by Peter Brune
In simple terms, the gamble of a Somme frontal assault failed because the Australians were unable to surmount two seemingly predictable obstacles. The first and most obvious was the fact that despite the Australian Corps’s speedy approach to the river, the Germans were professional enough to demolish all bridges and most of the foot crossings just prior to their arrival. As a consequence, the attackers were thus exposed to the vulnerability of crossing the numerous marshes and the river obstacle. Further, the Germans had ample machine gun and artillery covering those crossings. Having created that first obstruction, the second became the German capacity to employ the eastern slopes of the river to enfilade not only those obvious crossing locations but also the distant, relatively open-sloped western approaches to it. It should also be noted that this initial plan failed to recognise the critical importance of the German occupation of the Bouchavesnes Spur and the ability of machine gun and artillery fire on and around that feature to offer support for Mont St Quentin. Had the Australians gained a footing over the Somme they would have paid a very severe price for a failure to assault that obstacle.
Peter Pedersen has made two pertinent points regarding Monash’s command during 29 August. First, he has correctly pointed out that in his The Australian Victories in France in 1918, Monash quite simply failed to mention his initial attempt to breach the Somme by a westerly frontal assault, and further that this initial plan’s failure to consider the Bouchavesnes Spur was ‘a major blunder’.23
General Monash called a Corps conference at 5th Division HQ—‘then situated in a group of bare sheds . . . just south of Proyart’—at 5.00 pm on 29 August.24 In attendance were Monash, Hobbs (5th Division), Rosenthal (2nd), Gellibrand (3rd) and the British 32nd Division’s Major-General Lambert. The plan that Monash subsequently outlined to his divisional commanders was a masterly one, because it paid due attention to the ground and the German employment of it in their fire plan.
Monash now sought to concentrate his force on his left or northern flank. To achieve this, he ordered the British 32nd Division on his right flank to increase its front northwards along the Somme to a point opposite Lamire Farm. Although the 32nd was to now occupy a Somme frontage of some 7500 yards, its new role was merely one of a defensive brigade occupation of forward posts and to ‘demonstrate’ the intention of a crossing. Its remaining brigades were to rest. This northwards extension of the 32nd Division’s line allowed Monash to order General Hobbs’s 5th Division front to shorten but also move northwards. His 4000-yard front would now extend from Lamire Farm in the south northwards to Biaches. Hobbs’s orders were to force a crossing of the Somme at Péronne, but if its bridges were blown, to move further north and cross following the 2nd Division. The northern portion of the front (on and just below the Somme bend) was assigned to General Rosenthal’s 2nd Division, and was to stretch some 4700 yards from Biaches in the south to Omiécourt on the bend. Rosenthal’s orders were to cross the river at Halle or, failing that, to cross behind the present 3rd Division front. The 2nd Division was tasked with the capture of Mont St Quentin. Across the Somme, Gellibrand’s 3rd Division was given the short-term objective of the high ground north-east of Cléry, and a subsequent capture of the previously neglected Bouchavesnes Spur. The obvious possibility that might well cause the plan to falter was that there might be a lack of well-positioned, intact, or at least partially intact, bridge and/or footbridge crossing points. To overcome this potential for failure, Monash stipulated that whichever division secured a crossing, that passage was to be made available for another division to pass through them. He further ordered that these changes were to occur that night in readiness for the operation to commence at dawn the next day.
A number of features of this plan deserve examination. The first is Monash’s insistence upon the new divisional fronts being shortened, and occupied that very night, which indicates his determination to concentrate his force on a changed and localised portion of his front. The plan was also to gain surprise and maintain the momentum of his offensive. Next, his plan employed an admirable degree of flexibility. It allowed for a crossing in force—and a reinforcement of that crossing—despite the fact that at the time of the conference, such a location or locations had not yet been found. In addition, his subordinate commanders, at the division, brigade and battalion levels, were entrusted with an equal measure of flexibility in thought, in the use of their resources, and in their resultant plans and orders. And such plans would come to nought if the Corps engineers and pioneer battalions were unable to maintain the road-system approach to the Somme. Moreover, they had to forge bridge and footbridge crossings, which would allow the logistic staff to continue to adequately supply the Corps over that obstacle.
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To implement General Monash’s plan for 30 August 1918, it will be remembered that Major-General Rosenthal’s 2nd Division task was to cross the Somme at Halle, form a bridgehead and subsequently attack Mont St Quentin. If this crossing failed, the Division was to march north-west and cross the river behind the 3rd Division front. Rosenthal allotted this mission to Brigadier Martin’s 5th Brigade. Further, because of time constraints, the 5th Division’s 15th Brigade could not pass through Rosenthal’s 7th Brigade until the following night. Thus, the 7th Brigade was ordered to cross the Somme near Péronne pending the 15th Brigade’s arrival. To support the two thrusts, the artillery supporting the 2nd Division had been reinforced by the just arrived 2nd Division Artillery, which deployed three of its brigades in support of the 5th Brigade, and two in support of the 7th.
The success of Monash’s plan now came down to the engineers’ ability and speed in locating, and if need be repairing, his infantry’s Somme crossing points. To the south, on the 7th Brigade front, a daylight attempt on 29 August by the 7th Field Company to reconnoitre the canal and its far side south of Péronne met with formidable resistance. When the 7th Field Company’s Major Webb and Lieutenant Mott found a bridge still partially intact, they were met by ‘7.7 cm guns . . . shooting on to the bridge at about 800 yds range and machine guns at about 400 yds range and our own howitzers were bursting within 50 yds of it . . .’25 In quite an understatement, the 7th Field Company’s report stated that ‘this bridge and corduroy track on the far side could not be inspected at the time’.26 Clearly, nearly all bridge reconnaissance and construction would now have to be undertaken under the cover of darkness, which further pushed the urgency of the completion of those crossings.
In short, the bridges from Brie northwards to Lamire Farm, to the lock at La Chapelette, into Péronne, to the Canal du Nord, to Halle, and thence at the Omiécourt canal lock, were all either completely blown, partially blown—which allowed for only foot traffic—or covered by German guns and machine guns. To compound these difficulties, if a passage was gained, it often led into impassable stretches of lagoon or marsh. The experience of the 7th Brigade’s 26th and 28th Battalions in the early hours of 30 August is a case in point. After the 7th Field Company had constructed two footbridges south of Péronne, and those units had travelled a mere 200 yards beyond them, the foot track ended on the broad expanse of a lagoon.
General Rosenthal had briefed his 2nd Division Brigade Commanders for the attack on Mont St Quentin at 7.30 pm on 29 August—a mere nine-and-a-half hours before it was to go in. At that juncture, the Somme was still to be bridged. When the attempt at Halle failed, the 5th Brigade were redeployed to the Omiécourt crossing. However, with Cléry yet to be taken, the approach to Omiécourt was met with intense machine gun and shell fire that forced its abandonment. Later that night the Omiécourt crossing was blown up. At 3.00 am on 30 August, Rosenthal, in consultation with Brigadier Martin (5th Brigade), realised that the 5th Brigade’s crossing of the Somme hinged on two possibilities. The first was to follow the 7th Brigade to the south in the hope that it would secure a crossing at Halle; the second was swing back two miles to Feuillères, where a bridge had been repaired, and then move alongside the 3rd Division on the north side of the river. Giv
en the time constraints for this move—and the fact that Cléry was yet to fall—the attack for 5.00 am on 30 August was cancelled. The 5th Brigade was to now march some two miles back, cross the Somme at Feuillères, and march along the northern bank of the river, to join the 3rd Division’s right flank.
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With the plan for the capture of Mont St Quentin and Péronne now changed, its chances of success now hinged upon Major-General Gellibrand’s 3rd Division’s capture of Cléry and, ultimately, the Bouchavesnes Spur. It will be recalled that as the 2nd and 5th AIF Divisions had pushed on to the Somme south of its bend, by 28 August the 3rd Division had captured Bray and had subsequently taken Suzanne, Vaux and Curlu, and by the 29th was heading towards Cléry.
The 3rd Division’s fighting from Bray eastwards had been marked by strong German rearguard actions. However, should that advance reach Cléry and continue eastwards it would enable the Australians to ‘push in a south-easterly direction and so nullify the defensive advantages the enemy then had from the river Somme’.27 The Germans, therefore, strongly reinforced their line at and around the Cléry defences and the high ground stretching to the Bouchavesnes Spur. The 3rd Division would later record that: ‘Prisoners captured later gave the identification of the reinforcements as being the 2nd Guards Division, and stated that they had received orders to hold on at all costs.’28 The rearguard was now over. The fighting around Cléry would see a far more resolute German defence.
Charles Bean recorded the toll taken on Gellibrand’s 3rd Division on its approach to Cléry:
The 38th Battalion (10 Bde) had been fighting or moving continuously, night and day, since August 26th. Its staff having worked for 71½ hours without sleep had at last settled at Curlu, the intelligence officer and adjutant lying down to sleep while the doctor and the scout officer . . . proposed ‘a swim and a good feed’ first. At this moment there arrived the brigadier, General [Brigadier-General] McNicol, whom they assumed to be also coming for a long deferred ‘nap’. ‘Get your battalion ready to move in twenty minutes as advanced guard of the brigade,’ he said. ‘Cléry is burning and if possible your headquarters are to be there to-night.’29
During 29 August the 3rd Division had cleared the broken ground around the village of Hem but had run into strong German machine gun fire on the ridge west of Cléry. During the late afternoon and early night the Division made steady progress west of Cléry and managed to clear most of that village by around 10.00 pm. There remained, however, pockets of German resistance in dwellings on its eastern end that continued to be of concern. During that same day, the British advanced south of Maurepas to relieve the pressure on the 3rd Division’s left flank, and by nightfall the utterly exhausted 10th Brigade had occupied a line starting from the Cléry causeway and extending northwards to make contact with its 9th Brigade at and near Hill 110.
During 30 August, although the 3rd Division encountered heavy resistance on its right flank and was unable to advance beyond the limits of Cléry, it did make further ground on its left, which resulted in its line being extended from Cléry Copse northwards past Road Wood.
At around 9.00 pm on 30 August a stunned Brigadier-General McNicoll received orders from General Gellibrand that his 10th Brigade was to attack the Bouchavesnes Spur next morning. Further, after General Rosenthal informed Gellibrand that his 5th Brigade had been prevented from its crossing at the Omiécourt causeway, McNicoll was informed that he was to eliminate fire coming from Cléry forthwith to allow the 5th Brigade’s crossing. Given the tremendous effort his 10th Brigade had given in its sleepless advance on Cléry and its accompanying high ground—of some 72 hours—he sincerely doubted whether his exhausted troops could maintain the offensive. When Gellibrand informed him that the 5th Brigade were also fatigued, and that their crossing of the river depended on Cléry being taken, McNicoll acted with great haste. The 3rd Division report would record that Cléry village was eventually totally cleared at around 10.00 pm on 30 August ‘and then only after much hand-to-hand fighting among the dugouts and ruins’.30
While this savage 3rd Division fighting was in progress, the 5th Brigade was able to make its Somme crossing. Private William McLennan’s 2nd Machine Gun Company was in support. His diary for 30 August chronicles the 5th Brigade’s crossing at Feuillères, and its subsequent painstaking movement eastwards:
2.30 am. . . . Mr Carne goes to find 20th Btn Officers. 4 am. Mr Carne returns. 20th Btn come along. 18th Btn patrol have returned. Report bridge across the river has been destroyed not possible to cross. Hun commands situation with MG’s. Stunt off . . . 6 am. 18th Btn ordered to fall back. We go with them . . . Our Field artillery can be seen moving up into action across the river. Transport of all kinds also going up. Orders come through 10.15 am that 20th Btn are to cross river at Feuilleres & go up to hop off position beyond Clery. We are to go with them. 10.50 am 20th Btn move off. A little later our limbers come up. Pack our gear on board & move off . . . Cross river & up along road, then along trench to deep valley in front of Clery . . . HQ of a 3rd Div Btn here . . . 2.30 pm. Our limbers come in at the gallop dump the gear & gallop off again. It is not a place to loiter in. We shoulder our loads & move up the valley along a trench to left of the village. Hun shelling as we go; one lands very close . . . Hear that we cannot go further forward as our side is held up a bit . . . Hun shells the place at intervals of short duration till about 4 pm. 5.9s landing only a few feet away, he also sends some gas shells over; get a dose of it . . . good few casualties coming out of forward positions . . . The infantry can only get ahead slowly before dark as the Hun enfilades the CT [communication trench] with MG fire . . . hear that 7 men have just been buried in a dugout by a big shell bursting right on it. A party are digging them out. A little later they carry them past our dugout. 4 killed & 3 badly wounded . . .31
Late on the 30th the 3rd Division front extended from around 1100 yards west of Quarry Farm, bending southwards past Road Wood and thence just west of Cléry Copse to the Somme. The 9th Brigade was on the left or northern flank and the 10th Brigade south of it. The 2nd Division’s 5th Brigade was on the Somme bend and ready to assault Mont St Quentin. Far to the south, the 7th Brigade, having been unable to cross the Somme, was relieved during the late afternoon and night of 30 August by the 5th Division’s 15th Brigade. The 15th Brigade Unit Diary would report that the front was ‘vigourously patrolled during the night and the following day but at no place could a crossing be effected across the swamp’.32
The degree of difficulty in an assault upon two high-ground features such as the Bouchavesnes Spur and Mont St Quentin—and against an entrenched enemy determined to hold his vital ground—was extreme. And that degree of difficulty was compounded by the Australians’ diminishing numerical strength, their utter exhaustion and their resulting poor physical condition. It is little wonder, therefore, that when General Rawlinson visited Monash on the afternoon of 30 August, he was flabbergasted to learn that the attack would indeed take place at 5.00 am on the 31st: ‘And so you think you’re going to take Mont St. Quentin with three battalions! What presumption! However, I don’t think I ought to stop you! So, go ahead, and try!—and I wish you luck!’33
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Although the assault upon Mont St Quentin had been postponed for 24 hours to 5.00 am on 31 August, the preparations for that attack were still implemented under severe time constraints. Brigadier-General Martin (5th Brigade) ordered a three-battalion assault upon the Mont: his 20th Battalion on the left or northern flank, his 17th Battalion in the centre and his 19th Battalion on the river or right flank. The 18th Battalion was to act as the Brigade reserve. The fact that the 19th Battalion was ‘warned to be prepared to cross [the Somme] at 3 am on 31st August’,34 then march to its start line and attack a mere two hours later at 5.00 am, illustrates the speedy planning and resultant tight timetable. However, if the 24-hour postponement had involved pressured planning, and significant and exhausting movements for the infantry, then it had also facilitated a priceless
opportunity for further artillery support to arrive at the Somme.
The 5th Brigade was to be supported by five Field Artillery Brigades, with some 90 heavy artillery guns in support. These guns were deployed from the 9th Brigade Royal Garrison Artillery and elements of the Corps Heavy Artillery and also counter-batteries from the Corps.35 The planning may have been rushed, but its professionalism was not compromised:
The artillery support was arranged and co-ordinated by the C.R.A. [Commander Royal Artillery] direct with the G.O.C., 5th A. I. Bde. at latter H.Q. at 10 pm August 30th. Orders were then issued personally to the O.C’s F.A. Brigades and the O.C. 9th Bde RGA. The latter carried out all work possible with his own batteries and arranged with Aust. Corps H.A. for extra assistance from other H.A. Bdes.36
As the limitations of time forbade a standard creeping barrage, it was decided that the artillery would engage selected locations to the limits of their range, subsequent to that fire being adjusted to the anticipated advance of the infantry. For the 18-pounder field artillery—to be used across a roughly 2500-yard front on the lower portion of the Mont at a gun every 25 yards—each gun was to fire two rounds per minute. The heavy artillery 6-inch Howitzers, with their high trajectory and plunging fire, were allotted one round per minute, and were to engage the enemy on the summit and its flanks. For maximum and immediate ground burst, 106 fuses were to be used as far as possible.37
Additional 5th Brigade support was provided by one section of Vickers machine guns and two Stokes Mortars to each of its three front-line battalions. The Brigade Report stated that ‘special arrangements were made for telephone, visual and runner communications’.38 Thus, although the four battalions of the 5th Brigade were to undertake their Mont St Quentin attack with a grossly under-strength 70 officers and 1250 other ranks, the 1918 adoption of ‘firepower’ rather than the previous use of expendable ‘manpower’ was still being adhered to. But in the end, the Battle for Mont St Quentin would come down to the sheer courage, stamina and spirit of the exhausted infantry. The 17th Battalion’s Unit Diary, 31 August 1918: ‘A small issue of rum arrived and was distributed to the men just before moving off. It is worthy of note that the men were so fatigued and sleepy that even officers almost fell asleep standing up.’39