did the postings and transfers in the state, with the chief minister only occasionally intervening in the matter; while the formal approval of the chief minister was taken, all the processing was done by the chief secretary. Thus, a strong, strict and upright officer would be posted to a department held by a known corrupt minister, to maintain reasonable efficiency. Postings were done with a sharp eye, with full assessment of the personality and propensities of the minister and the bureaucrat at all levels of a ministry, even in the Government of India. But by the '90s, with increasing insecurity and political uncertainty, chief ministers had lost all leverage with their colleagues; a minister could dictate and get the secretary of his choice; indeed at all levels in the department, he could get officers handpicked by him. Even at the Centre, over the past ten years or so, ministers could choose their own team; with the result that corruption levels have shot up manifold in each department. When a corrupt minister and a not-so-straight secretary get together to tango, to collude in getting decisions taken and seek 'rent', the results can be disastrous; as has been witnessed in some recent deals. Corruption has now become institutionalised, with each ministry functioning as a smoothly-run business corporation, designed for the pecuniary benefit of the top management. All barriers, even token resistance, were removed from the path of the minister, who was given a free rein to choose his collaborators and co-conspirators. The damage to governance, and the adverse impact on management of the bureaucracy on sound lines, could be imagined. The major institutions which were the pillars of the administration – those like the Cabinet secretary, the chief secretaries, the chairmen of the various boards have all been bypassed and diminished, leading to major loss in administrative efficiency, fairness and integrity.
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*Already referred to in my earlier book Journeys through Babudom and Netaland: Governance in India.
5
THE BUREAUCRACY
The Civil Services – men may come and men may go …
he contribution of the higher civil services and the higher judiciary to the nation has been immense. But the institution which has held the country together in the first sixty years after Independence, and contributed most to its progress and development till now, is undoubtedly 'the higher civil services'. We have already seen how the political class has misused and exploited its powers. The lawyer class played a significant role in our Independence movement, but the higher judiciary in fact, has played a major role in nation-building. The function of the higher judiciary in continuing to uphold the concept of 'rule of law' in the country deserves to be appreciated. The other professional classes, like the doctors, engineers, accountants and business community, have contributed in their own respective domains. While the role of the judiciary is in full public view, by definition the role of bureaucracy is played out silently, behind the scenes almost anonymously.
In the first place, one should not forget that the competition to enter the Indian Administrative Service is fierce. At least till the '80s, the brightest graduates in India had made an attempt on the IAS as their first preference, and looked to other avenues only when that failed. In the last twenty or thirty years, increasingly many new opportunities for a professional career have emerged for the brightest students; the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), and lately the Information Technology (IT) sector have attracted the best talents. However, even today the IAS attracts the brightest minds in the country. Fortunately, the processes of the recruiting agency, i.e. the UPSC continues to remain transparent; the Central Government still manages to send high quality members to the commission, which has not yet got politicised. Sadly, the same cannot be said about the public service commissions in various states, many of whom have been tarnished by sordid scandals, demeaning the selection process in exchange for monetary considerations. It is also an interesting fact that at least twenty-five percent, probably much more, of the IAS intake consists of IIM or IIT graduates. In short, the best quality material in India has manned the IAS over the past fifty years. I have visited the National Academy at Musoorie many times and discussed this matter with the director of the day; and each time I come back with the impression that the quality of intake has not deteriorated. There has been some impact arising out of the expanded reservation polices, but by and large the present recruitment is not inferior to that of the '50s or '60s. Indeed, I had numerous occasions to observe (while I was in service during my field trips) young district-level officers who were as bright, dedicated and effective, as at any time in the past. In a nutshell, the brightest minds in India have manned the Indian civil services from Independence to the present era.
I recall attending a conference of Cabinet secretaries some time in the late '90s at Ottawa. The group comprised Cabinet secretaries from about thirty Commonwealth countries including Canada, the UK, Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, South Africa, etc. In one of the sessions, there was an informal discussion, when each member present wa
s asked to make a brief reference about the first thing that came to his mind in respect of each of the countries present at the meeting. Amazingly, nearly every Cabinet secretary, when referring to India, talked of the high quality of the Civil Services in India. Noting that this is from professional administrators, this appears to be the opinion held in other countries about the quality of Civil Services in India.
There is no question but that the esprit de corps of the services has vanished; its élan is a thing of the past now. Indeed the higher civil services are now seen, especially in urban areas, with a sense of ridicule and even pity. To some extent this is well-deserved, and has been wrought on themselves by the members of the services. We have discussed the role of political subjugation of the services in another chapter. However, even today, if one travels to districts and other rural areas, the IAS collector or district magistrate, is looked up to by most citizens as a bright, effective, and respected representative of the government. While the public may talk loosely about corruption at the level of the clerks in the collectorate or in the tehsil office, in general the district magistrate is even today highly regarded, spoken of with a sense of awe and is a role model for the youth of the district. He may not be the 'king of all he surveyed' of yore, but still plays the key role in holding the district administration together. As we have seen elsewhere, his freedom of action has been seriously impaired in recent years, with the henchmen of the state's political leadership looking over his shoulder; however, most district magistrates still manage to carry themselves with dignity and are highly effective. Again there are other officers at that level, frequently promoted from the provincial civil services, who have compromised the higher standards of probity and performance of the office, due to inroads of political influence. (This is really a general statement; it does not do justice to the very large number of provincial civil service officers who are extremely bright, not inferior in any way to their regular recruit IAS brethren, who retain higher norms of probity, and are frequently even more effective due to their longer experience.)
We see this dichotomy in the best young men and women of India who join the civil services; you look at each entrant twenty years later – he has lost his integrity; at least his intellectual integrity has gone, and in many instances this is so in the financial sense also; he has transformed himself from a 'public' servant to a 'private' servant of one politician or a party or generally to the political class; either this is his profile, or he has lost all motivation, he is apathetic, and has turned himself into a file-pushing 'babu'. The above two categories, sadly, describe most of these bright young men. Why has this happened? How has this happened? In the last two chapters we have seen how a civil servant is enticed or pummelled to submission; we have also seen the inducements, blandishments, threats and victimisation used as weapons to transform the honest civil servant into a conforming robot, devoid of morality. The well-orchestrated instruments include irrational frequent transfers (from one station to another station causing great inconvenience), adverse annual performance entries, special adverse 'character-roll' entries, harassment through false inquiries, physical threats or physical attacks, on the one hand; and on the other, inducements to join the game as a hunter and partake of the spoils. Sadly, many of the middle-level officers, with growing children to educate, elderly parents to look after, cannot bear the constant pressure, and buckle; they either switch off and become irrelevant to the system, or they join the politician, and all is well thereafter! This is true, in general in most situations, in practically every state of the country. Unfortunately, it is increasingly true also of the Government of India.
The question has been asked as to why the higher civil servants, who enjoy job assurance and 'status' in society, should buckle to political pressure. This is a legitimate question. Elsewhere, I have referred to Godbole's comment on how the first hint of political interference played havoc with the 'Steel Frame' even before Independence. In the first decade after Independence, the senior- most civil servants – the last of the Indian Civil Service, and the first batches of the IAS just did not go on to hold their positions. I would blame – to put it bluntly – the weak-kneed response shown by spineless senior-most officers of the '50s and '60s, who did not stand up to take principled positions and allowed the first predatory inroads to destroy their ability to work autonomously. Perhaps this is a harsh assessment; however, I do believe that the equations were set in the '50s and '60s; it was not possible for senior and junior officers in subsequent decades to battle against odds. As has been pointed out earlier, a blunder was committed when our Constitution did not define the relationship between the political executive and the bureaucracy; the relationship was to be defined in practice, as expediency and experience unfolded. Alas! the earliest administrators in the post-Independent era could not appreciate the responsibility they carried on their shoulders; for petty rewards they curried the favour of the political class and surrendered their positions.
In a democracy the citizen is the most important entity. His representative, viz., political executive is the undisputed boss and the civil servant has to work clearly under the direction of the political executive. Having stated this, what are the terms of engagement between the civil servant and the political executive? What are the relations between the district magistrate and the member of legislative assembly (MLA) or member of parliament (MP)? In a private company, clearly the chief financial officer (CFO) is subordinate to the chief executive officer (CEO). However, is the CFO required to collaborate and pander to the not-so-legitimate needs of the CEO, who may represent the owner and may be interested in swindling the company for private gains. There are defined norms for every functionary of a company in this regard. There ought to be similar norms in the relationship between the political executive and the civil servant. There was failure by the earliest civil servants in the post-Independent period to establish healthy, transparent and effective norms, with appropriate counterchecks, to define an efficient relationship contributing to the public weal. From the point of view of the civil services of later generations, this has been a major factor leading to the ineffectiveness, indeed paralysis, of the public services as they stand today. We have also seen in an earlier chapter, how the concept of 'committed bureaucracy', introduced by the political executive in the mid-'70s, played havoc with the higher civil services over the next decade or so. These two phenomena, the role of the higher civil services in the '50s and '60s, as well as the concept of 'committed bureaucracy' could be highlighted as the pointers in the process of the collapse of the 'Steel Frame'.
Focus on District Administration – keep your eye on the ball . . .
There is one other element which needs to be highlighted. During the British days, the main focuses in administration was related to law and order, and land administration – two areas vital to the welfare of the citizen. Towards that, every district magistrate or collector toured extensively every interior part of his district; many surprise visits were undertaken, as well as planned local halts. Indeed, looking after these aspects at the village level was the primary work of the collector, apart from handling periodic problems, like drought, floods, earthquakes, etc. In the process of supervision, the collector had the right and the ability to suspend or even dismiss lower-level employees which was done with regularity whenever warranted. Thus if there was unauthorised absence of a teacher in a village school or a compounder in the taluq hospital, the official could lose his job, if the collector happened to come across such a delinquency. The hawk-eye of the collector ensured a higher degree of general compliance, and contributed to the quality of administration. In its very essence, this was the secret of the 'success' of the British administration, in so far as meeting the objectives they had defined were concerned.
However, even as early as the '60s, the collectors became more and more 'outward-looking' – losing their focus on managing the villages. The latter was left to the subordinates, the tehsildars and the naib-tehsildars;
increasingly, with improved communication, the collector had to deal with the state capital on various matters, politically handling the MLA and MP at the district headquarters, spending time on the increasing frequency of ministerial visits to the districts; instead of being the sole supervising authority with full powers, he had now become a general non-descript coordinator, a gadfly to handle all and sundry events. I recall the occasion of the earthquake in one of the states where the collector did a tremendous local job of coordination to handle the crisis. But he neglected the 'critical' job of looking after the streams of VIPs from the state capital and Centre. So he was dubbed as thoroughly inefficient, was disgraced and transferred out unceremoniously after a week. But every person in the villages affected testified to that officer's high-quality handling of the situation. Henceforth, it was not important what was done. What was really important was what appeared to have been done. If during his inspection, the collector dared to suspend any employee, immediate political reaction would come from interested parties which, sooner or later, ensured that his decision was reversed. Thus the highly efficient machine which was established to manage a district was itself progressively blunted. The rulers of the state and the country were oblivious to the impact of letting loose new forces at the district level in an unstructured manner. It is important to reiterate that quality management of the district is the key to good administration. This has been forgotten in the past few decades. Any improvement in local affairs is possible only by reviving our focus on improving district administration standards. What needs to be done is well-known. The need of the hour is proper implementation if governance quality has to improve.
Goverment In India Page 13