Eyes on Target: Inside Stories From the Brotherhood of the U.S. Navy SEALs

by Scott McEwen

  We have also attempted to describe that the actions of the teams have not been without critics and courts-martial, as was the case with those charged with allegedly beating a known terrorist prisoner.

  Here we have tried to explain some of the trials and tribulations in the storied history of the SEAL teams to give the reader an idea of how they got to where they are today. They may have matured from pirates to professionals, but they have not lost the will to fight that made them pirates in the first place.

  Big Navy has had its issues with the teams, and it has severely thinned their ranks at times during their existence. The “great bloodletting” described in chapter 3 remains a hotly debated point in the history of the SEALs, but it made them who they are today.

  While the growth of any person or team is never complete, the SEALs as a small but highly specialized group of warriors have suffered more than their share. Their losses have been great and the funerals too frequent.

  * * *

  The war on terror cannot be ended unilaterally. Since before the Benghazi attacks, the Obama administration has been claiming that the war on terror is “over.” This is a cruel fantasy. If America tires of the fight, it cannot simply call back its drones and its SEALs. The terrorists will keep coming. Surrender only increases their thirst for victory.

  The war can end only with the enemy’s utter defeat. As long as al Qaeda and its affiliates retain the will to fight, their bombings and shootings will continue. The only way to keep those attacks from America’s shores is to send the SEALs and other commandos far from home to hunt and kill them.

  The SEALs must be a constant threat to those that would do harm to this nation and to civilization itself.

  If not, the razor edge of the threat will point the other way—at the hearts of civilians going about their daily lives. A mother pushing a stroller in a crowded mall. A secretary sitting in an office cubicle. A passenger on a plane, thinking only of a Thanksgiving dinner. A commuter lost in his iPad or a teen lost in her iPhone. The music of these innocents’ lives would suddenly stop if the SEALs stayed home.

  * * *

  We must, as a society, keep a group of warriors free of politics and bureaucracy, free of the distractions that keep them from doing their vital work.

  That means that we have to protect the teams from political prosecutions for operations that are perfectly run but ruined in the custody phase, as we detailed in the chapter about Carl Higbie’s sad saga. In the abstract, it may seem to make sense to show the world that we punish wrongdoers even when they wear our uniform. In the real world, the enemy has learned to use our legal procedures against us. They know that even false charges can effectively take SEALs out of combat, sometimes permanently. What the enemy cannot accomplish on the battlefield, it should not be able to do in the courtroom.

  Politics must be banished from special operations. Vice President Joseph Biden’s careless remarks that named SEAL Team Six have caused real and lasting harm to the teams. The warriors of the teams cannot do their lifesaving work if they are nagged by the worry that their families may be vulnerable to enemy retaliation. Special operations require special security, and that includes elected officials, who will always be tempted to advance themselves at the expense of the SEAL teams.

  Politics is vital to democratic deliberation and deadly to the elite culture of the SEALs. Our elected leaders should give them targets but not make them targets. Politicians need to know that they are not a wayward fraternity that needs to be corralled or cowed, but a delicate instrument to be unsheathed carefully and used surgically.

  Without these heroes, the Navy SEALs, horror and terror will come to our shores. With them comes honor and security. We forget this at our peril.

  APPENDIX

  Interim Progress Report

  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  An ongoing Congressional investigation across five House Committees concerning the events surrounding the September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya has made several determinations to date, including:

  • Reductions of security levels prior to the attacks in Benghazi were approved at the highest levels of the State Department, up to and including Secretary Clinton. This fact contradicts her testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 23, 2013.

  • In the days following the attacks, White House and senior State Department officials altered accurate talking points drafted by the Intelligence Community in order to protect the State Department.

  • Contrary to Administration rhetoric, the talking points were not edited to protect classified information. Concern for classified information is never mentioned in email traffic among senior Administration officials.

  These preliminary findings illustrate the need for continued examination and oversight by the five House Committees. The Committees will continue to review who exactly was responsible for the failure to respond to the repeated requests for more security and for the effort to cover up the nature of the attacks, so that appropriate officials will be held accountable.

  TABLE OF CONTENTS

  Introduction

  Findings

  Policy Considerations

  I. Prior to the Benghazi attacks, State Department officials in Libya made repeated requests for additional security that were denied in Washington despite ample documentation of the threat posed by violent extremist militias.

  II. The volatile security environment erupted on September 11, 2012, when militias composed of al-Qa’ida-affiliated extremists attacked U.S. interests in Benghazi.

  III. After the attacks, the Administration perpetuated a deliberately misleading and incomplete narrative that the violence grew out of a demonstration caused by a YouTube video. The Administration consciously decided not to discuss extremist involvement or previous attacks against Western interests in Benghazi.

  IV. The Administration’s investigations and reviews of the Benghazi attacks highlight its failed security policies leading to the attacks while undermining the ability of the United States government to bring the perpetrators to justice.

  V. The Benghazi attacks revealed fundamental flaws in the Administration’s approach to securing U.S. interests and personnel around the world.

  Appendix I: Oversight Activities by Committee

  Appendix II: Consolidated Timeline of Events

  This staff report has not been officially adopted by the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and therefore may not necessarily reflect the views of their Members.

  Introduction

  On September 11, 2012, armed militias with ties to terrorist organizations attacked U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, killing four U.S. personnel: Ambassador Christopher Stevens; State Department Information Officer Sean Smith; and two American security officers–and former U.S. Navy SEALs–Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. Given the gravity of these attacks and the loss of American life, the House Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Oversight and Government Reform initiated immediate inquiries into issues within each Committee’s jurisdiction concerning the events surrounding the attacks.

  In the course of their investigations, the Committees have interviewed dozens of officials and individuals with first-hand knowledge of the events, met with members of the military and diplomatic corps overseas, and reviewed tens of thousands of classified and unclassified documents, cables, emails, and reports. Members of Congress traveled on fact-finding missions to foreign countries, including Libya. The Committees paid particular attention to investigating allegations receiving public attention after the attacks and the associated findings are included in this report.

  At the direction of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader, the coordinated oversight work and assessments made to date are being presented to the Members of the House Repub
lican Conference in this interim progress report. The Committees will continue to review available information, and to interview sources as they come forward. This progress report will be updated as warranted.

  Findings

  This progress report reveals a fundamental lack of understanding at the highest levels of the State Department as to the dangers presented in Benghazi, Libya, as well as a concerted attempt to insulate the Department of State from blame following the terrorist attacks. The Committees’ majority staff summarizes findings to date as follows:

  Before the Attacks:

  • After the U.S.-backed Libyan revolution ended the Gadhafi regime, the U.S. government did not deploy sufficient U.S. security elements to protect U.S. interests and personnel that remained on the ground.

  • Senior State Department officials knew that the threat environment in Benghazi was high and that the Benghazi compound was vulnerable and unable to withstand an attack, yet the Department continued to systematically withdraw security personnel.

  • Repeated requests for additional security were denied at the highest levels of the State Department. For example, an April 2012 State Department cable bearing Secretary Hillary Clinton’s signature acknowledged then-Ambassador Cretz’s formal request for additional security assets but ordered the withdrawal of security elements to proceed as planned.

  • The attacks were not the result of a failure by the Intelligence Community (IC) to recognize or communicate the threat. The IC collected considerable information about the threats in the region, and disseminated regular assessments to senior U.S. officials warning of the deteriorating security environment in Benghazi, which included threats to American interests, facilities, and personnel.

  • The President, as Commander-in-Chief, failed to proactively anticipate the significance of September 11 and provide the Department of Defense with the authority to launch offensive operations beyond self-defense. Defense Department assets were correctly positioned for the general threat across the region, but the assets were not authorized at an alert posture to launch offensive operations beyond self-defense, and were provided no notice to defend diplomatic facilities.

  During the Attacks:

  • On the evening of September 11, 2012, U.S. security teams on the ground in Benghazi exhibited extreme bravery responding to the attacks by al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups against the U.S. mission.

  • Department of Defense officials and military personnel reacted quickly to the attacks in Benghazi. The effectiveness of their response was hindered on account of U.S. military forces not being properly postured to address the growing threats in northern Africa or to respond to a brief, high-intensity attack on U.S. personnel or interests across much of Africa.

  After the Attacks:

  • The Administration willfully perpetuated a deliberately misleading and incomplete narrative that the attacks evolved from a political demonstration caused by a YouTube video. U.S. officials on the ground reported–and video evidence confirms–that demonstrations outside the Benghazi Mission did not occur and that the incident began with an armed attack on the facility. Senior Administration officials knowingly minimized the role played by al-Qa’ida-affiliated entities and other associated groups in the attacks, and decided to exclude from the discussion the previous attempts by extremists to attack U.S. persons or facilities in Libya.

  • Administration officials crafted and continued to rely on incomplete and misleading talking points. Specifically, after a White House Deputies Meeting on Saturday, September 15, 2012, the Administration altered the talking points to remove references to the likely participation of Islamic extremists in the attacks. The Administration also removed references to the threat of extremists linked to al-Qa’ida in Benghazi and eastern Libya, including information about at least five other attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi. Senior State Department officials requested–and the White House approved–that the details of the threats, specifics of the previous attacks, and previous warnings be removed to insulate the Department from criticism that it ignored the threat environment in Benghazi.

  • Evidence rebuts Administration claims that the talking points were modified to protect classified information or to protect an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Email exchanges during the interagency process do not reveal any concern with protecting classified information. Additionally, the Bureau itself approved a version of the talking points with significantly more information about the attacks and previous threats than the version that the State Department requested. Thus, the claim that the State Department’s edits were made solely to protect that investigation is not credible.

  • The Administration deflected responsibility by blaming the IC for the information it communicated to the public in both the talking points and the subsequent narrative it perpetuated. Had Administration spokesmen performed even limited due diligence inquiries into the intelligence behind the talking points or requested reports from personnel on the ground, they would have quickly understood that the situation was more complex than the narrative provided by Ambassador Susan Rice and others in the Administration.

  • The Administration’s decision to respond to the Benghazi attacks with an FBI investigation, rather than military or other intelligence resources, contributed to the government’s lack of candor about the nature of the attack.

  • Responding to the attacks with an FBI investigation significantly delayed U.S. access to key witnesses and evidence and undermined the government’s ability to bring those responsible for the attacks to justice in a timely manner.

  Policy Considerations

  • The events in Benghazi reflect the Administration’s lack of a comprehensive national security strategy or a credible national security posture in the region. The United States continues to maintain an inadequate defensive posture in North Africa and the Middle East as a result of the Administration’s under-appreciation of the threat that al-Qa’ida and related terrorist groups pose in the region.

  • This singular event will be repeated unless the United States recognizes and responds to the threats we face around the world, and properly postures resources and security assets to counter and respond to those threats. Until that time, the United States will remain in a reactionary mode and should expect more catastrophes like Benghazi, in which U.S. personnel on the ground perform bravely, but are not provided with the resources for an effective response. As those opposed to U.S. interests will continue to take advantage of perceived U.S. weaknesses, the United States will continue to lose credibility with its allies and face the worst of all possible outcomes in strategically important locations around the world.

  • Congress must maintain pressure on the Administration to ensure the United States takes all necessary steps to find the Benghazi attackers. It has been more than seven months since the FBI investigation began, and there is very little progress. The risks of treating the Benghazi terrorist attacks as a law enforcement matter rather than a military matter are becoming increasingly clear. The failure to respond more assertively to the attacks and to impose meaningful consequences on those who planned and perpetrated them has contributed to a perception of U.S. weakness and retreat. Al-Qa’ida grew emboldened when the U.S. failed to respond forcibly and effectively to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), U.S. Embassies in East Africa (1998), and the U.S.S. Cole (2000). Active terrorist organizations and potential recruits will also be emboldened to attack U.S. interests if the U.S. fails to hold those responsible for this attack accountable.

  • Congress must also provide an effective counterweight to the Administration’s failure to adequately communicate the nature and the extent of the threats our country faces today. The Administration must do more to develop a coherent and robust national security strategy, and Congress must hold it accountable to do so.

  I. Prior to the Benghazi attacks, State Department officials in Libya made repeated requests for additional security that were d
enied in Washington despite ample documentation of the threat posed by violent extremist militias.

  I said, “Jim, you know what [is] most frustrating about this assignment? It’s not the hardship, it’s not the gunfire, it’s not the threats. It’s dealing and fighting against the people, programs, and personnel who are supposed to be supporting me… For me, the Taliban is on the inside of the building.”

  Testimony of Regional Security Office for the U.S. Mission to Libya Eric Nordstrom before the House Oversight & Government Reform Committee, October 12, 2012

  Setting Up the Benghazi Mission

  The Libyan revolution, which led to the overthrow of brutal dictator Muammar Gadhafi, was supported by the United States, most directly in the form of NATO air operations which lasted from March through October of 2011. After Gadhafi was killed in October of that year, the revolution’s interim Transitional National Council (TNC) declared the country liberated, and began attempting to establish a democratically-elected government. Around this time, the TNC relocated its center of operations from Benghazi to Tripoli.

  A State Department memorandum circulated at the end of 2011 recommended U.S. personnel remain in Benghazi.1 It explained many Libyans were “strongly” in favor of a U.S. outpost in Benghazi, in part because they believed a U.S. presence in eastern Libya would ensure that the new Tripoli-based government fairly considered eastern Libyan interests.

  The memorandum also outlined conditions for a U.S. mission in Benghazi (the “Benghazi Mission”), which were approved by Under Secretary for Management Patrick F. Kennedy.2 These conditions included the staffing of five Diplomatic Security (DS) agents. Diplomatic Security agents manage embassy security programs for the State Department and generally serve as the first line of defense for diplomatic personnel when stationed abroad.3 They include the Regional Security Officers (RSOs) who serve as each U.S. embassy’s principal security advisor.