by Jim Lacey
Chapter 18
THE PLAIN OF MARATHON
Early in August 490 BC, the Persian army landed at Marathon. The site was chosen for a number of reasons. Probably the most important was the advice of Hippias, who was now near eighty and making a final bid for power.1 He surely had memories of being a young man and landing on this same coast with his father, Pisistratus. At that time, the hill people had rallied to his father’s cause and joined him on his triumphal march into Athens. No doubt Hippias expected a similar welcome on this occasion and promised as much to the Persians. It must have come as a shock to him and a depressing surprise to Datis that much had changed in Attica since Spartan arms had sent Hippias packing. The hill people may still have had complaints, but they preferred to address them through democratic councils rather than count on the possibly fleeting goodwill of a tyrant.2
Rather than march immediately on Athens, the Persians tarried on the coastal plain for an extended period.3 How long is uncertain, but it was long enough to allow the Athenians to mass on the only practicable exit. Some have argued that the Persians halted to await the followers of Hippias, whom they expected to rally to his cause. Others claim the Persians waited in hopes that those Athenians supporting an accommodation with Darius would carry the day and the Persian army could march into the city unopposed. Both answers appear to be faulty. Datis was an experienced commander and would have made his plans or dispositions based on military realities, not on the uncertain hope of a popular uprising. There is a simple military explanation for the Persian delay: Even a modern amphibious landing is a scene of almost unparalleled chaos.4 Unloading thousands of men, tons of supplies, and possibly a thousand horses from unsteady wood ships, beached or lying in the shallows, would have been a nightmare. At the least, it would have taken the better part of the day to unload and get organized. With that done, or while it was ongoing, the Persians would have had to build a fortified camp as a base. Behind this, they would have had to construct palisades along the beach to protect their ships when they marched off to Athens. If they failed to do this, the Athenians surely had enough troops to dispatch to the beach and set the ships afire, leaving the Persians trapped in Attica.5
On top of this, another simple explanation must be added: Although the Athenians could not have known where the Persians would land, the Plain of Marathon must have been on the top of their list. After all, it had a lot to recommend it. As Herodotus says, the plain was an excellent piece of ground for the employment of cavalry. Moreover, it had a promontory that stuck out almost ninety degrees from the shore that provided the fleet a large degree of protection from the elements—a natural port. It was also far enough from Athens to ensure the Persians could land without fearing the Athenian army would be upon them before they completed unloading, but close enough for them to reach Athens in a single day’s hard march, if the gates were open to them.
However, the doors remained closed. The Athenians had not been at war almost constantly for the past twenty years without learning anything. The Plain of Marathon may have had a lot of advantages for the Persians, but it also had a very serious disadvantage: There was only one exit from the plain that was suitable for the rapid movement of an army.6 It is almost inconceivable that the Athenians would not have strongly outposted this exit, as it had been the road used by the last successful invader of Attica—Pisistratus. The reason the Persians did not march off the Plain of Marathon was that there were several hundred determined hoplites standing behind a fortified wall across the southern road.7 They could not have held this Thermopylae-like position indefinitely, but they did not have to. By the time the Persians had assembled sufficient forces to be certain of overrunning the Greek position, the rest of the Athenian army had arrived.8
The Athenians would have been alerted to the Persian landings, probably by smoke signals, within an hour of the first ship making shore. Herodotus tells us that they marched immediately to meet the threat, and there is no reason to believe it took them very long to muster their forces. The army would have begun mustering on the Persian approach across the Aegean and had likely been standing ready since Eretria fell.9 All it needed was a direction in which to march and the order to go. That they would march had been decided by the Athenians some time ago. Although we are not privy to the debates over whether it was best to march out and confront the enemy or to follow Eretria’s example and try to hold the walls, we are certain they took place. Both Aristotle and Plutarch make reference to such deliberations and credit Miltiades with convincing the Athenian assembly that their best choice was to fight on the open field.10 If there were any lingering uncertainties about forgoing the safety of Athens’s walls, the fate of Eretria must have sealed the case. Moreover, marching out for a direct confrontation was always the natural inclination of a Greek city-state. Also, any decision in favor of fighting from behind walls would have come with a significant cost, even if the Persians were held at bay. At least two-thirds of the population of Attica could not fit inside the walls and would have been at the mercy of the invader.11 Moreover, it was close to harvesttime, and the grain was vulnerable to fire.12 If the Persians destroyed it, Athens could not be sure of replacing it, as the Persian fleet was now positioned to blockade Athenian trade routes. Furthermore, if the Persians destroyed Attica’s olive trees, they would undermine the region’s economy for a generation.13 It is, however, interesting to speculate on the plight of a Persian army busily besieging ten thousand Athenian hoplites when fifteen thousand Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies marched into their rear.
For the Spartans had already been sent for.
At the same time the Athenian army had marched to Marathon, the Athenians had sent one of their day runners, Pheidippides, to Sparta to enlist the support of the finest army in Greece.14 Pheidippides arrived in Sparta the next day and announced to the magistrates, “Spartans, the Athenians beg you to rush to their defense and not look on passively as the most ancient city in Hellas falls into slavery imposed by barbarians, for in fact Eretria has already been enslaved, and thus Hellas has become weaker by one city.” The Spartans would have been under no illusion as to their eventual fate if Athens fell, so they resolved to help. Unfortunately for Athens, they were celebrating one of their many religious festivals and could not march until the full moon. Many commentators have interpreted this procrastination as reflective of a secret desire to see Athens defeated. However, the Spartans were a notoriously pious people, so this explanation is believable. Furthermore, there is no evidence that anyone in the ancient world doubted Spartan veracity on this matter. The fact that the first two thousand Spartans arrived as soon after the full moon as they did demonstrates that they were massed on the edge of the Spartan border before the festival ended and had force marched the entire distance. There is one further possible explanation for why the entire Spartan army did not march immediately or why, when it did, only two thousand hoplites were immediately sent. Plato says that the Spartans were late for Marathon because at the time they were engaged in a war against Messene (a helot revolt).15 There is enough other evidence to make a convincing case that the Spartans were having troubles at home, but it is impossible to gauge their extent.16
The Athenian vanguard would have arrived at Marathon in less than half a day and was probably there before sunset. Assumedly, the ten generals (one from each tribe) and the polemarch, Callimachus, were among the first to arrive. From the hills, they watched over thirty-five thousand Persians deploy across the plain and tens of thousands more sailors lounging near the shore, preparing an evening meal. One wonders if the clever old soldier Callimachus surveyed the ground and smiled. The Persians had placed themselves in a bottle, and he was the cork. All he had to do was bide his time; nature would do the rest.
To understand why this was so, we have to discuss the most important element of war, and the one most ignored by many classicists who have written about Marathon: logistics. The Persians had begun this campaign over a month earlier. What supplies
they started with were used up. They may have been able to get some replenishment in Eretria, but it is doubtful the city offered them much after being besieged for a week, at a time when their grain supplies would already have been low, as the new harvest was still in the fields. The eighty thousand men of the Persian force (soldiers and sailors) would have required at least 225,000 pounds of grain and 50,000 gallons of water a day just for the men. The horses would have needed another 25,000 pounds of feed (assuming they could not go out grazing in the presence of the Athenian army) and 10,000 gallons of water per day. The Persians might have supplied the water with some difficulty from a local stream, some wells, and possibly the Great Marsh at Marathon, if it was not overly salty. However, it is unlikely these sources could have provided all of the water needed. Moreover, it should be assumed the Athenians would have dammed up the stream as it left the hills and may even have poisoned it with a few dead animals.
In any case, the food problem was almost insurmountable. There was no possible chance that the Persians could have set up anything approaching an effective commissariat with which to draw supplies from the local area. It is almost certain that strong garrisons and roving patrols of light troops and hoplites were all along the mountains and even in the hinterland to prevent the Persians from foraging. Besides, no foraging party could have left the plain without being observed by the Athenians posted in the hills. From that point forward, the life expectancy of the foragers would have been drastically shortened.17 Moreover, even if the fleet could have been organized to ferry supplies from nearby islands, one can assume that the food stores on these islands would also be running close to empty as the harvest season approached. Even at half rations, the Persian army would be starving in a matter of days.
If logistics are often neglected, there is one other topic that is never mentioned by historians and frequently forgotten by soldiers. Delicately said, the amount of fecal matter an army can produce in a very short time (on full or half rations) is, to put it mildly, amazing.18 Given the sanitation practices of ancient armies, as many as eighty thousand men trapped in a restricted space would have found conditions unlivable within a remarkably short time. Tarrying too long not only would be unpleasant, but would have given time for the inevitable to happen. That great killer of ancient armies—disease—would have struck, and the Persian army would have vanished in the twinkling of an eye.
Datis needed a quick decision or he would be forced to withdraw in defeat. Callimachus knew this, of course, so it is fair to wonder if he smiled as he considered the possibilities. If the Persians advanced for a decisive fight, they would find his army arrayed in a fortified position, on ground of his choosing. If Datis ordered a withdrawal, there would be a moment when they would have some troops loaded and others milling on shore. The same chaos that reigned on landing would repeat itself as the Persians boarded their ships over an open beach. In that moment of vulnerability, Callimachus would order the phalanx forward. In the meantime, the Athenians could train, prepare, and await the Spartans.
The Athenian army marched along the south road to Marathon, through Pallene, and skirting the south side of Mount Pentelicus, to enter the plain from the southeast. There was a second route that went through the hills to the north of Pentelicus and entered the plain from the west, at the village of Varna.19 However, this second road was little more than a shepherd’s path and unsuitable for the movement of a major army or its logistics. Upon arrival at the base of the plain, the Athenians made camp in the sanctuary of Herakles. Here they were joined by a thousand Plataean hoplites. The site the Athenians had chosen was a strong one. The sanctuary possessed an extensive grove, and in ancient times the surrounding area was still heavily wooded. There is also evidence that there was a wall on the site, but this is not likely to have been extensive. Taken as a whole, though, the site provided excellent protection against cavalry and was easily defensible against infantry.20
Before them stretched the Plain of Marathon and the Persian army. All around the plain were hills of sufficient size to hem in the Persians, even if they were not strongly outposted with Athenian hoplites. The Chardra River (a large stream, really) bisected the plain, and the northern half was dominated by the Great Marsh, which was almost impassable for any significant force. At the northern edge of the marsh, the Kynosoura peninsula stuck out at ninety degrees from the beach, providing a perfect shelter for the Persian fleets beached along a narrow strip of sand between the sea and the Great Marsh. Between the marsh and the Athenian position was an almost barren plain, with some sparse tree growth at points.
Herodotus tells us of the Athenians’ arrival at Marathon but leaves us guessing as to what they did at that point. We do know that several days went by without either side engaging. But from Herodotus it would seem that the only notable event during that period was a debate among the ten tribal generals and Callimachus, the overall Athenian commander, on the advisability of attacking at all. In Herodotus’s account, each of the ten Athenian generals had command for one day on a rotating basis. As far as he was concerned, Callimachus’s role as polemarch was mostly honorary, and he had no more authority than any of the other generals. I strongly contest the accuracy of this viewpoint.
Herodotus relates the dispute among these generals:
The Athenian generals were divided in their opinions: some were against joining battle, thinking their numbers were too few to engage the forces of the Medes, while others, including Miltiades, urged that they fight.21
The ten generals remained evenly divided on the matter, so Miltiades asked Callimachus to make the tie-breaking vote. Herodotus has him do this through a fine piece of oratory that convinced Callimachus to vote for battle:
It is now up to you, Callimachus, whether you will reduce Athens to slavery or ensure its freedom.… If you add your vote for my proposal, your ancestral land can be free and your city the first of Greek cities.22
After this, the four generals who supported Miltiades handed over to him the days they were to command the army so he could attack when he pleased. Miltiades accepted the extra command days, but Herodotus reports that he did not launch the attack until it was his day to command.23 There are a number of good reasons to disbelieve Herodotus’s account. First off, Herodotus states, incorrectly, that the Athenians selected the polemarch by lot. He probably assumed this was the case from later Athenian practices and the fact that there was a council of generals who ran military matters in Athens during peacetime.24 However, in 490 BC, the assembly still elected the polemarch, and once appointed, he was the commander in chief. As noted earlier, in this dire hour the assembly would naturally have turned to a man of proven combat experience, and they certainly wanted a man who had won battles for them in the past. As Herodotus never gives us the name of the man who defeated the Thebans, the Chalcidians, and the Aeginetans and stood down a Spartan army, we can only guess at possibilities. Assuming the Athenians possessed one whit of common sense, which they most assuredly did, they would have turned to this man now.25 So Callimachus was not just a man of some political importance. He was also a soldier and general of no small repute. As such, he would have commanded the respect of the other generals present as well as that of the army.
One would also suspect that the decision to fight had already been made in Athens, and this was confirmed when the army marched. Therefore it was unnecessary to have this discussion at Marathon. It is much more likely that the debate was over how to engage and not whether to engage. Some have argued that the Athenians were stunned by the size of the Persian force and began reconsidering their decision to fight. This is unlikely to be the case, as the Athenians would have already received numerous reports about the size of the Persian force all during their advance across the Aegean and particularly when they were camped on nearby Eretria. In fact, based on the long history of reports on the size of enemy forces since the beginning of warfare, these reports were probably greatly inflated. If anything, the Athenians were probably surprised to
find fewer Persians at Marathon than they had feared. Besides, the Athenian army at Marathon had previously stood down a Peloponnesian force that greatly outnumbered it and was filled with dreaded Spartan warriors. Why would the Athenians turn coward now?
So what are we to make of Herodotus’s version? First, no army places ten generals in charge. Based on the workings of almost every army in history, what Herodotus presents is a “council of war” empowered to give advice but not to command. Callimachus may have asked their advice, as many commanders throughout history have done, but the power to decide was his alone. The Athenian generals, upon their arrival at Marathon, had much to take in and debate. However, whether to fight or not was not among the decisions they were called on to make. The Athenians had already made that decision, and if tradition is correct, Miltiades may have been instrumental in getting the assembly to commit to battle. One might also note that conducting a withdrawal in the face of a superior and unbroken enemy is the most difficult of all military operations. If the Persians caught the Athenian army in a state of disorder (as happens to almost all withdrawing armies) on the Attic plain, they would have annihilated it.
The Athenians had come to fight. What they did not yet know was how or when to attack. It is here that Miltiades was instrumental, as he was the only one who could lay claim to having experience in dealing with a Persian army. That Callimachus was willing to listen to his advice is to his credit, but it is also no less than what is expected of a first-rate commander.26
There is one strong piece of evidence from the period that supports the contention that Callimachus was the supreme leader and true hero of the battle. In 490 BC, the Athenians erected a memorial to Callimachus on top of the Acropolis, a high honor indeed. They never did that for Miltiades, who was then languishing close to death in prison.27 The inscription: