The Rise and Fall of Diamonds

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The Rise and Fall of Diamonds Page 12

by Edward Jay Epstein


  Instead, N. W. Ayer outlined a far more subtle program which included arranging for lecturers to visit high schools across the country."All of these lectures revolve around the diamond engagement ring, and are reaching thousands of girls in their assemblies, classes and informal meetings in our leading educational institutions," it explained in a memorandum to De Beers. The advertising agency also organized in 1946 a weekly service called "Hollywood Personalities," which provided 125 leading newspapers with descriptions of the diamonds worn by "screen stars." And it continued its efforts to focus news coverage on celebrities displaying their diamond rings as a symbol of romantic involvement.

  In 1947, the agency even commissioned a series of portraits of "engaged socialites." The idea was to create prestigious "role models" for the poorer middle-class wage earners. The advertising agency frankly explains in Its 1948 strategy paper, "We spread the word of diamonds worn by stars of screen and stage, by wives and daughters of political leaders, by any woman who can make the grocer's wife and the mechanic's sweetheart say 'I wish I had what she has.' " Aside from the romantic connection, N. W. Ayer also found that it could subtly exploit the premarital insecurity women were found to have in their relations with men. Even though the tradition of diamond engagement rings was, at least in its popular form, mainly an invention of the late nineteenth century, the advertising agency decided to give it deep historical roots and establish it in the public's mind as an inseparable part of the marriage process. "We keep people thinking of the diamond as the traditional symbol of the pledge to wed," it explains in the 1948 memorandum. "The tradition itself is kept before them its origin, its meaning, its history. Told in different forms, in articles, in short 'filler' items, in pictures, this story goes from our desks to appear in books, magazines and newspapers." As evidence of the success of this campaign of surreptitious authoring of news stories, it cited the fact that "newspapers have carried our items about the engagement diamonds of a list of women that range from Mrs. [Harry S.] Truman to the 'glamour girls' of Hollywood." It suggested that these carefully constructed news stories were especially effective in planting ideas in the public mind, noting, "Such items develop the feeling, more convincingly than mere repetition of the statement could do, that the diamond is in fact the only accepted symbol of engagement."

  De Beers needed a slogan for diamonds that expressed both the theme of romance and of legitimacy. Then in 1948 a N. W. Ayer copywriter came up with the caption "A Diamond Is Forever," which was scrawled on the bottom of a picture of two young lovers on a honeymoon. Even though diamonds can be in fact shattered, chipped, discolored or incinerated to an ash, the concept of eternity perfectly captured the magical qualities that the advertising agency wanted to impute to diamonds. Within a year, "A Diamond Is Forever" became the official logo of Dc Beers.

  In 1951, N. W. Ayer found some resistance to its million dollar publicity blitz. It noted in its annual strategy review: "The millions of brides and brides-to-be are subjected to at least two important pressures that work against the diamond engagement ring. Among the more prosperous, there is the sophisticated urge to be different as a means of being smart.... The lower-income groups would like to show more for the money than they can find in the diamonds they can afford."

  To remedy these problems, the advertising agency argued that "it is essential that these pressures be met by the constant publicity to show that only the diamond is everywhere accepted and recognized as the symbol of betrothal."

  N. W. Ayer was constantly searching for new ways to influence American public opinion during this period. Not only did it organize a service to "release to the women's pages [of daily newspapers] all the fresh material that we can find or create about the engagement ring," but it set about exploiting the relatively new medium of television by arranging for actresses and other celebrities to wear diamonds when they appeared before the camera. It also established a "Diamond Information Bureau," which placed a quasi-official stamp of authority on the flood of "historical" data and "news" it released. "We work hard to keep ourselves known throughout the publishing world as the source of information on diamonds," it commented in a memorandum to De Beers, and added, "Because we have done it successfully, we have opportunities to help with articles originated by others." Among such successes, for example, the agency pointed to an article in the National Geographic exalting diamonds that it had helped prepare.

  When sociologists such as Thorstein Veblen popularized in his book The Theory of the Leisure Class the idea that Americans were motivated in their purchases, not by utility, but by "conspicuous consumption," N. W. Ayer proposed applying this sociological insight to the diamond market. "The substantial diamond gift can be made a more widely sought symbol of personal and family success an expression of socio-economic achievement."

  To exploit this psychological need of Americans to conspicuously display symbols of their wealth, N. W. Ayer specifically recommended: "Promote the diamond as one material object which can reflect, in a very personal way, a man's ... success in life." Since this campaign would require advertisements addressed to upwardly mobile men, the ad agency suggested that ideally they "should have the aroma of tweed, old leather and polished wood which is characteristic of a good club." In other words they were to evoke in men the sweet smell of success.

  To further develop the diamond mind in America, N. W. Ayer asked both psychologists and sociologists to analyze "basic human wants," such as "comfort," "freedom from fear," "longer life," "the ability to attract the opposite sex," and "social approval." It justified this psychological investigation to De Beers in the following terms: "An advertiser who can make a close and believable association between one or more of the "basic human wants" and his product, can rouse a more vigorous and more universal demand for his product and in the process tend to separate this demand from control by consumers' current economic situation."

  The point of this manipulation was to create in consumers a desire for diamonds that had been subliminally linked through advertising with other "basic human wants." Dr. James Bossard, a professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, observed in a report that he prepared for N. W. Ayer: ~ The engagement ring . . . is a symbol of the ability to get your man in the competitive race. . . . It has the further features that it is not easily given (too expensive), it is visible (it sparkles), it is permanent (other things wear out), and it advertises the economic status of the giver. . . . Large scale society makes for impersonal relations. One result of this is to place marked emphasis upon outward manifestations and visible evidence." He concluded "Conspicuous consumption becomes more impressive than quiet confidence. . . . Symbols are indicators of status.... A formal and visible symbol of approaching marriage becomes a vital necessity in a large office, a big university, a large plant."

  In its strategy plan, N. W. Ayer strongly endorsed the professor's analysis. It added also that in terms of fashion "women are conditioned to want what is shown in the fashion news." It asserted that through psychologically designed advertising and public relations, women could be further conditioned to think of diamonds as a necessity of life.

  For some sixteen years, N. W. Ayer carefully cultivated the romantic image in the public's mind that a diamond was a unique manifestation of nature and the rarest of all precious objects in the world. Then, in 1955, the General Electric Company announced with considerable fanfare that it had invented a process for manufacturing diamonds from ordinary carbon, which was the commonest element on earth. At the behest of De Beers, the advertising agency immediately began feeding stories to the press intended to dispel fears that the mass production of cheap diamonds was imminent.

  The crisis of synthetic diamonds soon passed from public attention. N. W. Ayer reported back to De Beers, "At the time of the [General Electric] announcement there were, quite naturally, some expressions of uneasiness in the gem trade . . . but with each passing week the announcement is falling into perspective." It added, "We have fortunately been in a
position to counsel trade organizations on communicating a relaxed point of view to their members."

  Toward the end of the 1950s, N. W. Ayer reviewed its achievements in fostering, if not wholly inventing, the diamond engagement tradition. It reported to its client in South Africa that twenty years of subtle but well orchestrated advertisements and publicity had had a pronounced effect on the American psyche. "Since 1939 an entirely new generation of young people has grown to marriageable age," it noted with unmistakable pride of accomplishment. "To this new generation a diamond ring is considered a necessity to engagement to virtually everyone." The message had been so successfully impressed on the minds of this generation that those who could not afford to buy a diamond at the time of their marriage "deferred the purchase" rather than for going it. Not only had the twenty-year advertising campaign helped De Beers "sell current production" from its diamond mines, but, more importantly, it had elevated diamonds in the American mind to "cherished possessions" which, according to N. W. Ayer, helped "keep previous production in the hands of the consumer . . . and off the retail market." Even in a severe economic pinch, diamonds would not be resold by consumers who had subsumed the advertising pitch "A Diamond Is Forever."

  N. W. Ayer proposed that instant engagement traditions should be invented for other countries. In its 1960 strategy plan it suggested, "The idea of developing a public diamond engagement tradition in countries where it does not exist . . . has been volunteered by leading jewelers in those countries." It noted that Germany and Sweden would be two outstanding targets for such an invention. Specifically, it said that an international engagement ring tradition would: "enlarge the market for smaller diamonds . . . insure regular growth by broadening the market base . . . [and] help to keep diamonds in safe hands by making them cherished possessions of more people throughout the world." To this end, the foreign language editions of Reader's Digest were recommended as a means of introducing the diamond message abroad.

  N. W. Ayer recognized in its analysis that some countries already had "firmly rooted" traditions of exchanging simple gold rings to symbolize the engagement, and that in these countries it would not be possible to uproot instantly the existing tradition. Initially, it therefore suggested a campaign to associate diamonds with a "gift of love."

  The campaign to internationalize the diamond mind began in earnest in the mid-1960s. The prime targets were Japan, Germany and Brazil. Since N. W. Ayer was primarily an American advertising agency, De Beers brought in the J. Walter Thompson agency, which had especially strong advertising subsidiaries in Japan, Germany and Brazil, to place most of its international advertising. Within ten years, De Beers succeeded even beyond its most optimistic expectations in creating a billion-dollar-a-year diamond tradition in Japan. In Germany and Brazil, De Beers met with more moderate success.

  In America, which still remained the ultimate market for most of De Beers' diamonds, N. W. Ayer developed a plan for insulating diamond sales from the cyclical swings in the economy that affected most luxury goods. In 1960, it suggested a series of advertising messages which would gradually induce consumers into perceiving diamonds in terms of sentiments, such as love, instead of valuable gems which could be disposed of in hard times. Specifically, the "engagement advertising strategy" for the 1960s involved three steps:

  1. To attach to the diamond the meaning of the engagement period;

  2. Conversely, to identify with the engagement period the romance, beauty, uniqueness, value and permanence of the diamond;

  3. To express these ideas frequently to a clear majority of the U.S. families capable of responding.

  N. W. Ayer then outlined a "psychology" for sentimentalizing diamonds: "The first time that a man spoke to a woman of his love, devotion, and expressed the wish never to be parted from her ... the symbol of the first milestone was a diamond. The engagement diamond. This diamond ring ... was a badge for the outside world to see. It gave the woman her status as a woman, the prestige of a woman. Nothing else could take the place of the diamond." However, as the years go by, the woman needs further reassurance that her husband still loves her, according to this psychological profile. "Candies come, flowers come, furs come," the study continues, but such ephemeral gifts fall to satisfy the woman's psychological craving for "a renewal of the romance." A diamond, however, which originally symbolized the commitment of love, could serve to fill this emotional "later-in-life" need.

  The advertising agencies therefore recommended that De Beers initiate a program of advertisements which would instill in the public's mind that the gift of a second diamond, in the later years of marriage, would be accepted as a sign of "ever growing love." It argued that the development of a new "later-in-life" diamond market would be necessary to absorb the increasing supply of diamonds from South Africa, because the number of engagement diamonds was more or less fixed by the number of marriages in America. Specifically, it recommended a campaign to "reach deeper into the population to sell gift (later-in-life) diamonds in order to increase demand," and in 1962 it asked authorization to "begin the long term process of setting the diamond aside as the only appropriate gift for those later-in-life occasions where sentiment is to be expressed."

  De Beers immediately approved the campaign since the diamond mind had to be now expanded to accommodate the surfeit of Siberian diamonds that De Beers undertook to market for the Russians. Almost all of these diamonds were under one-half carat in their uncut form, and there was no ready retail outlet for millions of such tiny diamonds. When it made its secret deal with the Soviet Union, De Beers had expected the production from the Siberian mines to gradually decrease. Instead, it accelerated at an incredible pace, and De Beers was forced to restructure its sales strategy.

  Up to. this point, De Beers itself had been largely responsible for reducing the market for small, under one-carat diamonds. Through its twenty-year advertising campaign, it had encouraged American women to think of the size of a diamond as a status symbol or "badge": The larger the diamond, the more status it represented. During this period, N. W. Ayer had surreptitiously authored film scenario and news stories which constantly depicted women as measuring a man's commitment by the number of carats in the diamond he gave her. The engagement reports on celebrities that N. W. Ayer circulated also emphasized "caratage," or size, rather than quality. Diamonds were portrayed as "a girl's best friend" if they were conspicuously large. Now, however, De Beers had N. W. Ayer to reverse its theme: Women were no longer to be led to equate the status and emotional commitment in an engagement with the sheer size of the diamond. Instead, a "strategy for small diamond sales" was outlined which involved stressing the "importance of quality, color and cut" over size, and in advertisement pictures substituting "one-quarter carat" rings for "Up to 2 carat" rings. Moreover, the advertising, agency began in its international campaign to "illustrate gems -as small as one-tenth of a carat and give them the same emotional importance as larger stones." The symbolic content of the news releases was also to be manipulated so that women would be induced to think of diamonds, regardless of their size, as objects of perfection: A small diamond could be as perfect as a large diamond.

  The new campaign met with considerable success. The average size of a diamond, which was one carat in 1939, fell to none-quarter carat by the late 1970s. This smaller size coincided almost exactly with the average size of the Siberian diamonds that De Beers. was now distributing. However, as American consumers became gradually accustomed to the idea of buying smaller diamonds, they began to perceive of the larger diamonds as "flashy" and ostentatious. The advertising success was beginning, however, to take on the aspects of a financial disaster. In its 1978 strategy report, N. W. Ayer notes "a supply problem has developed . . . that has had a significant effect on diamond pricing." It then explains that this problem proceeds from its long-term campaign to stimulate the sale of small diamonds. "Owing to successful pricing, distribution and advertising policies over the last 15 years, demand for small diamonds now appears to
have significantly exceeded supply even though supply, in absolute terms, has been increasing steadily." But whereas there was not a sufficient supply of small diamonds to meet the demands of consumers, N. W. Ayer reported that "large stone sales [one carat and up] ... have maintained the sluggish pace of the last three years." Because of this, the memorandum continued, "large stones are being . . . discounted by as much as 20%." In other words, by heightening the appeal of minute diamonds, the advertising campaign had inadvertently diminished the salability of the larger diamonds. Since the larger stones were far more profitable to sell than the smaller ones, De Beers and its clients were being deprived of potential profits.

  Despite this embarrassing "supply problem," N. W. Ayer argued that "small stone jewelry advertising" should not be totally abandoned. "Serious trade relationship problems would ensue if, after 15 years of stressing 'affordable' small stone jewelry, we were to drop all of these programs," it pointed out. Instead, it suggested a subtle change in "emphasis" in presenting diamonds to the American public. In the advertisements, it planned such "adjustments" as replacing smaller diamonds with one carat and over stones, and resuming both an "informative advertising campaign" and an "emotive program" which would serve to "reorient consumer tastes and price perspectives towards acceptance of solitaire [single stone] jewelry rather than multi-stone pieces." Other "strategic refinements" it recommended were designed to restore the large diamond to being a visible symbol of conspicuous consumption. "In fact, this [campaign] will be the exact opposite of the small stone informative program that ran from 1965 to 1970 that popularized the 'beauty in miniature' concept. . . ." With an advertising budget for America of nearly ten million dollars, N. W. Ayer appeared confident that it could bring about this "reorientation."

 

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