by Jim Lacey
After crossing into Europe, Darius sent his fleet, almost all of it impressed from the Greek cities of Ionia, along the western coast of the Black Sea to the Danube River. Once there, the fleet sailed upriver for two days and constructed a bridge at the mouth of the Danube delta, where it waited for the arrival of the army. The tribes of southern Thrace, awed by the size of the Persian army, offered no resistance, and Darius’s easy victories must have greatly encouraged him and his army. Only when they approached the Danube did they encounter the first serious resistance from the Getae. Of this tribe, Herodotus relates:
The Getae, though they are the bravest and most just of the Thracians, adopted an attitude of foolish arrogance [to Darius] and were at once enslaved.1
With the Getae crushed, the Persian army crossed the Danube into Scythia.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to give more than the barest sketch of events that took place after Darius crossed the Danube into Scythian territory. To an even greater extent than is typical for most major events in ancient history, the course of the Scythian invasion is lost to us. What is absolutely known is that the expedition was a near disaster.
As his army marched away from the Danube, Darius left the Greek crews behind with their ships. Although Herodotus does not mention any Persian force being left behind, I find it unlikely that Darius would have marched off without leaving a loyal Persian force at the bridgehead to guard his baggage, protect the bridge, and keep a wary eye on the Greeks. It is almost inconceivable that a commander of Darius’s proven ability would have left his base solely in the hands of the Greeks, the most unreliable element of his army.
The Scythians, alerted to a large army marching through Thrace, had plenty of time to mobilize a hot welcome for the Persians, who were probably overconfident after the easy destruction of Getae military power. Darius was probably caught by surprise at the size of the force the Scythians mobilized against him, the extent to which they had denuded the territory, and their elusiveness. Harried from the start by horse archers who could outrange his best bowmen, unable to gather supplies, and incapable of bringing his opponent to battle, Darius stubbornly persevered in his aim until he was threatened with his own annihilation.
It was at this point that one of the most important events in Herodotus’s history takes place. With Darius’s army in trouble on the north side of the Danube, a large Scythian cavalry force approached the bridgehead and bade the Greeks destroy the bridge, return to Ionia, and raise the banner of revolt. The Greeks were further informed that Darius and the Persians would be dealt with so that they could never make war on them again. According to Herodotus’s version of events, the Greeks held a conference to discuss the proposal, whereupon Miltiades of Athens, who was then the tyrant of the Hellespontine Chersonese, initially persuaded most of the other Greeks to destroy the bridge. However, he was opposed by Histiaios, tyrant of Miletus. Histiaios reminded each of the Greek commanders that they were all tyrants of their own cities and held their grasp of power only through the support of Persian arms. If the Persians were overthrown, Histiaios told them, they would all be deposed. With their own best interest in mind, the Greeks voted to hold the bridge, although they did remove the portion within bow shot of the north shore. Disgusted, the Scythians departed, judging
the Ionians as free men to be the most worthless and cowardly of the entire human race; but as slaves, to be the most fond of servility and the least likely to turn from their masters.2
Eventually, Darius and his haggard army reached the Danube. In the darkness, he was unable to see that only a portion of the bridge had been disassembled. With the Scythians closing in, there were a few panicked minutes before he realized the Greeks were still there and the bridge was being extended back to the north shore.
What makes this story important is that it is the first time Herodotus calls our full attention to Miltiades, who was later heralded as Athens’s savior and served as a senior commander against the Persian army at Marathon. As we will see, upon his much later return to Athens, Miltiades was put on trial for his life, accused of being a tyrant and a supporter of the Persian king. The keystone of his defense was the claim that he had been the only Greek to advocate destroying the Danube bridge and therefore to leave the Persian army and its king to face certain destruction. It was a strong defense at the time and helped him pull off a surprise acquittal.
Historians have long puzzled over the truthfulness of Miltiades’ account. How likely was it that he could have advocated stranding the Great King and then survived in power for almost another decade? One would assume such a traitor would have felt Darius’s wrath soon after the king had returned to safety. This alone is sufficient reason to doubt Herodotus’s account of what took place at the bridge and to believe instead that it is a fabrication Miltiades crafted to secure his acquittal.3
Most likely Miltiades fully supported the decision to hold the bridge for Darius. Word must certainly have reached the Greeks that Darius was in trouble somewhere deep in the Scythian hinterland. This news must have stirred the camp with excitement, and there were likely enough Greeks present to overpower whatever Persians Darius had left behind, although they could not be certain of success. The revolts of the Greek cities near the Bosporus, including Byzantium and Chalcedon, attest to the fact that news of the Persian army having met some kind of disaster in Scythia was spreading rapidly throughout the empire. It is unlikely these cities would have considered such a course if they feared the Persian army was still intact in nearby Thrace. However, the Greeks on the Danube lost nothing by staying in place a bit longer and risked much by sailing away. In the end, practical, selfish concerns won out and they stayed.
Several points of evidence lead us to conclude that Miltiades was lying at his trial. First, upon his return, Darius appeared to have been in a hurry to show himself alive and well in the heart of the empire. As the revolt in the Bosporus made it impossible to return by the most practical route, he instead crossed the Hellespont at Sestos, in the heart of Miltiades’ domain. Darius, who returned to his western capital, Sardis, with only a small bodyguard, surely would not have been able to move through Miltiades’ territory if his loyalty had been in doubt. Moreover, there were no Greek tyrants of this era who did not have enemies, and Miltiades had more than his share. In fact, some of his foremost rivals were at the bridgehead with him. If Miltiades had campaigned publicly for the destruction of the bridge, it would surely have come to Darius’s attention. Given Darius’s proven ruthlessness to his enemies, one would expect Miltiades’ well-being to have suffered dramatically soon after Darius’s return to the heart of his empire. Instead, Miltiades was soon back at the Chersonese, resuming his role as tyrant. Here he remained for at least the next fifteen years, a loyal supplicant of the Great King.
As Darius hastened to Sardis and eventually on to Susa, presumably to make sure reports of disaster did not spark a new round of civil war, he left a large force behind under a Persian general, Megabazos.4 This force was charged with subjugating the rest of Thrace and was soon on the march. Although resistance was sometimes fierce, he was able to push as far west as the borders of Macedonia, which offered earth and water to the Persian king.5
That such a substantial Persian force still existed in Thrace is an indication that the Persian defeat north of the Danube was not as catastrophic as many historians have previously reported. However, it is also likely that the empire did not have any substantial forces in reserve for other duties, as it was at least two years before Megabazos’s replacement, Otanes, could be sent with reinforcements to crush the revolts in Byzantium, Chalcedon, and other nearby Greek cities.
In the meantime, Darius had been rewarding those who had done him great service during the expedition. Among them was Histiaios, whom Darius credited with holding the bridgehead at the Danube for him.6 When asked what he wanted as a reward, Histiaios requested and was granted the lands of Myrkinos in southern Thrace. As Megabazos was returning to Sardis with a port
ion of his army, he passed through this area and took careful note of the abundance of lumber-rich forests and silver mines in the region. He may also have noted Myrkinos’s strong strategic position, as it was the key to control of the north Aegean islands and sat along all of the major east–west trade routes, including those leading to the gold-laden interior. Upon reaching Darius, he informed the king that Histiaios, once entrenched in this position, might make himself powerful enough to become a threat or at least a major inconvenience to the empire. Convinced, Darius sent for Histiaios and carted him off to Susa in gilded captivity as a royal adviser.
For at least the next decade, the mists of history enshroud events within the Persian Empire. We can assume that Darius presented his invasion of Thrace as a great success and returned his attention to consolidating his hold on power. Moreover, we know that Otanes was busy crushing revolts and bringing order to the northern frontier, which would keep the army occupied and distracted from mischief for most of this time. Beyond that, very little is known.
But stresses were building in certain portions of the empire, and in 499 BC, they boiled over in Ionia. Moreover, when the Ionians appealed to their brother Greeks to come to their aid against the Persians, the Athenians were quick to answer the call.
Chapter 11
IONIA REVOLTS
In 499 BC, the Greek city-states of Ionia revolted against Persian rule, setting in motion the first great struggle between East and West. Herodotus has very little good to say about the conflict, describing the affair as an ill-considered enterprise doomed to failure from its inception. Given the final result, the revolt may well have been ill considered. However, as it took the Persians six years of near maximum effort to crush the revolt, Herodotus’s claim that it was a doomed enterprise is doubtful.
The proximate cause of the revolt is easy enough to determine. The ruling party of Naxos, an Aegean island, was overthrown. The losers then went to Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, to seek his help in regaining power. Thrilled at the notion that by helping the fallen oligarchs, he might gain control of what Herodotus describes as an island that “surpassed all other islands in its prosperity,” Aristagoras asked the Persian satrap in Sardis, Artaphrenes, for permission to act. Artaphrenes was also enamored with the idea of seizing the richest trading city in the Aegean, which, as luck would have it, also provided an excellent jumping-off point for further conquests in Greece. But a major military expedition was beyond his personal authority, and he needed to consult Darius. After the Great King had given permission, Artaphrenes assembled an army and a fleet of two hundred ships. The combined forces, however, were placed under an awkward command relationship, where Aristagoras shared responsibility with Darius’s cousin Megabates.
In all likelihood, a trading island like Naxos, with ships and trading agents in every port, would have noted preparations for such an extensive expedition as soon as they began. When the expedition arrived, its forces found the Naxians prepared and waiting. After a four-month siege, Aristagoras admitted defeat and departed.
Aristagoras was now in the unpleasant position of having commanded a fiasco. He undoubtedly understood that he would be on the losing side of any effort on the part of the Persians to find a scapegoat. According to Herodotus, at precisely this opportune moment, a message arrived from Histiaios ordering the rising of the banner of revolt.1
Histiaios’s role in this entire affair is perplexing. He was the former tyrant of Miletus and the father-in-law of the current tyrant and failed military commander, Aristagoras. It will also be remembered that he was the Greek who had made the decisive argument at the Danube bridgehead to keep the bridge intact, making it possible for the Persian army to escape from difficulties ensuing from the ill-fated Scythian expedition. Initially, he had received the reward of the city of Myrkinos, but he was soon afterward ordered to Susa to become an adviser to Darius. Herodotus would have us believe that his decade of gilded captivity had chafed at him and that he had been working throughout most of this period to foment a revolt in his Ionian homeland. Later, when the revolt did begin, Histiaios supposedly convinced Darius that he could negotiate a peace if only he was allowed to return to Ionia.
Herodotus states that Histiaios’s proposal to Darius was a ruse and that he always planned to take command of the revolt once he arrived in Ionia. Nevertheless, one wonders whether it is reasonable to believe that the man who held the Danube bridge for Darius, and who refused to rebel when he held a golden chance to destroy Darius and the Persian field army, would now seize a much more uncertain opportunity a decade later. Moreover, Histiaios, unlike most of his compatriots, had spent considerable time at the heart of the empire. He was in the unique position of being able to assess the might the Persians were capable of mobilizing in an emergency. It would take a very brave man or a fool to poke a finger in the eye of the man who wielded such power. The most likely case is that Histiaios made his offer to Darius in good faith, in hopes of further rewards and possibly reinstatement as tyrant of Miletus. However, upon his arrival in Ionia, he found himself trapped into rebellion by circumstances he had not foreseen.2
Accepting that Aristagoras, regardless of Histiaios’s involvement, had personal reasons to lead a revolt and that he probably had the support of the army and fleet when it returned from Naxos, there is still one question Herodotus does not answer.3 Why did Miletus and the rest of Ionia follow his lead?
Foremost among the reasons is economic decline. When the revolt broke out, the Ionian cities were most likely in a state of economic depression. They were trading cities, and their ability to trade was being severely curtailed. Sometimes this was the result of Persian actions, but most often it was due to changing circumstances. The rise of Carthage had closed off the western Mediterranean, while Phoenician traders, enjoying Darius’s favor, were replacing the Ionians in many eastern Mediterranean ports. Moreover, cheaper high-quality wares from Egypt and the Black Sea coast were replacing many of the goods Ionia traded in.4 Furthermore, Darius’s conscription of ships and trained crews for various operations in Thrace and along the north shores of the Black Sea must also have been a constant disruption of Ionian trading activities.
The final factor was Darius’s tax levy. By this time, it is likely that the Persian system for collecting revenue was operating with a high degree of efficiency. Considering their worsening economic plight, the Ionians must have found the four hundred talents demanded of them an excessive burden.5 Darius’s spending binge had ended long ago, and he now stored the bulk of these revenues in the royal treasury in Susa, while additional revenues collected in Ionia were spent well inland by the satrap in Sardis. As very little of these revenues ever made their way back into circulation in Ionia, the effect was to starve the Greek cities of liquidity. Soon enough, the entire Ionian economy seized up.
The Ionians blamed their dire economic condition both on the tyrants ruling their cities and on the Persians who kept them in power. They also would have been well aware of the tide of democratic ideas sweeping across Greece, which must have made an impression on them. Finally, we must throw in the effects of what we would call national feeling. Even after being under the Persian yoke for over fifty years, the Ionians must never have lacked adherents to the cause of freedom from the tyranny of an alien conqueror. This desire for independence must have been continually stoked or rekindled by the example of the free Greek cities just across the Aegean. Moreover, many Ionians interpreted the Persian defeat at Naxos as a sign of weakness. In the Ionian popular imagination, if the Naxians could hold the Persians at bay from behind their city walls, then they could do the same. Aristagoras may have lit the fuse, but the powder had been piling up for some time.
The leaders of the conspiracy met immediately after Aristagoras returned from Naxos. They voted unanimously to rebel, with the exception of the writer Hecataeus, who pointed out the vast wealth available to Darius compared with their own meager resources. After being outvoted, Hecataeus advised them to put their
faith in controlling the sea, where the Persians were weak and by which means they could supply cities under Persian siege. He also advocated that the rebels immediately seize the great wealth stored in the temple to Zeus at Branchidae, to gain sufficient capital to wage a protracted war. Unwilling to commit such a great sacrilege, the rebel leaders voted down the proposal.
At first, things went well. The Persians, evidently surprised, failed to react immediately. The rebels overthrew the city tyrants but for the most part spared their lives and sent them into exile. The one exception was Koes, a strong supporter of Darius, whom the people of Mytilene stoned to death.6 Aristagoras himself voluntarily laid down his position as tyrant and was immediately elected as a general. The rebellious cities made some efforts to coordinate their activities and did manage to create a standard currency from which to pay for soldiers and the maintenance of the fleet. However, they failed in two areas that later proved calamitous. The Ionians never created a combined field army under the command of a single general. Instead, each city opted to go its own way and provide as best it could for its own defense. The rebels compounded this error by failing to immediately expand the revolt into adjacent regions, particularly the Hellespont, the Bosporus, and Thrace. This was a major blunder, all the more remarkable as their actions in trying to involve mainland Greece in the quarrel make it obvious they understood that they could not hope to fend off or prevail against Persia on their own.