the remainder of the estate was distributed into the following shares: to the widow
Todora, 1555 para (of which 680 para came from the share of her deceased son
as münasaha—death of a person entitled to an inheritance, before his inheritance
share has been transferred to him); to the daughter, 204 para; to Kalina, widow
of Dragoi, 510 para; to Dragoi’s son, 1926 para; and to his daughter Ivana, 963
para.72
In some documents concerning the divorce of Christians, it was expressly
emphasized that no mehr had been provided for at the time of marriage. In 1772
the Christian woman Neno, daughter of Todor, from the Peio mahalle in the varoş
of Vidin, declared before the court that Petre had become her husband but without
stipulating [ tesmiyesiz] a mehr. Because there were arguments between them,
they had divorced by talâk and renounced their respective matrimonial rights and
obligations.73
Receiving mehr is considered to be among the principal advantages for women
under Shari‘a marriage, particularly in the event of divorce on the husbands’
initiative. This must have been an exceedingly attractive proposition for Christian
women as well. In spite of the influence of Shari‘a inheritance norms, however,
I have so far been unable to determine with certainty if the agreement on mehr
did gain ground among Christians as an element of prenuptial agreements under
the customary or Canon law, or if references to mehr among Christians occurred
mostly in cases of marriage or divorce before the kadı. While customary law
seems to suggest that a wife could retain ownership of her dowry after the
termination of the marriage, individual reported cases of compensation from
the husband in case of divorce—or from his estate after his death—do not seem
to reflect any general rule. Property issues between spouses could be settled in
accordance with the norms of canon law (which had, in turn, adopted a number of
customary practices): women were granted ownership rights with respect to both
their dowry and the marriage gifts they had received at the time of contracting the
marriage.74
Like Muslims, Christians too got married not only before a kadı court, but
also, in sporadic instances, before an imam. In 1802, the metropolitan of Varna
complained through the Patriarch to the Sublime Porte that upon meeting with
obstacles to marrying or to divorcing their lawful wives according to their ancient
laws, some disobedient Christians would go to Muslim mahalle s to the imam s,
and the latter, because of greed, would administer the marriage or divorce in
contravention of their laws. Subsequently, a ferman was issued confirming the
metropolitan’s jurisdiction and directing Shari‘a authorities to warn imam s to
abstain from this practice. The disposition quotes a decree issued on a similar
occasion in the kaza of Bania in the sancak of Vidin.75
As already noted, in opting for a kadı or imam, Christians sought an institution
through which they could circumvent prevailing customs (and probably the
ivanova, marital ProBlems of Christian Women
171
Church), perhaps regarded as excessively harsh. Significantly, this also meant
opting for an institutional marriage—something particularly important for
women.
Divorce
A marginal note from 1777 in a Bulgarian manuscript reads: “Let it be known that
a bride, the daughter of Pencho [nicknamed] Hard Bread, got married and had her
husband for nine days, and then hanged herself by a rope in the small house.”76
A village woman from the region of Sofia sought another solution for her marital
problems. On 17 October 1617, at night, Tzonio, son of Todor, a dweller in the
village of Dobroslavche, was murdered. Nikola, a brother of the victim, the
proxy of the mature daughters of the late Dafna and Vukana, and appointed in
a special court session as guardian of the infant sons Mihail and Eno, declared
in court jointly with Stana, sister of the murder victim, and in the presence of
representatives of their village whose names are enumerated, that Pirka(?),
daughter of Rade and wife of the victim, confessed as follows: While her husband
was alive, there had been no good life between them, only quarrels. He tormented
her and was mad. Worried by his harassment she went to Dimitar, son of Nikola,
and the gypsy Spas, brother of Sharko. She gave them two pieces of kâf irlik
(infidel’s) silver bracelets, three kâf irlik silver necklaces, three kâf irlik shirts, two
kâf irlik sleeveless jackets, two kâf irlik fur-coats, two kâf irlik waist-bands, and
one silver cup. In return for all this, she directed them to kill her husband. “I
am the cause of his death,” said the woman, confirming that she had no claims
[ diyyet] for his death against any dweller of the village or anyone else—a standard
procedure with criminal acts. Dimitar and Spas had committed the murder with
her consent ( re’y—decision, sentence). At the request of the “ashamed” widow,
the court divided the estate of the murdered Tzonio, from which she did not get
a share. After Pirka admitted to having murdered her husband, her father Rad
became her kef il for instances when she would be summoned by the court (also
standard procedure with criminal acts).77
Between the two extremes represented by these cases—committing suicide,
and contracting the murder of an abusive husband—the Christian women of the
period under study, both in towns and villages, resorted to the kadı court to seek
a divorce.
The kadı registered non-Muslim divorces, regardless of whether or not the
respective marriage had been concluded in accordance with the norms of the
relevant non-Muslim confession. Divorce between Christians was usually
denoted by a specific term meaning “annulment of marriage,” and was final.78 By
way of motive for divorce, the sicil s usually note briefly that there were constant
quarrels between the spouses. This is the most common formal ground in the case
of divorces between Muslims as well (in cases of hul). In 1781, Velko, a dweller
in the kasaba of Filurdin in the region of Vidin, declared to his wife Miladina that
there were quarrels between them and that he was leaving her by talâk-i bâin.
She accepted the divorce without receiving a mehr. In 1709, before the Sofia
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Women in the ottoman Balkans
court, Pano, son of Ishterko, a dweller in the mahalle of Sungurlar, declared in the
presence of his wife Suba, daughter of Tzone, that there was no accord between
them and that he wanted a divorce [ tatlik]. “Now I am parting from my wife,
the aforementioned Christian woman Suba. May she be divorced from me by an
irreversible divorce [ talâk-i bâin]. Since I married her with the transfer of one
pair of silver kâf ir bracelets as mehr-i muaccel, I am giving her similar ones.”
Evidently, in this case a mehr had been agreed upon as the basis of the nuptial
contract. According to another record, later that year the same Suba asked the
judge to set an allowance—money for food and clothing and other needs—for her
two infant sons of whom she was taking care. The court determined that the father
In many cases of divorce between Christians, the wife appears to have been the
initiator of the divorce. In 1709, Mile, daughter of Philip, a dweller in the mahalle
of el-Hac Pervane in the town of Vidin, declared before the court to her husband
Zjivan, son of Raiko, that because of the discord between them she was divorcing
him on her initiative [ talebim ile tatlik idüp], and she relinquished any receivables
and claims stemming from matrimonial and all other rights and obligations that
had existed between them before the divorce.80 It appears that the hul procedure
was applied in this case, although there is no express mention of it.
In 1728, Yovana, daughter of Simo, from the village of Seslavche in the region
of Sofia, stated to her husband Stoian, son of Gergo, that because there was no good
understanding between them, she was divorcing him lawfully by hul [ muhalaa-ı
sahihe-i şer’iye] in exchange for her relinquishing her claim to the assets that he
owed her under their agreement—a pair of silver bracelets worth 10 kuruş, a ring
worth 1 kuruş, and 6 kuruş in cash that were her mehr-i muaccel—and freed him
of any matrimonial obligations and claims for the time from the beginning of their
marriage until their divorce. In 1722, the Christian woman Tzveta, daughter of
Istoicho, a dweller in the village of Kamartsi (?) in the region of Sofia, declared
before the court to Paun, son of Mitre, a dweller in the village of Boyana, that he
was her husband but that there was no good understanding between them. “Since
I move for hul, I therefore give up all the agreed-upon assets that he owes me—
one pair of silver bracelets worth 5 kuruş that are my mehr-i muaccel; furthermore
as payment under our reconciliation agreement [ bedel-i sulh], I give Paun 10
kuruş and I am divorcing him by hul.” Paun accepted the terms. Besides all this,
however, Tzveta also gave her ex-husband three shirts worth 1 kuruş each, a waist
belt worth 1 kuruş, and a pair of socks worth 1 kuruş, as well as 10 kuruş as forfeiture for the hul [ bedel-i hul].81
As in most such cases, the record states that the document was issued and
handed to the husband, obviously because of his financial interest. As with
Muslim women, in the case of Christian women too, this divorce procedure,
identified as hul, underlined the privileged position of the husband—a situation
endorsed by Bulgarian customary law as well.82 For Christian as well as Muslim
women, the need to resort to the court signified their weaker position; however,
apart from the greater need for legal protection in the case of women, the fact that
ivanova, marital ProBlems of Christian Women
173
an institutional possibility existed for the provision of such protection deserves
favorable mention.83
Technically, divorces between Christians had to be administered by the
Church, and extant bishopric and municipal books (codex) from the nineteenth
century contain considerable material on the subject. Concerning earlier periods,
the pismovnik mentioned above is particularly valuable, as it contains a sample
blank form entitled “How a paper of leave should be written.” It goes as follows:
“Because [name], daughter of [name] from the village or parish of [name]
complains that her husband has stolen her belongings, has fled secretly, has not
sent her any money or letters for seven years; this fact having been established
by testimony under oath; therefore, after having witnessed the ill-treatment she is
subjected to and having perceived the weakness of her nature, under Divine and
sacred law our humility has delivered and grants leave to [name], claimant, from
[husband’s name], and we grant her permission to marry another man as arranged
by her and in accordance with her resolution. Therefore and for her salvation,
the present letter of leave is granted.” A second sample was intended to apply to
cases where the divorce was initiated by the husband: “In a different manner” a
divorce is granted to a husband whose wife “committed this and that … because
Divine and sacred law commands that the adulterous wife be separated from her
husband.” The man is permitted to enter into another marriage as well.84
Judging from the quoted samples, the divorce procedure shows some similarities
to that before the court of the kadı: the appearance of the claimant and possibly
the other party, the presence of witnesses (two people who may be subjected to
relevant procedures to establish their reliability), and reference to sacred law—
obviously the Christian canons in this case. However, in contrast to the hüccet s
of the kadı s, as well as to some of the records in the bishop kondika s from the
nineteenth century, the sample forms contain no provisions regarding property
matters between the ex-spouses. On the other hand, a great deal of attention was
paid to the reasons for the divorce, as was not the case with kadı divorces of
Christians, thus providing an explanation as to why Christians resorted to the
latter. The reasons for divorcing were the main consideration for the ecclesiastical
courts in determining whether or not to grant a divorce, and thus it was necessary
for them to be proven genuine.
It is curious that the reasons quoted in the sample form that a woman or man
might have used as grounds for divorce match the reasons most commonly
recorded in the bishops’ kondika s from the mid- and late nineteenth century:
women referred to the lasting absence of their husband and his failure to provide
financially for his family, and men referred to adultery on the part of their wife.
The forms in this pismovnik end with permission for a new marriage similar
to the permission in the bishops’ kondika s from the nineteenth century, but not
encountered in the hüccet s of the kadı. This is indirect proof of the existence of
the practice of requesting a vula (permission issued by the local bishop to enter
into a marriage after a divorce) verifying that the future marriage would be in
accordance with the canons.
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Women in the ottoman Balkans
Divorce because of the absence of the husband appears to reflect the realities
of the age. The increased migrations during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and the mobility of men (in general, because of population growth and
the strengthening of destructive elements within society as a result of significant
social transformations, but also more particularly due to the acceleration of the
economy) seem to have had a direct effect on the strength of the matrimonial bond.
In 1638, while the husband was away working, his Christian wife entered into a
new marriage. Regardless of the insistence of her first husband that she should
return to him, she asserted that she had divorced him, and received 700 akçe. In
1788, the villager Sarbin divorced his wife before his departure to Istanbul.85 It is
for this reason that in many cases of conditional divorce among Muslims, it was
stated that the husband was gone. There are also a number of recorded claims
by Christian women who, without initiating a formal divorce, asked the court to
appoint an allowance for t
hem and their children, or to grant them the right to
dispose of family assets because their husbands had been gone for too long. In
1657, Stamata from the mahalle Kuyumcu in Rousse stated before the court that
six years earlier her husband had departed for Wallachia. “I have received not a
single akçe or grain of corn for my living,” said she. The court authorized her
to sell her husband’s house, as was the standard procedure applied by the court
with respect to both Muslim and non-Muslim women in similar cases.86 It seems
that there was also an increase in the number of prospective bridegrooms whose
actual marital status was uncertain because they were migrants, probably leading
to the establishment of certain new social and legal practices that, particularly
for the Christian environment, are directly linked by historiography to the rise in
the number of divorces and the increasingly important role of women in migrant
families. For example, entries in different kondika s from the nineteenth century
illustrate the practice of requiring men coming from far away to provide testimony
from their native places or to present guarantors concerning their true matrimonial
status. Thus, according to Ivan Snegarov, the material from the kondika s of the
nineteenth century suggests that economic migrations and the absence of husbands
changed the way of life of the family. It could be expected that the birth rate was
also affected, that the burden of additional physical labor was placed on the wife
and children, and that the age and gender distributions of labor within the family
were altered. This would have eroded the despotic authority of the father in the
patriarchal family, while the wife would have gained a leading role.87
The divorce cases heard by ecclesiastical courts in the nineteenth century are
considerably richer in terms of reasons for divorce: there are examples of all
the sorts of factors that cause divorces in modern society—social, economic,
psychological, and physiological. The impression suggested is that a rich variety
of relationships existed between spouses and played important roles in both
marriage and divorce. In fact, in the majority of cases, divorces were initiated by
the wife even though this ran against with public morals: “Whether the woman
lives well or poorly, it is her luck, this was her lot, and she ought to bear her vile
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