Reference to ‘Hindu’ was initially to a geographical identity and only much later did it take on a religious connotation. The clubbing together of all the castes, non-castes and sects under one label – Hindu – would have been strange to most people and even repugnant to some, since it would have made brahmans, shudras and untouchables equal members of a religious community of ‘Hindus’ who were treated on par in terms of their religious identity. This was alien to the existing religions in the subcontinent. It therefore took some time for the term ‘Hindu’ to enter current usage. Hindus did not use this name for themselves until about the fourteenth century, and then only sparingly.
Similarly, the Hindus did not refer to the incoming peoples invariably as ‘the Muslims’ or ‘the Mussalmans’ or ‘the Mohammedans’. They were described by diverse terms that had varying origins. The Arabs were referred to in Sanskrit inscriptions as Tajiks and differentiated from the Turks who were called Turushka, a term used for people from central Asia. The choice of Tajik is not as curious as it seems since it was used earlier to differentiate Iranians from Turks and it appears that in India it was used to differentiate the Arabs from the Turks. Whereas the Arabs/Tajiks were more acceptable, perhaps because they had settled in India as traders and had held high administrative positions in some kingdoms such as that of the Rashtrakutas, the Turushkas were less so, possibly being seen largely as mercenaries and invaders to begin with. Later, Turushka and its variants became more widely used. The Turks and Afghans were also referred to as Shakas and Yavanas, the latter name being more frequent than the former. There was some confusion between Turushka and Kushana, and the Turkish Shahi rulers of the north-west claimed Kushana ancestry. This would suggest that they were viewed as representing a certain historical continuity and as linked to central Asia. Yavana, the term originally applied to the Greeks, was extended to mean those coming from the west and was used in this sense until recent times. The more generalized term mlechchha included a large variety of people regarded as culturally alien, and was a social marker pointing to those outside the pale of caste society. This would include kings and untouchables, irrespective of status. In a Sanskrit inscription issued by a merchant of Delhi, the Sultan was both eulogized and referred to as mlechchha. The term was clearly used as a social qualifier and did not imply disrespect or contempt. One is reminded of the reference to Hellenistic astronomers by Varahamihira, who stated that they were to be respected as sages, given their knowledge of astronomy, even though they were mlechchhas. The context of the term, therefore, is of the utmost importance in its specific uses.
The historical continuity of the labels used for those now settling in the subcontinent indicates that they were not perceived as altogether alien. The Arabs had been trading with the western coast of India since pre-Islamic times and the trade became more active in Islamic times. Over many centuries, the historical intervention of pastoralists, traders, armies and missionaries of Buddhism and later of Islam ensured continuous communication with those in the Indo-Iranian borderlands, in Afghanistan and central Asia. Hence the use of historically established names for those coming from these areas. That the Arabs, Turks and Afghans, and later the Mughals, settled in the subcontinent and married locally differentiates them from the people of later European colonial societies, who, having made their fortunes, retired to their own homelands and took their wealth with them.
The study of the subsequent period of Indian history has been conditioned by the theory of monolithic communities and a focus on the society of those in political authority. A wider study of society at the level of the majority of people suggests a different view and a more complex interweaving of social groups and their concerns. Towards the end of the first millennium AD, the fabric of Indian society was different from what it had been before: the texture of the political economy had changed, the warp and woof of religious belief and practice had been woven into varying patterns; and although the dominant culture of the Sanskritic tradition had come into its own, waiting in the wings there were forms of regional cultures.
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Northern India: Distributive Political Economies and Regional Cultures
C. AD 800-1300
Theories of Historical Change
Historians writing a century ago recognized the post-Gupta period as different from the previous historical scene. From the perspective of colonial historiography this period was viewed as a Dark Age in contrast to the ‘Golden Age’ of earlier times. Thought to be characterized by small, unimportant kingdoms with much political confusion, it tended to be dismissed as something of a long hyphen between the Guptas and the Delhi Sultanate. The implicit assumption was that, in the absence of empires in India, there was political chaos. When work on regional history gained momentum it was discovered that the period was seminal to significant historical changes. Regional sources were read more avidly and the underlying similarities between the regions became noticed. The focus shifted from the dominance of the Ganges Plain to other parts of the subcontinent. Historical questions focused on the nature of these changes in form and in space.
In the last half-century this period has attracted the attention of many historians. Apart from the interest in regional history, this attention grew from the debate on whether or not the polity of these times constituted what has been called Indian feudalism. More recently there have been alternative theories seeking to explain the structure of emerging states and societies, such as the system incorporating an integrative polity or that of the segmentary state. The latter was proposed and discussed more fully in relation to south India, and initially elicited much discussion. This, however, revealed inadequacies of a kind that questioned its application, particularly to the wider history of this period.
It may be appropriate here to mention briefly the characteristics of the first two theories before proceeding with a description of the changes that occurred at this time. The counterposing of these theories has introduced varied and detailed explorations of the political economy, social changes and the historical role of religious institutions, all of which have contributed to enriching the historical investigation of this period. This has also been made possible because the range and quantity of textual and inscriptional sources are impressively larger than for pre-Gupta times.
Despite the many arguments supporting what is regarded as either a feudal society in India or a feudal mode of production, a summary may suffice. The extensive exploration of the term ‘feudal’ in the histories of other societies and its application to diverse contexts has resulted in variant meanings. There is generally agreement on the essentials among historians using the concept for interpreting this period of Indian history, but this does not negate degrees of difference.
The considerable evidence of royal grants of land reflects an alienation of rights to land revenue, with the more powerful political authorities investing these rights in those of lesser authority. Grants to brahmans and to officers created holdings of land or villages where the recipients had the right to collect revenue but were not required to pay tax. The grant could either be of the revenue from the land or, more commonly over time, of both the land and its revenue. In either case the grantee appropriated the surplus produced by the peasant through rent and labour taxes. The appropriation used the rights invested in the grantee and did not preclude coercion or the threat of force. The rights and obligations of the grantee in relation to those settled on the land were listed, together with the taxes and revenues which he could collect. In effect, the landed intermediary had immediate authority over the peasant. These changes are said to have coincided with a decline in urbanism and trade during this period and up to the tenth century, reflected in the excavation of urban sites. The decrease in profitable maritime trade is said to have accelerated a decline in urban centres, together with some environmental changes that may have led to a fall in agricultural production in some areas. This marginalization of trade was accompanied by a paucity of coins. It therefore became necessary
to pay officials with grants of revenue from land instead of cash, which occurred more frequently after the seventh century. The number of feudatories, that is, holders of grants of land, increased, as did the hierarchy among them since they were not all of equal status. With differential access to political power there was decentralization and a parcelling of sovereignty.
It is also argued that the Puranas predicted a crisis in the Kali Age – the present and last cycle of time – when traditional rulers would lose their authority and be replaced by new kshatriyas. It was described as an age when righteous rule would be overthrown, with the lower castes taking over the functions of the upper castes, accompanied by the oppression of the people by those in authority. A general insecurity in relation to the existence of family and property was also predicted, such disorder being righted only with the coming of the last incarnation of Vishnu, the brahman Kalkin. This has been read as a reference to social changes of consequence in the centuries AD.
The argument in support of feudalism states that the movements of peasants were restricted and the grants converted the peasants who were paying tax to the state into peasants paying rent to the grantee. They were subjected to the requirements of vishti or forced labour/labour tax, as well as to non-customary taxes that the grantee had the right to impose. Grantees began to acquire fiscal and judicial rights that could aggravate the burden of labour, dues and demands on the peasant. There is some disagreement on whether this constituted serfdom. Villages tended to become self-sufficient and isolated from each other. There were a few instances of what have been interpreted as peasant uprisings, but the more widespread lack of these is partly attributed to the ideology of bhakti directing attention away from the impoverishment of material conditions. It is said these conditions roused little resentment because of the unflinching belief by many in the determinism of fate, reflected in part by the popularity of astrology.
Contractual relations in this model seem to have been limited to those between the king and the intermediary, referred to by historians as the feudatory. Underlying his loyalty to the king, the feudatory was expected to maintain armed levies, which he was in duty bound to furnish for the king’s service. Disloyalty was regarded as a heinous offence. The feudatory might also be called upon to give his daughter in marriage to the king. He was expected to use the currency of his suzerain, whose name he dutifully mentioned in his inscriptions and charters. Attendance at court on certain occasions was obligatory. The use of a title and symbols of status were allowed, such as a throne, a fly-whisk, a palanquin, the riding of an elephant in state processions and being heralded by the sound of the five special musical instruments. The surplus wealth of the feudatories went into conspicuous consumption imitating the royal court, particularly in palatial homes, and in richly endowed temples.
Some of the more powerful intermediaries were permitted to grant land in their turn, without necessarily obtaining permission from the king, although a reference to the suzerain may have been made in the text of the grant. This is seen as an Indian parallel to sub-infeudation. Such feudatories often had their own sub-feudatories, thus building up a hierarchy. This had started in an earlier period where a Gupta king had Surashmichandra as his feudatory, who in turn had Matrivishnu as his sub-feudatory. It gradually became more frequent. The hierarchy was reflected in the titles taken by the feudatories, where the more exalted called themselves mahasamanta, mahamandaleshvara, and the lesser ones were the raja, samanta, ranaka, thakkura and so on. These titles were not an invention of this period as some go back to earlier centuries, but their connotations differed in a changed context. Thus samanta, which had earlier meant a neighbour, was now used as a general category to refer to a subordinate ruler, a chief or a grantee.
More recently there has been an attempt to analyse these changes from a different perspective and some historians have suggested what they call an integrative polity, rather than a feudal society. It is argued that the formation of states in the post-Gupta period was in itself a different process from the earlier one and therefore created a different kind of economy and society. This can be seen in various ways. Territories emerged under new names and ruling lineages were associated with territorial names rather than only with clan names. With more areas being brought under cultivation, settled societies stratified by caste were frequently in the proximity of forest societies that were not stratified by caste. Ruling groups attempted to bring the latter closer in structure to the former. In the process of mutual political dependency links were forged between the emerging kingdoms and the chiefdoms. Rather than see the change as a decentralization of power, as in feudalism, it is thought better to view it as the rise of smaller states drawing on local sources of power and emerging as centres of authority.
This may be seen as the horizontal spread of the state system where pre-state polities were transformed into states that transcended the bounds of local politics. Monarchy was established in what had been pre-state societies. The creation of centres of power involved the colonization of an area with settlements established by subordinate branch lineages of the main dynastic line, often with the entitlement of a samanta. The latter were ranked and therefore had varying access to the court. Their power was derived from the dynastic centre and there were rights and obligations between the two recorded in the grants. Rulers governed through an administration whose control was mitigated by the network of lineage connections and the influence these had over administrative functions.
Agriculture was expanded through the transformation of non-sedentary peoples into peasants, a change that occurred largely in peripheral areas. Networks of trade developed gradually, reflected in increased commercial taxes. The acceptance of caste society, largely determined by conversion to jatis, brought diverse groups into a defined system. Religious institutions also received grants and their network was parallel to that of the land assignments to the samantas. Sacred places played multiple roles. They were linked to political and economic interests with grants from royalty and the court, and where temples controlled the hinterland they could become the base for urban centres. Local cults were integrated into an overall structure of Hindu sects and the patrons of these included the ruling lineages. Temples that focused on these cults fulfilled a political as well as a religious function.
This theory has been applied in some detail to the creation of the status category of the Rajput and the Rajput state. Even where they claimed lineage links and created kinship networks, the Rajputs were not necessarily kin-related groups and may well have come from different backgrounds. They acquired political power over a defined territory and had access to economic resources through a shared control of land and trade. Their legitimation was assisted through grants of land to brahmans, temples and monasteries. Particular lineages became ruling elites through military resources and the support of other lineages. These retained power through ranked statuses such as raja, ranaka and thakkura.
This theory appears more suitable to the creation of the Rajput category and has yet to be applied more generally to the history of this period. The pattern of lineages and branch lineages was not universal. Regional variations occurred even in the granting of land: changes in terminology, in rights and obligations, with their implications, would be worth investigating both in time and space. The making of a grant could have been an attempt to maintain a balance between contesting factions. Hierarchies in ranks are likely to have been a source of disaffection. A realistic view of balancing samantas is evident in the theory of mandala, where, in a circle of kings, the one desirous of supremacy is surrounded by serried ranks of friends and enemies, and politics is connected with degrees of support and hostility within the widening circle. The concept of an integrative polity differs from that of feudalism but, like the latter, it has contributed to further exploration of the nature of societies during this period and has suggested alternative analyses.
Given the variations in organizing resources and in caste and custom, a uniform pattern of e
xplanation presents problems. There are still many questions that require a fuller investigation. For example, the focus on agriculture would yield more specific data if differences of soil, crop patterns, agricultural technologies, types of irrigation and the nature and importance of landholdings could be introduced into the analysis of particular areas. There is little evidence, for instance, in the Punjab and the north-west generally, of a pattern of grants of land, and the dominant caste in the Punjab has been a trading caste: nor is there evidence for the creation of states based on systems of lineage connections. A comparative study with other areas would be revealing both for the north-west and for the granting of land as a system. If the pattern of caste hierarchy had regional variations, then the structure of service relationships, integral to the hierarchy, would also vary within the upper levels of society.
It has been established that the policies and activities of this period resulted in a reordering of society and economy. How it is to be interpreted and labelled still remains a matter of debate. What began as a study of these changes being seen as a counterpart to those taking place in Europe, and defining ‘medievalism’, has now taken on other dimensions. Some of these trends can be better recognized through comparisons that surface in the discussion of a feudal mode of production. Other trends become apparent through a different perspective. And above all there are variations. Variance would arise not only from the manner of structuring economic conditions of the time, but also from the intervention of caste as a system of organizing society, where enhancing the privileges of some and denying rights to others was implicit.
The Penguin History of Early India Page 64