by Phil Parvin
So, we need to be deprived of certain information in order to ensure fair outcomes. But why should the veil of ignorance conceal talents, status, and conceptions of the good in particular? The reason why these three things are behind the veil of ignorance is simple and crucial: they are concealed so as to enshrine the key liberal values of freedom and equality, and so as to model the individual as free and equal.
The veil of ignorance protects equality by concealing talents and status. Talent and status are, according to Rawls, the two main forms of inequality. Talent, in this respect, can refer to anything that society values, be it intelligence, strength or the ability to sing or dance or manipulate the stock market. One reason why some people have more resources or opportunities than other people is that they are better at doing the sorts of things that are valued in society.
Status is another key factor in causing inequality. One’s position in the class system can affect one’s opportunity as regards education, jobs, housing and so on. One’s position in the gender or race systems can affect one’s success in the job market, how one is treated or perceived in popular culture, and how one is supposed to behave.
So, Rawls argues that a system of justice can only be one that respects equality if people’s status and talent are not allowed to determine their life chances. Because status and talent are the two factors that have the greatest effect on equality, they must be abstracted from when choosing the principles of justice.
But why should the people in the original position not know their conception of the good? This time, the purpose is to protect freedom. Imagine if the principles of justice were to be chosen by people who did know their conception of the good. Imagine that 80 per cent of those people were fundamentalist Christians and the other 20 per cent were atheists or belonged to other religions. When these people come to decide on the principles of justice, the majority of Christians could impose Christianity as the official, compulsory religion of the society. If they know that they are fundamentalist Christians, they will argue that the state should require all citizens to be Christians, that it should provide only Christian teaching, and that it should punish any non-Christians. In such a society, there will be no religious freedom. People will not be able to choose or change their conception of the good. In such a society, even those who are Christians will not be free, since they will not be able to leave the faith.
Rawls argues that a crucial aspect of freedom is being able to choose and to change one’s conception of the good. If this is the case, then the principles of justice will not protect freedom unless they are chosen independently of any conception of the good. So, conceptions of the good must be behind the veil of ignorance.
The original position, then, is set up specifically to safeguard and enshrine the liberal values of freedom and equality. It is not an open-ended way of deducing first principles. It starts from the substantive first principles of freedom and equality, and moves from them to principles of justice.
The two principles of justice
Rawls argues that parties in the original position would choose two principles of justice. He describes the two principles as follows:
• First principle of justice: ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’ (Rawls 1971: p. 60);
• Second principle of justice: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls 1971: p. 83).
These principles tend to be referred to using shorthand terms. The first principle is called the equal basic liberty principle. Principle 2(a) is called the difference principle, and principle 2(b) is called the equal opportunity principle.
Rawls also tells us how to resolve any conflicts between these principles. The equal basic liberty principle is the most important. Nothing can be done that violates it, even if it adheres to the other two principles. Next comes the equality of opportunity principle, and finally the difference principle.
‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the many.’
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 3–4.
The equal basic liberty principle
We have already said that conceptions of the good are concealed behind the veil of ignorance so as to enshrine the value of liberty. This does not go all the way to explaining, however, why those in the original position would choose the equal basic liberty principle. It might be equally fair to put all possible conceptions of the good into a hat and choose one at random for state enforcement. Why would those in the original position not do that?
The answer is that Rawls specifies that the people in the original position have a very strong interest in choosing their own conception of the good (that is, living a life that they themselves have chosen, as opposed to one that has been forced upon them). Their interest in that is so strong that it overrides all their other interests. Remember, the equal basic liberty principle takes priority over all the others. So, the people in the original position must think that it is more important to be able to choose their conception of the good than it is to have equality of opportunity or a high level of welfare. If it were possible to have more resources by limiting liberty – for example, by forcing all people to do whatever work is most productive at any one time – those in the original position would reject it. Their preference for liberty is one of the required features of the original position. Or, to put it in Rawlsian terms, people have an overriding interest in being able to ‘frame, revise and rationally to pursue’ their conception of the good. It is this interest that explains why the equal basic liberty principle is the most important.
In contrast to teleological theories like utilitarianism, then, Rawls’s theory rules out principles of justice based on any particular conception of the good. It also rules out any argument that says that a particular value is more important than liberty. It is not open to anyone to say that their particular conception of the good is so important, or so correct, that it can be imposed. Even if Christianity, for example, were the one true religion, Rawls suggests that it is more important to allow people to choose a mistaken way of life based on an untrue religion than it is to follow the truth. People must be able to follow their chosen conception of the good, even if it is mistaken.
There are, of course, some exceptions to this rule. People will not be able to choose a conception of the good that involves limiting other people’s liberty, because that would violate the first principle of justice. So, individuals may not impose their views on others by implementing Nazism or fundamentalist religion. Choice does not go that far. But, for individuals, the ability to choose is of paramount importance.
‘The intuitive idea of justice as fairness is to think of the first principles of justice as themselves the object of an original agreement in a suitably defined initial situation. These principles are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would accept in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of their association.’
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 118–19.
The equality of opportunity principle
In order of priority, the equality of opportunity principle comes next. We discussed the concept of equality of opportunity in depth in an earlier chapter, so we wil
l not go into detail here. All we need to say at this point is that the equality of opportunity principle is derived from people’s ignorance of their talents and status. Because in the original position people do not know what sort of characteristics they will have after the veil of ignorance is lifted, it is rational for them to require that positions be allocated only according to relevant criteria. If you don’t know whether you will be black or white, middle or working class, it is rational to say that jobs or education or duties may not be allocated on the grounds of skin colour, and that people from different class backgrounds should have the same opportunities to develop the talents and skills that are needed for positions of advantage.
The difference principle
The difference principle is perhaps the most unusual and complex principle of justice. Remember, the difference principle states that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are … to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.’ This is a very demanding principle. It means that inequalities are only allowed if they benefit the worst-off in society. They are not allowed if they benefit others, even if they do not affect the position of the worst-off at all.
Remember, in the original position, we do not know our own talents or the talents of anyone else. So we would reject inequality based on talents, because we may end up without talents that are valued. Rawls argues that we would want to protect individuals from being harmed by a lack of talent. We would want principles of justice that benefit the worst-off because once the veil of ignorance is lifted we might be the worst-off! Indeed, Rawls stipulates that the people in the original position must be very worried about the possibility of being badly-off. As a result the principles of justice must help the worst-off as much as possible, because that is the best way of securing equality.
One objection to the difference principle is that it is unfair to the talented. You might think that people deserve to be rewarded for their talents. For example, talented sportspeople, pop singers and actors are paid more than people who lack those talents. Rawls rejects this idea. He argues that natural endowments such as talents, health and so on are morally arbitrary: a matter of luck. A person has not done anything to deserve the talents they are born with, and so does not deserve more resources. For Rawls, we should pay some people more than others only if doing so benefits the worst-off. For example, if it were necessary to pay doctors more money to ensure that there were enough of them then doing so might be permitted, since having enough doctors benefits the worst-off.
Case study: Fair inequality not equality
It is important to remember, in the context of our discussion in Chapter 3, that Rawls does not seek to establish equality, so much as fair inequality. Rawls’s scheme allows for inequalities to exist between the richest and the poorest members of society. Why does he do this? Why does he not simply argue that resources should be distributed equally among all members of society? One answer is, as we have said, that he does not think that that is what rational, self-interested individuals in the original position would choose. But that is not good enough because, as we have seen, Rawls constructs the original position in such a way as to get the outcomes that he thinks are consistent with justice. So: why does Rawls argue for fair inequality, rather than equality?
The answer is a controversial one, and one which has proven quite unpopular among more egalitarian and left-wing critics: he wants to provide an incentive for people with particular skills which could be of benefit to society to develop these skills and, hence, he wants to allow for the ‘trickle-down effect’.
The trickle-down effect is the idea that allowing higher wages as incentives can actually benefit the worst-off, by ensuring that valuable jobs are done. If no inequality is allowed whatsoever, there will be no material incentive for anyone to work harder and increase their productivity. Without the prospect of higher pay, it does not make economic sense for companies or individuals to try to innovate, and improve the products they offer. As a result, the overall amount of resources available in the society will be lower than it would have been if inequality of income had been allowed. People will be not be working so hard, will be producing less, and will not be innovating to the same level that they would if they had an economic incentive to do so. There will also be fewer jobs as a result, and all this is bad for the worst-off. In some circumstances, inequalities provide incentives for people to innovate and start up new businesses, and this kind of activity benefits those who are worst-off by providing more jobs and wealth in the economy. Hence, Rawls argues that inequalities in wealth and income can be compatible with justice as long as they are justifiable to – and help improve the condition of – the worst-off.
Conclusion
There is a lot more to say about Rawls’s theory, and we fill out the picture in the chapters to come. The central thrust of Rawls’s theory is that we must take the interests and aspirations of individuals seriously. We should not subordinate individuals to the general good of others. Instead, principles of justice must respect individual freedom and equality. Rawls’s principal achievements were to show the weakness of utilitarianism, and to provide a liberal theory of social justice which was egalitarian rather than libertarian. While traditionally many liberals argued that liberalism required a commitment to free markets, Rawls showed liberalism should instead be committed to egalitarian redistribution and state intervention. Parties in the original position would not choose free markets; they would choose to reject free markets in favour of an economic system which alleviated unfair inequalities through redistribution. Rawls’s principles of justice defend the redistribution of wealth, income and power from the richest members of society to the poorest in the name of freedom and equality.
A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work of political and moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. It is a fountain of illuminating ideas, integrated together into a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must either work in Rawls’ theory or explain why not… [I]t is impossible to finish his book without a new and inspiring vision of what a moral theory may attempt to do and unite; of how beautiful a whole theory can be.’
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 183.
Key ideas
Original position: The hypothetical situation in which persons consider and choose principles of justice, incorporating those conditions that Rawls believes it is necessary to impose upon the deliberative process in order to ensure that the outcomes are fair, and consistent with respecting the freedom and equality of all individuals.
Veil of ignorance: In order to ensure that the principles of justice chosen in the original position are fair, Rawls argues that we should not bring certain considerations into the deliberative process. Rawls therefore suggests that we should imagine that our status, talents and conception of the good are concealed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’.
Conception of the good: The particular preferences, ideals, aspirations and values which make up an individual person’s chosen way of life.
Separateness of persons: The idea that each individual is a person in their own right, with their own unique conception of the good, rather than simply an anonymous member of a social whole. Liberal justice seeks to respect the integrity of individual human beings as persons. Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, ignores the integrity of individual human beings by subordinating their interests and conceptions of the good to the overarching good of society as a whole.
Two principles of justice: The two principles which Rawls believes would be chosen in the original position. The first principle is commonly known as the equal basic liberty principle. The second is split into two parts: (a) the equal opportunity principle, and (b) the difference principle.
Dig deeper
Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Exami
nation of the Principal Doctrines of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Samuel Freeman, John Rawls (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
John Rawls, Collected Papers (ed.), Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).