by Daniel Wrinn
Other attacks to seize the heights of the eastern ridges were initially successful. Small infantry units scrambled up onto the bare ridge tops but came under fire from facing parallel ridges and caves. They were also harassed by strong enemy counterattacks who left their caves under cover of darkness in suicide attacks.
On September 20, the 7th Marines relieved the 1st Marines along the southwest front of the Pocket and resumed the attack the next day. These assaults achieved limited success behind heavy fire support and smoke. But these positions became impossible to maintain after the fire support and smoke lifted. Assault troops were withdrawn under renewed fire support to their original jump-off positions. There was little to show for the day’s bloody fighting.
On September 22, against the west shoulder of the Pocket (Wildcat Bowl), Allied troops gained ground on their early advances—most of which were surrendered at day’s end. Marines came under heavy fire from concealed defenders in their mutually supporting cave positions. The 7th Marines had advanced to within a hundred yards of Colonel Nakagawa’s cave position. But several supporting hilltops and ridges would have to be reduced before a direct attack on the cave would have any hope of success.
The fight for the Pocket was turning into a siege, but the 1st Marine Division believed they could break through enemy opposition. Rupertus ordered continued battalion and regimental assaults believing they would soon bring victory.
When the 321st’s eastward probes brought them within grasp of sealing off the Pocket from the north, they deployed two battalions to complete the encirclement. This assault would absorb the 321st Infantry’s full attention until September 26, while the 5th Marines were fighting in northern Peleliu. The 7th Marines continued to pressure the Pocket from the south. When the 321st broke through on the 26th, their mission was expanded to assault the Pocket from the north.
The 321st broke through in the north and cleared the sporadically defended Kamilianlul Ridge. Their attack along adjacent ridges allowed for the Allied forces’ consolidation on the north side of the Pocket—now 400 yards wide. On September 29, the 7th Marines were ordered to relieve the Army units in the northern sector.
Now that the 2/7 and 3/7 Marines were on static guard duty, hundreds of non-infantry were stripped from combat positions and put into support units. These “infantillery” units were assigned to hold the earlier held sectors. They faced the karst plateau between the Pocket and West Road.
On the 30th, with the 7th Marines’ flexibility restored, they moved south and secured Boyd and Walt’s Ridge. They controlled the East Road, but enemy defenders still harassed them from caves on the west side.
On October 3, the 7th Marines organized a four-battalion attack. This plan called for the 1/7 and 3/7 to attack Boyd’s Ridge from the north, while the 2/7 would attack Walt’s Ridge from the south. The 3/5 would make a diversionary southern attack into Horseshoe Canyon and Five Sisters to its west.
This regimental attack committed four battalions (closer to company strength) against the heights in the southern edge of the Pocket. The assault succeeded, but with heavy casualties. Four of the Five Sisters were scaled but were untenable and had to be abandoned. The next day, the 7th Marines made another attack to seize—then give up positions on Five Sisters.
During this fight, the 3/7 Marines’ push led to a rapid advance that gained them Hill 120. They hoped this would provide a jump-off point for the next day’s operation against the ridge to the west. But Hill 120, as with so many others in the Pocket, came under enemy crossfire, making it completely untenable.
The 3/7 withdrew and suffered heavy casualties. Among these was Captain “Jamo” Shanley, who commanded Company L. When several of his men fell wounded, Captain Shanley dashed forward under heavy fire to rescue two men, bringing them behind a tank. When he returned to help another wounded Marine, a mortar round exploded behind him—killing him instantly. His XO was shot by a Japanese sniper when he ran up to help, but collapsed on top of Shanley with a bullet in his brain.
Captain Shanley was awarded a gold star for the Navy Cross he earned in Operation Backhander at Cape Gloucester on New Britain, where he led his company in the seizure of Hill 660 in the Borgen Bay area.
The 7th Marines had been in the savage Umurbrogol Pocket struggle for two weeks. Under the advice of General Geiger, Rupertus relieved them but was still determined to have his Marines secure the Pocket and turned to his only remaining regiment. Colonel Harris moved in with his 5th Marines. He planned to attack from the north and chip off one ridge at a time.
Subduing the Pocket
On September 30, Peleliu aerial reconnaissance convinced Allied planners that siege tactics were required to clear positions in the Pocket. Colonel Harris believed in being lavish with ammunition and stingy with Marine lives. Harris would use all available fire support before ordering advances.
The 2/5 Marines were in position on October 5, but only reconnoitered positions where heavier firepower could come into play. Bulldozers prepared paths on the north end of the box canyons for tanks and LVT flamethrowers to operate. Light artillery batteries were placed along the West Road to fire point-blank into cliffs at the north end of the Pocket.
Cliffs considered “troublesome” were obliterated by direct fire. The rubble created a ramp for tanks to climb into better firing positions. Light mortars were used to strip vegetation from areas with suspected enemy caves. Planes loaded with napalm-filled belly tanks were also used to bomb enemy targets selected by the 5th Marines as their key objective.
While the 2/5 Marines picked off enemy firing positions in the north, on October 7, the 3/5 assaulted Horseshoe Ridge with tanks. This time the mission wasn’t to seize and hold but to destroy all targets on the faces of Five Sisters and the lower western face of Hill 100.
When all the ammunition was used, tanks withdrew to rearm and then returned accompanied by flame-throwing LVTs and small infantry fire teams. This tactic killed many cave-dwelling Japanese, along with finally silencing their heavy weapons. Before this, single enemy artillery pieces firing from Horseshoe Ridge had harassed the airfield. After the October 7 assaults, no further enemy attacks occurred.
For six more days, the 5th Marines provided all available support to small incremental advances from the north. Light mortars were used to clear vegetation and routes of advance. Both tanks and artillery were used at point-blank range, firing into suspected caves or rough coral areas.
Napalm aerial bombardments cleared vegetation and drove the Japanese defenders farther back into their caves. All advances were limited and aimed at seizing new firing positions. Small platoons and squads made these advances. After Hill 140 was taken, they had a firing site for a 75mm howitzer. The howitzer was wrestled in, disassembled, reassembled, sandbagged, and then fired from position. The 75mm fired into the mouth of a huge cave at the base of the next ridge from where enemy fire had come from for days.
Sandbagging the 75mm howitzer posed several problems. The only available loose sand or dirt had to be carried in from the beach or came from occasional debris slides. The use of sandbags in forward infantry positions increased, and this technique was later widely used when the 81st Infantry Division took over Pocket operations.
Securing the Eastern Ridges
The 2/5 carefully advanced through several small ridges and knobs and finally seized two murderous box canyons. Direct fire could now be poured into the west face of Boyd and Walt Ridges. But these cave-filled western slopes were protected by other caves on the parallel ridge known as Five Brothers.
After a week of siege-like activity pushed the northern boundary of the Pocket another 600 yards south, the 3/5 Marines were called in to relieve the 2/5. The forward positions being relieved were so close to the enemy that snipers picked off several incoming Marines (even the company commander).
During this exchange, a small enemy group reoccupied a position earlier secured by frequent interdiction fires. Even through these losses and interruptions, the relief w
as completed on schedule, and on October 13, the 3/5 Marines continued their slow and deliberate advance.
Terrain prohibited any advance south of Hill 140, so the 3/5 shifted southwest, paralleling the West road and into the coral badlands. This terrain was earlier judged unsuitable, but with the aid of fire-scouring napalm bombs, it was traversed. Major “Cowboy” Stout’s VMF-114 bombs fell incredibly close to the advancing 3/5 Marines front and the stationary units east of the West Road.
The 1/7 Marines launched a similar effort. Together, these two battalions advanced and secured one-half of the depth of the coral badlands. Between the West Road and the China Wall this clearing allowed the “infantillery” unit to advance their lines eastward and then hold as far as the infantry had cleared.
In early October, the 5th and 7th Marines’ actions had reduced the Pocket to an oval shape 700 yards north to south and 350 yards east to west. According to Colonel Nakagawa’s radio report, he still had over 700 troops within the Pocket, and eighty percent were still effective.
Division command suggested enclosing the Pocket with barbed wire and designating it as a prisoner of war closure. The Pocket no longer counted in the strategic balance nor in completing the effective seizure of Peleliu. General Rupertus wanted to subdue the Pocket before turning it over to General Mueller’s 81st Army Division for mop-up operations. Rupertus’ successful seizure of northern Peleliu and Ngesebus had ended the enemy’s capability to reinforce the isolated Japanese troops on Peleliu.
Without pressing for a declaration that Peleliu had been secured (which would formalize the completion of the 1st Marine Division’s mission), General Geiger ordered Rupertus to relieve the 5th and 7th Marines with his freshest and largest infantry regiment, the 321st RCT (still attached to the 1st Marine Division). General Rupertus replied that “very shortly,” his Marines would subdue and secure the Pocket.
Admiral Nimitz sent a message to General Geiger. He directed him to turn command over to General Mueller’s 81st Division, relieve the 1st Marine Division, and begin mop-up operations and garrison duty on Peleliu.
Mopping up Peleliu
On October 20, General Mueller took responsibility for mop up operations on Peleliu. He described the tactical situation as a siege—and ordered his troops to proceed accordingly.
For six weeks, his two infantry regiments, the 322nd and 323rd, plus the 2nd Battalion of the 321st Regiment, did just that. They used sandbags as an assault device, carrying sand up from the beaches and inching them forward. They pressed closer to enemy caves and dug-in strong points. They used tanks and flamethrowers and even improved on the vehicle-mounted flamethrower. They made a gasoline pipeline from a road-bound gas truck, enabling them (with booster pumps) to launch napalm hundreds of feet into the enemy’s defensive area. They took advantage of the 75mm howitzer on Hill 140 and found other sites to put howitzers and fire point-blank into enemy caves.
To support the growing need for sandbags on ridge-top foxholes, army engineers strung high lines to transport them (along with ammo and rations) up to the peaks and ridge tops. Army troops still took casualties, even with these siege tactics, as they ground down the stubborn Japanese defenses. The Umurbrogol Pocket siege consumed the 81st Division’s full attention and both regimental combat teams until November 27, 1944.
This prolonged siege operation was carried out within twenty miles of a much larger enemy force of 25,000 soldiers in the northern Palaus. The US Navy had the enemy isolated with patrols and bombing from Marine Aircraft Group 11 operating from Peleliu.
As costly and challenging as the Allied advances were, Japanese defenders had similar demanding, and even more discouraging, situations in their underground positions. Sanitation was crude. They had little to no water, rations were nearly nonexistent, and ammunition was even more scarce. As time wore on, some Japanese were given the opportunity to leave the defenses and make suicidal banzai night attacks. Very few were ever captured.
In late November, General Murai suggested in a radio message to General Inoue on Koror to make one final banzai attack for the honor of the empire. Inoue turned him down. By this time, Nakagawa’s only external communications were by radio to Koror. As he’d expected, all local wire communications were destroyed.
Tanks and infantry carefully pressed on in their relentless advance. The 81st Divisions’ engineers improved the roads and ramps leading into the heart of the final Japanese position. Flamethrower and tank attacks steadily reduced each cave position as the infantry pushed its foxhole sandbags forward.
On November 24, Colonel Nakagawa sent his final message to Koror. He’d burned the colors of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and split the remaining fifty-six men into seventeen infiltration parties. They would slip through Allied lines and “attack the enemy everywhere.”
On the night of November 24, twenty-five Japanese soldiers (including two officers) were killed. One soldier was captured the following day. His interrogation, along with post-war records, revealed that General Murai and Colonel Nakagawa committed Seppuku (Japanese ritual suicide by disembowelment) in their command post.
The final two-day advance of the 81st Division was indeed now a mop-up operation. Carefully conducted to eliminate any holdout opposition. By noon on November 27, north-moving units, guarded by other infantry units, met face-to-face with the battalion moving south near the Japanese command post. Colonel Arthur Watson, commanding the 323rd, reported to General Mueller that the operation was over.
The tenacious determination of the enemy was symbolized by the last thirty-three prisoners captured on Peleliu. In March 1947, a small Marine guard attached to a navy garrison on the island found unmistakable signs of a Japanese military presence in a cave.
Patrols captured a straggler, a Japanese sailor who said there were thirty-three Japanese soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Yamaguchi. While the straggler reported some dissension in the ranks, a final banzai attack was still under consideration.
The Navy garrison commander moved his personnel and their dependents to a secure area and radioed Guam for reinforcements and a Japanese war crimes witness. Admiral Michio Sumikawa flew in and traveled by Jeep along the roads near the suspected enemy positions. Through a loudspeaker, he recited the existing situation.
No response. The Japanese sailor who’d been captured earlier went back to the cave armed with letters from Japanese families and former officers on the Palaus, informing the holdouts that the war was indeed over.
On April 21, 1947, the holdouts surrendered. Lieutenant Yamaguchi led a haggard twenty-six soldiers to a position of eighty battle-dressed Marines. Yamaguchi bowed and handed over his sword to the on-scene US Navy commander.
Conditions on Peleliu
Robert “Pepper” Martin from Time magazine was one of the few civilian correspondents who chose to share the fate of the Marines on Peleliu. He wrote the following account: “Peleliu was a horrible place. Suffocating heat and sporadic rain—a muggy rain that brings no relief—only more misery. Coral rocks soak up heat during the day, and it’s only slightly cooler at night.
“The Marines were in the finest possible physical condition, but they wilted on Peleliu. By the fourth day, there were as many casualties from heat as from wounds. Peleliu was worse than Guam in its bloodiness, climate, terror, and tenacity of the Japs. The sheer brutality and fatigue has surpassed anything yet seen in the Pacific, indeed from the standpoint of troops involved in the time taken to make the island secure.
“On the second day, the temperature had reached 105 degrees in the shade. There was little to no shade in most places where the fighting was going on, and arguably there was no breeze anywhere. It lingered at that level of heat as days dragged by (temperatures were recorded as high as 115 degrees).
“The water supply was a serious problem from the start. While this had been anticipated, the solution proved less complicated than expected. Engineers discovered productive wells could be drilled almost anywhere on low ground. Personnel semi-p
ermanently stationed at the beach found that even shallow holes dug in the sand would yield a mildly repulsive liquid that could be purified for drinking with halazone tablets.
“It continued to be necessary to supply the assault troops from scoured out oil drums and 5-gallon fuel cans. But steaming out the oil drums didn’t remove the oil, which resulted in many troops drinking water and getting sick. When the captains of the ships in the transport area learned of this and the shortage of water, they rushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks to the beaches to ease the problem.
“The water situation was a problem for troops operating on the relatively open and level ground. Once the fighting entered the ridges, just traversing the difficult terrain without having to fight caused the debility rate to shoot up quickly. An emergency call was sent to all the ships offshore—requisitioning every available salt tablet for the 1st Marines.”
The statement that heat casualties equaled wound casualties was misleading. Most evacuated troops were returned to duty after a day or two of rest. Their absence from the front lines did not permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units. But these several cases strained the already overburdened medical core.
III Amphibious Corps
The III Amphibious Corps commander, General Roy Geiger, was responsible for planning the seizure of the southern Palaus (Peleliu, Ngesebus, and Angaur). But Geiger and his staff were distracted during these critical planning weeks with the liberation of Guam on August 10.