The Politics of Truth_Inside the Lies That Put the White House on Trial and Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity

by Joseph Wilson

  Then what’s the point of this new American imperialism? The neoconservatives with a stranglehold on the foreign policy of the Republican Party, a party that traditionally eschewed foreign military adventures, want to go beyond expanding U.S. global influence to force revolutionary change on the region. American pre-eminence in the Gulf is necessary but not sufficient for the hawks. Nothing short of conquest, occupation and imposition of handpicked leaders on a vanquished population will suffice. Iraq is the linchpin for this broader assault on the region. The new imperialists will not rest until governments that ape our worldview are implanted throughout the region, a breathtakingly ambitious undertaking, smacking of hubris in the extreme. Arabs who complain about American-supported antidemocratic regimes today will find us in even more direct control tomorrow. The leader of the future in the Arab world will look a lot more like Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf than Thomas Jefferson.

  There is a huge risk of overreach in this tack. The projection of influence and power through the use of force will breed resistance in the Arab world that will sorely test our political will and stamina. Passion for independence is as great in the Arab world as it is elsewhere. The hawks compare this mission to Japan and Germany after World War II. It could easily look like Lebanon, Somalia and Northern Ireland instead.

  Our global leadership will be undermined as fear gives way to resentment and strategies to weaken our stranglehold. American businessmen already complain about hostility when overseas, and Arabs speak openly of boycotting American products. Foreign capital is fleeing American stocks and bonds; the United States is no longer a friendly destination for international investors. For a borrow-and-spend Administration, as this one is, the effects on our economic growth will be felt for a long time to come. Essential trust has been seriously damaged and will be difficult to repair.

  Even in the unlikely event that war does not come to pass, the would-be imperialists have achieved much of what they sought, some of it good. It is encouraging that the international community is looking hard at terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But the upcoming battle for Baghdad and the lengthy occupation of Iraq will utterly undermine any steps forward. And with the costs to our military, our treasury and our international standing, we will be forced to learn whether our republican roots and traditions can accommodate the Administration’s imperial ambitions. It may be a bitter lesson.

  San Jose Mercury News, April 6, 2003

  IRAQ MAY SEE U.S. AS LATEST IN LINE OF CONQUERORS

  by Joseph Wilson

  WEDNESDAY, U.S. FORCES in An-Najaf were treated to what one officer called a “Macy’s Day parade” by several thousand residents happy to see them advancing through the city. But that was the first such celebration in a war the administration said would be fast and easy, partly because Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops as liberators.

  There have been plenty of indications that not everyone is as pleased as the revelers in An-Najaf to see U.S. forces. Soldiers have met rather intense resistance by irregulars—and in many places where U.S. troops have prevailed, the populations have been wary of their presence. Even in An-Najaf, the celebration was halted temporarily when a car with men hanging out the windows and pointing AK-47s sped toward the troops.

  In short, the picture of how Iraqis feel about this war is anything but simple.

  Perhaps in the end, the administration will be proven right. But if U.S. leaders have underestimated the power of nationalism in Iraq, the lack of a liberation “bounce” will vastly complicate not just the war, but also the much more complex and difficult peace.

  Having been convinced by exile groups and opposition leaders with their own pro-war agenda that Iraq would fall “like a house of cards,” the Bush administration might instead face a population that is far more ungrateful for our efforts than some accuse the French of being for the Allied liberation of France in World War II.

  If the level of resentment is high, U.S. troops who occupy the country, maybe for years to come, could face guerrilla warfare or terrorist attacks. It might also undermine one of the administration’s reasons for going to war: to establish a democracy in Iraq that would create a domino effect in a region populated with authoritarian rulers. It will not be easy to build that model democracy if a large part of the Iraqi population is hostile, or just sullen.

  Even if the Iraqis are thrilled at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, that jubilation could wane quickly as the United States passes from the role of liberator to occupier. The Iraqis are a proud people steeped in their history and their contributions to civilization. They remember their conquering heroes Saladin and Nebuchadnezzar as if their reigns were yesterday, rather than centuries before our own George Washington.

  And the Iraqis have been difficult vassals in the past. Ottoman dictionaries, from the time when the Turks ruled what is now Iraq, reportedly defined arrogance as “walk like a Baghdadi.” And the British—who took over from the Turks after World War I—soon moved to install a Hashemite king to act as their agent during their colonial rule. Direct rule had been too difficult and costly.

  So the vital question is this: Will a people free of outside control for less than a century, after several centuries of domination, live with an occupation, even if it is temporary?

  WHAT IRAQIS FEAR

  It’s not clear yet whether most Iraqis will welcome Americans in what they see as their initial role, as liberators. Some American commentators and government officials have explained away the relative silence from the Iraqi population as temporary. They suggested that Iraqis are so frightened of Saddam—and a possible repeat of his crackdown of rebellions in 1991—that the celebrations will begin only when his head is paraded on a pike.

  Of course Iraqis are afraid. Saddam has always ruled by fear, and terror is the key weapon in his arsenal to keep people in check, and to discourage dissent. In my years as a diplomat in Baghdad, just before the Persian Gulf War, Iraqis simply would not talk about the government or Saddam, other than to utter ritualistic praises about his enlightened rule and popularity.

  There were at least seven intelligence agencies, several of which spied on the others. Every neighborhood had its government agents to watch and report on neighbors. Nobody was exempt from government prying.

  One professor friend of mine recounted how he had entertained a senior government official at dinner. The next day, my friend and his wife were summoned to the local security headquarters for interrogation about what was discussed and what the official had said. Paranoia is entrenched at all levels of society. Torture, arbitrary executions and disappearances reinforced the reign of terror.

  Still, fear of Saddam and his thugs may not be the only reason Iraqis are less than jubilant about their pending liberation. A long history of having conquered and being conquered has left the Iraqis jaded, cynical and suspicious of foreigners’ stated goals.

  They joined the fight against the Ottomans in the first world war, alongside the British, only to have their national ambitions betrayed and their historic borders carved up to maximize British political and economic interests, including the hiving off of Kuwait as a separate emirate. At the time, the British claimed they knew what was best for the Iraqis: a jodhpurs-and-pith-helmet colonial rule.

  The Iran-Iraq war, so often portrayed as an example of Saddam’s wanton aggression, was viewed by most Iraqis as a decadelong sacrifice to keep out possible new conquerors, in that case the Persians. Virtually all Iraqi families lost loved ones in that brutal conflict fought with equal courage by the Shiites and the Sunnis. The Shiites, for all their justifiable grievances against Sunni rule, proved themselves in that war to be Iraqis first in the face of an external enemy, and opponents of Saddam second.

  SUSPICIONS RAISED

  Given that history, Iraqis may well be skeptical that liberation is the objective of the U.S. invasion. Once Saddam is gone and we remain, they may well see us as only the latest in a long line of conquerors with designs on their land.


  When I worked in Iraq in the late 1980s and early ’90s, one of the common themes in conversations from the bazaar to the ministries was that self-interest is the motivating factor in the policies of all governments. The United States supported Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war because it was in its self-interest to do so, not because it was being altruistic. The United States gave the Iranians weapons in the same war because it was in its self-interest to do so.

  “Why should we believe you are motivated by other than self-interest now?” my Iraqi friends would ask after that war.

  There is even more recent history that has stirred bitterness. For the past 12 years, Iraqis have suffered from debilitating economic sanctions, first put into place by the United States and subsequently by the United Nations. The goal was initially to pressure Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, and later to force disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.

  Those who supported the sanctions saw them as a way to avoid war, but the Iraqis didn’t necessarily agree they were being spared suffering—especially as the policy dragged on without a foreseeable end.

  It is not an accident that gold jewelry in Baghdad’s Khadamiya market is cheaper than anywhere else in the world. In Iraqi society, heirlooms are passed from generation to generation; gold is not just bangles and accessories, but serves as families’ savings accounts. The sanctions have forced many families to liquidate those accounts to put food on the table.

  SADDAM’S WAGER

  Iraqis have been told for years that the Americans are responsible for the destruction of the personal wealth of the nation. Consequently, the hatred of Saddam, which is widespread after 30 years of tyranny, does not necessarily translate into affection for or even trust of those who have reduced them to such dire straits.

  Saddam’s endgame wager this time is the same as during the 1991 gulf war, even as his strategy and tactics have changed. When I met with him on Aug. 6, 1990, four days after his invasion of Kuwait, he told me he did not believe that the United States had the political will or the tenacity to either accept the deaths of 10,000 soldiers in the Arabian desert—or to remain there as long as it would take to defeat his forces.

  In that war, he made the mistake of leaving his troops exposed in the desert where U.S. forces could pick them off at will—as they did, without exposing themselves to the prospect of high casualties. This time, he has taken a page out of the Stalin handbook, drawing American forces deep into the country, stretching their supply lines and trying to force them into urban killing fields. His idea is surely to kill or injure enough Americans so that we will go away.

  If he cannot hurt the United States militarily, the alternative is to hold out long enough so that the war of attrition in Baghdad wears away the political support for the war, and turns the Muslim world so against Americans that international opposition will be impossible to ignore.

  To succeed, Saddam needs his people’s support, as well as popular support in the Arab world.

  UNLIKELY TO SURVIVE

  It is unlikely Saddam will survive as leader of Iraq in any case. But it’s also not yet clear—and may not be clear for a long time—whether the United States will score the full victory it says it wants. A military win is one thing. But to bring democracy to Iraq—and to avoid a disastrous long-term struggle with its Arab neighbors—the United States will need to win the battle for people’s hearts and minds.

  So far, we have lost that battle in the greater Muslim world. The leaders of many neighboring countries were willing to go along with the war, but many of their fellow citizens do not agree with the war. Some Arabs are even willing to join Saddam in battle. Newspapers last week reported that hundreds of men from across the Arab world were trying to get to Baghdad to fight coalition troops.

  We are likely to lose more support during the battle for Baghdad if it is as bloody as some predict. The juxtaposition of Baghdad burning under American air assault with photos of two Iraqi peasants who say they shot down Apache helicopters leaves the impression that this is a war not to liberate but to conquer, a realization of Arabs’ worst nightmares.

  There are ways to ameliorate those fears, and perhaps even begin to regain some trust. One way would be to make the rebuilding of Iraq’s institutions a truly international project involving a significant role for the United Nations, our estranged allies, and even Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria and Iran. Only by having everybody involved in a positive way can we hope to avoid attempts to undermine our efforts.

  The other way to generate good will would be to quickly reinvigorate the peace process between Israelis and the Palestinians, acknowledging that this is an issue of vital concern among many Arabs.

  We should be under no illusions; the road to democracy will be long and tough. Iraqis of all stripes will quickly learn to speak to their American occupiers in the mellifluous tones of democracy.

  But the real game will be, as it has long been, about power—who has it, how to get it and how to use it for the benefit of family, clan, tribe and religion. Brokering deals among these competing interests will take all of our ingenuity and acumen.

  The New York Times, July 6, 2003

  WHAT I DIDN’T FIND IN AFRICA

  by Joseph C. Wilson 4th

  DID THE BUSH administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq?

  Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.

  For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d’affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush’s ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.

  It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa’s suspected link to Iraq’s nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That’s me.

  In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney’s office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake—a form of lightly processed ore—by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990’s. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president’s office.

  After consulting with the State Department’s African Affairs Bureau (and through it with Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, the United States ambassador to Niger), I agreed to make the trip. The mission I undertook was discreet but by no means secret. While the CIA paid my expenses (my time was offered pro bono), I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United States government.

  In late February 2002, I arrived in Niger’s capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70’s and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 90’s. The city was much as I remembered it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit, leaving only their eyes visible.

  The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are understandable, the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Niger’s uranium business. I was not surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq—and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington. Nevertheless, she an
d I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival.

  I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country’s uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.

  Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger’s uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there’s simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.

  (As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors—they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government—and were probably forged. And then there’s the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.)

  Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the CIA. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.