by Neil Sheehan
“Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.”
Mr. McNamara and Secretary Rusk both testified on behalf of the resolution in secret sessions of the Senate and House foreign relations committees on Aug. 6. In his narrative, the Pentagon analyst occasionally quotes from and refers to portions of their testimony that have never been made public by the Pentagon. Along with the study, The Times also obtained more extensive quotations from this portion of the hearing transcript. The following account of the testimony on Aug. 6 thus contains both quotations used by the Pentagon analyst and the fuller quotations obtained by The Times.
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon had learned that boats manned by South Vietnamese crews had attacked the two North Vietnamese islands on July 30. Mr. Morse, one of two Senators who were to vote against the Tonkin Gulf resolution—the other was Ernest L. Gruening of Alaska—alleged during the secret hearing on Aug. 6 that Mr. McNamara had known about the raids and that the destroyers had been associated with it.
“First,” Mr. McNamara replied, “our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any. . . . The Maddox was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times.
“I did not have knowledge at the time of the attack on the island,” he said. “There is no connection between this patrol and any action by South Vietnam.”
Mr. McNamara contended that whatever action had taken place against these North Vietnamese islands had been part of an anti-infiltration operation being conducted by a fleet of coastal patrol junks the United States had helped South Vietnam to organize in December, 1961.
“In the first seven months of this year they have searched 149,000 junks, some 570,000 people,” he is quoted as telling the committee in this secret session. “This is a tremendous operation endeavoring to close the seacoasts of over 900 miles. In the process of that action, as the junk patrol has increased in strength, they have moved farther and farther north endeavoring to find the source of the infiltration.
“As part of that, as I reported to you earlier this week, [Mr. McNamara had testified before the committee in a secret session on Aug. 3 after the first attack on the Maddox], we understand that the South Vietnamese sea force carried out patrol action around these islands and actually shelled the parts they felt were associated with this infiltration.
“Our ships had absolutely no knowledge of it, were not connected with it; in no sense of the word can be considered to have backstopped the effort,” he said.
Senator Frank Church of Idaho then asked Secretary Rusk at the same secret session: “I take it that our government which supplied these boats . . . . did know that the boats would be used for attacks on North Vietnamese targets, and that we acquiesced in that policy, is that correct?”
“. . . In the larger sense, that is so, but as far as any particular detail is concerned we don’t from Washington follow that in great detail,” Mr. Rusk replied.
“They are doing it with our acquiescence and consent, is that correct?” Senator Church continued.
“But within very limited levels as far as North Vietnam is concerned,” Mr. Rusk said.
At a Pentagon news conference after his testimony before the committee, Mr. McNamara spoke about the coastal patrol junks again and avoided any specific mention of the July 30 raid:
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes?
Q. Have there been any incidents that you know involving the South Vietnamese vessels and the North Vietnamese?
A. No, none that I know of, although I think that I should mention to you the South Vietnamese naval patrol activities that are carried on to prevent in the infiltration of men and matériel from the North into the South.
In the last seven months of 1961, for example, about 1,400 men were infiltrated across the 17th Parallel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. To prevent further infiltration of that kind, the South Vietnamese with our assistance have set up a naval patrol which is very active in that area which continues to inspect and examine junks and their personnel.
In one eight-month period that I can recall they discovered 140 Vietcong infiltrators.
Q. They operate on their own?
A. They operate on their own. They are part of the South Vietnamese Navy, commanded by the South Vietnamese Navy, operating in the coastal waters inspecting suspicious incoming junks, seeking to deter and prevent the infiltration of both men and matériel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.
Q. Mr. Secretary. Do these junks go north into North Vietnam areas?
A. They have advanced closer and closer to the 17th Parallel and in some cases I think have moved beyond that in an effort to stop the infiltration closer to the point of origin.
Q. Do our naval vessels afford any cover for these operations?
A. Our naval vessels afford no cover whatsoever. Our naval personnel do not participate in the junk operations.
When Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota subsequently brought up the July 30 attack on the islands during the Senate floor debate on the resolution, Senator Fulbright replied that he had been assured by the Administration that “our boats did not convoy or support or back up any South Vietnamese naval vessels” and that the destroyer patrol “was entirely unconnected or unassociated with any coastal forays the South Vietnamese themselves may have conducted.”
The Congressional resolution passed on Aug. 7 by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House.
The history shows that besides the May 19 progress report from the Joint Chiefs on the 34A Operations, Mr. McNamara had received other memorandums on the clandestine attacks from General Anthis, the special assistant to the Joint Chiefs, on June 13, July 1 and July 28, 1964. General Anthis drew up the advance monthly schedules of the covert operations for approval by William Bundy and Mr. McNaughton.
Where Mr. Rusk is concerned, the study reveals that he was kept reasonably well informed.
The study also makes it clear that there was no connection between the 34A raids and the coastal patrol junk fleet described by Mr. McNamara and referred to by Mr. Rusk.
Thus, in the space of three days, the Administration had put firmly into place two key elements of the May 23 scenario—prepositioning of major air strike forces and Congressional authorization for wider action.
Internal Administration planning for Congressional authorization to escalate also now disappears from the documentary record. The account notes that during the next round of planning “the question of Congressional authority for open acts of war against a sovereign nation was never seriously raised.”
There was confusion in Congress, however, over precisely what the resolution meant, the account says, commenting:
“Despite the nearly unanimous votes of support for the resolution, Congressional opinions varied as to the policy implications and the meaning of such support. The central belief seemed to be that the occasion necessitated demonstrating the nation’s unity and collective will in support of the President’s action and affirming U.S. determination to oppose further aggression. However, beyond that theme, there was a considerable variety of opinion. . . . Several spokesmen stressed that the resolution did not constitute a declaration of war, did not abdicate Congressional responsibility for determining national policy commitments and did not give the President carte blanche to involve the nation in a major Asian war.”
The Admini
stration would now communicate the meaning of the resolution to Hanoi by carrying out in a more significant manner an element of the May 23 scenario that Washington had already used once in June when the Canadian emissary had paid his first visit to Hanoi.
On Aug. 10, Mr. Seaborn was sent back with a second message for Premier Dong, which concluded:
“a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that ‘U.S. public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin.’
“b. That the U.S. Congressional resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly reaffirming the unity and determination of the U.S. Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on U.S. military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, D.R.V. efforts to subvert and conquer South Viet-Nam and Laos.
“c. That the U.S. has come to the view that the D.R.V. role in South Vietnam and Laos is critical. If the D.R.V. persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the consequences. [The word “continue” referred to the reprisal air strikes that followed the Tonkin incident.]
“d. That the D.R.V. knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.
“e. That the U.S. has ways and means of measuring the D.R.V.’s participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Vietnam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the D.R.V.’s response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them.” [See Document #68.]
Mr. McNaughton had drafted the message on the day the resolution was passed.
During this, as in his first meeting with Mr. Seaborn in June, the history says, “Pham Van Dong showed himself utterly unintimidated and calmly resolved to pursue the course upon which the D.R.V. was embarked to what he confidently expected would be its successful conclusion.”
In the heat of the Tonkin clash, the Administration had also accomplished one of the major recommendations of the June strategy conference at Honolulu—preparing the American public for escalation.
“The Tonkin Gulf reprisal constituted an important firebreak and the Tonkin Gulf resolution set U.S. public support for virtually any action,” the study remarks.
Almost none of the “disagreeable questions” the Administration might have to answer about the resolution, which had given the President pause in mid-June, had been asked in the emotional atmosphere of the crisis.
And inside the Administration the planners were moving more quickly now.
On Aug. 10, three days after passage of the resolution, Ambassador Taylor cabled the President a situation report on South Vietnam. It said that the Khanh regime had only “a 50-50 chance of lasting out the year.” Therefore, a major objective of the United States Mission in Saigon was to “be prepared to implement contingency plans against North Vietnam with optimum readiness by Jan. 1, 1965.”
On Aug. 11, four days after passage of the resolution, William Bundy drew up a memorandum for a high-level State-Defense Departments policy meeting. The memorandum outlined graduated steps towards a possible full-scale air war against North Vietnam with “a contingency date, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965.” But until the end of August, Mr. Bundy said, there should be “a short holding phase, in which we would avoid actions that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for escalation.” [See Document #70.]
On Aug. 14, a lengthy summary of Mr. Bundy’s memorandum was cabled to Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Unger in Vientiane, and to Admiral Sharp in Honolulu for comments that would permit “further review and refinement.”
The Tonkin Gulf reprisal air strikes, the analyst writes, “marked the crossing of an important threshold in the war, and it was accomplished with virtually no domestic criticism, indeed, with an evident increase in public support for the Administration. The precedent for strikes against the North was thus established and at very little apparent cost.
“There was a real cost, however,” he concludes, in that the Administration was psychologically preparing itself for further escalation. “The number of unused measures short of direct military action against the North had been depleted. Greater visible commitment was purchased at the price of reduced flexibility.” And “for all these reasons, when a decision to strike the North was faced again, it was much easier to take.”
Admiral Sharp, in his cable to Washington on Aug. 17 commenting on Mr. Bundy’s memorandum, “candidly” summed up this psychological commitment, the analyst says.
“Pressures against the other side once instituted should not be relaxed by any actions or lack of them which would destroy the benefits of the rewarding steps previously taken,” the admiral wrote.
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon’s study of the Vietnam war, for the period December, 1963, through the Tonkin Gulf incident in August, 1964, and its aftermath. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.
# 61
McNamara Report to Johnson on the Situation in Saigon in ’63
Memorandum, “Vietnam Situation,” from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.
In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.
1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.
2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.
3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.
Lodge’s newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.
As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this, John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.
4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Pro
gram was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government’s own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.
As remedial measures, we must get the government to reallocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.
This gloomy picture prevails predominantly in the provinces around the capital and in the Delta. Action to accomplish each of these objectives was started while we were in Saigon. The situation in the northern and central areas is considerably better, and does not seem to have deteriorated substantially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.
In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government’s side.
5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.