and Tissaphernes soured; and everyone knew it.
Everyone—including the Athenians of Samos, who understood that
they were in debt to Alcibiades, and also understood the price they would
pay for his support.
Alcibiades led the negotiations—not with Athens, but with the Athenian
force based on the island of Samos, just across from Ephesus and Mile-
tus. This was the fi rst sign of a characteristic of this period: there were, in
a way, two Athens, and they were not always in agreement. They agreed
even less where, owing to Alcibiades’s meddling, internal politics were
concerned.
We are now in the beginning of the year 411 BCE. Alcibiades had been
with Tissaphernes for only a few months. For the Athenian democracy, it
will be a year of drama and near civil war.
Naturally, Alcibiades had friends in the army at Samos. He went to
them, asking them to pass along a message to “the best men in the army,”
and his message was clear: “If only there were an oligarchy in place of
the corrupt democracy that had banished him, he would be glad to return
to his country and to make Tissaphernes their friend.” 15 The drama had begun.
Once again, this is how Alcibiades operates, offering quite a deal. Here
he is, a man condemned to death, with the gall to demand, without blink-
ing, and on his own authority, a regime change.
Was he so fond of oligarchy? He had certainly had personal enemies
in the camp of the radical democrats, such as Hyperbolus and Androcles;
and he castigated them. In Sparta he had spoken out with rare vehemence
about the folly of democracy. To reverse the democracy, therefore, would
15. “The best men” has a strong social-class connotation, in contrast to poneroi, “riff-raff,” 8.47.
In
Asia
Minor 115
satisfy a genuine grievance; it would also help assure his future safety. For
in fact, his old enemies would not let him return peacefully.
And yet . . . and yet, it is important to know that Alcibiades will in
fact return to Athens, and as a friend of the democrats. Some scholars
have suggested that he had always imagined making himself leader of the
people against that oligarchy he endorsed so loudly. 16 But, intricate as it may be, that hypothesis rests on no evidence. Under the circumstances,
Alcibiades was not solely responsible for the reversal of political positions.
In democracy, everything happens, and can happen, when the confl icts
between individuals are more important than the common good. As we
will see, Alcibiades was not the only one guilty of this. In 411 there was
an amazing back and forth, and numerous violent reversals followed. And
Athens, just in time, found a superb solution.
Meanwhile, Alcibiades’s secret message reached the Athenian leaders in
Samos. They knew that he had full authority over Tissaphernes, and thus
in Persia. Thus, given their personal leanings, “the captains and chief men
in the armament at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy.”
Some of them went to Alcibiades to discuss the matter. Alcibiades held
before them the attractive possibility of securing the friendship of both
Tissaphernes and the king, if the democracy were overthrown; and these
men readily agreed. Once again, Thucydides shows the reader a range
of motives that meshed well: “The most powerful citizens . . . now had
great hopes of getting the government into their own hands and of tri-
umphing over the enemy.” 17 Their hopes strengthened, they returned to Samos. They formed a conspiracy, but they did not keep their plans secret.
They told everyone that the king would offer friendship and money if
Alcibiades were recalled and the democracy overthrown! The majority
of the troops were hostile to the idea, but the offers were good. They did
not resist. The small band had their hands free and the plot almost suc-
ceeded; they still had to consider the next steps and the way to start. They
were not, after all, in Athens, but in Samos; and they had no authority to
change the established regime back home.
16. See McGregor, in Phoenix (1965): 27.
17. 8.48.1 The passage omitted here said “the most powerful citizens, who also suffered most severely from the war.” The wealthy citizens paid for the war, and they thought that, for paying more than others, they should have greater political power.
116 Chapter
7
This led to arguments among them, and one of the generals, Phryni-
chus, suddenly declared himself opposed.
Phrynichus was a stubborn man. He had previously stood alone against
his colleagues regarding a naval battle; he “fl atly refused either to stay
himself or to let them or anyone else do so if he could help it” (8.27.1). He
won. And Thucydides says that, on that occasion and the following one, it
appeared he did not lack real intelligence.
His reaction was the same to Alcibiades’s proposals: one against all, he
refused. He did so fi rmly and clearly, based on arguments that Thucydides
relates point by point.
Thucydides says of Alcibiades that Phrynichus rightly “thought he
cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to
change the institutions in his country in order to get himself recalled by
his associates; while for themselves their one purpose should be to avoid
civil discord” (8.48.4).
The desire to avoid civil strife was and would remain the truest sign of
civic-mindedness throughout this period. It was Phrynichus, ultimately,
who saved Athens. It is interesting to note that the opposition to Alcibi-
ades’s plan came not from someone motivated by democratic zeal, but by
someone with a longer view. If Phrynichus had stopped there, we would
rightly give him credit . . .
He was equally skeptical about Alcibiades’s promises. He knew that
the king had no interest in allying himself with the Athenians, whom he
mistrusted, whereas the Peloponnesians had always treated him well.
Last, there was talk about offering oligarchy to the allies. And he
doubted that as well: “As the allies would never prefer servitude with an
oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the constitution that they cur-
rently lived under, to whichever type it belonged” (8.48.6). He even ana-
lyzed the reasons the allies had for not favoring the Athenian oligarchs.
Such blunt analysis had, among other benefi ts, that of leaving no doubt:
for Alcibiades, but also for the allies, it shows that a concern for internal
politics is always secondary to the quests for power and for freedom. Ev-
erything else is pretext. Even in our own time, when ideology seems to
determine everything and sometimes takes precedence over patriotic feel-
ings, would anyone presume to say that Phrynichus’s analysis is not just
as valid? Is it possible to say that when a people choose democracy they
do so out of an attachment to the regime, or from a desire to restore their
In
Asia
Minor 117
independence? And can anyone say that any particular movement, toward
communism for example, arises from an ideological choice or from practi-
cal interests—such as Alcibiades’s sudden zeal for oligarchy?
Phrynichus, in any case, made a strong argument. It was not enough.
The members of the group did not change their minds; they wanted to send
a small delegation to Athens to prepare the city for these new decisions.
Phrynichus, beaten, told himself that Alcibiades would be recalled and
would be informed of the position he had taken. He grew frightened. And
the result was a series of steps and countersteps, plots and counterplots,
that surpass belief.
The events, as reported by Thucydides, happened in the following way.
Phrynichus, seeing himself in danger, sent a secret message to the Lace-
daemonian leader, revealing to him that Alcibiades was working now
against Sparta and offering Athens friendship with Tissaphernes.
That is a betrayal if ever there was one. For he made these revelations
to the military leader of the country against which he was at war. In his
letter he justifi es himself by explaining—Alcibiades could not have said
it better!—that he was at war with Alcibiades, and that it was legitimate
to destroy him, even at his country’s expense. So even for him, a private
quarrel gave legitimacy to a public betrayal. Athenian democracy really
was, as we can see, in crisis.
What did the Lacedaemonian leader do on reading this missive? He
went straight to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, at Magnesia, near Ephesus,
and told them everything, putting himself on their side.
Why? For the basest of reasons: remember that Tissaphernes had been
careful to give money to different Peloponnesian leaders in order to gain
their support for the cuts in pay. 18 This was one of those leaders, and some thought that he had been bought by Tissaphernes. Thucydides doesn’t
say so; but he reports that rumor, saying that the man had acted “out of
personal profi t, according to what was said.” 19 Phrynichus the traitor was
betrayed in turn, and for money!
18. 8.45.3; see above.
19. 50.3; cf. Delebecque, Thucydide et Alcibiade, 87–88, 110, as well as his review of the book by H. D. Westlake in Revue des études anciennes (1969): 475. Some scholars have found his charges to be without grounds.
118 Chapter
7
He knew it, of course. At this point, something surprising occurs: ap-
palled at the situation in which he found himself, Phrynichus wrote a
new secret letter . . . to the same person! Curious obstinacy in a man
who knew he had been betrayed. True, this time he offered much more
and could hope that his offer equaled any other: he offered the Spartans
the possibility of annihilating the whole Athenian army in Samos; and he
showed how to do it. He knew that this was an even greater betrayal, but
he thought he had to do anything he could: “Pleading that being in danger
of his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for doing this or
anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal enemies” (8.50.5). It
had come to a matter of life and death. However, no one—fortunately—
would ever say such circumstances excused everything . . .
The most curious part of this is that, in writing the letter, he mistrusted,
and with good reason, the one to whom he wrote. Also, in a reversal, he
himself hastened to announce the danger of a Spartan landing in Samos
and to argue for the construction of fortifi cations.
The letter Phrynichus feared as a result of these interactions arrived
from Alcibiades: the Spartan leader had told him everything; and, address-
ing the Athenians of Samos, Alcibiades accused Phrynichus of treason.
Amazing: the one time Alcibiades told the truth, no one believed him!
The Athenians thought that, in his usual way, he was not reliable (or pis-
tos), and that he made up this story to destroy Phrynichus. If there was
a plan for the enemy fl eet disembarking at Samos, it would be normal
for Alcibiades to know it . . . from the Peloponnesians themselves. So his
letter only confi rmed the rumors Phrynichus was repeating! 20 We have to admire this eminently moral lesson: for having lied, Alcibiades was not
believed, just as, after crying wolf, people stop listening. Added to this is
the great irony of the game of lies and truth, for these plots cancelled each
other out, thus maintaining the status quo.
Phrynichus was not so lucky with the Athenians: the messenger sent from
Samos to Athens by the conspirators brought charges against him. He was
stripped of his command. He had no choice: he had to join the side of the oli-
garchy, which, given how the situation had evolved, had now moved away
from Alcibiades. Phrynichus would later be assassinated under the oligarchy.
20. Some scholars have noted that Phyrnichus had acted against Alcibiades during the
scandals, and that fact may have led the Athenians to be suspicious.
In
Asia
Minor 119
The oligarchy did come. But before we follow the course of events in
Athens, we must return to Thucydides’s account of certain aspects of the
extraordinary imbroglio pitting Phrynichus’s betrayals against moves taken
by Alcibiades. This account is both somewhat suspect and highly revealing.
Thucydides says that Phrynichus was an intelligent man. His fi rst
move toward the Lacedaemonians was imprudent, but the second was an
unbelievable folly. Why would someone who knew he had been betrayed
put his trust again in the person he knew had betrayed him, when his life
was at stake?
Many modern historians have found that they could not believe the
story as it is told here.
One extreme response is to adopt the view of the Athenians at Samos:
Alcibiades is not trustworthy; he lies, and he made up the whole business
to destroy Phrynichus. After all, this is a man perfectly capable of making
up such a case, and Thucydides may have been, on this point, misled by
his sources. 21 What proof was there? Still, it is hard to believe that this story involving major individuals (Alcibiades, Phrynichus, the Lacedaemonian leader), and that must have aroused debate, rests on nothing. The
letters must have existed.
There is, though, another way to understand the text; a number of
scholars have adopted it. 22 This view accepts the sequence of events, but believes that a man as shrewd as Phrynichus, having seen the result of his
fi rst betrayal, took the second step as a way of laying a trap. This was a
fake deception: he knew that Alcibiades would use this letter against him
and that, by taking all the necessary measures for the defense of Samos, he
would render Alcibiades’s charges useless. He subtly laid the groundwork
for the Athenian defi ance, as in fact occurred. Phrynichus, in this view,
was no idiot but instead a master of deception.
That is one possible hypothesis. It does not fi t perfectly with
Thucydides’s account, an inconsistency one might easily pass over if there
were not a means of reconciling the two.
Phrynichus defi nitely sent a second letter to the Spartan. He may have
hoped that by offering much more, he would attract more attention. 23 But 21. See Hatzfeld, 232–33.
22. Grote, Brunt, Westlake, and also E. Delebecque ( Thucydide et Alcibiade, 87–88)
.
23. See Ellis, Alcibiades, 76.
120 Chapter
7
he did not ignore the risk, and must have realized the extent of it after
the fact. Then, very quickly, he guarded against this risk by adopting the
only attitude that would defend him against Alcibiades’s charges when
they came. 24 This explanation accords both with Thucydides’s account and with Phrynichus’s reputation as an intelligent man.
We see how diffi cult this interpretation is, both unproven and contro-
versial. How could it be otherwise, when everyone was lying, betraying,
and sacrifi cing all to private quarrels? How could anything be known for
sure, between versions that were perhaps bold fallacies? Alcibiades may
have invented the story about the letters. Phrynichus may have invented
a fake betrayal, in order to lay a trap (?). What detective story of our era
would contrive such a plot? We can see a time coming when it is impos-
sible to believe anything. Even in the slightly crazy hypothesis about Phry-
nichus’s letters, we cannot know either their authenticity or their sincerity.
Ultimately, these personal plots not only damage one’s personal enemies:
they fi rst destroy knowledge of the truth.
The most interesting aspect of this episode is its usefulness as a reveal-
ing signifi er. It may, quite directly, have had the effect of raising Tissapher-
nes’s doubts about his seductive adviser, apparently now fl irting with the
Athenians. 25 However, beyond this direct infl uence on events, in a more general way the episode helps us assess, despite the obscurity of methods,
the striking development of all these intrigues and betrayals.
We fi rst saw Alcibiades as an isolated example of a citizen who put his
own interests above those of the state, because he indulged in the internal
quarrels between political leaders. That behavior seemed quite serious.
But now, in 411, we fi nd that it was not an isolated incident. Alcibiades
does not get all the credit for the decline of civic-mindedness and he was
not the only one to manifest it: the same was true of his rivals, and of oth-
ers on the opposing side. The evil spread; it was the sign of a new period
in the democracy. We should not fool ourselves; Thucydides, in judging
all the events described above, uses the plural. He did not say that such
The Life of Alcibiades Page 18