In the Frankfurter Zeitung, editor Dr Rudolf Kircher set out “semi-official” German peace terms – they were the mix which was to become increasingly familiar. The Berlin correspondent of the Japanese Domei agency claimed that “a lull” was expected while Hitler watched the reaction of Britain. A definite refusal would launch the German attack on the British Isles. The general sentiment in Germany was for peace, but Churchill and his group would have to resign. A new Cabinet centred on Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of the First World War, Lloyd George and the British fascist leader Oswald Mosely – now in prison – would have to be formed. Nevertheless, it was “almost a foregone conclusion” that Britain would turn down Germany’s terms.11
Colville, writing in his diary, thought this was “the psychological moment to define our own war aims and state our terms”. They would be such that Hitler must refuse them, but in so doing would lose credit in the eyes of the outside world and also in those of his own people. But, Colville feared, “the Government lacks the imagination to make such a move”. Forty-eight MPs agreed with his sentiments, having tabled a resolution calling for Churchill to state Britain’s war aims. To those must be added Duff Cooper, and there was the Smuts’ response to Churchill’s telegraph on 12 July, with its lengthy proposal for a post-war settlement.
By coincidence, a major meeting was being held at the Reich Economic Ministry in Berlin, under the chairmanship of Minister Walther Funk, to discuss a directive issued by Göring on 22 June, concerning the organization of a Greater European economic area under German leadership. The Germans were well advanced with their plans for a post-war settlement of their own. But, indicating the uncertainty in the broader situation, the report stated:
One difficulty of planning lay in the fact that the Führer’s aims and decisions were not yet known and the military measures against Britain were not yet concluded. We therefore did not know whether the British Empire and its economic influence would remain to any extent or not. Those responsible for preliminary planning should assume that the British economy would continue to exist in some form and would affect the situation at any rate outside Europe.12
From the USA, there were reports in the media – relayed by J. W. T. Mason, the United Press “war expert”, that “tentative peace suggestions” were being presented by neutral powers. But Churchill seemed to float above the fray, ignoring these and all calls to respond with a detailed alternative vision. Instead, he instructed Lord Halifax to reject Hitler’s initiative. This Halifax did during a scheduled broadcast to the nation. “We shall not cease fighting,” he said, “until freedom for ourselves and others is secured.” Not unaware that Halifax was the man most likely to be seen as a negotiator, the Irish Times observed that this “may be taken as the authoritative answer to Herr Hitler’s vague offer of peace. Nothing could be more definite”.
Meanwhile, in the Glasgow Sheriff Court, 47-year-old Matilda Lynn was sentenced to twenty-one days imprisonment for, among other things, telling an acquaintance that docks in the south had been destroyed and that the Germans were in control there.13 In reporting such events, though, the press was not a disinterested player. It was fighting its own battles with the Ministry of Information, and had forced what was regarded as a major U-turn, when the Ministry announced that it would not introduce compulsory censorship. The left-wing Daily Herald crowed: “We have been saved from a blunder … which might have had the most evil consequences”.
More softening of the official line was apparent from Harold Nicolson, who had hosted a free concert in Hendon Park, sponsored by his Ministry. With more than 10,000 attending, he announced a policy rethink. The Ministry, he said, “is not, an Ogpu14 or a Gestapo. It does not desire to dictate to the citizens of this free country what they should think, say, feel or hear. It does not pry upon the private thoughts of the people. It does not bully and it does not sneak”. He finished by saying: “We want people to be more friendly and neighbourly than they have been. Talk more than you have ever talked before,” he said, “but talk of victory”.15 The Mirror noted, rather sourly, that Nicolson had not told his audience that the most effective way of preventing or killing rumour was speedier release of news of national importance.
The German Naval Staff was giving Hitler the bad news that invasion preparations could not be finished by the middle of August. And only when air superiority in the Channel area had been achieved could minesweeping start. Mine clearance was vital in order to permit free passage of the fleet, but it could take up to two weeks. The timetable was being stretched to the point of inelasticity. And only on this day had the Führer Directive been turned into detailed orders for action and passed down to the lower echelons, telling the various naval departments to start preparations in earnest. Merely preparing and transmitting orders to the various levels of command took time. It would not be until 25 July that the collection points for the barges would be set up.16
On the propaganda front, the Daily Express declared that the British were winning the “Battle of the coast”. Twenty-one “Nazi Raiders” had been shot down over the weekend. The Daily Telegraph made the figure 24. The paper then ridiculed Hitler’s “boast” to “starve British ports of shipping and the British people of the food and raw material they need”. After a month of intensive German air attacks, he had “completely failed”. But at least the paper acknowledged that the Germans were waging an “economic war”, part of the blockade that was using U-boats as one of the primary weapons.
This day was a landmark of a different kind – the first time a German submarine had visited a French port, in this case Lorient. Soon, eight or nine boats would be based at the port, taking 450 miles off the route over the north of Scotland. Gradually, the network of bases was extended, taking in Brest, Cherbourg and St Nazaire.17 The grip was tightening on Britain’s supply lines and the Express was premature in predicting victory. It was also underestimating the deadly effect of the minelaying programme. German destroyers, E-boats and specialist minelayers, U-boats, and aircraft were encircling Britain’s coast, its estuaries and ports, with deadly barriers of high explosive. And most of this action was by night.
Fighter Command, on the other hand, flew 611 daylight sorties. They lost two aircraft and downed two Germans. And the British were trying to impose their own version of a blockade. Six Swordfish carried out a minelaying sortie and raids were carried out on airfields in France and barges in Amsterdam. Another two aircraft were lost, bringing total RAF losses on the day to four, against the two to the Luftwaffe.
DAY 14 – TUESDAY 23 JULY 1940
Halifax’s speech jolted official German circles, according to Shirer. He recorded “angry Nazi faces” at the noon press conference. A spokesman had said with a snarl: “Lord Halifax has refused to accept the peace offer of the Führer. Gentlemen, there will be war”. Shirer noted that the campaign to whip the people up for a war with Britain had started with a bang that morning. Every paper in Berlin, he said, carried practically the same headline: “Churchill’s answer – cowardly murdering of a defenceless population!”. The story was that, since Hitler’s speech, the British had increased their night attacks on helpless women and children.18
Hitler, however, stood aloof. He attended a performance of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung at the Bayreuther Festspiele – the last time in his life he was ever to see a live performance of Wagner. Augustus Kubizek, a childhood friend, recalled the Chancellor telling him: “I am still tied up by the war. But, I hope it won’t last much longer and then I’ll be able to build again and to carry out what remains to be done”.19
The Press Association conveyed news of a “renewed German peace drive”. German radio had embarked on an intensive “peace offensive” in which Great Britain had been repeatedly urged to accept Hitler’s “appeal to reason”. The Bremen station was almost monopolized from 9.30 p.m. by a series of talks on the theme that this was Britain’s last chance to save herself. “Unless the Führer’s offer is accepted now – and as it stands – ther
e can be no question of its acceptance at a later date, or of any negotiations at any time,” one had said. “If the Führer is forced to do what he does not want to do, the order for the utter destruction of England will be finally and irrevocably given. The sad fact of the present crisis is that the views of the British people have not been heard at all”.
That, of course, was the last thing the British Government wanted. William Connor, writing in his Cassandra slot in the Mirror, noted that a farmer had been fined £26 for “revealing” that Hitler had only sent over a few bombers so far, then speculating on what would happen when thousands came over. “I suppose he can count himself lucky that he wasn’t clapped in the State dungeons for about half a year”, wrote Connor.
Elsewhere Haydn Spenser Dunford, a 28-year-old dockyard fitter, described as a “Dunkirk hero”, had been fined £50 and ordered to pay £15 15s costs by Falmouth magistrates for “trying to cause disaffection among naval men”. This was a man who had been at the Dunkirk and Brest evacuations and among the first to board bombed ships. He had rescued wounded men and thrown boxes of ammunition overboard to prevent explosions. Yet he got no sympathy from the bench chairman, Mr A. W. Chard, who told him: “Only by a majority have we decided to fine you. The next offender like you will have no option to prison”. Dunford’s mates had a whip-round to pay the fine.20
The Daily Express this day listed five cases caught by Cooper’s “Silent Column”, including Phyllis Bateman, a 30-year-old Post Office clerk in Clacton, jailed for three months for suggesting to two Army sergeants – flippantly, she claimed – that if they did not agree with government policy then they should “revolt”. “Why don’t you start a riot or a strike?” she is alleged to have said.
Home Intelligence articulated complaints about the prosecution of a prominent South Yorkshire councillor for calling Chamberlain a traitor and criticizing him for unpreparedness. This was contrasted with Halifax’s broadcast rejection of Hitler’s peace offer. “We will not stop fighting till freedom for ourselves and others is secured”, he had said. On another occasion, a man had been fined for saying, “this is a capitalist war in defence of dividends”. This raised more than a few eyebrows. The Daily Worker had been openly saying much the same thing for months.
The last straw was the conviction of a vicar, on the evidence of four boys – two aged 15 and two 16. It was alleged that in addressing about a hundred boys he had “communicated air raid information which might be useful to the enemy, and made remarks which were likely to cause alarm or despondency”. In Germany, stormed the Mirror, children are taught to spy on adults – even on their own mothers and fathers. The British people have often been told that one of the worst features of the Gestapo system of the Nazis is the way children are encouraged to supply evidence for its prosecutions. And the British people are now being assured by their Ministry of Information that there is no intention of encouraging a “Gestapo” atmosphere here. We need more than mere assurances.
There was only one person who could now sort this – the Prime Minister. In the Commons, he was challenged by Kenneth Lindsay, MP for Kilmarnock. The policy was “well-meant in its endeavour”, Churchill assured him. After the briefest of defences, Cooper’s baby was passed into what was called in the USA “innocuous desuetude”.21
The Express on its front page offered a story about the state of the fleet. Britain, as builder of warships for the world’s navies, had been able to take over ships being built in British yards for foreign governments. This was not helpful to Churchill, who was in the process of begging fifty surplus destroyers from Roosevelt.
But the story also gave details of a massive new minefield being laid, from Cornwall to south-east Ireland, ostensibly to prevent the Germans invading Ireland. This was the lead item in The Guardian, which also noted that much of the French deep sea fishing fleet in the western ports had escaped to Britain. Many of the vessels had been taken over by the Royal Navy, bringing home the staggering number which were being conscripted, or “impressed” in Navy jargon. Trawlers, drifters and whalers were to form the backbone of the patrol service, providing capable warships which could spell death to any invasion fleet.
As to the air war, the Luftwaffe was still targeting shipping. This day it concentrated its attacks on a convoy codenamed “Pilot” steaming off the Lincolnshire coast. Two raiders were shot down by fighters. In the mid-afternoon, a lone Dornier dropped bombs on the old airship hangar at Pulham and another attempted to bomb the Vickers Armstrong aircraft factory at Weybridge. Fighter Command lost three aircraft, all to accidents. A Blenheim and a Hudson were also lost, bringing RAF losses to five, compared with six suffered by the Luftwaffe. In two full weeks of fighting, total RAF losses stood at 110, compared with ninety-nine to the Luftwaffe.
One of the Luftwaffe losses made history in a small way when a Blenheim night fighter downed a Dornier 17 using airborne radar. But with the final stages of the kill in bright moonlit conditions, it was a long time before the success could be repeated. The Luftwaffe had its own successes. The cargo ship Lady Mostyn detonated a mine 1½ miles off the Formby Light Vessel, sinking with the loss of all seven crew. And a Dornier bomber attacked a submarine, about 150 miles east of Aberdeen. This was most likely the Narwhal, which had sailed from Blyth on 22 July to lay mines off the Norwegian coast. She failed to return.
DAY 15 – WEDNESDAY 24 JULY 1940
Assessing progress so far, the air fighting had started with a flurry in the Dover and south coast region, with additional attacks on the east coast. The rest of the country had suffered sporadic attacks, many by night, and a minelaying campaign was under way. From purely the operational stance, therefore, the picture had been a brief burst of activity, followed by a prolonged lull, with no major engagements other than attacks on shipping.
Only when the political dimension was added did this make sense. Without doubt, Hitler had been holding back the Luftwaffe, in the hope of negotiating peace. But now briefly in Berlin, he was “full of fury against London”. Walther Hewel, diplomat and Nazi Party “fixer”, wrote to Hohenlohe in Switzerland, instructing him to break off contact with Kelly. “The Führer does not desire further attempts made to build bridges for the British. If they crave their own destruction, they can have it”, he wrote.22 The Mirror ran a story headed: “Nazis cancel peace offer”. It was remarkably well informed.
However, even as this was happening, Göring was starting a new – and independent – line of contact with London, through the founder of the Dutch KLM airline, Albert Plesman. The initial contact had come via a Swedish KLM pilot named Count von Rosen, who was also Göring’s nephew. Göring arranged a meeting at the luxurious Karin Hall on his estate in the most beautiful part of the March of Brandenburg, forty miles from Berlin. Plesman then wrote a text which was later forwarded to London. It offered terms which were very familiar, leaving the British Empire intact, giving Germany control of the European continent and allowing the USA control of the Americas. But, in a significant addition, it also offered to remove occupation forces from Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and France.
The document was sent to the Dutch Ambassador in Stockholm and from there to Eelco van Kleffens, the former Dutch Foreign Minister, now in London as part of the Dutch Government in exile. He in turn passed it to Lord Halifax in the Foreign Office, where it was “studied with much interest”. There was communication between van Kleffens and Halifax as late as 29 August. Later, however, Plesman learned that there was “no interest in his plan”, while Göring disowned it.23
With only tiny fragments of the frenetic diplomatic manoeuvring being reported, the main concern of the British people was budget day. Swingeing tax increases to pay for the war were being announced. There was also a historical milestone, with the start of universal “pay as you earn” (PAYE). Tax was to be deducted in instalments from wages, rather than as a lump sum at the end of the year.24
The war started early when a hostile aircraft appeared over Glasgow and bomb
ed a printing works. Some windows of a Rolls Royce factory were broken and a few minor casualties were reported. Then, a few minutes before eight in the morning, an enemy formation was detected heading towards a convoy in the Thames Estuary. Fighters were scrambled but no German aircraft were shot down. At about eleven, an enemy formation threatened a convoy of small colliers. RAF fighters sent to intercept were visible from the coast, and thousands lined the shore to watch, raising the profile of Fighter Command. Elsewhere, houses were damaged in the usually quiet suburb of Walton-on-Thames and the Vickers factory in Weybridge was attacked by a solitary Dornier. Brooklands airfield was bombed by a Junkers 88 pretending to come into land. Remarkably little damage was done. This one got away, but another Junkers crashed near Brest. The aircraft was destroyed and all four crew perished.
Less visibly, shipping continued to be targeted. HMT Rodino was sunk off Dover, together with anti-submarine trawler Kingston Gelena. Twenty sailors were killed. The trawler Fleming was also sunk. And at sea that night, a disaster unfolded. The French liner Meknès, sailing from Southampton with 1,179 repatriated French naval personnel, was headed for Marseilles. Despite sailing floodlit and with prominent French markings, it was attacked and sunk by E-boat S-27. Destroyers responded to distress signals but 383 French sailors still drowned.25
By comparison, air losses for the day had been trivial: Fighter Command five – with 561 sorties flown; the Luftwaffe twelve down. No operational Bomber or Coastal Command losses were reported. The sea battle had been larger than the air component.
DAY 16 – THURSDAY 25 JULY 1940
Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain Page 10