by Thomas Leahy
For Down and Newry, see reference numbers 271, 420, 635, 977, 1215, 1216, 1240, 1883, 1983, 2049, 2057, 2165, 2202–4, 2283, 2307, 2332, 2337, 2368, 2410, 2437, 2511–12, 2519, 2525, 2561–2, 2575, 2599, 2613, 2617, 2681–9, 2694, 2695, 2700, 2714, 2724, 2739, 2743, 2747, 2755, 2757, 2764–6, 2821, 2829, 2848, 2906, 3004, 3079–81, 3101–4, 3108, 3308 and 3441 (Newry deaths includes ‘intended target’ killings by the South Down IRA, who primarily operated in Newry. The total for 1985 includes the Newry RUC base attack orchestrated with the South Armagh IRA.)
For Fermanagh, see reference numbers 118, 389, 390, 528, 529, 531, 564, 565, 602, 654, 674, 682, 867, 931, 936, 1066, 1068, 1277, 1302, 1680–2, 1869, 1899, 1909, 2036, 2103–4, 2106, 2169, 2171, 2201, 2215, 2218–19, 2234, 2243, 2265, 2275, 2335, 2387, 2393, 2427, 2476, 2614, 2628, 2629, 2665, 2671, 2691, 2708, 2733–4, 2758, 2794, 2822, 2863, 2925, 2962–3, 2997, 3084–5, 3172, 3198 and 3354.
For North and mid-Armagh, see reference numbers 177, 185, 286, 407–9, 666, 695, 710, 780, 810, 818, 918, 930, 945, 973, 1036, 1146, 1180, 1242, 1407, 1497, 1516, 1651, 1770, 1796, 1825, 1843, 1859, 1890, 1951, 1972, 2090, 2096, 2223, 2267, 2286–7, 2303, 2386, 2453, 2473–5, 2478, 2488, 2509, 2520, 2559, 2577, 2633, 2673, 2728–9, 2989, 3003, 3036, 3078, 3092, 3099, 3122–4, 3132, 3159–62, 3168, 3176, 3182, 3197, 3203–5, 3318, 3373, 3400, 3475, 3480 and 3486.
For south Armagh, see Toby Harnden, ‘Bandit Country’: The IRA and South Armagh (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2000), pp. 467–507.
For Tyrone, see reference numbers 126, 129, 211–12, 306, 365, 524, 586–8, 696, 732, 746, 766, 801, 813, 836, 848–51, 865, 881, 905, 996, 999, 1024, 1042, 1067, 1083, 1140, 1178–9, 1203, 1224–5, 1239,1300, 1423, 1525, 1534–5, 1672, 1689, 1696, 1828, 1895, 1897, 1905, 1924, 1933, 1938–40, 1948, 1966, 1967, 1986, 2014, 2037, 2040, 2050, 2091, 2099, 2101–2, 2116, 2118, 2175, 2187–91, 2252, 2336, 2351, 2353–4, 2363–4, 2392, 2395, 2431, 2436, 2464, 2489, 2521, 2530, 2543–6, 2555, 2565, 2576, 2598, 2610, 2620, 2627, 2632, 2639–40, 2646, 2649, 2651, 2726–7, 2731, 2740–1, 2768, 2782, 2798, 2832, 2847, 2901, 2926–7, 2961, 2972–9, 2999, 3025, 3042, 3056, 3077, 3088, 3095, 3129, 3143, 3156, 3191, 3277–84, 3377, 3393 and 3448–9.
Appendix 2
Seats Won by Sinn Féin and the SDLP in District Council Elections between 1985 and 1997
Sinn Féin
1985 1989 1993 1997
Antrim 1 1 1
Armagh 1 1 1 3
Ballymoney 1 1
Belfast 7 8 10 13
Cookstown 4 2 2 5
Craigavon 2 1 2 2
Derry 5 5 5 8
Down 2 2
Dungannon 4 3 5 5
Fermanagh 8 4 3 5
Limavady 2 1 1 1
Lisburn 2 2 3 4
Magherafelt 4 3 4 5
Moyle 2 1 1 1
Newry and Mourne 5 4 5 8
Omagh 6 6 6 6
Strabane 3 2 2 4
Total 59 43 51 74
SDLP
1985 1989 1993 1997
Antrim 3 4 4 4
Ards 1
Armagh 7 8 9 7
Ballymena 1 1 2 3
Ballymoney 2 3 3 3
Banbridge 3 3 3 3
Belfast 6 8 9 7
Castlereagh 2
Coleraine 2 2 3 3
Cookstown 3 5 5 4
Craigavon 5 6 6 7
Derry 14 16 17 14
Down 10 12 13 12
Dungannon 5 5 4 4
Fermanagh 4 5 5 4
Larne 1
Limavady 4 6 7 7
Lisburn 2 3 3 2
Magherafelt 4 4 5 5
Moyle 4 4 3 3
Newry and Mourne 14 17 15 12
Newtownabbey 1 1 1
Omagh 5 6 5 6
Strabane 3 3 5 5
Total 101 121 127 120
See ‘Results of elections held in Northern Ireland since 1968’, CAIN online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/elect.htm.
Appendix 3
Other Alleged Agents and Informers Killed by the IRA*
John Joseph Kavanagh, reference number 50.
Terence Herdman, reference number 866.
Hugh Joseph Slater, reference number 1233.
Kieran McCann, reference number 1590.
Patrick Joseph Smyth, reference number 1840.
John William Lawlor, reference number 1964.
Michael Kearney, reference number 2121.
Michael Madden, reference number 2237.
Anthony Shields, reference number 2240.
John Torbett, reference number 2403.
Seamus Morgan, reference number 2409.
Patrick Scott, reference number 2419.
Brian McNally, reference number 2641.
John Corcoran, reference number 2692.
Damien McCrory, reference number 2719.
Patrick Murray, reference number 2771.
Thomas Emmanuel Wilson, reference number 2856.
Eamonn Maguire, reference number 2871.
Anthony McKiernan, reference number 2903.
Thomas Oliver, reference number 3217.
Christopher Harte, reference number 3375.
Michael Martin Brown, reference number 3476.
Caroline Moreland, reference number 3505.
All references from David McKittrick et al., Lost Lives (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd, 2007). Allegations against each individual remain unsubstantiated.
* Note: In some cases the IRA has recently apologised for falsely accusing a person of informing.
Notes
Introduction
1. Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 29–46, 135–46, 230–45, 265.
2. For examples, see Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948, trans. by Haim Watzman (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); and Mosab Hassan Yousef with Ron Brackin, Son of Hamas (Milton Keynes: Tyndale, 2011).
3. See Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau; and Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Penguin Books, 2010), pp. 447–51, 454–8, 462–6.
4. For example see Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and John Bew, Martyn Frampton and Inigo Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (London: Hurst and Company Publishers, 2009).
5. Greek acronym for the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.
6. Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 447–58, 462–6.
7. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, pp. 29–46, 135–46, 230–45, 265.
8. ‘Loose Talk Can Be Fatal’, An Phoblacht, 25 January 1974, p. 4.
9. Thomas Bartlett, ‘Informers, Informants and Information: The Secret History of the 1790s Reconsidered’, in Thomas Bartlett, David Dickson, Dáire Keogh and Kevin Whelan (eds.), 1798: A Bicentenary Perspective (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2003), pp. 406–21.
10. See examples in Pádraig Ó Concubhair, ‘The Fenians Were Dreadful Men’: The 1867 Rising (Cork: Mercier Press, 2011), pp. 29, 40–6, 76–85.
11. For examples of old IRA operations against British intelligence see Tom Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1989), pp. 104–15; and John Borgonovo, Spies, Informers and the ‘Anti-Sinn Féin Society’: The Intelligence War in Cork City 1920–1921 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007).
12. Greg Harkin and Martin Ingram, Stakeknife: Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 2004), pp. 60–9; John Ware, ‘How, and Why, Did Scappaticci Survive the IRA’s Wrath?’, Irish Times, 15 April 2017.
13. For Scappaticci’s denials see Harkin and Ingram, Stakeknife, pp. 242–54; ‘Stakeknife: Ex-IRA and MI5 Members Could Be Prosecuted’, BBC News Online, 18 December 2018: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-46598765.
14. Harkin and Ingram, Stakeknife; John Ware, ‘How, and Why, did Scappaticci Survive’; for republicans see
Gerry Bradley with Brian Feeney, Insider: Gerry Bradley’s Life in the IRA (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 2009), pp. 220–1, 234; Tommy McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament (London: Pluto Press, 2011), pp. 242–3; Anthony McIntyre, ‘How Stakeknife Paved Way to Defeat the IRA’, The Blanket, 11 May 2013: http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/paved.html; for academics, see below.
15. Danny Morrison, ‘Number 10’s Murderer – Scap’, 30 January 2016: www.dannymorrison.com/?p=3620.
16. Martyn Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes: Britain’s ‘‘Dirty War’’ in Northern Ireland’, in Samy Cohen (ed.), Democracies at War against Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2008), pp. 77–8.
17. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 2nd edition (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 580.
18. ‘The Spy’s Tale’, The Independent, 6 April 2006: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-spys-tale-the-life-and-death-of-denis-donaldson-472992.html.
19. For instance, see Peter Taylor, Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1998), pp. 160–2, 256–65.
20. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 77–8.
21. For example see ‘Stakeknife Leaves the IRA “in Shock”’, The Telegraph, 13 May 2003: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1429902/Stakeknife-leaves-the-IRA-in-shock.html.
22. William Matchett, Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA (Lisburn: Hiskey Ltd, 2016), pp. 2–24, 100–4, 220, 231–8, 248–57; Colonel Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Weidenfeld Military, 1997), pp. 222–6; Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, Phoenix: Policing the Shadows (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), pp. 389–95; Sean O’Callaghan, The Informer (London: Bantam Press, 1998).
23. McIntyre, ‘Stakeknife’; Anthony McIntyre, ‘Serving the Agenda of Two Masters’, Irish News, 17 December 2005: www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2005/dec17_serving_two_masters__AMcIntyre.php.
24. Danny Morrison, Rebel Columns (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 2004), pp. 131–4; Danny Morrison, ‘Number 10’s Murderer – Scap’.
25. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 77–8, 86–93; Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 110–11.
26. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 93–4; see also Martyn Frampton, The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn Fein 1981–2007 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 79–85.
27. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 110, 246–7.
28. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 107–14, 242–51; Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 93–5; Frampton, Long March, pp. 16, 45–6, 79–93; John Bew and Martyn Frampton, ‘“Don’t Mention the War!”: Debating the Notion of a “Stalemate” in Northern Ireland’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40.2 (2012), 296.
29. Moloney, A Secret History, pp. 336, 574–82.
30. Thomas Hennessey, ‘The Dirty War: MI5 and the Troubles’, in Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas (eds.), Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 (Gloucestershire: Amberley, 2009), pp. 593–96.
31. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 93–4; Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 72, 107, 246–7.
32. Cf. James Dingley and Michael Kirk-Smith, ‘Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of Intelligence’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20.3–4 (2009), 566.
33. Cf. Jon Moran, ‘Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland’, Intelligence and National Security, 25.1 (2010), 1–23; Bradley W. C. Bamford, ‘The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland’, Intelligence and National Security, 20.4 (2005), 581–607; see also the journalistic account of spies by Stephen Grey, The New Spymaster: Inside Espionage from the Cold War to Global Terror (Milton Keynes: Penguin Random House, 2015) pp. 6, 58–81.
34. Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Books, 2003), pp. 303–15; Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1999), pp. 13, 159–68, 195–200, 238–40, 283–5, 301–22; Taylor, Provos, 277–327.
35. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 77–9.
36. There was a heated exchange between Paul Dixon and Bew and Frampton in 2012 that primarily debated definitions of the word defeat, rather than providing detailed analysis of the intelligence war. See Paul Dixon, ‘Was the IRA Defeated? Neo-Conservative Propaganda as History’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40.2 (2012), 303–20.
37. Niall Ó Dochartaigh, ‘The Longest Negotiation: British Policy, IRA Strategy and the Making of the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement’, Political Studies, 63.1 (2015), 1–19.
38. Richard English, Does Terrorism Work? A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 30–6, 107–26, 131–42.
39. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 62–4, 72; Ó Dochartaigh, ‘The Longest Negotiation’, 6–8; Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland (London: The Ministry of Defence, 2006), ch. 8, point 809.
40. See a similar view of IRA strategy in Ó Dochartaigh, ‘The Longest Negotiation’, 6–7.
41. O’Brien, Long War, pp. 196–9.
42. O’Brien, Long War, pp. 319–24.
43. Bew et al., Talking to Terrorists, pp. 1–16, 239–59; Colombia is a recent example of a peace process incorporating ideas from the Northern Ireland. See ‘Colombia Adopts Northern Ireland Peace Process Model in Bid to End Civil War’, Belfast Telegraph, 18 March 2014: www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern–ireland/colombia-adopts-northern-ireland-peace-process-model-in-bid-to-end-civil-war-30100821.html.
44. Standout academic examples discussing aspects of the regional nature of the conflict are Amy Grubb, ‘Microlevel Dynamics of Violence: Explaining Variation in Violence Among Rural Districts during Northern Ireland’s Troubles’, Security Studies, 25.3 (2016), 460–87; Edward Burke, An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018); Martin McCleery, Operation Demetrius and its Aftermath: A New History of Internment Without Trial in Northern Ireland 1971–5 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015); Henry Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also accounts by Darach MacDonald, The Chosen Fews: Exploding Myths in South Armagh (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2000); Toby Harnden, ‘Bandit Country’: The IRA and South Armagh (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2000).
45. John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1999), pp. 258–9; see also English, Does Terrorism Work?, pp. 20–1, 38–41.
46. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 6, 9, 12, 40–8, 362, 390–2.
47. David Omand, Securing the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 13, 101–2, 175–79, 191.
48. Ian Adams and Ray Wilson, Metropolitan Police Special Branch: A History 1883–2006 (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015), pp. 379–89; Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp. 771–98.
49. Ó Dochartaigh, ‘The Longest Negotiation’, 1–19.
50. Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers (London: William Collins, 2017) pp. 11, 263–77, 307–28, 352–409, 492–7.
51. Omand, Securing the State, pp. 90–3, 260–9.
52. Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 2–11, 17–21, 59, 188, 317.
53. Operation Banner, 809.
54. Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 59.
55. For British intelligence efforts against loyalists see Johnston Brown, Into the Dark: 30 Years in the RUC (Dublin: Gill Books, 2005); Harkin and Ingram, Stakeknife, pp. 160–227; Colin Crawford, Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 100–18; for the INLA see Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, INL
A: Deadly Divisions (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1994), pp. 193–210.
56. Frampton, ‘Agents and Ambushes’, pp. 79.
57. Loch Johnson, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies’, in Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companions to Intelligence Studies (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014) pp. 3–4; Michael Warner, ‘Theories of Intelligence: The State of Play’, in Dover et al. (eds.), Intelligence Studies, pp. 25–9; Omand, Securing the State, pp. 29, 90–1; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), pp. 17–19; Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, pp. 1–21, 485–98.