by Daniel Wrinn
The grouse shooting metaphor was simple, but even the 4th Division commander, General Cates thought the campaign had a sporting aspect. “The fighting was different from most any that we’d experienced because it was good terrain. A good, clean operation the men really enjoyed.”
Before the bush beating could begin in a proper order, three things needed to happen. First, the 2nd Division needed to be put ashore. This was completed on the morning of July 26.
Next, Japanese pockets of resistance and stragglers on the island’s northern sector had to be crushed. That job was completed on the 26th as the 2nd Marine Division swept across Ushi Point airfields and reached the east coast before turning south.
The 4th Division seized Mount Maga in the center of the island, also on the 26th. This forced Colonel Ogata and his staff to abandon their command post on Mount Lasso, which fell to the Marines without a struggle. Two days later, Navy Seabees had the Ushi Point airfields in operation for Army P-47 Thunderbolt Fighters.
The third objective was to drive south a skirmish line of infantry and tanks stretching across the 29 square mile island. This was also accomplished on the 26th. The 4th Division lined up in the western half of the island. The 23rd Marines were on the coast, with the 24th in the center and the 25th on the left flank. The 2nd Division lined up with the 2nd Marines on the east coast with the 6th Marines in the center now all tied into the 25th. The 8th Marines stayed in the north to mop up any further resistance.
This was achieved with only minor casualties. On July 26, Jig Day +2, the 2nd Division reported two dead and 14 wounded. These were the heaviest losses since the first day and night of fighting had been sustained by the 14th Marines, the 4th Division’s artillery regiment, following the Japanese counterattack. An enemy shell smashed into the 1st Battalion’s fire direction center, killing the battalion commander, intelligence officer, ops officer, and seven other staff members. Fourteen Marines in the battalion headquarters were also wounded. Nearly all the casualties sustained by the regiment during the Tinian campaign happened on that one day—July 25.
The morning of July 27, Jig Day +3, started the bush beating drive to the south. General Schmidt’s plan for the first two days of the drive alternated between the two divisions’ main thrust. The official history of the operation likens it to “a man elbowing his way through the crowd swinging on one arm then the other.”
The 2nd Division got the heavier work on July 27. Artillery firing from southern Saipan had softened up suspected enemy positions early in the morning. At 0730, the 2nd Division began its advance. They advanced swiftly and were harassed by sporadic arms fire. By 1345 they’d reached their objective. They gained over 4,000 yards in less than six hours.
The 4th Division moved out late in the morning against “negligible opposition” and reached their objective by noon before calling it a day. A Japanese prisoner of war complained to his captors, “you couldn’t drop a stick without bringing down artillery.”
On the morning of July 28, the 4th Marines got the “swinging elbow” job. It was now apparent the remaining Japanese defenders were fleeing to the hills and caves along the southern coast. The opposition to the Marine advance was virtually nil. The 4th Marines moved more than two miles in less than four hours, with troops riding in half-tracks and tanks.
Starting again early in the afternoon in a blitz fashion, they overran the airfield at Gurguan Point before quitting for the day at 1730 after gaining just over 7000 yards—a little over 4 miles. The 2nd Division got light-duty and moved ahead a few hundred yards, reaching their objective in two hours, and digging in to wait for the next morning.
General Cates later wrote how he spurred on his 4th Division troops: “‘Look men,’ I said. ‘The Hawaiian island of Maui is waiting for us. See the ships out there? The quicker you get this over with, the quicker we’ll be back there.’ They almost ran to the other end of that island.”
On the 29th, General Schmidt dropped the elbowing tactic and ordered both divisions to move as far and as fast as sensible. Opposition had been so light that preparatory fires were canceled to save the dwindling artillery supply shells left on Saipan and to prevent any “waste of naval gunfire on areas largely deserted by the enemy.”
While the 2nd Marines in the eastern terrain ran into pockets of resistance at Masalog Point, the 6th Marines encountered a twenty-man Japanese patrol attempting to penetrate the regiment’s lines after dark. The 25th took heavy sniper fire as they moved through cane fields and engaged in a heavy firefight with Japanese troops fighting from dug-in positions later in the day. The Marines suffered casualties and one of their tanks was disabled in the fight. But the resistance was eventually overcome. The 24th Marines operating near the west coast ran into Japanese positions, including a series of mutually supporting bunkers. The 4th Tank Battalion reported that the area had to be overrun twice by tanks before the resistance ended.
By nightfall, more than half of Tinian was in Marine hands. The 4th Division Marines could see Tinian Town from their foxholes. While great for morale, the night was spoiled by weather and heavy enemy activity. A soaking rain poured through the night. Enemy mortars and artillery fired relentlessly, drawing counter-battery fire from Marine gunners. Mortars and small arms fire silenced probes in front of the 3/25 Marines—forty Japanese bodies were found in the area at dawn.
On July 30 (Jig Day +6), Tinian Town became the principal objective of the 4th Division. At 0730, all of the division’s artillery battalions laid down preparatory fire in front of Marine lines. After ten minutes, the firing stopped, and the troops moved out. At once, two destroyers and a cruiser lying in Sunharon Harbor of Tinian Town started an hour-long bombardment to support the Marines. The 1/24 Marines advanced 600 yards before coming under heavy fire from the caves along the coast north of town.
With the help of tanks and armored amphibians operating offshore, this problem was solved. Flame-throwing tanks worked over the caves, allowing engineers to seal them with demolition charges. A 75mm gun hidden in one cave was found and destroyed.
The regiment entered the ruins of Tinian Town at 1430. Except for a lone Japanese soldier—eliminated on the spot—the town was deserted. After searching through the rubble for snipers and documents, Marines advanced to their O-7 line objective south of town. The greatest danger was from mines and booby traps planted in beach areas and roads.
As the 24th continued south, the 25th Marines seized Airfield 4 on the outskirts of Tinian Town. A Japanese prisoner revealed that the unfinished airfield was rushed to completion in order to accommodate relief planes promised by Tokyo. Only one plane was parked on the crushed coral airstrip—a lone Zero fighter. Flying suits, goggles, and other equipment were found in the supply room.
En route to the airfield, the 25th took light small arms fire and while crossing the airstrip, was mortared from positions in the south. This was the 25th’s last action in the Tinian campaign. They went into reserve and were relieved by units of the 23rd and the 1/8 Marines.
The 2nd Division operating east of the 4th ran into intermittent opposition from machine gun positions and a 70mm howitzer. The 3/2 Marines of the 2nd Division had the roughest time. After they silenced the howitzer, they attacked across an open field and chased a Japanese force into a large cave. With the help of a flame-throwing tank, ninety-three Japanese were killed, and four machine guns destroyed.
Afterward, the battalion came under mortar fire. The unit commander, Colonel Walter Layer wrote: “It was beyond my memory as to the number of casualties the 3rd suffered at that time. I remember rendering first aid to wounded Marines and seeing seven wounded or killed by enemy mortar fire. Half-tracks and tanks took the enemy under fire, destroying enemy mortars.”
There were more minor delays, but the division reached the objective on time and dug-in by 1830. Nearly eighty percent of the island was now in American hands.
End of Resistance
The Japanese were now confined to a small area of southeastern T
inian. Marines had advanced so quickly that only four miles of the island remained safe firing for ships not supporting battalions.
General Schmidt saw the end in sight in the late afternoon of July 30. He ordered the divisions to drive all the way to the southeast coastline and seize all territory remaining in enemy hands and destroy any Japanese troops.
This was not an insignificant assignment and caused the heaviest fighting since the Jig-Day counterattack. A Japanese officer captured on July 29 estimated that 500 troops of the 56th Naval Guard Force and 2,000 troops of the 50th Infantry Regiment were in battle-ready condition in the island’s southeastern area. US intelligence estimated on July 29, based on daily reports from the divisions, that 2,800 Japanese troops had already been killed or taken prisoner up to that point. If this was true, then nearly two-thirds of the 9,000 Japanese defenders would still be alive and ready to defend the island.
The main Japanese force occupied rugged terrain that was difficult to reach and traverse—well suited for their defensive purposes. Outside of Tinian Town, the gentle landscape ended with the ground rising to plateaus of over 5,000 feet long and 2,000 yards wide—with altitudes over 500 feet. There were many caves. The plateaus were rocky and covered with thick brush. All along the east coast, cliff walls rose and seemed impossible to scale. Cliffs and jungle growth obstructed the approaches. The road in the center of the plateau led to its top and was reportedly mined. This plateau would be the last hold out for the remaining Japanese.
Next came the most intense bombardment any Japanese force had yet experienced in World War II. Marine artillery regiments on southern Saipan fired throughout the night of July 30 into the wooded cliff lines. Battleships California and Tennessee along with the heavy cruiser Louisville and light cruisers Birmingham and Montpelier began two sustained bombardments at 0600.
Firing for over an hour, they stopped to allow a forty-minute strike by 126 P-47 Thunderbolt Fighters, Mitchell Bombers, and Grumman Avenger Bombers from the carrier Kitkun Bay. These planes dropped seventy tons of explosives before the offshore gunfire resumed for another thirty minutes.
The battleships and cruisers fired over 600 tons of shells at their targets. The 10th and 14th Marines’ artillerymen and gunners fired over 7,000 rounds during the night. According to a Japanese prisoner, the effect was “unbearable.”
The following day, the 2nd Marines’ task was to clear out the western coastal area with one battalion assigned for the plateau’s seizure. The 2nd Marines intended to seal off the east coast at the base of the plateau. The 6th, 8th, and 23rd Marines would assault the cliff areas and advance to the top of the plateau.
The 24th Marines jumped off at 0830 and advanced into the coastal plains. They immediately encountered brush and undergrowth so dense that tank operations would be hampered. Armored amphibians lying offshore fired against enemy beach positions and covered the regiment’s right flank as they made their way down the coast. A platoon-sized Japanese beach unit launched a foolish counterattack on the 1/24 Marines at 0950. The Japanese were destroyed. Flame throwing tanks burned off brush and undergrowth, which concealed the Japanese riflemens’ positions.
The 3rd Battalion on the regiment’s left flank assaulted the base of the plateau. They encountered minimal opposition until 1610 when they took machine gun and rifle fire from cliff positions. Tanks were called up but got caught in a minefield and were delayed for several hours while engineers cleared dozens of mines.
The 1/23 Marines encountered a similar problem. As the regiment approached the plateau, they ran into intense small arms fire from two positions. A small village at the base of the cliff and from the cliff face itself. They took fire from a “large caliber weapon.” Marines pressed forward without tank support, running a few yards, then diving, and getting up to advance again. Marine tanks finally came in search of this elusive and well-concealed weapon. One tank took six hits from the Japanese gun. A second tank was hit, but in the process, a concrete camouflage bunker hiding a 47mm anti-tank gun and twenty enemy troops was destroyed.
The 2/23 Marines came under fire from machine gunners and riflemen. One of their supporting tanks was disabled by a mine. Its crew was taken to safety by another tank, but the disabled tank was taken over by the Japanese and used as an armored machine gun nest. Other tanks were dispatched to take it out. The 23rd Regiment also lost two 37mm guns and a 1-ton truck belonging to the regiment's half-track platoon. The guns and the vehicle got too far ahead and came under heavy fire before being abandoned. The platoon later retrieved one of the guns and removed the breech block from the other. The 50-caliber machine gun from its truck mounting was brought back.
By late afternoon, the 1/23 Marines got a foothold on top of the plateau. The 3rd Battalion soon followed. On their left flank, the 3/8 Marines shrugged off small arms fire to reach the cliff's base where they were delayed for the night. The 1st Battalion had better luck. Company A made it to the top of the plateau at 1630 and was soon followed by the entire battalion and Companies E and G from the 2/8 Marines.
Captain Carl Hoffman commander of Company G of the 2/8 Marines later wrote a definitive history of the Saipan and Tinian campaigns. In an interview, he described his own experiences on top of the plateau on the night of July 31: “By the time we got up there, there was enough daylight to get ourselves properly barbed wired in, get our fields of fire established, and site our interlocking bands of machine gun fire. All things necessary for preparing a good defense.
“By dusk the enemy started a series of probing attacks. Some Japs made it into our positions. It was such a black night that the Japs moving around in our positions made our troops edgy and they challenged everyone in sight. We didn’t have any unfortunate incidents of Marines firing on Marines because we were all well-seasoned by this point.
“While the night wore on, the intensity of enemy attacks started to build and finally they launched a full-on banzai attack against our battalion. The strange thing the Japs did here was that they executed one wave attack after another against a 37mm firing canister ammunition. That gun just stacked up dead Japanese. As soon as one gunner dropped another took his place. [Eight out of the ten Marines manning that gun were killed or wounded.] We were shoulder high with dead Japs in front of that weapon. By the next morning, we had defeated the enemy. Around us were a lot of dead ones—hundreds of them. From then on, we were able to finish the rest of the campaign without any difficulty. People often said that the Tinian campaign was the easiest campaign—in the Pacific.”
Marines in that 37mm position on the escarpment might disagree with that assessment and think Tinian was the busiest campaign in the Pacific War.
Captain Hoffman had another vivid experience before leaving the island. He was obsessed with trumpets and carried his horn with him throughout the Pacific War: “On Tinian, I didn’t take any chances sending my horn ashore in a battalion ambulance or a machine gun cart. I had it flown to me. One night my troops were in a small perimeter with barbed wire all around us on top of a cliff. My Marines were shouting requests: ‘Pretty Baby’ and ‘Oh You Beautiful Doll’ among others. While I was playing these tunes, all of a sudden, I heard the scream of banzai. One Jap soldier charged right toward me through the barbed wire. Marines had their weapons ready, and he must’ve been hit from fourteen different directions at once. He didn’t even get to throw his grenade. He must not have liked my music. Not a supporter of my trumpet playing. But I continued with my little concert after we accounted for him.”
In the early morning of August 1, a final banzai attack happened. A 150-man Japanese force attacked the 1/20 Marines on Hoffman’s left flank. After twenty minutes, the attack’s thrust was spent and at dawn, the Japanese withdrew. One-hundred mangled Japanese bodies laid in an area seventy yards in front of Company E from the 2/28 Marines. That night the 8th Marines took seventy-five casualties.
The next day the two divisions got back to work. The 2nd Division moved across the plateau toward the eastern cliffs.
The 4th Division advanced toward the cliffs to the south and west. When they reached the edge of the escarpment and overlooked the ocean, their job was primarily done. At 1900, General Schmidt declared the island secured. This meant the organized resistance had ended. But not the killing. Hundreds of Japanese troops remained holed up in caves on the southern cliffs rising from the ocean.
On August 2, a Japanese force of 200 men charged and attacked the 3/6 Marines. After over two hours of combat, 119 Japanese were destroyed. This kind of contact continued for months. By the end of the year, the 8th Marines left on Tinian for mop-up operations had suffered sixty-seven casualties, with twenty-two Marines killed. Japanese losses were over 500 killed.
Beginning on August 1, there were large-scale surrenders by civilians fleeing the caves where they took refuge. Marine intelligence estimated that nearly 10,000 civilians were hiding in the southeast sector.
Marine General James Underhill took command of the island as military governor on August 10. He was responsible for the care and feeding of civilians. He wrote of his experiences: “Five hundred came through immediately, the next day eight hundred then one thousand, and then two thousand and so on. Numbers increased until we counted over 8,000. Another 3,000 hid in the caves and dribbled in over a period of months. It was 30 percent adult males, 20 percent adult females, and the rest were children. They were in terrible shape—hungry, sick, wounded. They had few possessions beyond the clothes on their backs.
“We estimate 4,000 civilians were killed in the bombardment of Tinian and the fighting on the island. On Saipan, Marines were helpless to prevent mass suicides among the civilian population. While we were more successful on Tinian, unfortunate incidents did occur. Civilians, for example, died under Marine fire after wandering into the lines at night.”