The theory that Wallace contemplated continuing the struggle against Edward other than militarily gains credibility when we look at the current political situation and at Wallace’s own actions. He remained a convinced and committed adherent of Balliol, and in 1298 the latter’s position was improving slightly. Wallace had been instrumental in securing the election of William Lamberton as bishop of St Andrews in November 1297.37 The bishop’s devotion to the Scottish cause was not in doubt, and when he journeyed to Rome for his consecration, which took place on 1 June 1298, he would have worked hard to convince Pope Boniface VIII to seek a betterment of Balliol’s situation. On his way back to Scotland, Lamberton stayed in France, where, with other Scots already there he had the opportunity of gaining the ear of Philip IV. At that period, June and July 1298, when Lamberton was first in Rome then in France, both pope and king wrote to Edward. They called on him to free Balliol and to leave Scotland in peace.38 Although the release of Balliol was not achieved until a year later, when he passed under the protection of the papacy, Wallace would have known in 1298 of the pressure on Edward and shared in the hope of an eventual Balliol restoration. As Barrow has so clearly indicated,39 that hope had never entirely disappeared among the Scots, and after Balliol’s transfer to papal protection in 1299, it re-emerged, greatly strengthened. By his decision to go abroad in the service of Scotland, the most intriguing action of his career, Wallace was demonstrating a belief that the way to achieve the freedom of Scotland now lay in diplomatic rather than military activity.
As with the suggestion that Wallace would ever consider surrender to Edward in 1298, the idea that he might be prepared to tolerate some kind of arrangement with him whereby Balliol would be restored as king is likely to be received with hostility. But neither the surrender nor the accommodation with Edward should be disregarded. The first would reflect Wallace’s disenchantment with the magnates, the second his hope that Scotland would have its own king once more. To this end he would have gone abroad to argue for the return of Balliol. Such an event could not have been possible without the agreement of Edward; neither Wallace nor any other Scot engaged in diplomatic work could have pretended otherwise. With any such agreement would have gone conditions imposed by the English king, but conditions, it might be, overseen by such independent authorities as Wallace could convince. It would not be wholly different from the situation accepted by the Scots in 1292. Why Wallace went abroad in the first place has been variously explained,40 but all commentators are of one mind: his mission was a diplomatic one. Such a mission does not preclude the possibility that, however indirectly and however painful the thought, he and those like him were seeking just that kind of solution which would allow Balliol’s restoration with Edward’s agreement. Wallace was not the romantic figure he subsequently became in the popular imagination, an outlaw with the trappings so often acquired with the passage of time. He was a patriot realistic enough to understand what could be achieved and what could not. He is not diminished by the proposal that he would work for a resolution of what was otherwise an intractable problem.
If Balliol was to be restored, Edward could not be ignored. Wallace would have faced that fact with his habitual honesty. Edward was not the man to be persuaded by pope or king to give up his claim to Scotland. He saw it as both legal and valid. As Wallace knew better than most, Edward would fight for that claim. He would have been under no illusion as to the English king’s determination to hold on to Scotland; nor would he have deceived himself into believing that military victory over Edward was in any way certain in the foreseeable future. But an accommodation, a restoration of Balliol under some form of English sovereignty, a buying of time – that might be another matter. Wallace was never to be deflected from his support of Balliol; he turned to diplomacy as a more subtle means of working for his restoration. It was further evidence of his honesty, of his capacity to adjust. It cannot have been easy.
There is no precise date to be given for Wallace’s departure from Scotland. The incident at Peebles, touched on above, does, however, provide us with some guidance. The events of that day in August 1299 bear relating for what they tell us of Wallace’s situation and of the fragile nature of the Scottish leadership without him. A spy in the pay of Robert Hastings, Edward’s constable of Roxburgh, was among the Scots present at Peebles and informed Hastings of what had happened there. Hastings in turn passed the information on to his master in a letter written on 20 August, twelve days after the developments he described:
At the council [that is, of the Scottish leaders] Sir David Graham demanded the lands and goods of Sir William Wallace because he was leaving the kingdom without the leave or approval of the Guardians. And Sir Malcolm, Sir William’s brother, answered that neither his lands not his goods should be given away, for they were protected by the peace in which Wallace had left the kingdom, since he was leaving for the good of the kingdom. At this the two knights gave each other the lie and drew their daggers. And since Sir David Graham was of Sir John Comyn’s following and Sir Malcolm Wallace of the earl of Carrick’s following, it was reported to the earl of Buchan that a fight had broken out without their knowledge; and John Comyn leapt at the earl of Carrick and seized him by the throat, and the earl of Buchan turned on the bishop of St Andrews, declaring that treason and lèse-majesté were being plotted. Eventually the Stewart and others came between them and quietened them …41
An examination of this extract from Hastings’ report is revealing. The sad fact of the recurrence of trouble between Bruce and Comyn may be passed over; little excuse was needed by either for an outbreak of violence. Although Wallace was not present at the council, we do not know why, he had not yet gone abroad. His absence can be explained in several different ways, of course. He could have been barred by those attending, although if that were the case, it would be difficult to understand Malcolm’s role. He could have chosen to remain apart from his former colleagues, being disillusioned or despondent. He might have been planning his journey. He might equally by this time have fallen out of sympathy with the continuation of the war in its present form; such an attitude would be in keeping with the argument that he was now committed to a diplomatic resolution of the war. We cannot neglect the fact that, unlike Malcolm, he had played no part in the recent raid mounted by the Scots across the south of Scotland. At one time such an opportunity would have appealed to him, and one cannot but wonder that he did not participate. The raid would have been a reminder to him of those days, the year before, when, before Stirling, he had struck at Lanark, raced to Scone with Douglas to surprise Ormsby, and then hurried to assault the defences of Dundee. It may, indeed, be argued that it was precisely this sort of undertaking for which, by experience and temperament, he was most suited. Yet he did not share in it. His failure to do so unless, in contradiction of Hastings’ account, he was already out of the country, is both strange and significant, indicative of his adjusting to the unfamiliar and perhaps unpalatable role he was about to play.
If, for whatever reason, Wallace was not at Peebles, his interests were well guarded. Malcolm Wallace was swift to answer on behalf of his brother and ready to protect both his name and his possessions. What Malcolm is reported to have said is not without its own interest. He asserted that his brother had left the kingdom in peace. That can only mean after Falkirk and at the time of his resignation. Malcolm’s remarks may be dismissed as those to be expected of him. But that is not entirely wise. Falkirk was a defeat but it did not end the war in Edward’s favour. On the contrary, even with much of the Scottish army destroyed, Edward was unable to consolidate his position, was forced to quit Scotland within two months of the battle, and would not return until July 1300. Wallace must be allowed some credit for that relatively happy state of affairs; it has not been demonstrated beyond debate that he resigned as Guardian before Edward left Scotland in September 1298. Scotland, thus, in that sense, had been left in peace.
Lamberton, too, was at Peebles. He had returned from the Continent
in time to join in the raid, and his continued devotion to Wallace is not to be questioned. According to Hastings, the earl of Buchan rounded on the bishop. Whether this implied violent intent is not clear, although it is not unlikely. Buchan saw in Lamberton a supporter of Bruce and, as Hastings makes plain, Wallace and Bruce were linked through the former’s brother. Lamberton was a powerful figure in the Scottish leadership and can safely be assumed to have added his voice to that of Malcolm on behalf of Wallace on this notorious occasion. It is not easy, lacking evidence, to say the same of Bruce. He was concerned, it would appear, more with his own than with Wallace’s affairs. Such words as he may have uttered in defence of Wallace would be indirect, originating in his own opposition to Comyn or to anyone who, like Graham, was associated with Comyn.
It is, of course, possible that any indifference felt by Bruce towards the absent Wallace was the result of Wallace’s lack of sympathy for those now leading (since his resignation) the Scots. That lack of sympathy is substantiated by Hastings. He reported to Edward that Graham had charged Wallace with leaving Scotland without permission from the Guardians. Wallace was acting as he thought fit and setting out to argue the Scottish case abroad. It makes sense therefore to believe that, once he had decided upon this journey, he was not to be deflected and did not consider the opinion of Bruce and Comyn to be of relevance or consequence. It is also reasonable to assume that he would have spoken with Lamberton before, at length, beginning his journey. If that is indeed so, he would have listened closely to what the bishop had to say on the mission, and the two would have entered into some form of agreement regarding what Wallace was to do. It is quite impossible to accept that Wallace, although enjoying an international reputation because of his achievements as Guardian, would ever go abroad without having the advantage of both Lamberton’s knowledge and of written letters of introduction from him. The subordination of his natural aggression to diplomacy notwithstanding, Wallace was too strong a personality ever to be content with the humble role of messenger ascribed to him by McNair Scott, but he would not have neglected to insist on the blessing and the fullest support of the Church, through his constant friend and ally Lamberton, and no doubt also through Wishart. That enigmatic figure, whatever the vagaries of his relationship with Wallace, cannot have done other than wish for the success of the forthcoming mission.
At some unrecorded date, either about the time of or soon after the meeting at Peebles, Wallace left Scotland for the Continent. Again, interestingly, we find ourselves deprived of precise details of his movements and his activities. If he does not entirely disappear, he fades, not from the popular memory, but from the accounts of the chroniclers. Such slight information as we have suggests that he may have visited Norway, France, and Rome, probably in that order, and if we despair of learning the truth we can, as always, turn to Blind Harry to elaborate on Wallace’s adventures – for such they must have been – with his customary invention. Thus, if Harry is to be believed, Wallace fought with the French pirate, Thomas Longueville the Red Rover, who, recognising superior virtue as much as strength, became his companion, and with the Englishman, Thomas Lyn, not to mention his epic defeat of an enraged lion. Major42 is not alone in questioning Harry’s fabrications, but in the course of his extended wanderings Wallace would most certainly have had the opportunity of proving his courage in the simple interest of staying alive. Why, therefore, should not Philip IV have sought to enlist Wallace in his service, as the tradition would have us believe? Philip was nothing if not intelligent; an ally of the experience and stature of Wallace was not to be overlooked. That same tradition has the Scot decline the honour, and the rewards of serving the king of France for that love of country which was, finally, to destroy him, but we cannot confidently state that Wallace was not approached by Philip or his agents.
The evidence for a visit by Wallace to Norway lies in a safe-conduct issued to him in the name of Haakon V. This document, together with others of perhaps greater significance, was found on Wallace’s person at the time of his arrest by Menteith43 but, like them, has disappeared. Whether Wallace met Haakon we do not know, and what such a meeting, if ever it took place, was intended to achieve is equally unclear. Certainly, any kind of military alliance between Scotland and Norway was unlikely if not impossible. Norway would remain for some considerable time, as it had always been, an important if unreliable factor in Scottish politics. Had not Eric II, father of the Maid, been among the original competitors for the throne of Scotland, no matter how insubstantial his claim? Largs and the treaty of Perth both lay well within living memory. Not until 1468 would Shetland and Orkney become part of the Scottish kingdom. The Scots, however desperate they thought their situation at the time of Wallace’s departure, would not have sought to bring to their shores a Norwegian force whose friendship could never be taken for granted, even if Haakon had been willing to supply it. It may be that, as Barrow suggests,44 Wallace went no further into the possessions of the king of Norway than the Orkneys; such a journey would still have entailed a safe-conduct. Wallace would in any case be more drawn to Germany than to Norway, to those towns such as Hamburg and Lübeck with which he had been anxious to establish contact in the course of his association with Murray. There is no reference to his going to Germany, but such a visit makes at least as much sense as one to Norway. If indeed he went to Germany, he would first have gone north in order to lessen the possibility of interception and capture by the English, whose ships would have rendered hazardous a crossing of the North Sea by the direct route. Wallace would have been anxious to convince any German towns which he did in fact visit of the continued wisdom of trade with a Scotland still independent of England.45
We can speak with more authority when we turn to the question of Wallace and France. That he came to the attention of Philip IV is indisputable, although the exact circumstances seem to puzzle the chroniclers who tell us of the vicissitudes suffered by Wallace at this time. One account has him seized with his companions on the orders of the French king who was ready to turn him over to Edward.46 Wallace may here have been the victim of a temporary cessation of the feud between the two kings from which the Scots had for long sought to benefit. In June 1299 at Montreuil-sur-Mer a treaty was agreed for the marriage of Edward with Philip’s sister, Margaret, which took place on 4 September. Edward, in thanking Philip, merely asked him to retain Wallace in France, a peculiar circumstance to which it will be necessary to return.47 Whether or not Wallace subsequently impressed Philip by deeds such as those Blind Harry describes, the French king proved to be not unsympathetic to the Scot. Devious as he was, Philip was not the man to allow the marriage of his sister to interfere for long with his quarrel with Edward, and almost four years were to pass before Philip made with Edward that treaty which helped to break the Scottish resistance to Edward. In the meantime, Philip had Wallace in France, a possible source of embarrassment to Edward. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that he was as impressed by Wallace as Blind Harry would have it, but Wallace was not to be seduced from his mission. On his behalf Philip wrote to Rome to instruct the French representatives at the court of Boniface to aid Wallace, whom he chooses to describe as ‘our beloved William le Walois of Scotland knight’, in the work he was about to undertake there.48 Philip’s letter is dated 7 November 1300 and therefore heralds Wallace’s departure for Rome. What he hoped to achieve there it is difficult to say, for he was about to become involved in a debate of a kind for which he was eminently unsuited, in what was in essence a trial of the question of Scotland before the papal court.49 At the time at which Philip’s letter was written, Wallace had been away from Scotland for more than a year. It cannot have been an easy year for him but, as was his way, he sacrificed himself to the cause of Scotland wherever that cause took him. In his absence, Bruce had resigned the Guardianship, Edward had invaded Scotland in a campaign from which neither he nor the Scots could claim great satisfaction, and a truce of seven months had been agreed. To these and other events in Sc
otland we must now turn.
NOTES
1 See below, chap. 8.
2 Chap. 6, above.
3 Rishanger, 188. His successor as Master of the Scottish Templars, John of Sawtry, also perished at Falkirk.
4 Lanercost, 191.
5 Watson: Under the Hammer, 67, describes the English losses as ‘the silent, but significant, casualties of an English victory’. Prestwich: Edward I, offers a figure of ‘approaching 2000’ casualties in the English infantry.
6 Watson, op. cit., 62, suggests that 1500 men-at-arms ‘actually served’.
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