by Peter Brune
Operating from their advanced aerodrome at Glisy, No. 3 Squadron, after a thorough prior reconnaissance of the German positions and movements, and having also provided numerous aerial photographs of the battlefield, was charged with the task of dropping phosphorus bombs to make a smokescreen around the rise above Chuignes village.
The 1st Division’s assault on 23 August was another vivid illustration of the implementation of what was by now an astute, comprehensive and smooth execution of a set-piece doctrine. On the northern or left flank, the 1st Brigade, accompanied by the tanks from the 2nd Tank Battalion, took Chuignolles by 5.30 am. This was despite the now customary heavy German machine gun fire, which was encountered at Chuignolles Wood as well as on the extreme left flank. By 7.00 am the first phase had been completed and, despite varying degrees of progress, the now customary tactic of a reserve battalion moving forward to briefly secure a vulnerable flank was employed.
The second or first exploitation phase—although undertaken without artillery support—was most successful, despite the fact that enemy machine gunners deployed in a number of woods offered stubborn resistance. And in surmounting that resistance the tanks provided invaluable support. Lieutenant W Ribchester commanded Tank 9388 during the advance:
The visibility was good but the smoke caused by the barrage tended to limit it to about 300 yds . . . Anti-tank guns were numerous but accurate fire caused them to desert their guns. Machine gunners in many cases hid in hope of being passed, but few escaped our observation and the infantry followed on with very few casualties . . . [although the Germans] used many AP [armour-piercing] bullets, I succeeded in either knocking out the machine guns or causing the gunners to flee . . . One anti-tank gun I was compelled to run over after putting the crew to flight, as the gunners attempted to return . . . After the battle I towed out three tanks which were ditched. Before reaching the rallying point my track broke so I reported to the OC and immediately after repaired the tank and returned . . . I had 2 casualties while the remainder of my crew were wounded by splash. On the whole the ground was extremely strongly held and roughly I put out 30 machine guns and one anti-tank gun.22
During the fighting that day, Lieutenant Ribchester’s tank expended some 5000 rounds of small arms fire, was in action for five hours and covered nine miles of ground.23
For the third and last exploitation phase, a creeping barrage delivered by three field artillery brigades that had rushed forward during the morning added significant protection to the advancing infantry. When the 3rd Brigade passed through the right flank of the 1st Brigade early that afternoon, it was able to capture the ground around the key Froissy Beacon and the heights overlooking Chuignolles. Lieutenant Syd Traill, 1st Brigade, 1st Battalion:
A great morning and just a shade of mist. Tanks came up and everything went well . . . Tanks went over and the lads followed. The barrage was just about perfect, and very heavy. Prisoners soon started to roll in and the attack succeeded . . . A most successful stunt, we took beaucoup prisoners, a 16” gun, 3 77’s, an anti-tank gun, and over 70 M.G.s and 6 minnies . . . All this belongs to the one day . . .24
On the afternoon of the 23rd, while the Australians were scaling Chuignes Ridge, No. 3 Squadron sent out a number of planes to attack retiring German artillery and infantry and to disrupt any signs of a counter-attack. Later a patrol of some five planes sighted ‘burning supply-dumps and other symptoms of a possible German 25 retirement’.25
In summing up the 1st AIF Division’s attack on 23 August, Charles Bean stated that:
The Australian Corps had by dusk won not only its main objective but, except for immaterial fractions, the ground intended to be gained by exploitation. Most of the German batteries lay beyond this line, at the head of Chuignes gully, and the troops’ elation was somewhat damped [sic] by the severe shelling that followed. Nevertheless a most powerful blow had been struck. Of 8,000 prisoners taken that day by fifteen divisions in the successful offensives of Fourth and Third Armies, the 1st Australian Division captured 2,000.26
While high praise was due to Major-General Gellibrand for the 3rd Division’s efforts the previous day, the leadership of Major-General Glasgow and his subordinate 1st Division commanders on 23 August was outstanding. Peter Pedersen has identified two entirely fair criticisms of General Monash’s command of the 1st Division’s fighting on that day. The first was his decision to place the Green Line ‘short of the old French trenches on the eastern slope of the valley so that the wire guarding them would not have to be crossed under machine gun fire’.27 Pedersen has pointed out that while this decision was taken by Monash to protect the Australians from the potential of a German counter-attack, it also allowed the enemy the chance to ‘manoeuvre on the Foucaucourt Plateau’28 in the rear. He further points out that the tanks and artillery might well have been employed to cut the wire. Second, Pedersen indicates that Monash changed a number of the objectives just 24 hours before the attack after having pledged, as usual, that all matters must be finalised at his final conference on 21 August. These issues demonstrate two important points: first, Monash was indeed at fault; but second, they portray a corps commander who was willing to both acknowledge an error and change his plans, and who also possessed tremendous confidence in his divisional commanders. Major-General Glasgow more than rewarded such trust, and his ‘grip’ of his battle was first-class.
We have noted the distinguished campaigning of the 5th Tank Brigade during the battles of Hamel, 8 August and this Australian Corps offensive of 23 August. Of the 37 tanks deployed on the Australian Corps front that day, 26 returned to their rallying point and eleven were knocked out by direct hits. While valuable lessons had been learnt concerning their need for careful coordination with both the artillery and infantry during the period 9–11 August, a far more serious problem confronted them at the end of this operation, which could not be addressed quickly. The 5th Tank Brigade would later record that:
The conditions in which this action was fought make very noticeable the gallantry and determination of the Tank crews. A number of cases were reported of men becoming delirious and even unconscious during the battle, this was partly due to the heat of the day which after sunrise became oppressive; but the main cause was to be found in the toxic action of the petrol fumes from the exhaust pipes. These had been strained and contorted by the long period of marching and fighting without overhaul and allowed the closed Tank to fill with poisonous gasses. The effects of these on Crews became the subject of a Special Report by the Senior Medical Officer of the Brigade and henceforward the study and remedy of this defect inherent in the design of the Ricardo Engine became a matter of the first importance.29
***
In order to maintain contact with events across the Somme, it was decided to renew Gellibrand’s 3rd AIF Division and the III Corps thrust to capture Bray and the La Neuville Peninsula. From the cliffs overlooking that centre, the Pioneer Battalion was able to construct light footbridges across the river to facilitate infantry movement onto the peninsula and establish contact with the 1st Division’s 3rd Brigade. Having ascertained that the German machine gun defences around Bray were formidable, the 10th Brigade was ordered to relieve the 9th and capture Bray in unison with a III Corps assault to seize the Green Line—which they had failed to capture on 22 August. The plan foresaw the 40th Battalion undertaking the attack with left-flank assistance from the 37th Battalion. After having captured Bray, both battalions were to establish posts on the eastern side of the town.
During the night of the 23rd, the 3rd Division’s artillery bombarded Bray and La Neuville, while the Pioneer Battalion crossed the Somme via their footbridges. At around 1.00 am, and under the screen of an artillery and machine gun barrage, the 40th Battalion attacked. The 3rd Division Unit Diary:
. . . owing to the defences and size of the town, the troops found great difficulty in maintaining touch and direction. The enemy put up a determined resistance from the western and north-western hedges and the attacking troop
s were met with heavy machine gun fire when trying to leave the gardens on the north-eastern outskirts.30
When the artillery barrage was then extended for some fifteen minutes, and elements of the 37th Battalion were added to the assault, the area around the railway was taken and all of the original objectives captured. The booty from this action yielded ‘a large dump of timber and material & three loaded trains, also a large ammunition dump partially prepared for demolition’.31 On the Australian left flank, III Corps was able to recapture the high ground north of the Chalk Pit. Bray had fallen.
Gunner James Armitage, 3rd Division Artillery, had been a keen observer of the recent 3rd Division fighting:
On the 22nd August a big stunt opened out and it was very successful. Several thousand prisoners were brought back past us. This stunt just left us out of range of enemy targets. On the 23rd the attack on Bray was made. Our brigade didn’t fire in the attack but leap-frogged through the other batteries while they were in action. Bray is in a deep hollow valley and the surrounding country is very high, though completely level like a tableland. As we advanced the Germans were being driven out of Bray by our troops and we see the fighting on both sides of the town, and the German and our own artillery barrages steadily moving back into German territory. It was a wonderful sight.
This high road into Bray was littered with German skeletons. They must have been there for years. The flesh was all gone from their bones and they were just skeletons in rotting uniforms. We could not understand why they had been left there. They were well inside old German territory and had been driven over for ages. Our horses hated it and whimpered. There were skeletons of horses too.32
***
The period 8–23 August 1918 was tumultuous and exhilarating. Field Marshal Haig’s eternal optimism now knew no bounds. Late on the night of 22 August, and rightly sensing a general German loss of morale and a growing inability to cope with the pressure of coordinated attacks across their defences, he now advocated far more aggressive tactics:
. . . the most resolute offensive is everywhere desirable. Risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur ought now to be incurred as a duty. It is no longer necessary to advance in regular lines and step by step. On the contrary each division should be given a distant objective which must be reached independently of its neighbour, and even if one’s flank is thereby exposed for the time being. Reinforcements must be directed to points where our troops are gaining ground not where they are checked . . . The situation is most favourable. Let each one of us push forward to our objective.33
***
From a BEF and Fourth Army command perspective, the period 23–27 August 1918 is noteworthy for a divergence of thought and subsequent orders. We have noted Field Marshal Haig’s 22 August order for ‘the most resolute offensive’ and that ‘risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur ought now to be incurred as a duty’. Peter Pedersen has pointed out that the very next day Haig qualified that order by asserting that the prerequisite for such risks would most likely constitute a penetration of ‘a system of defences in depth’, which would inhibit a rapid break-through.34 Peter Pedersen: ‘This shows conclusively that Haig was not expecting a breakthrough, and that the main German defence lines would be reduced only by heavy fighting. In short, it was far from an expression of imminent victory.’35
When Rawlinson sought reinforcements to continue his advance, Haig denied that request, pointing out that the next major BEF offensive was to take place to the north on General Horne’s First Army front. Haig anticipated that Horne’s thrust—with General Currie’s elite Canadians in the van—might pierce the northern portion of the Hindenburg Line and endanger the German right flank facing the Third and Fourth Armies. If that offensive gained significant ground, two important outcomes would occur: the first was that the Germans facing the Fourth Army would be forced to withdraw not only past the Somme, but possibly back to the Hindenburg Line; and second, that such a strategy would complement Marshal Foch’s impending offensive north of the BEF’s front by the Belgians, and to its south by the French and Americans.
Late on 25 August, as a consequence of that meeting with Haig, Rawlinson, conscious of the news that the Germans were most likely reinforcing their defence of his front, informed Monash that the Fourth Army was to ‘mark time and await events elsewhere’.36 His orders for Monash now anticipated operations designed to support Byng’s Third Army across the Somme and simply maintain contact with the enemy south of it. Clearly—and understandably—Rawlinson was more than prepared to endorse a policy of a frequent shift in major operations, employing a ‘bite and hold’ strategy.
However, Monash was of a different mind. When, late on 27 August, Rawlinson ordered that ‘touch must be kept with the enemy’, Monash considered it ‘sufficient to justify an aggressive policy on my part’.37 Fortified by the fact that his Australian Corps front had been shortened to around nine miles by the relief of his 4th AIF Division by the French on the 23rd, and that his 2nd and 5th Divisions had relieved his 1st Division south of the Somme on the night of the 26th, Monash now foresaw an opportunity to achieve two aims. He would later write:
. . . firstly, that his [the German] withdrawal should be more precipitate than would be agreeable to him, and secondly, that when he reached that line [the Somme] he should be accorded no breathing time to establish upon it a firm defence from which he could hold us at bay for the remainder of the fine weather.38
Monash now had his nine-mile front held by four divisions with two in reserve: to the north and across the Somme was Gellibrand’s 3rd Division; southwards across that feature were his newly deployed 2nd and 5th Divisions; and to their south was the British 32nd. In reserve were his just relieved 1st Division (resting on the Somme near Chipilly) and the 4th (near Amiens).
By 28 August Gellibrand’s 3rd Division north of the Somme, after having seized Bray, had pushed on and captured Suzanne, Vaux and Curlu, and was now moving on Cléry. On the southern side of the Somme, General Rosenthal’s 2nd Division and General Hobbs’s 5th, with the British 32nd Division, were nearing the bend in the river. But as the Germans fought their rearguard actions such a rapid Australian Corps pursuit still entailed stiff fighting and casualties. Private Len Clarkson, 32nd Battalion, 8th Brigade, 5th Division, faced such an action on 28 August:
We . . . kept going . . . till we came to open country with low bushy copses ahead of us. We were advancing in artillery formation when crack! crack! rang out from the copses ahead of us, and bullets started to whistle past our ears. We had certainly found him, and undoubtedly he had found us. We lay down for a while for it was getting a bit too hot with bullets whispering around us in the grass. A very exhilarating sensation I don’t think!
Then came the order to advance, and we hopped up again. The snipers got to work again and two or three bullets whistled within an inch or so of my head, and I thought to myself ‘it won’t be long now’ . . . we couldn’t go far under this fire. Several of our chaps had been hit and were lying behind us, and bullets were too near to be pleasant. The aggravating part of it was that not a sign of Fritz could we see . . . so we dashed forward and hopped down into the welcome cover of an old disused trench. We got our machine guns into position and had a good rest, for we were dog-tired after our long tramp after the Hun. There were still chaps behind us, and we watched them from our new position. As soon as even one of them so much as moved, crack would go a sniper’s rifle . . . We stopped in this trench till nightfall and Fritz kept up his firing all day. I have never placed too much faith in newspaper reports of the Germans firing on the Red Cross, but I can fully vouch for it now. Some of our chaps as I have said had been wounded and were stretcher cases. Out go four stretcher-bearers with Red Cross badges on big white armlets plainly visible. They hoist the wounded chap onto a stretcher and move off, and then the snipers opened up on them before they had gone ten yards. One of the stretcher-bearers was killed, hit clean through the head. I don’t think the Hun c
an be human, but I think he’ll find out that this stretcher-bearing business is a game two can play. That’s how it makes you feel!39
At ‘the bend in the river’ the new Australian Corps objective would be the town of Péronne. The battle that would now follow constitutes one of the most stirring episodes in the Australian story.
CHAPTER 9
. . . an ignorant, wonderful lot of fools
The approach to, and the subsequent capture of, Mont St Quentin and Péronne would amount to the toughest challenge yet faced by the Australian Corps. This was because the number and physical condition of Monash’s infantry, his artillery requirements, the availability of tanks and his logistics were all causes for concern.
We have noted the AIF’s almost continuous fighting during the previous five months, and Monash’s attempts to give them an opportunity for a rest after Amiens. It has also been mentioned that that ‘rest’ for each division was brief before they were returned to the front. Towards the end of August 1918 the casualties and drain upon the Australians’ reserves of energy were becoming ever more acute. The AIF was now a rapidly diminishing resource. As an example, when the 2nd Division’s 5th Brigade returned to the line on 26 August, Charles Bean identified its 17th and 20th Battalions as having a strength of eighteen officers and 357 other ranks, and eighteen and 302 respectively—both under half-strength.1 And a portion of that diminishing AIF strength comprised experienced soldiers, such as the long-serving 4th Division, 13th Battalion’s Corporal Cliff Geddes. Five days after his relief, Geddes recorded that: ‘I have been very crook lately with diarrhoea & pains in stomach & was sent today in a motor ambulance to the 61st Casualty Clearing Station.’2 On 5 September 1918, he guessed that his war might be over: