by Alex Fynn
“Because I started my job there. I feel I have good vision. I’m used to it. I don’t like the physical separation from the team,” came the reply.
“But am I correct when I say that might be why sometimes the substitutions aren’t right – because you can’t see the overall pattern?”
“No, it’s not true that your opinion is right. I can find you 50,000 different opinions in the crowd but people ignore many things I know.”
“Such as?”
“Such as,” replied Wenger, “I know that a guy will ‘die’ after an hour because I know in the last three games his high intensity dropped 30 or 40 per cent and he will not be capable to keep going.” (Even so, Wenger doesn’t always practise what he preaches. He still blames himself for not acting on his instincts and withdrawing Robert Pires before he ruptured his knee ligaments against Newcastle in 2004. Pires himself admits, “My injury was due to mental tiredness and [for] that I was at fault because I was not focused enough.”)
“Precisely, that’s my point,” argued Wenger’s inquisitor. “You only make substitutions for physical reasons, not tactical ones.”
So the wide midfield players are withdrawn for fresh legs around the 70-minute mark and, depending on the state of play, either a central midfielder (if the team are leading) or a striker (if they are not) will be replaced, usually by a like-for-like change. There is rarely any element of surprise in the player withdrawn or the time of the switch. What improvisation that does occur is down to the ability of the players to do the unpredictable with their movement on and off the ball. Wenger can be acclaimed as an icon for the discovery, preparation and development of footballers of all ages, but he is no tactical magician. However, he certainly knew enough to realise Arsenal were better served by a 4–4–2 for his first full season.
Allied to that simple tactical change, made in the summer of 1997, Wenger’s first league title was arguably the direct result of the willingness of the defensive domestic stalwarts to adapt. Another who changed his ways was Ray Parlour, who became a regular for seven seasons before following Paul Merson’s exit route to Middlesbrough. Satisfied with his options for a number of key roles the manager was able to devote his transfer budget to strengthening the midfield. It seems no coincidence that in his first year, Wenger released Eddie McGoldrick, David Hillier, Andy Linighan and Ian Selley alongside Hartson and Merson, whilst acquiring a number of replacements, only one of whom (Matthew Upson) was English. Amongst the new arrivals were Marc Overmars, Emmanuel Petit and Gilles Grimandi. The first two facilitated the adaptation to a 4–4–2 system. Overmars was a speedy winger from Ajax. With his negligible defensive contribution, he would have been unsuited to the 3–5–2 of the previous campaign and was purchased in the full knowledge that such a line-up was now obsolete. Petit had been groomed by Wenger at Monaco, and was earmarked for central midfield.
So it was out with the trio of Platt, Vieira and Merson, who had been flanked when going forward by two wing backs, and in with a four of Parlour, Vieira, Petit and Overmars. Grimandi was a versatile defensive player signed along with Petit from Monaco, who joined Platt as a valuable substitute. Wenger saw the key defensive element of his 4–4–2 formation as the central players, with the midfield duo screening the centre backs. It worked particularly well with Vieira and Petit in front of Adams and Keown, and after a team meeting midway through the 1997/98 season in which the central defenders reminded their colleagues that they needed more help from the midfield in halting opposition attacks, they initiated a long unbeaten run that culminated in the double. (And the defensive quality was maintained the following season, with Gilles Grimandi often deputising for either Petit or Vieira pointing to the manager’s priority that defending through the centre was more important than on the flanks.) The price to pay was a reputation for ill-discipline and a high yellow and red card count. There was a steely side to Arsenal to accompany the silkiness of their football, but the trouble with officials that came as a consequence reprised the ‘backs against the wall’ mentality associated with the great teams in the club’s history.
As wide players, Overmars and Parlour were inevitably more comfortable in possession than Dixon and Winterburn had been as wing backs and allowed the team to push on and hurt opponents further up the field. It was a move towards controlling matches through dominating both possession and territory. With a midfield all keen to demonstrate a positive approach, the defence passed the ball more, or brought it out themselves, instead of playing a long percentage hoof simply to relieve pressure and go for territory. It was certainly easier on the eye and the team began to earn a reputation as entertainers. So much so that as the season progressed, Overmars’ attacking inclinations altered the system into a de facto 4–3–3. Now the chant “Boring, Boring Arsenal” initiated with just cause by opposition fans was purloined and lustily sung with ironic relish by Gooners. And there was hardly time to wallow in an old favourite from the Graham years, ‘One-nil to the Arsenal’, as the goals came thick and fast to render it redundant.
It is significant that, as the seasons passed, Arsenal developed their ability to hold onto the ball higher and higher up the field. By 2008 they had reached a stage where they have comfortable possession of the ball in exactly the same areas that Graham’s men used to lump it up to. Now there are a number of teammates to assist in keeping possession, working the ball out of defence and through the midfield so that the opponents often withdraw into a mass of bodies within 30 yards of their goal line. This is one of two Pavlovian responses; the other is to engage in combat, to ‘rough ’em up’. Consequently, the priority is to try to make greater use of width, to add variety to the attacking options when allied to the intricate interplay.
But it all began over a decade ago with an English back four bringing the ball out of defence and refusing to give it away cheaply. The coup de grâce came in the final home match of Wenger’s first full season. With three fixtures remaining, Arsenal simply had to beat Everton to be able to celebrate a first title since 1991 in front of their own public. At 3–0 up with the clock ticking down, the red and white ribbons were already on the trophy. Arsène Wenger made a rare sentimental substitution, replacing forward Christopher Wreh (another Monaco import) with Steve Bould. The veteran slotted into central midfield and set up the fourth and final goal, playing captain and fellow central defender Tony Adams into the Everton half to beat the offside trap and smash a glorious half volley into the net with his weaker left foot. It was, in a snapshot, an example of the total football Wenger had inspired. Bould, with a reputation as a defensive destroyer who loved nothing better than the now outlawed sliding tackle from behind, producing the sweetest of passes into the path of a colleague who had cruelly been labelled a ‘donkey’ by the Daily Mirror in his earlier years.
Yet, it was not a matter of complete harmony for those presented with their medals at the conclusion of the game. With his outspoken views on broccoli, an inevitable clash of personalities between the manager and his star striker had always loomed on the horizon. In the early part of the campaign, there was a great deal of media attention surrounding Ian Wright breaking the club goalscoring record, overtaking the 178 goals notched up by Cliff Bastin. Having achieved the feat, Wright declared he wished to move to the Portuguese club Benfica, who had made an enquiry about his availability in December. With the teenager Nicolas Anelka and the unproven Christopher Wreh as his only back-up forwards, Wenger wasn’t about to sell his principal striker and did not appreciate his public comments on the matter whilst being interviewed on BBC’s Match of the Day. Moreover this incident occurred at the conclusion of a difficult run of league matches that saw the team drop 16 points in eight outings, capped by a 3–1 home defeat to Blackburn. Wright then aggravated his situation by aggressively gesturing to fans about their lack of support during the Blackburn defeat from the dressing room windows facing the Avenell Road. He created enough of a furore for the police to be called to warn him about his behaviour.
&n
bsp; However, Arsenal soon discovered what life without Wright would be like a month later when he suffered a hamstring injury in an FA Cup tie at Port Vale. Nicolas Anelka became the regular starter in Wright’s absence as the team then embarked on an undefeated run that only ended when the title had been secured with two games to spare. This consistency was carried over to the FA Cup and the club won its second league and cup double. Anelka’s ability was such that a flourishing future without Wright could be now be contemplated, a preposterous notion at the start of the season. The manager’s faith in the inexperienced teenager in preference to the safer, more conservative option of the experienced campaigner became, over the years, a regular occurrence when exceptional talent, however youthful, was on call. The later departures of Patrick Vieira and Thierry Henry took place under similar circumstances.
Wright was out for several weeks, but once fit the manager resisted the temptation to recall him until the title had been wrapped up. It was a difficult time for the player, anxious to prove his fitness with selection for the England squad for the 1998 World Cup Finals imminent. He started the final two league fixtures, but it was Christopher Wreh who got the nod to partner Anelka for the final commitment of the season – the FA Cup Final against Newcastle United.
Arsenal were two up with 20 minutes left on the clock at Wembley. The first substitution had already been made: Wreh had been replaced by David Platt. With the fans clamouring for Ian Wright, there was the opportunity for a sentimental gesture (Wenger was happy enough to do it in 2004 to ensure Martin Keown qualified for a Premiership medal). As the final whistle approached, there was movement on the bench as one of the substitutes removed his training top. That he did not actually get on before the end of the match was irrelevant to the supporters, as the intended replacement was not Wright, but Gilles Grimandi. It was an unaccommodating decision, the denial of an appearance, however brief, a final dagger in the heart of a player who professed to bleed Arsenal. It soon went from bad to worse as Wright failed to make the final squad for France 98 and was forced to spend the World Cup as a television pundit. In fact, Wright had already worn the red and white shirt for the last time as during the close season he was sold to West Ham.
CHAPTER FOUR
YOUNG AT HEART
Nicolas Anelka was only 19 at the time of Wright’s farewell. He was an early Highbury example of youthful promise unearthed by Wenger and turned into a superstar. Reluctantly sold by Paris St Germain in controversial circumstances in 1997 for a fee of £500,000 (Arsenal exploited the French system whereby prospects have to sign their first professional contract with the club who develop them. They cannot sign for another French club, yet there is nothing to stop them joining one abroad) he made an immediate impact in his short spell at Highbury. Largely due to Vieira and Anelka, Wenger developed a reputation as a discoverer of exceptional young stars, but until Cesc Fabregas broke through in the autumn of 2004 no comparable youthful talent emerged. Many came to the training ground in the hope that they would become good enough for the first team only to slip quietly away having failed to make the grade. The most extreme example is Anelka’s countryman Jérémie Aliadière. Signed in 1999 as a 16-year-old, he did not leave the club until 2007, two years short of a testimonial. During that period, though, he made only 29 league appearances and scored just one goal. (Although Wenger has picked up some amazing potential at bargain prices, good returns have also come with more mature men.)
In fact, it could be said that Wenger’s top teenage sensations emerged at Monaco. He is proud that he “put Petit in at 18, and [Lillian] Thuram at 18” and he bequeathed a healthy youth set up, including Thierry Henry and David Trezeguet. But in England it has been more a case of picking up players who had served their apprenticeships but had not yet (in his eyes) fully developed their potential. So, in the way that at Monaco he’d signed George Weah from Tonnerre Yaoundé in Cameroon at the age of 21, Patrick Vieira had played for both Cannes and Milan before he was purchased for Arsenal on Wenger’s recommendation aged 20. That of course is not to gainsay the phenomenal progress they and others like them, such as Thierry Henry, Gaël Clichy and Mathieu Flamini, made under his tutelage. Perhaps in France either Wenger was lucky to have such talented youths emerging contemporaneously (as Alex Ferguson had been in the early 1990s) or other coaches didn’t share the importance he attached to being able to mould young and old alike so that they could perform at their optimum level.
So to believe that his young teams are created from a burgeoning youth policy is not the complete picture, certainly as far as young Englishmen are concerned. On leaving Arsenal for Coventry in 2001, Jay Bothroyd, a star of Arsenal’s youth team, commented, “Arsenal want to buy success. If a few young players come through, that’s a bonus, but they are not really interested.” He could have been speaking for Jermaine Pennant, Steve Sidwell, David Bentley and Matthew Upson (all of whom enjoyed Premier League success away from Arsenal, with the latter two capped as full England internationals, although none so far is a regular starter with a top four club).
The writing is generally on the wall for an Arsenal prospect if he is sent out on loan. The prospects Wenger has earmarked tend to be kept within the fold, given the odd chance from the bench or a start in the domestic cups by way of experiencing what might lie ahead. Perhaps he thinks they are best kept away from other coaches, in spite of the fact that young players generally benefit from first team experience. The hopefuls who spend time away for a few months or a season are removed from Arsenal’s huge wage bill (even if at that stage of their career they do not earn that much more than their peers in other industries). More pertinently, the playing time and exposure they receive – even at a lower level than the Premiership – can enhance their value in the transfer market. A long-established member of Wenger’s scouting team, Tony Banfield, explains: “At Arsenal, 15-year-olds are offered a three year contract. Then at 18, if they are good enough, they are offered a further three years. In that time, if it is felt they might not be good enough, they are sent out on loan to get more first team football, with the idea that it might improve them. When they return, if they are better they might stay, otherwise the club look to sell them on.” Often the loan is turned into a permanent move as occurred with Blackburn’s signing of David Bentley, whilst Birmingham bought Jermaine Pennant, Sebastian Larsson and Fabrice Muamba. And the arrangements are not always restricted to novices. Matthew Upson was over 20 when he began a series of loan spells between 2000 and 2002 at Nottingham Forest, Crystal Palace and Reading, before finally being becoming another Birmingham acquisition in 2003. Arsenal, in common with other clubs, often build a clause into such transfers as Upson’s whereby they receive a percentage of any sell-on fee if a player is successful and subsequently moves on for more than his original sale price. It allows the club to continue benefiting from their initial commitment.
Occasionally the cast-off is recalled. Upson played enough matches in 2001/02 to earn a Premier League winners’ medal. But the long-term outlook is bleak for those whose objective is to be regarded as an integral component of the first-team squad. Even if Jérémie Aliadière did notch up eight seasons, he had been farmed out three times before eventually getting a number of first-team appearances under his belt during his final months at Arsenal. But the surprise was that he had lasted so long. Just when it looked as if, having persevered in the face of competition from a plethora of international strikers, he might get his chance, injury intervened in the 2004 Community Shield, ruling him out for most of the season. By the time of his recovery, he had fallen back down the pecking order and eventually Wenger accepted an offer of £2 million for him from Middlesbrough in 2007. Three of the current first-team pool who have returned from their loans are Alexandre Song, Nicklas Bendtner and Justin Hoyte. Hoyte should be especially concerned as, according to the data, it is not until a player is given a number below 30 that he can feel the manager is seriously contemplating keeping him (Aliadière wore the number 30 in his last sea
son; Hoyte sports 31).
Often cited as evidence in favour of both the academy and the loan system, Ashley Cole’s progress through the ranks must be regarded as atypical. With the club ceasing to field the first-choice Brazilian-born left back Silvinho for fear of punishment due to his being registered with the football authorities using a dubious Portuguese passport, Cole was pressed into service early in 2001. He had been on loan at Crystal Palace, and just before the Silvinho predicament arose, a fee of £200,000 had been agreed to make the move permanent.
So the sweeping under the carpet of Wenger’s first choice (quietly sold the following summer to Celta Vigo) opened the door to a genuine product of Arsenal’s youth academy. The young man took his chance and was soon regarded as a permanent fixture. Academy head Liam Brady expressed pride that two of his former apprentices gained title medals in 2002, although goalkeeper Stuart Taylor, despite coach Bob Wilson’s recommendation, was never given the opportunity to take over from David Seaman and only obtained the requisite ten appearances due to a combination of injuries to the two above him in the pecking order and a final-day substitute appearance.
The Arsenal academy has the responsibility for the development of boys between the ages of nine and 21. As it has been in existence for less than ten years, perhaps the 2001/02 season was a little premature to be expecting fully fledged first-teamers to emerge. However, by 2008, still no one had followed in Cole and Taylor’s footsteps. The club’s own website lists the players that the academy has produced. Johan Djourou, Fabrice Muamba, Sebastian Larsson, Arturo Lupoli and Nicklas Bendtner are cited among the more recent graduates, even if they spent their earlier years with clubs abroad. Going back a few years Jermaine Pennant, David Bentley, Steve Sidwell, Justin Hoyte, Jérémie Aliadière and Ryan Smith are mentioned. “With academy players regularly dominating the Arsenal reserve team line-ups and a steady progression of players being blooded in the senior side,” states arsenal.com, “the academy production line looks set to continue and produce players to grace the Gunners’ new Emirates Stadium for many years to come.” If they do, it will be a genuine breakthrough.