by Thomas Leahy
There were further shifts in British strategy between 1989 and late 1992, albeit minor. Despite Brooke’s public statements and the reopening of backchannel contacts with republicans, little progress was made in talks. The British government and intelligence services did not trust republican leaders who talked peace whilst the IRA continued its campaign. According to Sinn Féin’s record of backchannel contacts with the British government in the 1990s – which are said by some to be more accurate than the British government’s version of events –58 limited conversation emerged in backchannel communications up to late 1992. In November 1991, for instance, Sinn Féin recorded a message from the British representative from the intelligence services talking about possible means of communication. In reply, the republican leadership said ‘we [are] more interested in the substance of communications than the means’. A few months later, on 19 May 1992, the British representative ‘urged Sinn Féin to be more proactive in using the line of communication’. In the meantime, the British government proceeded with exploratory multiparty talks without Sinn Féin under Brooke and Sir Patrick Mayhew in 1991 and 1992. British intermediaries informed the republican leadership via their backchannel contacts about progress in the talks.59
In a letter to David McKittrick from prison, Danny Morrison suggested that the constitutional party talks showed that Peter Brooke had ‘given up on [republicans]’.60 Michael Cunningham agrees that the British state did not seek to involve republicans in a settlement in early 1992. For Cunningham, the Brooke–Mayhew talks aimed to isolate Sinn Féin and the IRA from political life, because continuing IRA activity made the British government wary of trusting republican peace overtures.61 However, the evidence available suggests that the British Conservative government did want a settlement inclusive of Sinn Féin even during the Brooke–Mayhew talks. By attempting to warn republicans that political discussions would move forwards without them, the British government hoped to encourage the IRA towards a cessation.62 This tactic failed. The SDLP and Irish government would not proceed to create a settlement without the IRA. In their view, the British approach was a recipe for continued conflict. Martin Mansergh, for example, notes: ‘For Albert Reynolds, securing an IRA cease-fire was more important than a talks process … a successful agreement from which republicans were excluded offered no guarantee of an early end to violence’.63 A former British civil servant involved in the peace process also commented that the Brooke–Mayhew talks:
in the early 1990s [broke] down. Why? Because of John Hume … he thought there was a growing chance in his dialogue with Gerry Adams of bringing the republicans around … Hume did not want … an all-party agreement excluding Sinn Féin.64
In the words of Peter R. Neumann, ‘[g]iven the SDLP’s and the Irish government’s veto, the British government’s indirect approach of integrating Sinn Fein into the political process had thus become untenable’.65
Thereafter, there was a slight alteration in British political strategy in order to draw republicans towards a political settlement and a ceasefire. The focus switched to promoting more proactive dialogue in public statements and backchannel contacts. One example is Sir Patrick Mayhew’s speech given at the University of Ulster in Coleraine in December 1992, shortly after the Brooke–Mayhew talks had failed. Mayhew stated that ‘there can be no proper reason for excluding any political objective from discussion’. He promised that republicans had a role to play in Northern Irish society if the conflict ended.66 A text of the speech was handed to the republican movement beforehand in backchannel meetings, illustrating that the British state wanted a positive reaction from republicans.67 Adams commented: ‘Mayhew … is acknowledging our ability to [affect] the political agenda’.68 Thereafter, backchannel contacts between the British government and republican leaders increased in intensity up to 1993. According to Sinn Féin’s record of these contacts with the British government in the 1990s, there were ten messages passed between the republicans and the British between October 1990 and October 1992. After the Brooke–Mayhew talks failed, there were twenty-one messages passed between the two sides from 4 December 1992 to 25 May 1993. This figure included meetings between senior Sinn Féin members and representatives from British intelligence services.69
It is inaccurate to suggest that the impetus for increased contact between the Provisionals and the British state was the so-called ‘conflict is over’ message. On 22 February 1993, John Major was given a message, supposedly from republicans, that read: ‘The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close.’70 It has since been established that this message was a forgery. The British intermediary ‘Fred’ altered the words of a message by republican intermediaries in the hope that it would encourage the British government into commencing intensive dialogue with republicans.71 Whilst John Bew and Martyn Frampton accept that the message was fake, they argue that it explains why the British state increased dialogue with the republicans in 1993.72 But British policy had already shifted before this, and not in relation to the ‘plea’ for help in the made-up republican message in February 1993.73 Mayhew had already made his important speech and forwarded a copy of it to republicans in December 1992. The February 1993 message merely reassured the British government that it appeared right to engage with Sinn Féin before a ceasefire and that republicans were not playing games. Since IRA attacks continued, there was no reason for the British state to fully trust republicans any more than previously. But the failure of the Brooke–Mayhew talks to produce a settlement, continuing IRA violence and the pan-nationalist talks had encouraged the Major government to take risks and increase contact with the Provisionals by late 1992.74
The Major government’s willingness to take risks and accept the sincerity of the republican leadership’s desire for peace demonstrates a careful approach to intelligence received from various sources including backchannel intermediaries.75 There certainly appears to have been greater restrictions on the security forces using lethal force against suspected IRA volunteers via the SAS in 1993 and 1994, with few republicans dying in such incidents. Phoenix suggests there was ‘an increasingly common pattern in the 1990s – decisions would be taken, then reversed because the police were under growing political pressure to avoid “shoot-to-kill” incidents which might jeopardise the back-door diplomacy between the Provisionals and the government’.76 Major and Blair realised that trying to conduct talks required a lowering of the political temperature, if possible, which frequent SAS ambushes would not provide.
With IRA activity continuing, however, the British state adopted the ‘dual-approach’ strategy that they had previously followed between 1974 and 1975.77 The British would continue to try to erode the IRA’s armed capacity, partly via intelligence and security efforts. In the meantime, British representatives would talk to the republican leadership before and during a ceasefire to try to persuade them to accept an internal power-sharing settlement.78 Yet, as Chapters 8 and 9 have shown, IRA activity had not been reduced to an ‘acceptable’ and ineffective level by August 1994. So why did the IRA call a ceasefire in 1994?
Political Factors and IRA Strategy, 1983–1998
A range of authors suggest that the increase in loyalist violence towards the nationalist community was partly responsible for a rethink in republican strategy in the 1990s. By 1993, loyalist paramilitaries were killing more people than the IRA. Most of their victims were nationalist civilians, but they targeted at least twenty-six republicans between 1989 and 1993 too.79 Yet too much weight has been attributed to this factor. There had always been loyalist activity and violence throughout the conflict. In fact, between 1975 and 1976, loyalists killed 126 people each year. Whilst devastating for the families targeted, loyalist killings in 1993 and 1994 were lower, at forty-eight and thirty-nine people respectively.80 Furthermore, republican leaders were already seeking a political compromise before the loyalist onslaught of the 1990s. The IRA also remained capable of killing loyalists. For example, they shot leading UDA figures Joe Bra
tty and Raymond Elder on 31 July 1994 in Belfast.81 The dilemma for the republican leaders was that any action against loyalists risked sparking tit-for-tat republican and loyalist attacks. These attacks could have derailed the progress made by Sinn Féin in gaining backing from the SDLP, the British government and the Irish government for an inclusive peace process. The Shankill fish-shop bombing in October 1993 is a prime example, as it sparked loyalist retaliation at Greysteel in County Derry a few days later, leading to eight nationalist civilians being killed.82 The political repercussions made regular bomb attacks against loyalists too problematic in case civilians were killed. This point could explain why Bratty and Elder were shot instead.83
Various external factors to Ireland played a limited role in convincing republicans to accept a ceasefire in 1994.84 By the 1990s, various paramilitary allies for the IRA across the world, including the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, ended their armed campaigns.85 Danny Morrison, the former Sinn Féin director of publicity, wrote an article entitled ‘Bitter Pill’ in prison in April 1992. Although never published in An Phoblacht, it argued that republicans needed to look at their allies elsewhere, for example in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas had renounced armed struggle in 1990 and gone into opposition. Morrison praised this strategy as realistic, as the Sandinistas’ armed campaign could achieve no more. He argued that republicans should also think about ending their armed campaign whilst they had enough support from which to create political momentum to move forwards without conflict.86 Nevertheless, external factors were not crucial. Other armed struggles that the IRA supported, such as ETA’s campaign in Spain, continued. Consequently, the IRA would not have been completely isolated. What can be said is that the example of other paramilitaries compromising with former enemies provided further legitimacy for the actions of the republican leadership during the 1990s.87
As English suggests, internal factors in Ireland had the greatest bearing on the formation of the republican leadership’s peace strategy.88 More specifically, the inability of Sinn Féin to outpoll the SDLP or nationalist parties in the Irish Republic in the early 1980s was a crucial factor encouraging republican leaders towards a political compromise.89 Sinn Féin were repeatedly beaten by the SDLP in local district council, Westminster and European elections up to 1984. In some areas, such as Belfast city council, Sinn Féin did match, and at times, even surpassed SDLP totals. But overall they were not dominating nationalist politics in Northern Ireland.90 In Irish elections, Sinn Féin performed poorly, producing no TDs between 1985 and 1996.91 Gerry Adams recognised this electoral stagnation. Referring to the republican leadership’s decision to engage with constitutional nationalists in the 1980s, Adams writes:
[t]here was a military and political stalemate. While Irish republicans could prevent a settlement on British government terms, we lacked the political strength to bring the struggle to a decisive conclusion. Military solutions were not an option for either side.92
As far as Adams was concerned, republicans could maintain their level of activity, but so too could British forces. He also realised that republicans did not have a strong enough political mandate to decisively sway a political settlement towards fulfilling the republican objective of Irish unity.
One factor inhibiting Sinn Féin’s electoral growth was IRA attacks that killed civilians. Despite the republican leadership being aware of the damage that civilian casualties had on republican support levels, they were never completely prevented. In the Irish Republic, Gordon Wilson, the father of twenty-year-old Marie Wilson, who had been killed in the Enniskillen bombing, was made a member of the Irish Senate. This action further signalled the rejection of the IRA by the Irish state.93 The IRA had to apologise for further civilian deaths resulting from IRA attacks and bombings thereafter, including the Warrington bombing on 20 March 1993 which killed two children. That particular incident encouraged a mother from Dublin, Susan McHugh, to arrange a peace rally in Dublin.94 Former republican prisoner Féilim Ó hAdhmaill recognises the impact such killings had on republican support:
Events such as the Warrington bombing had a massive impact in the south of Ireland. People would have been coming over from England with connections to Ireland, and they … had children. Everybody sees this whole incident … where these kids are killed, and that it was totally unnecessary. Not that any life is necessary to take, but I am just saying that that particular incident had a big impact on support for republicanism within the 26 counties [southern Ireland]. I think the deaths of civilians (not just at Warrington) would have impacted emotionally on everyone including republicans. However, politically it was disastrous for them, especially in the 26 counties, where knowledge of the conflict and its context was relatively unknown to most people living there. Most people there were usually not living the conflict on a day-to-day basis and had little personal knowledge of it or of how it was affecting communities and families there. In the main most of them were dependent on restricted, censored and indeed politically biased information from the media outlets there. An illustration of that might be that whilst there were massive protests in the South over the deaths of children at Warrington, little was said of the death of a seventeen-year-old youth deliberately killed in Belfast ‘in retaliation’ [Damien Walsh] by loyalists. That was also an incident where collusion/collaboration between loyalists and the British security forces was strongly suspected due to the particular circumstances … The problem is that this conflict was complex, like all conflicts. It wasn’t simply a case of ‘goodies’ versus ‘baddies’. However, it was important as in any conflict for each side to portray themselves in a good light and their enemies in a bad light.95
Whilst republicans felt that British injustices against nationalists were often overlooked by the media in southern Ireland, they still faced the fact that IRA injustices were highlighted and did appear to influence Sinn Féin support in the Republic of Ireland. Following the Enniskillen bombing, for example, Adams admitted: ‘our efforts to broaden our base have most certainly been upset … This is particularly true for the south and internationally.’96 Further attacks leading to civilian deaths, even if these were by accident as republicans claimed, put the party beyond the pale for some voters across the island. Statistics concerning IRA ‘intended targets’ must be viewed in parallel with the IRA’s killing of civilians in specific incidents. The implications of this argument are that even if the IRA had escalated its campaign, it was unlikely to have succeeded in fulfilling its objectives. More attacks would have undoubtedly increased the number of civilian deaths, whether intentionally or not, which the evidence suggests would have seen Sinn Féin’s vote, at best, stagnate, and at worst, decline.
Very few Protestants in Northern Ireland would ever vote for Sinn Féin, as they believed that the IRA’s shooting of members of the predominately Protestant RUC and UDR was sectarian. Henry Patterson describes how in the border areas of Fermanagh and south Tyrone where numbers of killings of members of the security forces were high, the local Protestant population viewed the IRA’s campaign as ethnic cleansing. Whilst Patterson admits that the IRA did not target these individuals because of their religious affiliation, more Protestants had historically joined the security forces, and therefore many from that community were convinced that the attacks were sectarian.97 Tommy McKearney supports this assessment. In his opinion, the local knowledge of Northern Irish security-force personnel meant that the IRA had to target them. But he acknowledges: ‘many Protestant people viewed this campaign as a sectarian assault on their community’.98 The republican community was therefore fighting against over 50 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland before 1998.99
If Sinn Féin wanted a strong electoral mandate to pressurise the British government to return to talks and to grant significant concessions, they needed greater electoral support across the island.100 The need for more electoral support from southern Ireland contributed to Sinn Féin dropping abstention from the Dái
l in 1986 to see if it would increase their vote. In that year, Adams argued that this was a sensible move because there was in his view ‘instinctive republicanism’ in the Irish Republic.101 Nonetheless, a series of factors specific to the Republic of Ireland meant that Sinn Féin’s support levels remained low. Censorship of the Provisionals from the early 1970s had restrained their ability to gain support. The Dáil’s Offences Against the State Act in the 1970s enforced that anybody associated or known to be supportive of the Provisionals who was in publicly funded work could lose their job. There was also a broadcasting ban against members of Sinn Féin and the IRA until 1994.102 Republicans believe that both policies hampered their efforts to gather support. Adams recalls how an RTÉ reporter was sacked after interviewing Martin McGuinness when the three IRA coffins from Gibraltar came back to Northern Ireland in the late 1980s.103 Seán Mac Manus, Sinn Féin’s National Chairperson, told its Ard Fheis in 1990 that poor electoral results in the Irish Republic resulted from: ‘[a] combination of factors … among them is Section 31 [the broadcasting ban] which leads … to a failure to inform the public of our policies’.104
Brendan O’Brien reminds us, however, that the IRA’s campaign in Northern Ireland offered few practical benefits for citizens of the Irish Republic: ‘in the Republic, there were no British soldiers on the streets, no memories of street conflagrations in [19]69 … interest faded’.105 Fears that the conflict might spread also increased following incidents such as the Dublin–Monaghan bombings in 1974. The latter were brutal reminders that loyalism was not going to accept any united Ireland settlement born out of conflict. Most Irish citizens were either against the IRA, too scared to support it for fear of loyalist violence being regularly visited on the Republic of Ireland or of being monitored by state forces, or were indifferent to a conflict that they believed did not directly involve them.106