by Mark Zuehlke
At 0615 hours, the two companies launched the main attack. Johnson’s ‘D’ Company led off and headed towards a height of ground identified as Point 302. The company slipped onto the summit at dawn by platoons and found two bewildered Germans just waking up. Johnson put them under guard and the two companies started digging in on another easily secured objective.9
HAVING SPENT THE night securing their hold on Convent Hill and the ground to its immediate east, 1 CIB’s regiments were beginning to feel the effects of lack of sleep. The men also knew there would be no rest any time soon, for at 0600 hours Brigadier Calder arrived by jeep at the Royal Canadian Regiment’s headquarters with orders for an immediate attack on Mombaroccio. Calder’s arrival came mere minutes after Lieutenant Colonel Jim Ritchie finally wandered out of the hills into his regiment’s position. An exhausted Ritchie said he still had to reorganize his regiment and—always prone to being careful, slow, and methodical—would need until noon to organize the attack. Calder agreed to the delay.10
In a brief moment of radio clarity, Calder had also managed to contact Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron during the night to give the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment its orders for the morning. Cameron then held an O Group of his company commanders at 0400 hours and arranged for the men to be served a hot breakfast at 0710 hours. They gulped the food down and at 0730 hours ‘C’ Company led the advance with a squadron of tanks in support. The other companies followed with ‘A’ directly behind, then ‘D’, and finally ‘B’ bringing up the rear of the column. The regiment’s task was to “move forward in pursuit of the enemy” by crossing the Arzilla River at Villa Grande and then advancing to capture points 268 and 146.11 Both lay four miles from the start line, with the latter hill a few hundred yards east of the former.12 On this clear, blue morning the villages of Monteciccardo, Sant’ Angelo, and Ginestreto “stood out white and crenellated against the skyline.”13 To the immediate right of Monteciccardo, a monastery’s tall bell tower rose high above the other buildings. Monteciccardo and Sant’ Angelo lay about a mile to the west of the Hasty P’s line of advance, Ginestreto just a few hundred yards west of Point 268. Both villages were on summits about one thousand feet high, only a bit lower in elevation than either Point 268 or Point 146. The Hasty P’s could see that whoever controlled these two points also dominated the surrounding ground and the Foglia River valley below.14
No sooner was the regiment across the start line than the supporting Churchills were stalled by a maze of craters blocking the road. They headed back to the start line to find an alternate route forward, leaving the infantry to carry on alone. The soldiers advanced warily into a devastated landscape. German demolition teams had blown every bridge and cratered long stretches of the roads and tracks. Mines were a constant threat and every vineyard, olive grove, stout-walled church, monastery, or farmhouse potentially hid a sniper or machine-gun position. Sporadic shelling and mortaring repeatedly forced the companies to ground. Progress was slow and the tanks, having finally discovered that the safest route forward was to follow in the infantry’s footsteps, were unable to keep up as they lurched perilously across the rugged, stone-strewn country that threatened to break their tracks.15
Crossing the three miles of country between the start line and the southern edge of the Arzilla River took three hours. While the men started digging slit trenches among the vineyards and olive groves hugging the edge of the ridge, Cameron stared down at the valley floor. Almost a mile wide, the country down there was open and through it the little stream wound like a snake. Cameron recognized the ground for what it was—an ideal kill zone for any Germans manning positions on the valley’s northern flank. There was no sign of movement there, but Cameron sensed the Germans watching and waiting. For infantry to move down into the valley unsupported by tanks would be asking for a mauling, so Cameron knew the Hasty P’s must wait on the badly lagging tankers.16
CALDER’S PROPENSITY for being constantly on the move was frustrating Major General Chris Vokes. When he pulled up in a jeep outside 1 CIB headquarters at 1100 hours, he was told Calder was still up front. Vokes stared at his map and then radioed Calder with orders for the brigadier to meet him at a specific map reference point near Convent Hill. Calder raced to the rendezvous and waited there until 1230 hours, but Vokes never appeared. Giving up on the major general, the brigadier drove to a forward observation point from which he could see the ground between the convent and the Arzilla River.17
Having apparently overshot the rendezvous point, Vokes drove up to the convent at 1200 hours. The general complimented Ritchie on the RCR’s performance since the crossing of the Metauro River and then went back to searching for Calder.
After bidding adieu to the major general, Ritchie ordered ‘A’ Company to lead off towards Mombaroccio with ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ companies following in line. Meeting no resistance, the regiment passed through the little village’s ruins, and pressed on towards the Arzilla River.18
About the time the RCR left Mombaroccio, Vokes returned to 1 CIB headquarters and found I Canadian Corps commander, Lieutenant General Tommy Burns, also waiting on Calder. The two officers were finally briefed on 1 CIB’s operational plan by the brigade major “in absence of the brigade commander.”19 From here, Vokes and Burns travelled to 2 CIB’s headquarters to discuss the operation with Gibson. Both “seemed well pleased with the progress that had been made,” the brigade’s intelligence officer, Captain Ed Bradish, noted in the war diary.20
Although generally satisfied with the development of his division’s offensive, Vokes worried that the advance was being dangerously slowed by a combination of the problems the tanks faced traversing the rugged ground and the slowly stiffening German resistance. Champing at the bit to get closer to the action, Vokes ordered his divisional headquarters moved just north of Passo.21 Captain H.B. Gourlay and Captain C.J.A. Hamilton from 2 CIB were meanwhile locating a new brigade headquarters for occupation in the morning that was, in a curious development resulting from Gibson’s tendency to hang well back, several miles to the rear of the divisional headquarters.22
Burns was even more anxious than Vokes about the increasingly sluggish pace of the advance. Before visiting 1 CIB headquarters, he had conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the front, “but little was to be seen of what was happening.”23 That had led to his trip to brigade headquarters, which left him certain that the “advance was taking much longer than had been anticipated [and] that the enemy might have time to occupy the Gothic Line in strength.” Hoping to hurry things up, Burns ordered Vokes to prepare his reserve brigade—3rd Canadian Infantry—to take over the right-hand portion of the line from Calder’s brigade. He then issued a warning order to 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Major General Bert Hoffmeister to be ready to pass through 2 CIB on the night of August 28–29. By then, Burns hoped both 1 CIB and 2 CIB would have reached the south bank of the Foglia River. If not, the fresh units would have to finish this job before immediately following up with an assault on the Gothic Line.
Hoffmeister, Burns knew, would have to relieve 2 CIB with his experienced 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, supported by one of 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade’s tank regiments. This would weaken I Canadian Corps’s ability to take advantage of the breakout from the Gothic Line by advancing rapidly into the German rear, which was his main strategic purpose. Lacking a third division, Burns also knew he had no alternative but to draw down his armoured division’s fighting strength in front of the Gothic Line should Vokes’s division require reinforcement.24
Burns also had to watch his flanks. General Oliver Leese warned Burns that II Polish Corps and V Corps were both trailing behind the Canadians. The Poles, Leese said, could not possibly reach the Foglia until August 28 and that meant the Canadians were now “the spear-head of the attack.”25 The Eighth Army commander, previously betting on V Corps effecting the breakthrough, had now decided the odds favoured I Canadian Corps winning the race to the Gothic Line. He hoped Burns could get his divis
ions there in time to surprise the Germans and “gatecrash” the Gothic Line, which would avoid a set-piece attack.26
EVEN AS LEESE and Burns indulged themselves in this optimistic scenario, the Canadian advance was banging into ever more determined opposition, particularly on the far left flank where the PPCLI were attempting to cross the Arzilla River. At noon, ‘C’ Company, commanded by Major S.A. Cobbett, had sent a fighting patrol over the river to test the German defences. The patrol quickly overran and captured five Germans defending a small gun position. By 1245 hours, the entire regiment had crossed the river and was pushing north, the men sweating heavily in the sweltering early afternoon heat.27
Behind them, the tanks of 145th Regiment’s ‘B’ Squadron were descending in a line down a spur that cut from the overlooking ridge to the riverbank when shells started exploding around the tanks. The squadron commander spotted the muzzle flashes of 88-millimetre guns firing from the village of Monte Santa Maria, almost a mile to the northwest of their position, and quickly directed artillery fire against the hilltop village. As the first shells exploded among the houses, the German fire ceased. But now the tanks stood on the edge of the river and could find no suitable crossing, for, although the Arzilla was shallow and narrow, its steep banks presented a natural tank obstacle. A delay ensued while ‘B’ Squadron’s reconnaissance troop searched for a viable crossing point. Finally one was located and the tanks continued “over steep mountainous slopes and razor-back ridges” that caused many tanks to throw tracks, become stuck, or break down as they tried to catch up to the infantry.28
The PPCLI was having its own problems moving through the countryside north of the Arzilla. Each company had been given a series of preliminary objectives in the form of hills or other significant landmarks that were to serve as marking points guiding them to the final objective. For three of the companies, this scheme worked well and they stayed on course. ‘D’ Company under Captain R.G.M. Gammell, however, overshot its final objective by about one thousand yards. The mistake proved costly, as this brought them into range of German artillery and mortar positions on a hill to the northeast of Monte Santa Maria. A salvo of shellfire killed four of Gammell’s men and wounded eleven others. When the Germans continued heavily bombarding the company, Gammell’s men were unable to withdraw. They could only frantically dig slit trenches and hunker down.29 Major Colin McDougall’s ‘B’ Company, some distance back from ‘D’ Company and to its left, paused for a short break at 1530 hours next to a church that had been one of its guiding points. Just as the men began to brew some tea, German rifle and machine-gun fire started whipping around them. The fire was coming from two points—Monte Santa Maria, about six hundred yards northwest, and a farmhouse four hundred yards to the company’s front. When two of ‘A’ Squadron’s tanks rolled up, McDougall had them shell the house while a platoon rushed it. The house was quickly cleared, with several Germans killed and twelve taken prisoner in exchange for one wounded Canadian.
Hoping to escape the German fire from Monte Santa Maria, McDougall rushed the rest of his company over to the house. If anything, the fire only intensified. McDougall knew the hilltop village lay within V Corps’s sector and was an objective for the 46th British Division’s 128th Brigade, supposedly operating on the PPCLI’s left flank. But there was no sign of the British. McDougall had another problem. His radio had failed and, with dusk approaching, the tanks withdrew. Unable to contact Rosser for instructions, McDougall decided to rid the regiment of the threat Monte Santa Maria posed to its left flank.
Fortunately, McDougall had the PPCLI’s medium machine-gun platoon following him on foot. Captain J.R. Koensgen immediately set his men to reassembling the forty-pound Vickers water-cooled guns that they had broken down for carrying purposes. As the machine-gunners started linking belts of .303 ammunition into the breeches, McDougall sent one platoon of riflemen to circle around the village to attack it from the rear. Once that platoon attacked, McDougall then led the rest of the company in a direct assault, with the medium machine guns providing covering fire. Although the small German force inside the village was well equipped with machine guns, resistance quickly collapsed in the face of the two-pronged attack. When McDougall managed to establish radio contact with Rosser at 1715 hours, he was able to report the village secure and that the company had suffered no casualties. Koensgen’s medium machine-gunners had been less fortunate. As they had been approaching the hill to rejoin the company, a stonk of shellfire had caught one gun team, wounding two men and knocking the gun out.
McDougall left a platoon under Sergeant Frederick William Snell—who had won a Distinguished Conduct Medal at the Hitler Line—to temporarily garrison the village until the British arrived. The rest of the company then cut back to its assigned advance line and marched through to the final objective to the southwest of Monteciccardo. Soon ‘B’ Company was setting up near ‘C’ and ‘A’ companies for the night. While ‘A’ Company had suffered no casualties during the day, ‘C’ Company had reported four men wounded and one missing after a single hit by artillery fire. ‘D’ Company remained isolated well to the front of the rest of the regiment.30
ON THE PPCLI’S RIGHT, the Loyal Edmonton Regiment had renewed its advance at 1400 hours towards the base of the hill leading up to Monteciccardo. ‘C’ Squadron of the 145th Regiment supported them. The infantry made the journey without incident and were in position by 1700 hours. As had become the norm in this rough country, the tanks had fallen well behind. One by one, the tanks were immobilized until only two Shermans remained operational. These were ordered to circle back around Mombaroccio and join ‘A’ Squadron, which was to support a planned advance by the Seaforths the next morning.31 The Edmontons, meanwhile, were warned to be ready to pass through the RCR during the night, following that regiment’s capture of Monteciccardo.32
Like the PPCLI, the RCR had been keeping on track by advancing from one identifiable landmark to another. Lieutenant Jimmy Quayle and his scout platoon were moving “up a dry, parched slope, leading ‘A’ and ‘D’ companies, when brown-clad people entered a house on our left.” Sergeant Roy Greenough, who habitually carried his Thompson submachine gun “at waist level, with index finger curled around the trigger,” and Corporal Muller “rushed the building and called out to surrender. There was some hesitation, so Greenough fired a tommy gun burst through the window. Four Germans came tumbling out, hands high in the air. They had been about to set up an MG42 which would have given them a lethal enfilade sweep of ‘A’ and ‘D’ companies as they climbed the long slope. Our new prisoners told us there were more Germans ahead and they were ready to surrender. Four of us raced on, full of confidence, until another MG42 opened fire from the crest of the hill. Now the shoe was on the other foot, with a vengeance.”33 The enemy fire killed one of Quayle’s men.
‘D’ Company’s Captain G.C. Hungerford was preparing to assault the hill with ‘A’ Company providing covering fire, when Ritchie radioed an order cancelling the attack. As the day had progressed, the boundary between 1 CIB and 2 CIB had been increasingly pinched with the Edmontons and RCR both closing on Monteciccardo. Assessing the situation, Vokes had decided the RCR should shift several hundred yards to the right, widening the Canadian front in an easterly direction. This would close a gap that was developing between the Canadians and the Polish 5th Kresowa Polish Infantry Division, as this division drifted eastward in an attempt to bypass positions being stiffly defended by the 4th Parachute Regiment. Instead of attacking Monteciccardo, the RCR was instructed to “side slip a considerable distance to the right” and become 1 CIB’s reserve.34 The Loyal Edmonton Regiment was ordered to capture Monteciccardo in a night attack. Divisional intelligence warned Lieutenant Colonel Bell-Irving he would probably face stiff opposition, for the Germans were believed to have turned the village into a major strongpoint. All afternoon, Allied planes had been bombing Monteciccardo, so the Canadians expected “to find the enemy at least shaken” by the experience.35
On the RCR’s right flank, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment descended into the Arzilla River valley at 1535 hours, following the arrival of its supporting tanks. ‘A’ Company led with a squadron from the 12th Royal Tank Regiment in support and the other infantry companies close behind. The infantry again crossed the river easily, while the tanks were unable to find a passable crossing. Caught in the open, the tanks presented perfect targets for German antitank guns firing from concealed positions on the northern heights. Two tanks were knocked out. Finally, unable to find a crossing point, the tankers pulled back. They were to return to the riverbank at first light, by which time engineers would either have located a crossing or created one.36
The Hasty P’s marched on towards their objectives, with ‘D’ Company aiming for Point 268 and ‘A’ Company heading to the right to outflank a cluster of buildings perched on a spur of ground jutting out into the valley. As the companies started ascending the long gradual slope leading to the ridgeline, they came under mortar and artillery fire. Spreading out, the men pressed on. Just two hundred yards short of Point 268, ‘D’ Company was raked by heavy machine-gun and rifle fire coming from the hilltop and from hidden trenches located on both flanks. Forced to ground, the troops quickly scraped out slit trenches and began returning fire.
Having reached the buildings on the spur, ‘A’ Company’s leading platoon found the first building empty. Outside, somebody blew a tinny whistle that sounded like a child’s toy. Then the building was struck by machine-gun fire from three directions. The rest of the company scattered into the cluster of houses, breaking down doors and crawling through windows to find cover from the deadly fire. Artillery rounds directed against the Germans struck the Canadian positions instead. Then two Churchill tanks on the south side of the river started taking potshots at the buildings, presumably thinking them still German-held. Hearing planes approaching, the men looked up and were horrified to see two Spitfires vectoring in on them. A quick-thinking platoon commander hurled a yellow air-recognition smoke canister out a window just in time to warn the pilots off. The planes turned tightly and dropped their payloads on two German tanks that had been clanking towards ‘A’ Company’s position.37