The national media has recently highlighted some of the proposed steps towards reform. These include recruitment age, selection process, use of specialists and some others. Contrary to popular belief, the civil services still attract talented individuals, some of the best available in the country. That they become supine, listless, self-centred and carry a negative attitude, is substantially a part of the baggage that they acquire after entry, and should not be laid at the doors of the recruitment policy. It is a failure of our system to utilise properly the civil services. Indeed, there is great demand for the services of retired senior civil servants in the open market, whose services are sought with great alacrity; which is one index of their quality. The cynic would say that this is merely due to their 'liaison-role' potential; while this is partly true, the larger reality is that there is genuine need for their services, largely stemming from their ability and experience.
However, there is still a strong case for reducing the maximum age of recruitment to twenty-four, which would improve considerably the quality of intake. I once heard a director of the IAS training academy at Mussoorie mutter, 'How can I mould the attitude and character of a fresh recruit, when he is already a grandfather!' We should not, however, swing to the other extreme to try to 'catch 'em young', by recruiting potential administrators as they leave high school. After all, we are not recruiting potential athletes for the Olympic games. Most children leaving high school do not have sufficient maturity to make up their minds if they wish to be lifelong administrators, to the exclusion of so many other professional opportunities now open to them.
There is the other suggestion, sometimes seen in the papers, to replace the present selection board for senior posts with 'outside experts'. There is no harm, and indeed there will be benefit if suitable outside expertise is utilised in personnel management. But to replace the present selection structure with a brand new process transplanted from outside will do more harm than good. If we do not trust our own senior-most management echelons, who know our own senior personnel well, how do we expect strangers to the system to do this job better? This is not a task that can be outsourced – there will be higher costs and quality will not improve. Here again, we are barking up the wrong tree. The malaise is not so much in the interpretation of the annual character rolls of the personnel, as with the very process of writing the annual remarks in respect of each officer, by his own bureaucratic and political superiors. That is the core of the problem that needs to be addressed.
The specialist vs generalist debate is a perennial issue; it resurfaces periodically. I have seen a chief of the Electricity Board, an excellent engineer who managed his power plants and transmission systems extremely well, totally clueless in matters relating to power policy. I have seen a first rate irrigation chief engineer taking over as secretary of the irrigation department and floundering from day one, on administrative issues. On the other hand, I have seen scientists, long abdicating their scientific work turn into fine administrators and policy makers. I have also seen IAS secretaries, with excellent reputations, unable to find their feet in alien departments. My own experience is that there is no hard and fast rule in such matters. I believe that at present, roughly half of the jobs at the level of secretary in the Government of India are held by so-called 'specialists' and the other by all-India service officers. This is not an imbalance really. I have found that the suitability and background of each officer for a post is more relevant than his label. Certainly, I would hesitate to place any officer at secretary or additional secretary level in any department unless he or she has had some previous exposure to that or an allied department – one gets no time to learn the basics at that level.
If we have to face the reality of our existing milieu, the key to quality governance lies rather in concepts like transparency, opening up of the economy, fewer regulations but strict enforcement, larger role for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and less government in general. In any event, if core issues cannot be addressed for political compulsions, there is no point tinkering with the periphery. Reform of the political class will automatically lead to reform of the civil services.
All recent efforts at administrative reforms I have seen are narrow technical exercises which miss the basic fact that the civil services are only an instrument, as good as how the wielder of the same wants it to be. To be only slightly overly-cynical, most ministers at the Centre and the states, want only collaborators to aid their own self-interest – they do not need administrators. Any reform will have to take this central aspect into account. Technical reforms through enactment of a Public Service Law or amendment of the All India Civil Services Rules, etc., will have little impact, unless there is a political consensus that a sharply improved and independent civil service is essential for good governance; good governance incidentally is imperative for removal of poverty and provision of education and public health, and so on. All of this will be a pipe dream till we reform our politics and the politicians. Only the voter can push towards this, but tragically, as yet there is no sign of this happening.
In the ultimate analysis, it is the quality and moral fibre of the people who govern us that is the most critical determinant. In any system, if the top is uncorrupted, clean, public-spirited and efficient, that system will furnish good governance. Merely changing the system is not going to change anything, unless we prescribe genuine checks and balances and then expect and get highest standards of probity at senior-most levels. It is not sufficient for a prime minister to be personally honest, while his other ministers make hay at every sunshine. There is no magic formula to produce men with probity at the top.
Our political class, unless it reforms itself seriously and comprehensively, is now turning out unfit to govern. Will they take heed, make the necessary course corrections and at last play the role envisaged for them? Will the public wake up at some stage and force them to do so? Both scenarios seem highly unlikely, as of now. One can only hope that someone will rise from the present political class, show the vision, credibility, boldness, energy to take full control, all within accepted democratic processes and undertake to clean the system. Things have not deteriorated totally beyond hope even now. If we have such a person who may emerge through the election process, all we need is ten years of good quality governance to turn all systems around. His first three years will be highly challenging with every vested interest fighting bitterly to hold on to its privileged position, and retain opportunities to loot the country. Our messiah will find full public support from this democracy in cleaning up the Aegean stables. The only practical step a citizen can take is to add a sentence in our daily prayers, that our democracy may project a leader who will redeem us from the present lacuna.
6
THE PRESIDENCY
t is said that the president 'reigns, but does not rule'. Corresponding to this saying, the Indian Constitution envisages the president to be the republic's titular head. Drawn on the British parliamentary democracy model as it existed in the mid-twentieth century, the Indian president corresponds to the British monarch, in terms of the role played, functions discharged and in the overall conception. All appointments to constitutional positions in the country and to the All India Services are made by the president nominally. Similarly, the president is also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, in a titular, though symbolic manner. However, it is the government of the day which processes and makes the appointments, without the specific concurrence of the president for each instance. There are also some positions for which the explicit prior consent of the president is taken, but whatever the case may be, the appointment is actually made by the government, in the name of the president.
Between 1947, when India became independent, and 1950, when India became a republic, the head of state was designated as the governor general. The last viceroy during British rule in India, Lord Mountbatten, became the first governor general of independent India; this was a remarkable expression of goodwill between the erstwhile rulers an
d its colony. However, here too, the governor general was only a titular head of state, while Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru headed the first Indian Cabinet of independent India. State power had been transferred by the British to the Indians on 15 August 1947. As is known to everyone, what followed was the infamous Partition of India, and led to what has been called the largest genocide in history. This reminds me of an episode, which is probably not well remembered or noted in India – during the peak of the atrocities that took place in the Punjab and in Bengal, the governor general, in fact, at least on one occasion presided over a 'crisis' meeting of the Cabinet, which had met to take emergency measures; thus, even in independent India, there has been an instance of the titular head of state presiding over a functional Cabinet meeting; clearly an aberration from the parliamentary democratic process. As we would see later in this chapter, the successive presidents of the republic remained mere titular heads, playing arguably even less than the minimal role envisaged by the letter of the Constitution. Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari, Rajaji as he was known, was the first Indian governor general of independent India.
The first president of the republic in 1951 was Dr Rajendra Prasad, a Congress leader who was prominent during the freedom movement. He has been followed, in general, by a succession of fairly eminent persons, mostly from among the political community. Many distinguished persons have held this position, including Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Zakir Hussain, and R. Venkataraman, who deserve mention. The only non-political appointee was A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who was the president till recently. It is interesting to note that while selecting the president, care has been taken to alternate between north and south of India; and also to diversify intake from different communities. However, India never had a lady president – it has taken sixty years for us to find one.
It has been the prerogative of the ruling party to nominate the president, whenever the vacancy arose; due to its majority in the two Houses, it is usually the ruling party's nominee who gets elected to the post. The normal term of presidency is five years, with a second term permitted under the Constitution. By and large, the quality of presidents that India has had, has been quite good; and some of their contributions, as mentioned above, have been special. In the case of the current president of India, Pratibha Patil, the selection process was quite interesting, and intriguing. Perhaps a decision was taken by the ruling coalition to anoint a lady to the post. Every name that cropped up was demolished or vetoed by one or the other of the constituents of the coalition, as they found the person unacceptable from their own perspective. Thus, quite eligible national level politicians of some stature, like Shiela Dixit, Margaret Alva (who has since then bitten the political dust), were found unacceptable. Indeed, selecting Alva would have 'killed' two birds with one stone – it would have elevated a Christian lady to the highest post in India (I apologise for thinking in such terms; but sadly all these thoughts would have gone into the minds of our 'secular' leaders). In the event, the final choice was not of 'one most acceptable to most', but of 'one least unacceptable to anyone'. It must be said to the glory of the chair, that the incumbent carries herself with some dignity, presence and aplomb.
Though the powers of the president have not been explicitly defined in the Constitution, the tradition and experience of sixty years is that the president has no effective role to perform in the process of governance. It is true that all Acts of Parliament, before they become effective have to be formally approved by the president; however, he or she can at the most return a Bill for reconsideration, unless it is a Money-Bill (a legislation that empowers government spending) which he needs to give assent to without demur. In short, the president cannot effectively block the business of government, or the proceedings of Parliament. Among his formal duties are summoning the parliament for its sessions, addressing the sitting of both Houses of Parliament at the commencement of each session, taking the salute at the parade on Republic Day, and diverse ceremonial duties as head of state.
It is not clear if this purely ceremonial role, without having the ability to effectively intervene in any matter, is entirely and totally mandated by the Constitution, or if a part of this is through convention and precedent. Indeed, over the past sixty years, there have been acts of omission and commission by the government of the day, which have not been entirely beyond controversy; but it must also be noted that no president has ever demurred, or expressed dissent, however discreetly. In fact, when Abdul Kalam was the first non-political appointee to the post, there were expectations in many quarters that he would make a departure from past precedents, and when occasion demanded, would make his presence felt strongly. Unfortunately, though he was presented with a couple of opportunities of this nature, this was not the case. The system was powerful enough to absorb him and mould him into full conformity. Thus, for example, on the issue of 'office of profit', perhaps the president could have encouraged a stricter definition – the lack of it has been observed, for example, in legislators and ministers becoming chairmen of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) in many states, as has been referred to elsewhere.
The president also appoints the governors to the various states. Again the actual selection of the governor is done by the government of the day, and the president merely approves the proclamation. However, the governors technically report only to the president; while this is true in theory, in practice they dance to the tune of the Home Ministry, especially when the state is under President's rule. Thus, it is a function of the president to oversee, if not directly supervise, the performance of the governors of the states. As has been seen, except on some occasions, the presidents have been generally neutral and non-controversial, despite being political appointees; most of them transcended their political phase, on the elevation to presidency. There have been some exceptions, notably that of Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad approving the 'emergency' in 1975. Perhaps, he went well beyond the level of 'cooperation' expected from the president; though he could have asked for reconsideration, and publicised that, or even refused on the grounds that the Constitution does not specifically provide for the eventuality; that never happened.
On the other side of the spectrum, some presidents had shown willingness to 'take on' the prime minister of the day, though none went any significant distance. Indeed, the first president, Dr Rajendra Prasad, initially tried to assert himself, but was thwarted early; Dr S. Radhakrishnan tried the same, with the same result. Sanjeeva Reddy after the Emergency, showed some degree of independence; Giani Zail Singh appeared to have 'fallen out' with the then prime minister, and appeared to threaten to take an independent line, but in the end it all came to nothing. In short, none of our presidents have contributed anything significant to our constitutional history; arguably perhaps, none utilised the potential opportunities provided by the wording of the Constitution, as circumstances presented themselves.
However, the governors of the states generally have a larger range of constitutional duties in their respective states, vis-à-vis the president in relation to the Government of India. Thus the governors function as chancellors of the various state universities, and play a direct and active role in their management. Again, they have a larger interface with the politics of the state, and in many instances, try to intervene actively in the political processes of the state. They also have a strong role in recommending President's rule, under Article 356 of the Constitution, when they perceive a breakdown of the administrative machinery or inability of the government to carry on the process of governance. In general, the governors, most of whom were originally politicians and some chosen from the bureaucracy, showed much more inclination to 'play politics' in their respective states. Whereas the Constitution envisaged the governors to be totally neutral and act as non-partisan umpires, many of the governors have displayed contempt of this principle, some of them behaving more politically than the active politicians of the state. It is noteworthy that no president, despite having the role of overseeing the functioning of governors, ever admonished implic
itly or explicitly, overtly or effectively, the excesses of governors who go out of line. This clearly has been a failure on the part of successive presidents.
That reminds me of a Cabinet meeting held some time in 1997 to consider the recommendation of Romesh Bhandari, the then governor of Uttar Pradesh, recommending President's rule in that state and dismissal of the then Kalyan Singh government. The move was politically coloured, and was designed to please the Central Government of the day. It recommended the dismissal of the state government run by a rival party. The recommendation was also symbolic of the willingness of ex-bureaucrats to side-step facts, and play extreme politics. Clearly, the recommendations were unsustainable in light of a number of observations made by the Supreme Court on the subject. At any rate, the Cabinet meeting went on from about 10 am to 2 am the following day, for about sixteen hours, to debate and take a final view on the governor's recommendations. The difficulty was in reconciling an illogical recommendation with a political need. At around 1.30 am, the recommendation to dismiss the Uttar Pradesh government was sent to Rashtrapati Bhavan. Within twenty minutes, the reply had come from President K.R. Narayanan, asking for reconsideration of the Cabinet proposal. Naturally, this was enough to scuttle the proposal; if it were widely known that the president demurred, and if the deed was to be actually done, public opinion would have swung heavily. This is an instance of the kind of moral intervention that could or can be taken by the president in dealing with unsavoury proposals of the Cabinet. It is also noteworthy that this was probably the longest Cabinet meeting to have taken place; I wonder if that record still stands.
The vice president is also elected indirectly by the Houses of Parliament. In general, the vice president has no formal duties, except in his capacity as the chairperson of the Rajya Sabha. One heartbeat away from presidency, as the saying goes, it is largely a ceremonial position, without any significant role in the process of governance. Many or most of the incumbents till now have come from a political background, generally as a reward for party services rendered; and many of them have not been distinguished in any significant field. The present incumbent, Hamid Ansari is an exception; a scholar of repute and a diplomat of distinction, he is well respected in many circles. He has started his tenure a little unusually, by recognising and criticising unsavoury practices in the public domain.
Goverment In India Page 17