CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT
Plattsburgh
THE BRITISH CROSSED the Canadian border and invaded northern New York at the same time they assaulted Baltimore. Plans for the attack had been finalized in London as soon as Napoleon abdicated in April. On June 3 Bathurst ordered Sir George Prevost to “commence offensive operations on the enemy’s frontier.” He had in mind “the entire destruction of Sackets Harbor and the naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain,” as well as capturing Plattsburgh and points farther south. He was leaving it up to Prevost to decide how far to penetrate into the American interior. But he cautioned him not to drive so far south “as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command.”
Bathurst was covering himself in case things went wrong, as they had for General Burgoyne during the Revolutionary War. Actually, Liverpool expected great things from Prevost. Sackets Harbor and Lake Erie would obviously have to wait until Yeo regained supremacy on Lake Ontario, but marching down the Champlain Valley should not prove difficult.
Bathurst did not have to worry about Prevost marching too far. Offensive operations would be getting under way so late in the season that a man as cautious as Prevost, and as experienced as he was in the American theater, would not want to get caught in upstate New York in the middle of winter. The name of Commodore Macdonough’s flagship, Saratoga, was a reminder of how dangerous that could be.
On September 1 Prevost marched across the border with an impressive army of 10,351, made up largely of Wellington’s veterans. General Edward Pakenham, Wellington’s adjutant general, had dispatched the troops directly from Bordeaux to Bermuda and thence to Canada. The men he sent had been fighting in Portugal, Spain, and France for seven years. They represented one-third of the total number of officers and men Prevost now had in Canada. Major General De Rottenburg was second in command, and under him were three of Wellington’s best: major generals Manley Power, Thomas Brisbane, and Frederick Robinson.
Prevost’s army was the largest on the continent, but at the same time, it was pathetically small for invading a country of nearly eight million. Liverpool and Bathurst blithely assumed the number was more than sufficient. And, if need be, Prevost could be reinforced after he took Plattsburg and gained control of Lake Champlain. Success might induce the British people to endure more sacrifice.
But that might not be necessary. The American commissioners at Ghent and their masters in Washington, disheartened by continual defeat, might give Liverpool what he wanted without Britain making any greater exertion. In any event, Liverpool expected Prevost to have immediate success, and when he did, the prime minister could judge how far south he would go from there. Reaction in Britain to the burning of Washington was so enthusiastic that Liverpool might be encouraged to push much farther. Or the army invading New Orleans might move north at a faster pace, in which case Prevost’s army could tie down the Americans while the major thrust into the interior came from the south.
Prevost marched down the western, or New York, side of Lake Champlain rather than through Vermont. He did not want to stop the flow of Vermont food that was sustaining his army. “Vermont has shown a disinclination to the war,” he wrote to Bathurst, “and, as it is sending in specie and provisions, I will confine offensive operations to the west side of Lake Champlain.” He later told Bathurst that “two thirds of the army are supplied with beef by American contractors, principally of Vermont and New York.”
Meeting scant resistance, Prevost entered Chazy on September 3 and marched unimpeded toward Plattsburgh. As he approached the northern part of the city on the morning of September 6, a few of Commodore Macdonough’s gunboats attacked his left wing at Dead Creek, forcing him to stop and bring up heavy artillery. The British gunners fired on the spirited gunboats, but heavy seas prevented them from firing back, and they withdrew.
Prevost moved on, arriving that evening on the north side of the Saranac River. The American army was entrenched on the other side. Its commander, Brigadier General Alexander Macomb, had the planks already removed from the river’s two bridges. Determined to fight no mater what the odds, he continued to prepare in the face of overwhelming numbers. He had only 1,500 regulars and an equal number of raw recruits and convalescents.
Up until August 29 there had been a strong American army of 5,500 regulars at Plattsburgh, under Major General Ralph Izard. They would have put up a stout defense against Prevost. Izard had been in command of Military District 9 since early May, when he took over from General Wilkinson. Izard had watched with growing anxiety as Prevost’s huge army assembled on the other side of the border, only thirty miles away. By August, Izard expected an invasion at any time. With his well-trained regulars, and the addition of militiamen from New York and volunteers from Vermont, he expected to do well against whatever was thrown at him. He had already built two blockhouses and three redoubts in Plattsburgh south of the Saranac. Even with Wellington’s veterans, Prevost was not going to have an easy time taking Plattsburgh, if he took it at all.
Izard was assiduously preparing for battle when Secretary Armstrong, in a letter dated July 27, ordered him to take 4,000 men and march west to the St. Lawrence River between Kingston and Montreal and threaten communications between the two towns. Izard received the order on August 10 and thought the secretary completely misunderstood the situation. He wrote to Armstrong that if he left Plattsburgh, Prevost would be in possession of the city within three days.
Armstrong wrote again on August 12, before he received Izard’s protest, giving specific orders to “carry the war as far to the westward as possible, particularly while we have ascendancy on the lakes.” On August 29, Izard reluctantly obeyed, and marched 4,000 regulars out of Plattsburgh, leaving Macomb and his troops to suffer the consequences.
Armstrong was more responsible than anyone else for the burning of Washington, and now he was handing Plattsburgh over to the British. If it wasn’t well established that he was an incompetent, one would have thought he was in Liverpool’s pay. Henry Adams wrote, “Armstrong’s policy of meeting the enemy’s main attack by annihilating the main defense never received explanation or excuse.”
General Macomb was not giving up, however; he intended to fight. He called for militiamen from New York and Vermont, and he removed the garrison and heavy guns Izard had placed on Cumberland Head at Macdonough’s suggestion and moved them to Plattsburgh. Patriotic volunteers from Vermont poured into the American camp. Federalist governor Martin Chittenden, son of Vermont’s first governor, Thomas Chittenden, would not order the militia to march out of state, but they could volunteer, and they did. New York militiamen came as well, doubling the size of Macomb’s force.
Originally, Prevost had planned to assault Plattsburgh first thing in the morning on September 7. But after the gunboat attack, he changed his mind and decided to wait for the British naval squadron to remove the threat from Macdonough’s squadron before he moved on the city. Macdonough’s ships were then in Plattsburgh Bay preparing for battle. Prevost expected the British lake fleet, under Captain George Downie—the second-ranking naval officer in Canada—to easily defeat Macdonough. Prevost planned to begin his attack on Macomb the moment Downie began his on Macdonough.
While waiting impatiently for the British squadron to arrive, Prevost sent Downie urgent, pointed messages to get his fleet under way. It wasn’t clear why Prevost was in such a hurry. Taking Plattsburgh would consume only a few hours. It was true that winter was coming, but this was only the first part of September. If Prevost intended to march farther south, he could easily reach Ticonderoga before the end of the month.
The day Prevost crossed the border, Macdonough had moved his squadron back to Plattsburgh Bay and prepared for the expected British attack. He had his flagship, the 26-gun Saratoga (two hundred ten men), the 20-gun Eagle (one hundred twenty men), the 17-gun Ticonderoga (one hundred ten men), the 7-gun Preble (thirty men), and the galleys Allen, Burrows, Borer, Nettle, Viper, and Centipede, all of which h
ad two heavy guns. In addition, he had the gunboats Ludlow, Wilmer, Alwyn, and Ballard, with one heavy gun each. Together, the galleys and gunboats had three hundred fifty men. The President was twenty miles south of Plattsburgh repairing damages, and the Montgomery was at Burlington ferrying Vermont volunteers to Macomb.
Macdonough’s squadron appeared to be weaker than the enemy’s because of the 37-gun frigate Confiance, Downie’s flagship, which had a main battery of twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders, one of which was on a pivot and could be fired from either side. In addition, she carried four thirty-two-pound carronades and six twenty-four-pound carronades. But the Confiance had problems. To begin with, Downie had just taken command. Since the abortive attack on Sackets Harbor in May 1813, Yeo and Prevost had difficulty working together, and Prevost’s drive on Plattsburgh was no exception. Yeo decided at the last minute to remove the commander of the Lake Champlain fleet, Captain Peter Fisher, and replace him with Downie, who did not know the squadron or the men or even his own ship.
In June, Yeo had dispatched Fisher from Kingston to assume command on Lake Champlain from Commander Pring, who was to be his second. Then, a few weeks later, Yeo changed his mind and sent Downie to replace Fisher, who returned to Kingston. Although these sudden shifts would have a serious impact on Prevost’s invasion plans, they were not coordinated with him. Downie did not appear at Isle aux Noix to replace Fisher until September 3—after Prevost began the invasion. Even worse, neither the crew nor the equipment for the Confiance was anywhere near ready. Commander Pring wrote later that “only sixteen days before [August 25], she had been on the stocks, with an unorganized crew, comprised of several drafts of men, who had recently arrived from different ships at Quebec, many of whom had joined the Confiance the day before, and were unknown to the officers or to each other, with the want of gun locks as well as other necessary appointments not found in this country.” Apparently unaware of these naval problems, Prevost proceeded with the invasion.
After the battle, Admiral Yeo wanted to know what all the rush had been about. Why had Prevost pushed Downie to fight when he clearly wasn’t ready? Macdonough’s squadron was anchored in Plattsburgh Bay, midway between the city and Cumberland Head, a mile from shore. Admiral Yeo wanted to know why Prevost, instead of waiting for Downie to attack Macdonough, didn’t take Plattsburgh and turn Macomb’s batteries on Macdonough? Yeo maintained that Macdonough would have been forced to quit the bay and fight Downie in open water, which Downie much preferred and where he would have had a big advantage.
Yeo’s argument was persuasive. By delaying the assault on Plattsburgh and prodding Downie to attack before his ship and crew were ready, Prevost was helping Macdonough immeasurably.
On September 7, the day after Prevost arrived at Plattsburgh, the Confiance left the dock at Isle aux Noix and was towed south, workmen still working furiously on her. They kept at it until two hours before the first shots were exchanged in Plattsburgh Bay, when they had to stop and get off. But the Confiance was still unfinished. Not only was the ship not ready, but the men had had almost no time to exercise at the guns. Prevost, who normally was ultracautious, blithely assumed the Royal Navy would prevail.
Even though the Confiance had problems, she was still powerful, and combined with the other vessels in the squadron, Downie’s fleet was strong enough to destroy Macdonough. In addition to the Confiance (three hundred men), Downie had the 16-gun Linnet (one hundred men), under Captain Pring; the 11-gun sloops Chub and Finch (forty men each); five galleys with two guns each; and seven gunboats with one gun each. No accurate number of men from the British galleys and gunboats exists. Macdonough thought there were on average fifty to a boat, and that is probably the best estimate. The Chub and Finch were the former sloops Growler and Eagle captured from Macdonough’s squadron on June 3, 1813.
While the British were scrambling to get the Confiance ready to fight, Macdonough was carefully positioning his squadron. He decided to anchor and wait for Downie to attack. The prevailing winds on Lake Champlain were from the north or the south. Lake ships were poor sailers close-hauled because of their flat bottoms and shallow draught. Macdonough reasoned that Downie would be forced to come down the lake with a northerly wind and then have to beat back against it in order to get into Plattsburgh Bay. When he did, he would be caught in the lee of Cumberland Head, where the wind would be light and erratic.
Macdonough situated his ships in a line north to south, one mile east of Plattsburgh’s waterfront and parallel to it. The Eagle, under Master Commandant Robert Henley, was farthest north, followed by the Saratoga, the Ticonderoga, under Lieutenant Stephen Cassin, and the Preble, under Lieutenant Charles Budd. The Eagle was considerably south of the Saranac River, and the Preble was a mile and a half from Crab Island. The gunboats were in a line abreast, forty yards west of the four larger ships.
The Saratoga had eight long twenty-four-pounders, six forty-two-pound carronades, and twelve thirty-two-pound carronades. The Eagle had eight long eighteen-pounders and twelve thirty-two-pound carronades. The schooner Ticonderoga had four long eighteen-pounders, eight long twelve-pounders, and five thirty-two-pound carronades. The sloop Preble had seven long nine-pounders. The six galleys were seventy-five feet long with forty oars and had one long twenty-four-pounder and one eighteen-pound columbiad. The four gunboats had one long twelve-pounder each. The larger ships had springs on their cables that allowed them to turn without using their sails. They also had stern anchors. In addition, the Saratoga had a kedge anchor off each bow with a hawser attached to the quarter on that side, enabling Macdonough to turn the Saratoga and bring both the starboard and larboard batteries to bear. Being able to wind the ship in this fashion was an enormous advantage.
On September 10, the British fleet gathered at Isle la Motte, a tiny island at the mouth of the Chazy River, twelve miles north of Plattsburgh. At daylight on the eleventh Downie got under way with a northeast breeze. By five o’clock he was off Cumberland Head, where he signaled Prevost by scaling his guns (firing cartridges alone). Downie then stepped into his gig and slipped around Cumberland Head to get a look at Macdonough’s arrangements. When he returned to the Confiance, he held a meeting of officers and presented his plan of attack. He decided to sail into the bay, run up north of Macdonough’s line, then turn south and give the Eagle a broadside before laying across the bows of the Saratoga and raking her. Commander Pring in the Linnet would follow and engage the Eagle. Lieutenant James McGhie and the Chub would assist him. At the same time, Acting Lieutenant William Hicks would attack the Preble and the Ticonderoga with the brig Finch and the flotilla of gunboats. Downie expected the powerful Confiance to easily crush the Saratoga. Once that happened, he thought, the rest of the American squadron would quickly strike their colors.
At eight o’clock Macdonough’s lookout boat signaled the approach of the British squadron, and when Downie hove into sight off Cumberland Head, Macdonough made the signal “Impressed seamen call on every man to do his duty.” As the enemy approached, the deeply religious Macdonough knelt with his officers on the Saratoga’s deck and said a solemn prayer.
When the Confiance, the lead ship, came under the lee of Cumberland Head, the wind became light and fitful, just as Macdonough had predicted. As the Confiance pulled within range, Macdonough sighted and fired a long twenty-four-pounder himself, before ordering “close action.” Fire from the American squadron concentrated on the Confiance, which was struggling to get into position. Her small bower anchor and the cable on her spare anchor were shot away, as well as the spring on her best bower.
At nine o’clock the contrary winds forced Downie to anchor two cable lengths from the American line and return fire—not where he had planned to be. But his ship was still potent. His first broadside from fourteen, double-shotted twenty-four-pound long guns smashed into the Saratoga and killed 20 percent of her crew. One of the dead was Macdonough’s first officer, Lieutenant Peter Gamble, the brother of Marine Lieutenant John M. Gamble,
who had served under Commodore David Porter on the Essex. Peter Gamble had taken over when Lieutenant Raymond Perry (Oliver’s brother) fell sick just before the battle. Even though Perry wasn’t there, Macdonough credited him with training the crew and had high praise for his efforts. Needless to say, Perry was depressed about not being aboard during the fight.
The first devastating broadside from the Confiance did not stop Macdonough or his men. They resumed firing, and a general battle raged. Fifteen minutes into the action, Captain Downie was standing in back of a gun when a ball from the Saratoga knocked the cannon off its carriage onto him, killing him instantly. Losing a leader at such a critical moment was devastating. Lieutenant James Robertson assumed command.
Macdonough was in constant danger himself. He personally worked some of the guns and was in the act of sighting one when a ball struck the spanker boom and sent a piece of wood slicing into him. For a few moments he was unconscious. He recovered quickly, however, and resumed the fight. A while later, a head from a decapitated seaman smacked into his face and knocked him out again. When he regained his senses, he struggled to his feet and carried on.
The Linnet and the Chub had taken up stations near the Eagle and were firing at close range. The larger warships on both sides were now grouped together. The Saratoga and Eagle, supported by seven gunboats, were fighting the Confiance, Linnet, and Chub. The Ticonderoga, the Preble, and three gunboats engaged the Finch and four gunboats. The other seven British gunboats, under Lieutenant Rayot, stayed clear of the action and ran away. Shortly, Lieutenant McGhee in the Chub had his cables, bowsprit, and main boom shot away. He drifted within Macdonough’s line and was forced to surrender. Midshipman Charles T. Platt, who had fought with David Porter on the Potomac River just days before, took possession and brought her inshore, where he anchored.
1812: The Navy's War Page 45