by Nigel West
‘A’ Force was now burdened with the responsibility of exaggerating the defences at El Alamein, most of the dummy tanks prepared for FABRIC having perished during the retreat. The plan called for the entirely notional 6th New Zealand Division and the 3rd South African Division, which had been part of the CASCADE deception, to be deployed as reinforcements, and the principal channel for conveying the false information, codenamed SENTINEL, was CHEESE. SENTINEL suggested that the British forces were due to be reinforced towards the end of August, and a grossly exaggerated assessment of Allied strengths persuaded Rommel to abandon his planned attack, thus leaving it to the 9th Army to seize the initiative, a plan concealed by yet another cover story devised by ‘A’ Force.
One news item that was considered impossible to keep secret was Churchill’s impending visit to Cairo, scheduled for 4 August. He wanted to visit the 8th Army and confer with Wavell, who was summoned from India, and General Jan Smuts, who arrived from South Africa, and the cover plan, codenamed GRANDIOSE, was for CHEESE to report Churchill’s movements accurately, but only after a delay of two days.
During Churchill’s momentous visit, made while en route to Moscow, he replaced Auchinleck as commander of the 8th Army with General Gott, who was promptly killed when his aircraft was shot down, so the post went instead to Montgomery. Churchill also split the Middle East command into a Near East Command, taking in Palestine, Africa and Syria, with its headquarters in Cairo, headed by Harold Alexander, and a Persia and Iraq Command headed by General Maitland Wilson, who had been leading the 9th Army in Syria. Auchinleck would become Commander-in-Chief India, and Wavell would be appointed the Viceroy.
ISLD’s principal task was penetration of the enemy’s intelligence apparatus, and developed PESSIMISTS and QUICKSILVER for this objective. The PESSIMISTS were a group of three double agents run in Syria who had landed in Tripoli in October 1942 on a mission to Damascus, and had been quickly captured through TRIANGLE and turned against their Abwehr controllers in Athens. They consisted of PESSIMIST X, a Swiss-Italian named Costa who notionally acted as a courier for PESSIMIST Y, the group’s wireless operator and a professional singer. Known to the Germans as MIMI and to SIME as JACK, he was a Greek named Demetrios, originally from Alexandria, and was described as ‘a greedy devious shit and a stirrer’. He collected information from PESSIMIST Z, a thug with a criminal past involving drug smuggling. Of the three, only PESSIMIST Y retained his liberty, living in the same house as QUICKSILVER, a Greek air force officer, George Liossis, and nephew of General Liossis who had dispatched on a mission for the Abwehr in August 1942 with a prostitute, Anna Agiraki, codenamed GALA, and a Greek sailor, regarded as a Gestapo thug, named Bonzos and codenamed RIO. When questioned, Erich Vermehren confirmed that Costa had supplied details of Allied divisional signs and was ‘well looked upon’ by the Istanbul KO which had assessed his reporting as ‘very good indeed’.
Their mission already compromised by TRANGLE, all three were picked up in a small boat off Latakia and, upon his arrival in Beirut, Liossis, who had been in contact with SIS in Athens before the war, cooperated with the local DSO Douglas Roberts, who assigned John Wills of SIME to supervise the contact made with his German controllers by radio in October 1942, after GALA and RIO had been imprisoned. QUICKSILVER’S notional network also included KHALIL, a laundryman working for the British 9th Army, and KYRIAKIDES, supposedly a Greek businessman with royalist connections in Cairo, where he was a frequent visitor.
In 1944 QUICKSILVER’S diminishing funds were replenished with 200 gold sovereigns supplied by INFAMOUS, an Armenian double agent under SIS control since May 1943 who had been friendly with the Belgian consul in Beirut, and therefore was considered suspect. Famously his ISLD case officer in Beirut, Charles Dundas, complained to Cairo that ‘plans which appear well-prepared at your end seem half-baked at ours’. Despite the protest, INFAMOUS was allowed to make his delivery, but took the opportunity to smuggle some watches into Lebanon, where he was caught and briefly imprisoned. This incident appeared to have no impact on QUICKSILVER’S standing with the Abwehr, and in August 1944 he was appointed provost-marshal of the Royal Hellenic Air Force in Egypt.
Another important SIME double agent was STEPHAN, who was actually an Austrian named Klein who was arrested in Cairo in March 1941. Then there was INFAMOUS who became relevant to CHEESE when, in May 1943, evidence emerged that the Abwehr had decided to use an unidentified courier to smuggle money to CHEESE in Egypt. Naturally, all the parties involved were anxious to spot the man and place him under surveillance, and elaborate arrangements were made to watch the passengers on the Taurus Express which departed Istanbul on 17 May. According to INFAMOUS, the courier had been instructed to deliver the money and a document described as a directive to a contact at the Hotel Baron in Aleppo.
At one point, in late May 1943, information from INFAMOUS suggested the existence of an Abwehr network in Egypt, perhaps centred on Alexandria. On 26 May the Istanbul station sent the following message to SIME in Cairo:
INFAMOUS has been instructed by Swiss to stand by for return of courier from Aleppo June 4 or June 5. He may however return before then. Courier expected to bring with him from ARNAVIR most important information concerning British submarines which transport arms for assistance of [group omitted] there. Numbers of notes will be available shortly.
SIS’s man in Istanbul, Nicholas Elliott, designated 18700, announced that
INFAMOUS reports that courier returned Istanbul 6 June and contacted him morning 7 June. Courier is Turk, aged about thirty-eight. INFAMOUS gained impression he travelled via Gaziantep and crossed Syrian frontier illegally. Description follows shortly.
On the following day, Elliott sent a further report about INFAMOUS:
On contacting INFAMOUS… courier slit open lining of his coat and produced piece of linen similar to that brought by the priest. Typewritten on linen (which was sealed with adhesive tape) was letter in moderate English dated Alexandria 2 June 1943 from ARNAVIR to NAHICHEVAN.
Following is paraphrase of salient points: (a) Letters dated March 22 and April 16 received. (b) 415 pounds Egyptian not yet received; we have only received from T£15,000 dollars. (c) We confirm arrival of very important convoys from England to Gibraltar already made to intelligence by ‘transmission B.2 on May 31’. (d) B.2 will transmit exact date of convoys to Derna. Section of 10th Army proceeded Derna.
On 16 June the ISLD station in Istanbul reported that
INFAMOUS confirms ASLAN left June 10 intended change trains after Ankara and take local train to Diarkbekir and Hardin. Destination probably Aleppo. ASLAN told INFAMOUS he might not be able to bring MOUSSA back to Turkey as he is on a mission to Iran. ASLAN also stated MOUSSA brings parcels to Turkey from Syria.
When the directive and its covering letter reached SIME in Cairo, they were studied with great interest. The letter was signed NAHICHEVAN and proved to be instructions on how the sum of E£415 was to be delivered ‘with every precaution to ‘Madame MARIE’ at ‘Cairo, Rue Gogol 20, in the neighbourhood of the Neiogan Tawgig’. The directive turned out to be a request for ‘information about British espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage organisations, together with the countries in which these are particularly interested. According to INFAMOUS, the person behind the operation was von der Marwitz, the German naval attaché in Istanbul. The others implicated were CAPPELLARTA, ODIOUS and ARMAVIN.
Rolf von der Marwitz was a familiar figure to British Intelligence, having been the prewar German naval attaché in Paris. A member of the nobility, he had been appointed to the same post in Ankara in April 1939, and was known to have commanded a squadron of minesweepers at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven during the First World War. Although not an Abwehr professional, he was implicated as the paymaster in several espionage cases across the eastern Mediterranean.
ODIOUS was Max Brandl, a Swiss watch salesman recruited by SIS in Istanbul in December 1942 as a double agent after he had volunteered the fact that he had been approached by
the Abwehr in Vienna to spy in Syria. With SIS’s consent he had returned to Vienna to agree his mission, and had returned in March 1943. He had been allowed to travel to Syria the following month but SIME interrogated him, aware that he had undergone undisclosed training by the Abwehr in 1940. He was arrested by SIME on a second mission to Syria in October when he admitted that he had been spying for the Abwehr in Spain, Tangier and Vienna since 1941.
Neither SIME nor SIS had any trace of ARMAVIN but it was believed that he was probably ARMEN, a character who had appeared in a TRIANGLE decrypt the previous December as having been the recipient of a large sum of money from von der Marwitz. In that same month ARMEN reported on the French fleet in Alexandria and later, most inaccurately, provided information about Gibraltar.
The issue for SIME was whether INFAMOUS was telling the truth about the existence of a hitherto undiscovered Abwehr spy-ring in Egypt, or if he was part of some elaborate test to check on CHEESE. The matter would never be completely resolved but SIS found a TRIANGLE reference dated December 1942 from von der Marwitz in Istanbul concerning a payment made to ARMEN in Egypt for information which included a map of Gibraltar and details of various warships. However, in Berlin’s estimation, the information was ‘highly inaccurate’. SIS noted similarities between ARMEN and ARMAVIN and speculated that they were the same person, remarking that both were believed to be Armenian; both had received large sums of money from the Abwehr in Istanbul and both are interested in naval information and pass material of dubious quality. Accordingly, SIS was inclined to conclude that INFAMOUS was telling the truth and that ARMEN was identical with ARMAVIN, in which case CHEESE did not seem to be under suspicion.
In October 1943 there was a further threat to CHEESE when an SIS agent in Athens, codenamed GROWNUP, reported that ‘In Heliopolis, Cairo, there is a German transmitter worked by an Italian ROBERTO’. After some discussion, it was agreed that SIS would declare the news ‘very interesting’
How did you get this information? Give full details of this source. Try and get further exact information to help us in running the spy to earth.
Fortunately, GROWNUP was not able to pursue the matter any further, and the subject was quietly dropped,
The single recurring problem was, of course, the transfer of funds to CHEESE which posed some challenges for SIME as well as for the Abwehr. Clearly the Axis showed little initiative in sending money to him, but in Cairo the debate was more about how to handle the expected courier. In October 1942, when it really looked as if an unknown individual was about to turn up in Cairo and hand over a packet of money to MISANTHROPE, there was a lengthy discussion about what she should say to the courier if she was questioned, and about the fate of the mystery intermediary. On 11 October James Robertson decided on a plan that would accomplish most, if not all of its goals while still maintaining the pretence that CHEESE was at liberty and working entirely independently.
1. MISANTHROPE will be given, verbally, a summarised version of the CHEESE case.
2. It will be most strongly impressed upon MISANTHROPE that her role is a DEFENSIVE one and that what she is defending is the false picture of Paul Nicossof which has so far existed in the enemy mind. Her task is primarily to prevent the enemy realising that Nicossof is not an Axis agent acting in liberty. Her task is NOT:
(a) To get the enemy’s money, or
(b) To arrest the enemy courier
although both (a) and (b) may be considered if we can at the same time be absolutely certain of security our primary objective.
It will be made clear to MISANTHROPE that to arrest the courier, while leaving possible accomplices at large, would give warning to the latter and at the same time cause them to suspect the integrity – perhaps even the existence of – Paul Nicossof.
She will therefore be told that, although she will have to prepare herself by learning the following ‘part’, it will be her role not willingly to reveal information about herself or Paul, but rather to remain constantly on the defensive. This will be naturally explained by the extreme nervousness of both herself and Paul. She will refer more than once to the recent execution of five spies at Aleppo; she may also mention the arrest of the two German spies on a houseboat, and the spate of arrests they brought in their train.
If pressed to introduce the courier to Paul, she will quote explicit instructions from him against this, and will plead his great nervousness. She will also advance the argument that a meeting between Paul and the courier would double the danger for both, as in fact it would.
Any further instructions which may be necessary will be communicated to MISANTHROPE verbally.
3. Name (Fictitious)
To be decided in consultation with MISANTHROPE herself.
4. Address
That of a flat in Cairo to be obtained by DSO.
5. [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]
6. MISANTHROPE has already been briefly prepared for the part which she may have to play. She has not been told that we have been in wireless communication with the enemy; it may be necessary to put her in the picture without any reservations – but this will be avoided if possible. Her ‘part’ is being prepared in detail and she will be instructed to learn it by heart.
7. If the enemy reply to the measure given in Paragraph 2 by informing us of the approximate date of arrival of the courier we shall send:
‘Faur que messager aille a …………. le …… [date and time] … Mons amie sera assise a ----- [exact positon of table in café or restaurant] ----[.] Elle s’appelle ----------[.] Taille 1 metre 62[.] Yeux bruns[.] Sourcils noirs[.] Cheveux bruns clairs[.] Sera habille en blanc sans chapeau[.] Portera sac rouge[.] Faut que messager lui dise[.] J’aiete chez Emile[.] Elle repondera[.] Comment va-t-il et Marie[.]
8. Description of MISANTHROPE to be in accordance with her altered appearance
Considerable discretion will be left to MISANTHROPE as to the policy she adopts but she will be told that our essential objectives are:
(a) To discover whether the courier is working alone or with associates, (b) If and when he proposes to return (c) If he had any other mission besides the delivery of the money (d) At all costs to allay or to parry any inquisitiveness on the part of the courier on the subject of Paul, She will plead ignorance of Paul’s espionage activities – ‘He is so mysterious about what he does’ – and will lay emphasis on his extreme nervousness. If the courier expresses a wish to meet Paul, she may say that she will ‘try to persuade him,’ but will subsequently inform the inquirer that Paul feels that a meeting would be too dangerous for both parties. Paul’s danger would in fact be doubled if the courier became too well informed about him; a policy of cautious mysteriousness would therefore be a natural one to adopt, but of secondary importance to the concealment of the real facts about Paul – to arrest the courier. It will be explained to her that this will be dangerous for our plans if associates of the courier remain at large, or if the arrest of the whole ‘gang’ does not take place simultaneously and secretly.
9. In case of emergency agents of the DSO will be present at a suitable distance at each rendezvous between MISANTHROPE and the courier. If the interview goes in such a way as to suggest to her that the courier has become suspicious, or is likely to slip out of our hands, she will communicate with the DSO agents by a previously agreed signal. In accordance with arrangements which will be left to DSO, the courier will then be arrested as unobtrusively as possible and immediately subjected to intensive interrogation on the points set out in Paragraph 3. It will be emphasised most strongly to MISANTHROPE that this plan will only be adopted in case of extreme emergency; and that unless compelled to it we are most anxious not to arrest the courier unless the conditions specified are satisfied. This emergency plan will require very careful planning in full consultation with DSO.
1. MISANTHROPE has been instructed to look for a suitable place for the rendezvous, where the chances of her being seen by acquaintances are at a minimum.
2. DSO will be asked to arrange a
suitable flat in Cairo where Special Section or Advance HQ ‘A’ Force representatives will meet and instruct MISANTHROPE.
SIME, of course, was handicapped by the lack of a ‘flesh and blood’ Nicossof to appear for the courier, and there were other loose ends, such as the language to be spoken at the rendezvous, and even a physical description of MISANTHROPE and Nicossof. When Maunsell read Robertson’s proposal he speculated about what might happen if two couriers turned up, Nevertheless, he gave his approval, and the DSO then began to assemble a suitable reception for the courier and his confederates at SIME’s villa where two SIME officers, Majors Kennedy and Dunstan, gathered a team of Field Security NCOs to act as guards. The plan dictated that
On arrival in the villa the prisoner will immediately be placed under guard in a room prepared for ‘straightforward interrogation’.
The BGM will have been brought with the prisoner to the villa. Out of hearing of the prisoner she will inform the interrogators of the substance of any conversation she may have had with him.
The interrogation will then proceed in the light of such information as may have been obtained from the BGM. The interrogation will cover the following important points:
I. Name of the prisoner.
II. How long has he been in Egypt (the Middle East?)
III. Who gave him his instructions for the rendezvous at the café and the password?
IV. The prisoner will be briefly questioned in order to discover how much he knows about CHEESE.