A Memoir- the Testament

by Jean Meslier

  In the same way, sounds, smells, tastes, and flavors are not round or square things; and it would be ridiculous to say they must be round or square, since they are modifications of matter. In the same way, vices and virtues are only modifications of matter; for human virtue is nothing but a good, beautiful, upright, and commendable way of acting and behaving, whereas human vice is only a bad and ugly and reprehensible way of acting and behaving. All of which good or bad ways of acting and behaving in life are clearly observable in humans, who are made of matter, and consequently, nobody can claim that vice and virtue are not modifications of matter.

  However, it doesn’t follow from this that the virtues and vices are things that can be divided, split, or cut into many pieces, as one might cut matter; and it would even be ridiculous to say or to imagine that such things must be entailed by such a principle. Thus, a pari and as an equal conclusion, if our thoughts and knowledge, our desires and our will, if our feelings and our affections, our friendships and our hatred, our pleasures and our pains, our joys and our sadness, in short, if all our feelings and all our passions were only modifications of matter, this wouldn’t mean at all that they would or should be, for all that, things that could, as they say, be split or cut into pieces or bits; on the contrary, it is ridiculous for our Cartesians to imagine that such things would follow from it.

  Let’s consider, if you please, this argument from a different angle. The reason why the Cartesians refuse to acknowledge that matter is capable of thinking, feeling, desiring, willing, loving and hating, etc., is because they fail to see how a will, a thought, a desire, a love, a hatred, a joy, a sadness, or any other affect or passion can consist in modifications of matter; and they can’t accept that such things might be modifications of matter, because they aren’t as they say, extended things like matter, and because they aren’t things that can be divided, spit, or cut into bits and pieces. But this argument doesn’t keep thought, knowledge, feeling, will, desire, love, hatred, joy, sadness, and all the other affects or passions of the soul from being the modifications of matter; thus, this argument does nothing to prove the spirituality of the soul, as our Cartesians claim, and they’re even quite ridiculous to use them to demonstrate the existence of an infinitely perfect being by the idea they have of one. For just as the idea one holds of a thing does nothing to prove that this thing really is as it’s imagined, in the same way what is called the spirituality of the thoughts, desires, wills, affects, and passions of the souls, which are not extended things, which are not round or square things, and which can’t be split or cut into pieces or bits, do nothing to prove that they aren’t modifications of matter. The evident reason for this is that all the modifications of matter should don’t need to have all the properties of matter; and in fact, it’s impossible for them to have all of them. It is characteristic of matter, for example, to be extended in length, width, and depth; but this doesn’t mean that all the modifications of matter can or should be extended in length, width, and depth; it would even would be ridiculous to say so. It is characteristic of matter to be susceptible to all sorts of shapes, all kinds of motions, but this doesn’t mean that all the modifications of matter can or should have all sorts of shapes, all sorts of motions; it would even be ridiculous to say so. It is characteristic of matter to be divisible, to be split or cut length- or crosswise and in all sorts of ways, but it does not follow then that all changes of matter can or should be capable of be divided, split or cut lengthwise and crosswise or askew; but this doesn’t mean that all the modifications of matter can or should be divisible, splittable, or cuttable lengthwise, crosswise, or askew; it would even be ridiculous to say so. In the same way, again, it is characteristic of matter to be measurable into feet, for example, into ells or yards, and to be measured with cards, pots or pints; but this doesn’t mean, either, that all the modifications of matter can or should be able to be measured like this, into feet, ells, or yards, or to be measured by cards, pots or pints, which would even be ridiculous to say. Finally, it’s characteristic of matter to be weighed in a scale or a balance, but this doesn’t mean that all the modifications of matter, or even that all kinds of matter can or ought to be able to be weighed in a scale, and it would be ridiculous to say so. In the same way it is ridiculous for our Cartesians to claim that our thoughts, our reasonings, our knowledge, our wishes, and the desires and feelings we have of pleasure or pain, love or hatred, joy or sadness. are not modifications of matter, arguing that such modifications of our soul are not extended in length, width, and depth, on the pretext that they are neither round nor square, and they can’t be divided or cut into pieces and bits, and it is, I say, ridiculous for them to claim this, since it’s impossible that all the modifications of matter presently have all these properties.

  Here are some examples that confirm this argument. Motion, as I’ve said, and wind, for example, are certainly nothing but modification or agitations of matter; but it’s it is undisputed that motion and the wind are not round or square things, or that they have any shape; they can’t be measured in pots, pints, or cards, they can’t be weighed in a scale; therefore, all the modifications of matter can’t always have all the properties of matter. It is equally certain, clear and obvious that what we call life and death, beauty or ugliness, strength or weakness, health or illness, are only modifications of matter, of which the body is composed; yet it is clear that such things are neither round nor square, nor do they have any other shape; nor can they be split or cut into quarters, like matter; they can’t be measured by ells, yards, or with pot or pints, and can in no way be weighed or placed in a scales. It would be ridiculous to speak, for example, about an ell or a yard of life or health; it would be ridiculous to talk about a pound or two or three pounds of illness, of fever or pleurisy, or two or three pounds of health and strength, etc. So, all the modifications of matter can’t always have all the properties of matter. Similarly, the vices and virtues that we see clearly in all men are, as I said, only modifications of matter; because the virtues and vices only consist in certain good or bad dispositions or ways of acting or living, of behaving and comporting in life, which are certainly the dispositions and ways of acting, which concern the body as well as the mind, and consequently which are so many modifications of the body, as they are modifications of the mind. However, it is clear that the vices and that the virtues of men are not round or square, or shaped in a different way; they aren’t things that can be split or cut into various parts, they aren’t things that can be measured with ells or yards, which aren’t things that can be weighed in scales or a balance; and it would be ridiculous to think that they could be measured into ells or yards, or that they could be weighed in a scales or a balance; thus it is plain, clear, and evident that all the modifications of matter shouldn’t be round or square things, and that they shouldn’t always be things that can be split or cut into pieces. And although it can’t exactly be said that certain given movements of matter in a straight line, or an oblique or circular, spiral, parabolic or elliptic line, as our Cartesians say, produce particular instances of love, hatred, desire, joy, sadness, or some affect or passion of the soul, it doesn’t follow from this that these sorts of feelings or affects of the soul aren’t modifications of matter.

  Finally, the things we call noise, sound, light, smell, taste, heat, cold, or fermentation are certainly not, as to the very things anything but modes or modifications of matter. Sleep, for example again, is most certainly also a change in matter. Do our Cartesians ask, for all that, whether sleep is something round or square, and whether it’s conceivable as something that can be split or cut into pieces, and what shape would result from this division? They would do well to have a good laugh at themselves. They might perhaps have just as much reason to ask what color a dream would be, what color a thought, a desire, a joy, a sadness would be. What madmen! What are they thinking? How can’t they see? … and yet, it is clear that these kinds of things are neither round nor square, nor any other shape. It is obvious
that they can’t be split, or divided into parts and pieces. And finally, it is plain to see that they can’t be measured or weighed in any way; so, once more, it is plain, clear, and evident that all the modifications of matter shouldn’t always presently have all the properties of matter, that they shouldn’t always be round or square, and that they shouldn’t always be divisible with a knife or axe, and shouldn’t always be measurable into ells or yards, or weighable in a scale or balance; consequently, it is clear and evident that our Cartesians have no reason to say that the thoughts, the desires, and the will and sensations of the soul are not modifications of matter, on the pretext that they are neither round nor square, or any other shape. And so, their supposed demonstration of the spirituality of the soul, which they base on this argument, proves to be manifestly vain and ridiculous.

  From this supposed spirituality of the soul, so well demonstrated, as they think, they think they can legitimately draw a clear conclusion in favor of its immortality. Here is their argument. That which is spiritual has no extension, that which has no extension has no parts which can be divided and separated from each other; that which has no parts which can be divided and separated from each other, cannot be corrupted (for it’s only by the disunion and separation of the parts that bodies are corrupted); that which cannot be corrupted cannot perish or cease to be; that which cannot perish or cease to be, always stays in the same state, and consequently, since the soul is spiritual, according to the alleged demonstration, it has no extension, having no extension, it has no parts that can be divided or separated from each other, having no parts that can be divided or separated from each other, it can’t be corrupted, unable to be corrupted, it remains always in the same state; and consequently, they find that it is immortal. This is how they claim to demonstrate the immortality of their soul.

  But, since this whole argument is only based on a false hypothesis and a vain and ridiculous supposed demonstration of spirituality, it is easy to see that this argument cannot prove anything and that it is of no force. But how can our Cartesians say that the soul would be a spiritual and immortal thing, since they recognize, and truly they necessarily have to recognize that it is capable of various changes and diverse modifications, and that it’s even now subject to various changes, modifications, and even various infirmities. For this reason, they ought rather to say that it is not spiritual or immortal, for something that is capable of various changes and diverse modifications can’t a spiritual and immortal thing (i.e., a Being or a substance).

  1) It cannot be something immortal: here is the obvious reason. That which is capable of various changes and various modifications is capable of various alterations; that which is capable of various alterations is capable of corruption; that which is capable of corruption, is not incorruptible; that which is not incorruptible is not immortal, that is clear and obvious. But our Cartesians recognize that the soul is susceptible to various changes and various modifications; they even recognize that it is presently subject to it, for they say and agree that all our thoughts, all our knowledge, that all our sensations and that all our perceptions, our desires, and our wills are modifications of our soul; and thus, since our soul is by their own confession subject to diverse changes and diverse modifications, they must recognize that it is subject to diverse alterations, which are the principles of corruption, and consequently, that it is not incorruptible, or immortal, as they claim. This is why their great St. Augustine[894] says that a will which varies in its resolutions, in any way at all, cannot be immortal in its duration: and thus, since the soul is subject to various changes and various modifications, it cannot be immortal in its duration.

  2). Since the soul is, even by the admission of our Cartesians, subject, as I’ve just, to various changes and various modifications, it cannot be spiritual in their intended sense of the term, since a thing which has no extension or any parts cannot change its way of being, and can’t even have any way of being; that which can’t change its way of being, and which can’t even have any way of being can’t be said to be subject to various changes, or to have various modifications. Now, the soul, as our Cartesians claim, would have no extension or any parts: therefore, it can’t change its way of being and can’t even have any way of being: therefore, it couldn’t be subject to any change, or undergo any modifications; or if it can change its way of being and be subject to various changes and various modifications, then it must have extension and it must have parts; and if it has extension and parts, it can’t be spiritual in the sense intended by our Cartesians. All this is clearly evident.

  They can’t conceive, they say, that matter in a square shape, or round, oval... etc. can sense pain, pleasure, joy, sadness, warmth, color, smell, sound... etc. They should rather say they can’t conceive that matter organized this way or that produces pain, warmth, pleasure, etc., for it’s not exactly matter that constitutes pain, pleasure, joy, sadness etc.; but it’s what produces in a living body the feeling of pain, pleasure, joy, sadness... etc. by its various modifications. They can’t, I say, conceive this; and for this reason alone, they don’t want these feelings to be modifications of matter. But do they rather conceive, or do they conceive any better how a Being which would have no extension or any parts, could have some way of being and have many diverse ways of being? Can they rather conceive that a Being without extension or any parts can see, know, think, and reason about everything? Can they rather, or more easily conceive that a Being without any extension or any parts can see and contemplate the Heavens and the Earth and count, each in turn, all the objects it would see across the vulgar mass of the body, where it would be contained as if in a dark dungeon? Can they more easily conceive that a Being with no extension or any parts can have pleasure and joy, pain and sadness? Who could ever bring pleasure and joy to a Being of this nature? Who could cause it to feel pain, fear, and sadness? Could joy even, or sadness, find a place to reside in such a Being? Certainly, our Cartesians say and receive in that things which are countless times more inconceivable than the ones they reject, on the pretext that they’re unable to conceive of them.

  For, although it’s hard to conceive that this or that modification of matter brings us this or that thought, this or that sensation, we must nevertheless and necessarily acknowledge that it’s by this or that modification of matter that we have this or that thought or this or that sensation. Even our Cartesians can’t disagree with that. Why do they need, then, to resort for that to an imaginary Being, or a Being who is nothing at all, and of whom, if it were even something real, as they imagine, it would still be impossible to conceive of nature and to have any true idea thereof, impossible to conceive of its relationship with the body and impossible to conceive how certain modifications of matter might excite in it certain thoughts and certain sensations, without any knowledge of these sorts of modifications of matter? There is only one problem to explain, by assuming, as I do, that modifications of matter alone produce all our thoughts and all our sensations and all our knowledge; but if the opposite is assumed, many insurmountable problems appear.

  It shouldn’t come as a surprise, as I’ve already said, if we don’t have a clear knowledge of the way this or that modification of matter gives us this or that thought, or this or that sensation, because these sorts of modifications are the first principle of life in us, and the first principle of knowledge and feeling, they are in us due to the natural constitution of our body, to make us feel and know all that can be known and perceived, which are external to us, and not to be felt or known directly and immediately of themselves; in this they are similar to the natural constitution of our eyes, which are in us, not to be seen or to see themselves, but to show us everything that is outside ourselves. This is also why we effectively do see everything that’s visible and external to us with our eyes, although we ourselves can’t see our own eyes, or any of their constituent parts, and the evident reason for this is, because the principle of sight doesn’t need to be accessible to our sight. And for the same reason
it is also true that the principle of feeling doesn’t need to be accessible by feeling, and that the principle of knowledge isn’t accessible by knowledge. And there is no doubt that this is the reason why we don’t clearly know the nature of our mind, or the nature of our thoughts, or of our sensations, although at bottom they’re only modifications of the matter of which we are composed. It is true, though, that we can see our own eyes, even when we see ourselves in a mirror, since the mirror represents our face and our eyes to us, as if they were outside of us and separated out from us; but since there is no mirror that can similarly represent our soul back to us, or any of its modifications, and since we can’t see anything in other men, this is why we can’t immediately know them by themselves, even though we feel them immediately by themselves.

  And something that confirms the truth of this last argument is the natural, confident, and assured feeling we always have of ourselves; for we certainly know, from our feeling, that it’s we ourselves who think, we ourselves who wish, we ourselves who desire, we ourselves who feel, pleasure here, pain there, and who have joy here and sadness there. In addition, we know and we certainly feel by ourselves that it’s by our head and especially by our brain that we think, that we wish, that we know and that we reason… etc., just as it’s with our eyes that we see, that it’s with our ears that we hear, and it’s by our mouth that we talk and discern flavors and tastes, and it’s by our hands that we touch, and that it’s by our feet that we walk, and that it’s by all the parts of our body that we feel pleasure or pain, we can’t doubt any of these things: but we only see, we only feel, and we certainly know nothing except what is matter. Take away our eyes, and what would we see? Nothing. Take away our ears, and what would we hear? Nothing. Take away our hands, and what would we touch? Nothing; except very imperfectly with other parts of the body. Take away our heads and our brains, and what would we think of? What would we know? Nothing. Finally, take away our bodies, and all the parts thereof, and what would we feel? Where will our life be? Where will our thoughts and our knowledge be? Where will our contentment, our pleasures, our joy be? Where will our sorrows, our pains, and our displeasure be? And where will we ourselves be? Certainly, nowhere. And it’s impossible, in this supposition, to conceive that we might, in this state, still have any thoughts, any knowledge, or any feelings. Therefore, it’s plain, certain, and a sure thing that although our thoughts, our knowledge, and our feelings are neither round nor square, or divisible by length and width, they remain modifications of matter; and that, consequently, our soul is only matter in us that is subtler and more highly agitated than the other, coarser stuff, of which the visible parts of our bodies are made. And so, it is clear and obvious, even if little heed is given to the subject, that our soul is neither spiritual nor eternal, as our Cartesians use these terms. And if it were asked what becomes of this agitated and subtle matter at the moment of death, it can be said without hesitation that it dissipates and dissolves immediately into the air, like a light mist and a slight exhalation, or almost like the way a candle’s flame is gradually extinguished, by itself, in the absence of combustible material to keep it going[895]. For I think it would be too ridiculous to say, as many ancient philosophers have imagined, that the soul then passed whole and entire from one body to another. The invention of this opinion is usually attributed to the famous Pythagoras, a philosopher of Samos, who is supposed to have said that he remembered strongly that he had previously been a woman named Aspasia, a famous courtesan from Miletus, then he became a young boy who served as wife to the Tyrant of Samos, then that he was reborn in Crates, the Cynic philosopher, and after that he was a King, then a doctor, then a Satrap, then a horse, a jay, a frog, a rooster. Similarly, that he remembered having been Aethalides, Mercury’s son, then he was reborn in Euphorbia, where, he says, he was killed at the siege of Troy; from Euphorbia he became Hermontime; from Hermontime he became, through another birth, Pyrrhus, and that, after the latter’s death, he became Pythagoras after all these metamorphoses. If it’s true that this philosopher[896] really said and believed such things, I certainly dare say that he was, at least in this matter, madder than he was wise, and that he scarcely deserves to be called a Philosopher.