In its second part, this section aims to demonstrate that societal control mechanisms in various geographic areas and society types may have a common ground, but that differences also occur, according to cultural specificities. In the Muslim world, the control of religion , embedded in the socio-cultural milieu from early childhood, may be one of the reasons why individuals choose to die defending their culture against westernisation and globalisation. To this end, the theoretical framework is provided by the interrelated concepts of ‘societies of control’, ‘ideological state apparatuses’ and ‘disciplinary societies’, as outlined by Western contemporary philosophers, but emphasis is also laid on the Qur’an, the most relevant Muslim religious text, to test the validity of the hypothesis that Muslims resist Western civilisation mainly because of the religious constraints to which they are exposed and which constitute, within their culture , the most effective state apparatus, because, as Buruma and Margalit explain, ‘to a devout Muslim , politics, economics, science, and religion cannot be split into separate categories’ (2005, 7).
Disciplinary Societies
The concept of ‘disciplinary societies’ is outlined by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1975 book, Surveiller et punir: La Naissance de la Prison (1977, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison), which deals with the prison and its modern modes of punishment, based not on physical force and terror , but on power. F oucault uses the idea of the ‘panopticon’, which is a device of surveillance, more precisely, ‘a tower in the centre surrounded by a ring-shaped building composed of cells, each housing a prisoner’ (McHoul and Grace 1995, 67) and which allows for the continuous observation of inmates. In Foucault’s view, the panopticon induces a ‘state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic function of power’ (Foucault 1995, 201). However, this concept, correlated with that of discipline, can be and is actually applied at the level of the entire society, not only in prisons. Foucault does not regard discipline as an institution or as an apparatus: ‘it is a type of power , a modality for its exercise, compromising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or “anatomy” of power, a technology’ (215).
According to Foucault, discipline is much more effective and civilised than the old forms of punishment based on torture and on the visual impact of the scaffold, all the more as it begins in early childhood and continues throughout the whole life of the disciplined individual. Foucault stresses the idea that prison is just an example, and that the reality of surveillance and control is applicable in other societal spheres as well: ‘I shall choose examples from military, medical, educational, and industrial institutions’ (141). He insists that discipline operates at all societal levels with the help of three instruments: hierarchical observation, normalising judgement (which compares, differentiates, hierarchises, homogenises and excludes the individual (182)) and examination (which ‘combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment’ (184)).
To summarise, one may say that, in Foucault’s terms, disciplinary societies act much in the way prisons do, displaying and enforcing power over individuals through observation and normalisation of practices, and also aiming at normalising and levelling individuals through their numerous mediums of control: family, education, army, workplace, media and, in some cases, religion and cultural customs.
Societies of Control
Building on Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary societies, another important French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, acknowledges their transience under the constraints of successive new worlds and worldviews:the disciplines underwent a crisis to the benefit of new forces that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after World War II […]. These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies. (1992, 3–4)
The difference between the two concepts, in Deleuze’s view, is that, in disciplinary societies, the individual passes through different spaces of confinement (family, school, barracks, factory), whereas, in the societies of control, ‘one is never finished with anything’ (5). The reason he finds for this state of affairs is inspired by Marxist ideology and starts from the assertion that nineteenth-century capitalism was one based on production, for which factories as spaces of confinement were erected, while present-day capitalism relegates production to third-world countries, focusing on the product (that is to say, on its marketability) and replaces factories with corporations. Family, education and even art are said to be part of this global corporatism in which the individual is no longer ‘enclosed’, but indebted, and for whose profit he/she is taught to continually learn and improve. Deleuze’s conclusion is that people should understand that ‘they’re being made to serve’ (7).
Nonetheless, apart from the economic context and the difference between discipline and control, the latter being regarded as more dangerous and intrusive for the individual, precisely due to the persistence of the control factors throughout his/her entire life, one may easily notice that Foucault’s forms of enclosure and Deleuze’s control mechanisms are basically the same: family, education, workplace and so on. It is, however, worth mentioning that the two French ideologists refer to Western societies, which, in the context of analysing an Eastern society, might seem out of place. In truth , though, as soon as Eastern societies have abandoned feudal structures and have embraced capitalist structures (at least partially), they may and should be analysed as westernised societies, despite their inherent peculiarities.
Ideological State Apparatuses
When approaching individual identities by relating them to their context of manifestation and the ideological constraints that inform them, one cannot overlook the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser’s views on ideology , as outlined in one of his most famous essays, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation’. Of course, his argument is grounded in Marxism and constantly refers to production and the replication of the means and relations of production (Althusser 1969 in Žižek 1994, 101). While this chapter does not discuss the Western realities to which Althusser’s article as a whole applies, a series of key Marxist concepts which refer to ideology may still prove useful in formulating the hypothesis that individuals may and do act as a result of their education (in a broad sense) within a society strongly marked by ideological control. Such is the case with the interrelated concepts of infrastructure and superstructure. Althusser explains that the former represents the economic base (‘the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production’), while the latter—relevant for the present case—is made up of two different levels: ‘the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)’ (105).
Furthermore, he draws a line between what he terms Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) (the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, and others) which function by means of violence, and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), represented by: religion , education, family, laws, politics (including the political system and political parties), trade unions, communications (mass-media) and culture (literature , arts, sports, and so on) (110–111). Nonetheless, RSA and ISA can only function in concert.
The role of religion as one of the most effective ISAs is further underlined, partially belying Althusser’s claim that the order is arbitrary. In the pre-capitalist historical period, Althusser asserts, religion was the dominant ISA ‘which concentrated within it not only religious functions, but also educational ones, and a large proportion of the functions of communications and culture’ (115). In the context of Eastern fundamentalist civilisations, it may not be too far-fetched to state that institutionalised religion still preserves all these ‘capabilities’ that the Christian Western Church has lost over the centuries. In a society dominated by religion , an individual’s consciousness is shaped by his/her beliefs (126–7); consequently, his/her beha
viour and practices are in accordance with the tenets of the ISA, although it may seem that they have been predetermined by one’s own conscience.
Control Factors in Islamic Civilisations
Drawing a preliminary conclusion to the three views on the mechanisms of control as outlined by these important theorists of the twentieth century, one cannot but notice that, despite inherent differentiations and alternative denominations, these controls operate through the same institutions—family, school, workplace, religion , communication, culture—in order to subjugate the individual and to integrate him/her in a specific social, political, economic and cultural milieu. While reference is made, in all the three cases presented above, to Western realities, such as industrialisation, post-industrialisation and Christianity, similar constraints may be understood as also functioning within the Eastern world. It is the specific case of religion as a determinant political factor in many parts of the Islamic world which has suggested the hypothesis of this subjection of the individual so as to make him engage in murderous acts, apparently by his own will, but, in fact, as a result of ideological mechanisms at work in his upbringing.8 This may very well apply in the case of the Muslim terrorists who crashed the planes into the WTC on 9/11 and whose fictional repre sentations, constructed by Western literary discourse, are the focus of this chapter.
Recent history has witnessed a break in Islamic civilisation: some Islamic states have accepted an opening towards globalisation, Westernisation, economic exchange with non-Islamic countries, and even some freedoms for their citizens (Turkey is a good case in point, but not the only one), while others—and the most representative cases are those of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan—are governed by the principle of returning to (or remaining in the sphere of) the teachings of the fundamental writings of Islam , the Qur’an,9 the Sunnah10 and the Sharia.11 Any further mention of the Islamic fundamentalist states should be interpreted as referring to this latter group, because of their government, and not as a generalisation or conscientious inclusion of all Muslim believers in the category of terrorists , a mistake which the West has constantly made since the day of the infamous attacks on the WTC.
Without claiming a thorough theological knowledge of Islam, there follows a very brief overview of a few Qur’an verses which might have led to an [erroneous] interpretation of the Others as enemies,12 leading to the suicidal attacks with tragic death tolls directed at the Western world: the 2001 attacks on the WTC in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC (9/11); the Madrid trains bombings on 11 March 2004 (known as 11 M); the London bombings on 7 July 2005 (referred to as 7/7). More recently, the terrorist offensive against Europe was continued with the attacks in Paris on 7 January 2015 (at the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical weekly magazine which constantly featured cartoons and polemic articles considered extremely offensive by Muslims); on 13 November 2015, at the Bataclan Theatre in Paris; in Brussels (22 March 2016); Nice (14 July 2016); Berlin (19 December 2016); Manchester (22 May 2017); London again (3 June 2017); and Barcelona (17 August 2017). The fundamentalist militant movements Al-Qaeda and, in the more recent cases, ISIS , have claimed responsibility for all these events.
Among the most problematic of all the Qur’an verses that violence may be read into are the ones which make reference to infidels/unbelievers in the teachings of Allah and his Prophet (Messenger) Muhammad:3:56—As to those who reject faith, I will punish them with terrible agony in this world and in the Hereafter, nor will they have anyone to help. (Qur’an 2000, 44).
3:151—Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers […] their abode will be the Fire: and evil is the home of the wrongdoers. (53)
8:12–13—I will instil terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all fingertips off them. (137)
8:39—And fight with them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere. (139)
The list of such quotes could be much more exhaustive, yet it seems sufficient to indicate the fact that the Qur’an contains (potentially) inflammatory verses directed at those who do not embrace the religion of Allah. However, the real issue is not the existence of these verses—after all, the Old Testament is equally violent in some parts—but the fact that such statements are interpreted literally in the contemporary world, with the support of the administrations in power in the Muslim fundamentalist world. In other words, the verses come to be enforced as control mechanisms for the subjection of the true believer, and ideology works towards political ends which could not have been foreseen in the seventh century ce, when the text was written.
As Althusser remarks, religion went hand in hand with education in the heyday of Christianity; in the case of Islam, the affirmation is still valid—or Islam is still in its heyday. A perfect example is the renowned translator of the Qur’an, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, an Indian by birth, who states in the Preface that ‘it was between the ages of four and five that [he] first learned to read its Arabic words, to revel in its rhythm and music and wonder at its meaning’ (2000, x), being at the same time taught the foreign language for this sole purpose. Nonetheless, while the Indian scholar’s service to the Qur’an was ‘to present it in a fitting garb in English’ (xi), in other cases, ideology makes people present their services to the Holy Book as is their duty, but also in view of receiving the reward of eternal life. Let us consider the following verses:4:74—Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of the world for the Hereafter. To him who fighteth in the cause of Allah—whether he is slain or gets victory—soon shall We give him a reward of great value. (2000, 68)
4:95—Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt and those who strive in the cause of Allah with their goods and persons. (72)
These verses show how Muslims who become suicidal terrorists could be inculcated with an urge to be rewarded, on the one hand, but also with a certain spirit of competition, on the other. Thus, they do not want to be those who sit at home, and they expect to be awarded for their bravery in the afterlife (it is worth mentioning that this reward goes as far as promising those who are willing to die in action weddings with 72 virgins in paradise). Thus, the Islamic society of control makes use of human foibles in directing its subjects towards reprehensible acts. It is the exact series of factors described by Foucault, Deleuze and Althusser that determines the suicidal terrorists to commit their deeds: education begins at home, in the bosom of the family, academic and professional achievements (often pursued in the Western world), are geared towards the same purpose as their military training—and everything lies under the overarching power of religion.
The distance that the Western world has travelled from institutionalised religion (in the sense of laicisation of its nations) may be an explanation for the Westerners’ misapprehension and enhanced sense of otherness when it comes to Muslims. Most definitely, the attacks led by their most radical factions have contributed heavily to the perpetuation and accentuation of these misconceptions, which have inevitably given birth to a new phobia, ‘Islamophobia’, manifest at all societal levels of Western civilisation, even at the level of literary representations.
The Terrorist Other in Contemporary Literature
Post 9/11 Islamophobia
Because of the visibility of the extremist organisations and of the violent acts pursued in the Western world by their followers, the Western discursive sources—the street, the press, fiction—have started, especially after 9/11 , to reveal the Muslim Arab as the ultimate ‘Other’ of the new millennium, where terror and terrorism have become the newest threat in the cultural mindset of Western civilisation. The mirage of the East has been almost completely replaced with an image of a violent and psychotic barbarian come to blow himself and many innocent people into pieces, in the illusory hope of honours and rewards in the afterlife. In the preface to the third edition of Orientalism, Said casts the blame for this ‘terror-isation’ of t
he Muslims exclusively on the media:Today, bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror , Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there who have been such a terrible thorn in ‘our’ flesh. Accompanying such warmongering expertise have been the omnipresent CNNs and Foxs of this world, […] plus innumerable tabloids and even middle-brow journalists, all of them re-cycling the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations so as to stir up ‘America’ against the foreign devil. (2003, xvi)
Terror, threat and menace are just three of the concepts associated with Islam after 9/11 and they all contribute to the portrayal of ‘the devil’, as Said notices. Of course, a superficial analysis of the word choice in the quotation above deems it subjective. ‘Shabby screeds’, ‘screaming headlines’, ‘tabloids’, ‘middlebrow’, ‘recycling’ and ‘generalisation’ point to derogation and so does ‘fic tion’, in this context , especially as it is ‘unverifiable’ (as it should be). Said himself borrows specific phrases from journalistic discourse—the adverb ‘supposedly’ is used in the sense of true on inconclusive grounds, therefore, not far from false, just like the verb ‘pretending’. In addition, the adjectives ‘omnipresent’ and ‘innumerable’ reinforce that might is right—the imposing power structures represented here by the huge television networks. What is more, America is written within inverted commas, which points to a totum pro parte synecdoche that may be read as standing for Westerner in general, in the context of the effacing boundaries between globalisation and Americanisation. Last but not least, the phrasal verb ‘to stir up’ pairs with the adjective ‘warmongering’ to suggest manipulation , even instigation.
British and American Representations of 9-11 Page 25