by Daniel Wrinn
By the end of the day, at least two colonels on Peleliu had misleading information about their situations and gave inaccurate reports to their superiors. When General Smith finally got a telephone wire into the 1st Marines’ command post, he was told the regiment had secured the beachhead and was on the objective line. He was not told about the gaps in his lines nor of the gravity of the 1st Division’s struggle on the Point—where thirty-eight Marines battled to keep the position.
Colonel Nakagawa reported that the Marines’ landings attempt had been routed. He also reported that his brave counterattack had thrown the Marines into the sea.
The Umurbrogol Pocket
General Rupertus was irritated that after his failed efforts to land, his division reserve into the southern sector of the beachhead. Now he was informed that his northern sector—on the extreme left flank—needed reinforcements. Rupertus ordered the 2/7 into Colonel Puller’s sector to assist.
Division headquarters afloat had reported the Marine D-Day casualties had exceeded 1,100, of which 210 Marines were killed in action. While not a substantial percentage of the total divisional strength, this number threatened the overall cutting-edge strength. Most of those 1,100 casualties were from each of the division’s nine infantry battalions (with the exception of the center). General Rupertus was still not on the O-1 objective line—the first of his eight planned phase lines.
Rupertus had inaccurate information about the 1st Marines’ situation. The general was determined to get ashore and see what he could do to reignite the lost momentum. He had a broken ankle from a pre-assault training exercise. His foot was in a cast, but his gimpy leg dragging in a sandy trench would not hold him back from seeing the situation on Peleliu for himself.
On Colonel Nakagawa’s side, he saw a different situation from his high ground because of the incredible reports being sent out from his headquarters. The Marine landing force had not been routed. He watched while a division of Marines deployed across two miles of beach. While the Marines had been punished on D-Day, they were still in the fight.
Nakagawa predicted the next assault would be preceded by a hailstorm of naval artillery, gunfire, and aerial bombardments. Also, that they’d be supported by the US tanks that annihilated the Japanese armor on D-Day.
In Nakagawa’s D-Day counterattack, he lost one of his five infantry battalions.
Across Peleliu, he lost hundreds of beach defenders in fighting across the front, and in futile night attacks. Still, he had several thousand courageous, well-armed and well-trained soldiers ready to fight and die for the empire. They were deployed through strong defensive complexes and fortifications, with abundant underground support facilities. Nakagawa’s troops were determined to kill as many Marines as they could before they fell.
Colonel Nakagawa had the terrain advantage. He focused his defensive strategy around the occupation and organization of that terrain. Until he was driven from the commanding crests of the Point, he still had a dominant position. He could observe and direct hidden fire on the attackers while his forces were largely invisible to the Marines and their fire superiority. Continuing to hold this terrain was a key component of his overall defensive strategy.
The Marines were assaulting fortified positions, and precise fire preparations were needed. Marines on the left flank were under extreme pressure to advance rapidly, sacrificing speed for careful preparation. General Rupertus understood that enemy weapons and observation dominated the Marine position and troops were getting picked off at the enemy’s leisure. Rupertus’ concern for momentum was a priority and would save Marine lives.
The rapid advance burden was on the 1st Marines—on the left flank—and on the 5th in the airfield area. In the south, the 7th Marines already held the edge of the airfield’s terrain. The scrub jungle screened the regiment from enemy observation.
Colonel “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Marines had suffered the most casualties on D-Day. They fought through the most formidable terrain and assaulted the toughest positions. They had to attack and relieve Company K of the 3/1 on the Point and then assault the Pocket ridges north to south.
Puller’s Marines (aided by the 2/1) swung leftward and secured the built-up area between the airfield in the ridges. When Puller was at the foot of the cliffs, his Marines fought in a savage, scratch and scramble attack against the enemy troops in the ridges.
Puller closed the gaps on his left flank and swung his entire regiment north. With the help of the 3/1, he reinforced Company K on the Point. Then he moved north, keeping his left on the beach and his right close to the West Road, along the foot of the Pocket. While the terrain allowed for tank support, maneuverability was tight, and hard fighting was involved.
The rapid rate of movement along the boundary and the more open zone created a pressing need for reserves. Tactically, it was necessary to press east into and over the rough terrain and destroy enemy defenses. That job was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Marines and the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines. But more troops were still needed to move north and encircle the rugged landscape of the Umurbrogol Pocket area. By September 17, reserves were needed along the 1st Division’s western (left) advance, but neither division nor III Amphibious Corps had reserves.
The 3/1 Marines battled up easier terrain on the left flank. In the center, the 1/1 Marines advanced between the coral ridge and an open flat zone. One of their early surprises, as they approached the foot of the ridge area, was another enemy blockhouse. Admiral Oldendorf had reported that blockhouse destroyed from pre-landing naval gunfire, but the Marines who first encountered it reported the enemy placement as “not even having a mark on it.”
This blockhouse was part of an impressive defensive complex. It was connected and supported by a web of adjacent emplacements and pillboxes. It had four-foot-thick walls of reinforced concrete. The naval gunfire support team from the USS Mississippi was called on to help. They annihilated the entire complex. The 1/1 Marines advanced again until running into the far more challenging Japanese ridge defense systems. Major Davis, in command of the 1/1 Marines (later to earn a Medal of Honor in Korea) said the attack into and along the ridges: “was the most difficult assignment I’d ever been tasked with.”
All three of the 1st Marines’ Battalions battled beside each other onto the Pocket and its wicked, cave-filled coral ridges. The initial reserve, the 2/7 Marines, was assigned to the 1st Marines and immediately thrown into the fight. Colonel Puller fed companies into the battle piecemeal. Shortly afterward, the 2/7 took the central zone of action between the 1st and 2nd Marine Battalions.
The 1st Marines continued to assault the stubborn enemy defenders in their underground caves and fortifications. Every new advance opened the Marines to new fire from the incredible number of cliffs and ridges and concealed positions in the caves above and below the newly won ground.
Nothing exemplified this tactical dilemma better than the September 19 seizure and withdrawal from Hill 100. This ridge bordered the Horseshoe Valley on the eastern limit of the Pocket. The 2/1 Marines landed with 240 Marines. Now they had only 90 Marines left when they were ordered to take Hill 100. The Japanese called it East Mountain (Higashiyama).
Marines were at first supported by tanks but lost that support when the leading two tanks slipped off the approach causeway. The Marines continued with only mortar support into the face of heavy machine gun and mortar fire. When the Marines reached the summit at twilight, they discovered the ridge’s northeast extension continued to even higher ground, where Japanese troops poured fire on the hill.
Just as threatening was fire from enemy caves on the parallel ridge to the west—known as Five Brothers. Into the setting darkness, Marines supported by heavy mortars hung on. Throughout the night, a series of enemy counterattacks on the ridge top were turned back. Marines repulsed them with mortars and hand-to-hand brawls, knives, and rifles. Marines even threw rocks when their grenade supplies ran low.
Marines were still clinging to the ridge
-top when dawn broke. Only eight Marines were left. The remaining Marines, under the command of Captain Everett Pope, withdrew and successfully evacuated their wounded. The dead were left behind on the ridge until October 3, when the ridge was finally captured for good. Another example of the enemy’s expert use of mutually supporting positions on the Umurbrogol Pocket.
By D +4, the 1st Marines was a regiment in name only. They’d taken over 1,500 casualties. General Rupertus had continued to urge Puller’s under-strength Marines forward. General Geiger (commander of III Amphibious Corps and Rupertus’ superior) was an experienced ground operations commander from Guam to Bougainville. He understood the lower combat efficiency that these types of losses imposed on a committed combat unit.
On October 2, General Geiger, after visiting Puller in his forward command post and observing the exhausted condition of his Marines, met with General Rupertus and his staff. Rupertus wasn’t willing to admit that his division needed to be reinforced, but Geiger overruled him. He ordered the Army’s 321st Regiment Combat Team and 81st Infantry Division (on Angaur) to be attached to the 1st Marine Division.
Geiger ordered Rupertus to stand down and send the 1st Marines to the division’s rear area base on Pavuvu, in the Russell Islands.
On September 21, the 1st Marines had 1,749 casualties. They reported killing over 4,000 Japanese soldiers and capturing ten heavily defended coral ridges. They reported the destruction of three blockhouses, twenty-five pillboxes, fourteen anti-tank guns, and over 140 defended caves.
The 1st Marines’ assault battalions had captured much of the crest required to deny the enemy observation and effective fire on the airfield and logistical areas. Light aircraft flew on September 25 from the scarred and still under repair airfield.
With the Pocket now in Allied control, the division’s logistical lifeline was assured. While the Japanese still had some observation capability on the airfield, they could only harass rather than threaten.
The Marine front lines were now close to the final Japanese defensive positions. While intelligence couldn’t verify it—the terrain and situation suggested that all assault requirements had been met, and it was time for siege tactics.
Enemy defenders learned that when aerial observers were overhead, they could no longer run their weapons out of caves and fire on the beach or the airfield. After one or two rounds, they were answered with a quick counter-battery fire or a dreaded aerial attack from carrier-based planes.
On September 24, Marines used attack planes operating from the airfield on Peleliu.
Peleliu’s Eastern Peninsula
On D +1, when the 1st Marines launched their bloody assault on the Pocket, the 5th Marines (on the right flank) found less opposition and easier terrain to navigate.
The 1/5 fought southwest to northeast across the airfield through a built-up area similar to what the 2/1 Marines faced. The battalion took fire from the Pocket and assorted small arms from hidden defenders in the rubble-filled built-up area.
The 1/5’s tank-infantry attack carried the day. Marines had control of the east to west cross-island road—the next step in securing Peleliu’s eastern peninsula.
The 2/5 Marines had a more difficult time. Their progress was opposed by infantry from the woods, and artillery directly from the Pocket, which targeted their tanks supporting the attack along the wood’s edge.
Whether the Japanese troops in those woods were posted to defend that position or just trying to survive was never established. The battle took all day, and Marine battalions suffered heavy casualties. By nightfall, the 2/5 Marines had fought past the north end of the airfield and halted to spend the night in the woods, concealing the approaches to the eastern peninsula.
The two-battalion Marine assault was deeply engaged on its front and right. Regimental headquarters near the beach was hit by an artillery barrage that, coupled with the 3/5 Marines’ CO and XO losses, prompted a considerable rearrangement of command assignments. The barrage at the regimental command post took out most of the staff and buried the regimental commander in the crumbling Japanese anti-tank trench.
Luckily, it was a temporary burial, and the regimental commander, Colonel Harris, crawled out with a twisted and battered leg but could still hobble. Two of his staff officers were casualties, and the sergeant major was killed. Harris didn’t evacuate but needed help in his CP. Harris ordered Colonel Walt back from the 3rd Battalion and had the XO of the 2/5, Major John Gustafson, take command of the 3/5.
Fortunately, the 3/5 Marines were having a quiet day, unlike their hair-raising regrouping on the night of D-Day. After daylight, the 2/5 attacked to the north, and the 3/5 stretched along the east edge of a mangrove lagoon, separating Peleliu from the eastern peninsula. From that position, the 3rd Battalion 5th Marines tied into the 3/7 Marines as they attacked south.
This maneuver protected each regiment’s flank against enemy movement across the lagoon and into the rear of the attacking Marines. While no such threat developed, a more pressing concern emerged for the 3/5 Marines. Major Gustafson was tasked with getting the 3/5 into position to bolster and relieve the 1/5 Marines as they closed in on their objective.
The next day, the 5th Marines tied in with the 1st on their left and secured the foot of the East Road. To the right, the 2/5 Marines hacked their way through the jungle north of the airfield and alongside a road leading to the eastern peninsula. A thick and almost impenetrable scrub reduced progress to a crawl. The scrub concealed most of the advancing Marines from enemy observation on the high ground to the northwest.
The 5th Marines’ position overlapped with the northeast sector. Securing that visual boundary meant frontline Marines were spared hostile, directed fire from Pocket. Like the 7th Marines, hidden mainly in the jungle to the South, this would lessen the need for a frontal assault.
Now Marines had the freedom to maneuver purposefully and coordinate supporting fire more carefully into enemy positions.
7th Marines in the South
In the south, starting on D +1, the 7th Marines’ spirited assault against enemy fortifications smashed into the elite 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment.
Even though the enemy was isolated and surrounded by Marines, this Japanese battalion showed skill and an understanding of Colonel Nakagawa’s orders and mission: to sell Peleliu at the highest price possible.
The 7th Marines attacked. The 3/7 were on the left and the 1/7 on the right. Marines had the advantage of assaulting the extensive and well-prepared defenses from the rear—with heavy fire support. Both sides fought bitterly, but by 1530 on September 8, the battle was over. Marines destroyed the fortified elite Japanese infantry battalion in their stronghold.
General Rupertus was informed that the 7th Marines’ objectives had been met, through the courage, bravery, skill, and many casualties of the 7th Marines infantry companies. Now the 7th advanced out of their successful battle area and into another bloody assault—better known as a siege.
The 5th Marines were still battling bitterly for the eastern “lobster claw” peninsula. By the end of D +2, the 5th Marines stood at the approach to the eastern peninsula off the East Road—near the 1st Marines’ vicious fight at the Pocket.
They’d planned an assault on the eastern peninsula across a narrow causeway the Japanese were sure to defend. But a recent reconnaissance revealed that the causeway was not defended. The 2nd Battalion advanced swiftly to seize the opportunity. They moved across in strength but were turned back by friendly fire. The battalion was strafed by Navy planes and then hit by an artillery airburst that killed eighteen Marines.
Still, a bridgehead across the causeway was established and on D +3 the 5th Marines moved in. By the afternoon, Marines advanced to capture and clear the eastern peninsula. Marines expected an attack against a strong defending force that never materialized, this provided an opportunity to secure Purple Beach quickly—a massive logistical prize.
Just before dark, two companies of the 3/5 Marines moved across the causeway
to plan the next day’s advance. They hoped for little resistance but armed their point units with war dogs to guard against a nighttime ambush. Their lead companies moved out just after dawn, while nearly ambushed, the war dogs warned the Marines and thwarted the enemy’s attempted surprise attack.
By the end of D +4, the two battalions had secured the main body of the eastern peninsula and reached Purple Beach from the rear. While the Japanese defenses were extraordinary, many were unmanned. The enemy troops encountered were more interested in hiding than fighting. This added to the speculation that Colonel Nakagawa’s trained infantry had been moved west. By D +5, Purple Beach was secured along with the southwest and northeast of the long peninsula of Purple Beach.
From that position and others near the island of Ngardololok, Marines could direct fire against the cave-infested ridges of central and northern Peleliu.
Now that eastern and southern Peleliu was captured, the Allies planned to encircle the Japanese defenders in central Peleliu and assault nearby Ngesebus and Kongauru in the north. While this was the obvious next tactical phase for the fighting, securing it was unnecessary for strategic and tactical goals.
General Oliver Smith, the 1st Marine Division’s assistant commander, believed that the island’s mop-up operations should take priority. He wrote: “by the end of the first week, the division controlled everything on the island that was needed, or later even used.”
The airfield was secured and under improvement and repair—and in use. There was now no threat to MacArthur’s long-heralded return to the Philippines. Purple Beach, Peleliu’s best strategic axis, was secured and provided a protected logistic access to the major battle areas. While enemy defenders in their caves on northern Peleliu could still somewhat harass Allied rear installations, Marine counterattacks would quickly silence them.