The chief reason for the Wehrmacht’s initial success on land was its adaptation to the possibilities of a new kind of warfare. As only small cogs in a murderous machine, the memoirists rarely use the word Blitzkrieg in order to describe the novel combination of lethal force that made the German Army superior. As first suggested by theoreticians such as B. H. Liddell Hart and Charles de Gaulle, it was the combination of massed tanks, dive bombers, and mobile artillery that breached enemy lines and surrounded entire armies, cutting their communication and supply links in order to force them to surrender. Hitler’s massive rearmament had developed weapons systems such as the Stukas, which struck fear into their enemies’ hearts, while the systematic militarization of youths had produced crews ready to use them without compunction. But once the victories no longer continued, some soldiers, such as Hans Queiser, began to realize that this was turning into “a war of conquest and annihilation” that might drag on and on.31
During the first years of the war, soldiers coped with German losses by considering them necessary costs of ultimate victory. To the young men caught up in the struggle, there was no denying that even military success demanded an increasing death toll. Gerhardt Thamm remembered that in “May, June, and July of 1940, our hometown newspaper was filled with death notices. Silesia had lost the cream of its youth.” His father survived a shrapnel fragment that ripped into his chest only because he was carrying “a pocket-sized version of the New Testament.” Soldiers tended to pass over the death of a comrade by attributing their own survival to blind luck or better training. In midst of a staff conversation, Heinz Schultheis heard the hhhsssscht of an approaching grenade and threw himself down. “A thunderclap” later and the master sergeant was wounded by a splinter in his thigh and the first lieutenant “had turned into a corpse with a smashed head.” Although nothing happened to Schultheis, “the uncanny randomness of the hit shocked [him] for a long time.”32
The actual combat experience was a mixture of excitement, fear, and tedium. Raw recruits tended to look forward eagerly to their “baptism of fire,” hoping to prove their mettle. But when they witnessed comrades being wounded or passed disfigured corpses, many soldiers feared they might be next. “Up to this point I had not seen a dead man, was shocked and mortally afraid,” Horst Andrée recalled. The survival instinct made them want to be anywhere else. “More than once I said to myself, if I could only be at home.” Similarly, flying as a tail-gunner into massive antiaircraft fire, Hans Queiser “got to know a whole new quality of fear.” To suppress such fright, commanders often issued extra rations of schnapps or methamphetamine drugs. While noncommissioned officers showed green recruits how to survive combat, lieutenants led the charge in order to inspire the men to follow their example.33 This system worked fairly well as long as orders seemed reasonable and objectives were gained so that attacks made sense to the men. Between bursts of action, there were also long stretches of boredom, which the soldiers filled by playing cards or writing letters home.
Robert Neumaier reports that “all were enthusiastic to be finally used as real soldiers, defending the fatherland, and participating in the ‘ultimate victory.’” But first, they had to be trained for their actual tasks and assembled at their military bases. Then they “were loaded onto a freight train, whose wagons were only furnished with a stove and some straw.” Wehrmacht troop transports often took days to reach their distant destinations because they had to wait on sidings to let civilian, supply, or hospital trains pass. Upon arrival, units had to disembark and march on to reach staging areas from which they would be deployed to the front, known as “the main fighting line,” in order to reinforce positions, prepare for an attack, or fend off enemy offensives. Since enlisted men had little information about the course of battle, all they could do was to grin and bear the orders that they seldom understood.34
An infantry attack created an explosion of violence that heightened perception and released the men’s animal instincts. Usually it began with “withering artillery fire opposed by an equally heavy barrage of enemy artillery.” Gerhard Krapf describes that in this “suddenly unleashed fury, one mechanically moved forward, sprinting from crater to crater.” Due to the shelling “the ground heaved, the air was filled with the deadly and destructive products of man’s hatred, the atmosphere shivered with the uproar of murderous machinery.” Ignoring “a lovely blue flower,” he “moved on, alternately sprinting and firing.” Time seemed to stand still. “Hunger, thirst, and sensation no longer registered, on and on we stumbled.” At last, coming to a trench, he “was checked by a ghastly obstacle” of intertwined German and enemy bodies. On reaching yet another trench, he made out “Germans, fellows from various units,” whom he gathered in order to hold the objective. “Now we had regained [the assigned position], but at what cost!”35
Whenever the movement stopped, classic trench warfare developed in intricate fortified positions that shielded combatants from enemy fire. Often prepared by slave laborers of the Organisation Todt, German trenches were narrow, about six feet deep, and ran in zig-zag patterns so as to avoid crossfire. Sections were anchored by machine gun positions and every five yards there were rifle stands with overlapping firing ranges. Forward observation posts were connected to infantry trenches, which were backed up by supply and staging positions. For protection, crews built elaborate bunkers with double bunks, tables, and woodstoves, giving “the impression of comfort and warmth.” Gerhard Krapf’s dugout was “a model of trench life style,” being quite roomy and “covered with a double layer of logs, on top of which had been placed a thick blanket of twigs and dirt.”36 These shelters were the places where soldiers huddled in inclement weather, wolfed down the food of the field kitchens, and killed time between active engagements.
One important key to survival was the comradeship by which soldiers supported each other in life-and-death situations. Living and fighting in close quarters created a male bond that women had a hard time understanding. In the squad, led by noncoms, everyone depended upon the competence of everyone else. Lone fighters did not survive long. In the platoon, headed by lieutenants, the covering of flanks was essential in order to avoid being attacked from the rear. In the company, higher officers set the tone of the outfit by interpreting orders creatively, thereby engendering trust in their troops. Because shirking duty, cowardice before the enemy, and quarreling with one’s fellows had lethal consequences, these inclinations were suppressed by the soldiers themselves. The chief reason why wounded men, once recovered, volunteered to go back to their primary group, was this sense of fellowship. Robert Neumaier returned to the front because “there was true existential comradeship; everyone stood up for everyone else.”37
Wehrmacht superiors also selected exceptionally valorous and battle-proven soldiers for officer training. Many privates, such as Paul Frenzel, were happy to keep their heads down, because not being noticed increased chances of survival considerably. But other patriotic youths such as Hans Tausch, Heinz Schultheis, and Gerhard Krapf were delighted to be promoted and sent to officer school. Due to having been wounded, the latter was exempted from marching drill, “but the greater portion of activities consisted of weapons theory and practice and of classroom instruction in disciplines such as military law … tactics … troop leadership and such things.” Moreover, there was additional specialist training for each respective army branch. For his artillery assignment, he had “to brush up and/or take the trouble to acquaint [him]self with logarithms and a lot of math” for calculating the flight path of shells. When he was on furlough, his “mother was very proud of her officer son who looked so dashing in his new uniform.”38
A large part of the German forces was not engaged in mortal combat but rather served in relative comfort in the occupied territories. Ethnic Germans, in particular, welcomed Wehrmacht soldiers, as they were grateful to be freed from hostile control. According to Gerhardt Thamm, “after their liberation mother’s uncles and aunts confirmed Herr Goebbels’ story of atrociti
es against Germans committed by Poles,” which made them glad to be included in the expanded boundaries of the Reich. Other nationalities, such as Hungarians, who looked for German help against their Slavic neighbors were also pleased to be allied with the Wehrmacht and hoped for a return of ethnic diasporas to their national state. Because the fighting had been less acrimonious there and Nazis respected their populations more, the occupation regimes in Western and Northern Europe were generally less oppressive than in the East, which was to be Germanized.39 In the occupied countries, soldiers who were no longer battle-fit guarded prisoner-of-war camps, supply routes, and military bases.
France was an especially popular billet. Many Germans loved or at least respected the country. According to Hans Queiser, the victors “did not hate the French,” having often learned the language in high school and visited its attractive tourist destinations. Most occupiers regretted that Paris had entered the war because of the Polish Corridor and simply reasoned that “it had to be defeated so that Britain can be eliminated.” Moreover, the troops lived in relative comfort by settling in to the military installations of the defeated and enjoying the wines and cuisine of their involuntary hosts. While they found that the majority of the French “avoided any contact with the Germans,” some young locals who were impressed with the Wehrmacht were interested in talking about “a united Europe under German leadership.” A few young women were also willing to flirt with the dashing victors. The collaboration of the conservative Vichy regime made it easy to overlook the first instances of national resistance.40
Even better was an assignment to the Channel Islands. Compared with other duties, “living on the island was … the purest vacation.” Paul Frenzel recalled that “the British did not think of bombing their own island” in order to protect its inhabitants. Hellmut Raschdorff marveled about “the lodgings, dining halls, and lounges—I did not live this well at home.” Since the Royal Navy was not about to attack, the main challenge for the occupation forces was not to get too bored. With reading books, watching films, listening to piano recitals, and savoring the food such as the abundant lobsters, the troops tried to idle the time away. While the fortification of the islands by slave laborers required supervision, there was still plenty of time for making anti-Hitler jokes or holding chess tournaments. Even the arrival of a “gold pheasant,” a Nazi political officer, who ordered Raschdorff to stand watch in the harbor, could not spoil the mood.41 Such idyllic duties were exceptional, but they made soldiers temporarily forget the deadly reality of war.
Similarly, being sent to Norway seemed like winning the lottery. After the initial conquest there was no longer any major fighting. Nazi propaganda made it appear to Hans Queiser “that the German Wehrmacht was almost in a friendly country” and that it would not be difficult to convince these “Nordic people” to accept “the necessity of a German Europe.” A minority of Norwegians embraced this optimistic offer and the local fascist leader, Vidkun Quisling, was ready to accept his subservient role. Moreover, the long occupation also led to a number of liaisons between Norwegian women and German soldiers which resulted in over nine thousand children. But the majority of the population reacted “with icy disregard” to enemy soldiers when they dared to show up in a theater.42 In spite of the official rhetoric of friendship, the arrogant behavior of the Germans eventually inspired the formation of a vigorous resistance movement that made the country a rather dangerous place for the occupiers.
By contrast, wherever the Wehrmacht had plundered and supported rigorous Germanization policies, the young soldiers met with open hatred. For instance, in the prewar conquest of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the ethnic struggle between Germans and Czechs had left deep-seated hostility. The Sudeten German Hans Tausch recalled, “My homeland could no longer be Austrian, it did not want to be Czech, and it would have liked to become Reich-German.” The economic exploitation and political repression of the Czechs fueled a fundamental revulsion that equated everything German with National Socialism. Similarly, in the general government of Poland, the brutality of the Nazi conquest, the murder of part of the elite during the combat, and the merciless mistreatment of the defeated population engendered an aversion that made collaboration unpopular. One Polish nurse confided to the wounded Paul Frenzel, “as suppressed [people] we must be quiet. But things will change again someday.”43
Surprisingly enough, the autobiographies also contain sporadic references to local supporters who eased the burden of warfare for young soldiers. Most Germans looked down upon their allies, such as the Italians, who “just could not do anything right,” since they proved unable to defeat even the Albanians. Nonetheless, the Wehrmacht used numerous local assistants, collected in units of HIWIS, an abbreviation for the word Hilfswillige (volunteers). Gerhard Baucke commanded thirty POWs as assistants to man a field bakery that produced bread for an entire company. In some instances, a close relationship developed between individual soldiers and their local helpers, since the latter knew the lay of the land. Robert Neumaier baldly states that during the winter retreat in the East, “I owed my life to my Russian comrade.” Sometimes it was just an unexpectedly warm reception by a farmer who provided food and shelter or a supportive smile by a young woman that restored a tired soldier’s spirit.44
The Wehrmacht used a whole range of measures to maintain the morale of its fighting troops. Surprisingly enough, direct political indoctrination is only rarely mentioned in the recollections, if at all. During basic training, soldiers had to attend formal lectures on the purpose of the war, the nature of the enemy, and the like. When it was Gerhard Krapf’s turn to hold forth on the adage that “war is the father of all things,” he used the opportunity to argue “that war most certainly could not be seen as productive of anything but destruction”—and he actually got away with this critical view. Nazi political officers were generally disliked because they were not considered to be real fighting men. Most soldiers were not in the war to advance National Socialist goals, but rather for the sake of “defending the ‘good’ Germany from an army of brutal Bolsheviks threatening to bring the war home to Germany.” Even while it was serving the Führer’s cause, the army “to a degree still represented pre-Hitlerian ideals” of patriotism.45
More effective was the slanted reporting from the front by journalists in special propaganda companies. As a war reporter, Hans Queiser recalled that “‘ideological conformity’ was a matter of course” because his stories had to pass censorship. “Naturally, top priority was a ‘positive’ portrayal of German victories and successes—as long as these existed.” It also went without saying “that our own losses, failures, and catastrophes were not allowed to be reported.” Soldiers only laughed about “invented hurrahreports,” since such whitewashing lacked credibility. With the increasing length of the war, “it was to a certain degree ‘desired’ for reports to reflect something of ‘the toughness of the struggle’” as long as these were not too realistic. Because troops only knew about “the events which took place in their immediate vicinity,” the more thoughtful ones were desperate for any news that allowed them to get an overall impression of how the war was going.46 As a result, many soldiers developed a talent of reading between the propaganda lines.
Another method of reinforcing the fighting spirit was promotion and decoration as a result of exceptional valor. Due to the limitation of the Reichswehr to one hundred thousand men by the Treaty of Versailles, the Wehrmacht had a constant need for officers, especially since junior ranks were most at risk. When a private such as Hans Tausch showed unusual bravery in serving as a tank gunner, his commander promoted him to sergeant on the battlefield “by handshake” in order to take over for personnel killed in action. But as an officer candidate he still had to complete formal training. Soldiers with wounds often received special badges to indicate that they had been hurt in combat. More coveted was the Eisernes Kreuz (Iron Cross), a decoration invented during the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. Though Tausch was immedi
ately decorated with the EKII, Gerhard Krapf never received this honor because a superior blocked the award. The converse was a “death command”—a lethal assignment by an officer who wanted to get rid of a disliked soldier for presumed dereliction of duty.47
Regular mail service of letters and packages maintained emotional ties between the front and the home and was essential for shoring up morale. Based on the experience of World War I, the Wehrmacht devoted considerable resources to assuring steady deliveries, since mail served as a sign of life that reduced anxieties about the fate of loved ones. To reassure young soldiers who did not yet have girlfriends, the BdM asked its members to start corresponding with an unknown soldier. One day Erich Helmer received a letter that began: “Dear anonymous recipient, I have no idea what is hiding behind the field-post number except that you must be in the air force.” More important was correspondence between newlyweds, such as Kurt and Anneliese Huber: “And yet it is a painful joy to offer consolation to you while I myself need it because of the separation from you which is so hard to bear.”48 Although censorship suppressed military information and political commentary, the letters were an emotional lifeline for both partners.
When the front was stable enough, entertainment was an important means to distract soldiers from the murderousness of fighting. One means of diversion was the showing of films like the fabulous adventures of Baron von Münchhausen starring Hans Albers, “which let one forget the war.” The radio was also essential for troops stationed far away from home. Sentimental hits such as “Lili Marlene” by singers such as Lale Andersen touched the heart by promising a reunion: “Underneath the Lantern / by the barrack gate / darling, I remember / how you used to wait.” Few soldiers were as lucky as the noncom pilot Rudi Müller, who beat out his officers in attracting the favor of the touring popular singer Evelyn Künneke, best known for the song “Have You Kissed in the Dark?” For troops stationed in the rear, there were also occasional church services, in which the chaplains prayed patriotically for Germany’s victory.49 During short leaves, small-town soldiers often engaged in military tourism, marveling at the cultural wonders of Vienna, Paris, or Rome.
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