by Peter Brune
To the south of the 5th Division’s 14th Brigade fighting, its sister 15th Brigade (Brigadier-General ‘Pompey’ Elliott) had tried—and failed—for nearly two days to cross the Somme. Frustrated by this lack of success, Elliott, in a typical act of boldness, took into his own hands a task normally assigned to a small reconnaissance patrol. At 8.00 am on 1 September, Elliott personally reconnoitred the front and discovered that the road bridge over the Somme, which had been previously reported as destroyed, was in fact crossable by single-file infantry:
. . . owing to the fact that whilst the whole structure had collapsed on the surface of the water, a steel girder had fallen and jambed [sic] in such a way that men could cross with little difficulty.
The Brigadier crossed without opposition but was fired on by an enemy Machine Gun from the vicinity of the Railway Line on gaining the crest of an old earthwork on the opposite bank. He immediately directed the platoon of the 59th Battalion who held the post guarding the Bridge to the West side to move at once to establish a post on the opposite side, which was done. He then instructed the C.O.’s of the 58th and 59th Battalions, to move . . . (the 58th by the Road Bridge and the 59th by the Railway Bridge), to exploit the situation.52
During 1 September the 15th Brigade found that ‘the situation’ was most difficult to exploit. When the 14th Brigade’s 54th Battalion managed to enter Péronne, Elliott hoped to secure that Battalion’s right flank by a push across the Somme and the capture of the key railway station and village of Flamicourt, to be followed by taking the high ground to the south-east. To this end, two companies of his 58th Battalion crossed the bridge he had earlier ‘recced’. In concert with this thrust, Elliott ordered his 59th Battalion to cross the railway bridge and advance towards Flamicourt along the railway line. The plan failed at this early juncture on 1 September because neither Péronne or Mont St Quentin had yet fallen. An early attempt to join flanks with the 14th Brigade, and thence move north-eastwards, was thwarted by severe machine gun fire and, in the approach to Flamicourt, all movement was confined to the railway track as there were swamps on either side. If the approach to that railway station was hard enough, then the building itself was a veritable machine gun fortress:
. . . a strongly built two story [sic] brick building. The enemy had, by using steel rails and concrete formed the ground floor into a huge pill box fort which resisted with ease a heavy bombardment with 6" Howitzers with splendid observation. Many direct hits speedily reduced the top floors to ruins but had no effect on the machine gunners below.53
By 8.00 pm on that action-packed day, Elliott had withdrawn all but two companies of his Brigade—deployed to protect their hard-won bridgehead—to the western bank of the river.
By the end of 1 September 1918, the Australians had not only stormed and seized the much-vaunted Mont St Quentin and significant ground to its north, but were also in possession of most of the prize of Péronne. And away to the north, the III Corps and the Australian 3rd Division had driven the Germans from the high ground on the Bouchavesnes Spur. Private William McLennan witnessed parts of that day’s fighting and recorded an interesting observation on the Australian efforts that day:
Prisoners & wounded are beginning to go past down the trench. 3rd Div are forging ahead on the left. Our artillery is giving the Hun something to occupy his mind . . . Our boys are now mopping up the village & wood of Mont St Quentin; it is a very strong position . . . Capts Mansfield & Allen of the 17th Btn are below sleeping after a long & strenuous spell of fighting. We make them some tea about 3 pm wake them up; give them a mug each of it, with a good tot of rum & something to eat. They give great praise to those of our guns who were forward with them & tell us some tales of the fighting. Capt Mansfield questioning a Hun officer whom he had captured asked him what he thought of the Australians. The Hun answering said, You are an ignorant, wonderful lot of fools.54
***
The Australian Corps engineers had also laboured tirelessly during 1 September. By late that night they had completed a bridge for motor transport; strengthened bridges at Omiécourt and Cléry; repaired the road approaches to Feuillères; built a heavy pontoon bridge over the Somme to Halle; and secured and tested invaluable water supply points. This enabled the Corps field and heavy artillery units to now concentrate beyond the Somme.
The plans for 2 September, from the north of the front southwards, envisaged a British III Corps thrust to force the Germans across the Canal du Nord, capture the Nurlu Heights and occupy the high ground south of that village. To assist this plan, on the night of 1 September the 58th British Division was relieved by the 74th (Yeomanry) Division. In unison with this attack, in the centre, the 2nd AIF Division was to advance along the southern bank of the Canal du Nord and capture the high ground around Aizecourt-le-Haut. It was hoped that this British III Corps and 2nd Division thrust would gradually squeeze the Australian 3rd Division out of the front, allowing it a more than deserved rest. Further to the south, the 5th AIF Division was to capture the ground eastwards of Péronne from Bussu stretching south to Doingt.
It will be recalled that the 2nd Division’s 7th Brigade had given way to the advancing 14th Brigade during their crossing of, and concentration over, the Somme on 31 August. For the operation on 2 September, the 7th Brigade was tasked with a thrust forward through the 5th Brigade’s reserve position and thence a movement through the 6th Brigade to take over the 2nd Division front. To support its operations, the artillery plan was arranged to provide a series of standing barrages onto trenches and selected targets so as to allow the 7th Brigade to move forward close enough to storm the enemy trenches. Employing the now standard Australian Corps additional support, the Brigade was assigned one section of Vickers Machine Guns and two Stokes Mortars to each battalion. Its strength for its operation on 2 September was (including Battalion HQ), 49 officers and 1065 other ranks.
The 7th Brigade went in on a three-battalion front at 5.30 am: its 27th Battalion on the left or northern flank, its 25th in the centre, and its 26th on the right. When the assault began, heavy casualties ensued, mainly caused by an intense combination of enemy HE and gas shell fire, and intense machine gun fire.
On the left flank, the 27th Battalion missed the retaliatory German barrage at zero but struck heavy machine gun fire when it reached Tortille Trench. When all but two of its officers became casualties, we note yet again the experience and initiative of its junior leaders, who assumed command and subsequently led the Battalion through and then past Allaines and Haut Allaines. In the centre, the 25th Battalion crossed their start line on a two-company front, with the third in close support and the fourth in reserve. When its soldiers were held up by concentrated machine gun fire, and the artillery barrage consequently left them well behind, the assault became one of a critically important and skilled outflanking of German posts and the use of mutually supporting fire. But the Brigade’s 26th Battalion’s right or southern flank presented the biggest challenge. Obliged to cooperate with its 25th Battalion on its left and the 14th Brigade on its right—which did not attack until 6.00 am—the 26th ran into a stream of machine gun fire from both its front and unsupported right flank, where heavy casualties ensued. When the newly deployed British 74th Division failed to hold its objective and was pushed back westwards, and with the 14th Brigade held up on its right, the 7th Brigade was holding a pointed, narrow and therefore vulnerable salient. The 2nd Division Report for 2 September 1918 would record that by the end of the day its 7th Brigade had experienced:
. . . a bitter day’s fighting for the enemy had fought stubbornly and never yielded an inch of ground until forced to do so. Despite the loss of their officers the infantry fought with bravery, determination and skill that is indescribable. Without the slightest hesitation they crossed the fire swept slopes and flat ground to their objectives. Our casualties were heavy, amounting to 32 officers, and 417 other ranks . . . The day ended with the Brigade on a frontage of 5,000 yards and only 800 bayonets to hold it—a task which
needs no comment.55
It will be remembered that to the south of the 2nd Division, the 5th Division’s 2 September objectives were the final ‘mopping up’ of Péronne and the seizure of the ground eastwards from Bussu stretching south to Doingt. The 14th Brigade’s task was to employ its 56th Battalion and two companies of the 55th to advance eastwards north of Péronne and gain possession on the ridge west of Hesse Trench. Meanwhile, the 54th Battalion was to complete the occupation of Péronne. On reaching its objective, the 55th Battalion was then tasked with facing and protecting the southern flank in order to both secure its ground and subsequently link up with the advancing 15th Brigade on its southern flank. The 15th Brigade’s objectives were to move its 58th Battalion into Péronne and assist the 14th Brigade’s 54th Battalion in clearing it, while the 59th and 60th Battalions were charged with the thrust north of that town. Zero hour was 6.00 am.
The 14th Brigade struck trouble even before its assault could commence. When the 7th Brigade’s artillery concentration opened at 5.30 am upon their front, and the heavy artillery began to bombard the north-eastern ramparts of Péronne, the Germans replied with a barrage ‘even more intense than that experienced during the morning of 1st September’.56 A significant portion of that barrage fell upon the assembling 56th Battalion, causing heavy casualties and a difficulty in the transmission of orders. When the 56th Battalion advance did commence, it was met with a hail of enfiladed fire from the seemingly unaffected Péronne north-eastern ramparts and from St Denis, with the result that only one company managed to advance some 300 yards before digging in. That company now numbered 35 men. Employing their now standard fire and movement, and initiative, two companies of the 55th Battalion—close behind—now sought to assist the 56th by a left-flanking movement. Although this thrust saw them gain an embankment running south from the Brickworks, a consequent attempt to cross that embankment and work around the eastern side of the ramparts proved a failure. But at 7.45 am a company of the 55th had managed to occupy a part of the Brickworks, which caused the Germans to withdraw from St Denis. A line was then established just east of the Brickworks along the St Denis–Mont St Quentin Road.
Despite its early difficulties, the 56th Battalion had, by 9.30 am, managed to slowly move small numbers of men forward to link with the 55th Battalion on their left. When elements of that Battalion subsequently made contact with the 59th on their right, who in turn had established contact with the embattled 54th south of the cemetery, the 14th Brigade had, by 10.00 am, painstakingly formed an unbroken forward line. When the 14th Brigade stopped and consolidated its line late on 2 September, it occupied ground running roughly from its boundary with the 2nd Division just east of the Péronne–Mont St Quentin Road to just past the northern ramparts of Péronne.
If all of the Australian Corps’s attacking brigades experienced great difficulties on 2 September, then the degree of difficulty experienced by Brigadier-General ‘Pompey’ Elliott and his 15th Brigade was even more extreme. At 9.00 pm on 1 September Elliott was summoned to a conference at 8th Brigade HQ. After a car sent for Elliott failed to locate him, he decided to walk to that venue. But he too experienced considerable navigation problems and did not arrive at 8th Brigade HQ until 2.30 am, by which time the other commanders had received their orders and left. Major-General Hobbs then proceeded to issue his orders for 15th Brigade’s role in the attack for 2 September. Hobbs ordered Elliott to be ready to attack at 6.00 am in support of the 14th Brigade after a half an hour’s artillery bombardment. He was ordered to deploy his 58th Battalion to assist in the mopping up of Péronne with the 14th Brigade’s 54th Battalion, and further, that his 59th and 60th Battalions were to pass through the 14th Brigade and capture the last portion of high ground, seize Flamicourt, and move on to Le Mesnil. Elliott considered these orders impossible to execute. However, he realised that given the lateness of the hour, the fact that the other commanders had received their orders and had left and, finally, that there was also insufficient time to register any form of realistic protest, he must carry out those orders to the best of his ability. It would be 4.15 am on the 2nd before Elliott was able to issue his orders to his battalion commanders for an attack due to start in less than two hours.
In short, despite the fact that the 15th Brigade met with the same determined machine gun fire resistance as had the other brigades, by 10.00 am its 59th Battalion had pressed north of Péronne and, supported by its sister 60th Battalion, had eventually gained a line from the ramparts of the fringes of St Denis to the right of the 14th Brigade’s 55th and 56th Battalions. Concurrent with this advance, the linking 15th Brigade’s 58th Battalion was able to assist the 14th Brigade’s 54th Battalion to clear the northeastern ramparts of Péronne.
During the afternoon of the 2nd, patrols that crossed the St Denis–Mont St Quentin Road encountered severe machine gun fire from St Denis Wood. This forced a consolidation of the 5th Division line, which ran from the road to the south-eastern and eastern outskirts of Péronne.
Further fighting during 3–4 September 1918 saw attempts made to gain further ground east of Péronne and Mont St Quentin, and also to push the Canal du Nord line. On 3 September the 5th Division gained a part of Flamicourt and, after having completed its capture the following day, then moved further eastwards and seized Chair Wood. With the German threat to the key high-ground features of Mont St Quentin and the Bouchavesnes Spur now gone, the 2nd Division confined its fighting to a gradual movement forward along the Canal du Nord.
Throughout the fighting for Mont St Quentin and Péronne, the German artillery and machine gun fire, and his ever-present use of gas, constituted a never-ending and cruel lottery of life and death. Private William McLennan’s diary, 3rd September 1918:
. . . heard that our boys are held up beyond Peronne. Some of our guns may have to go up again. 9.30 pm Hun starts shelling our trench with HE & gas . . . have to don our respirators now & again as there is a good bit of Blue cross or sneezing gas about. Shelling continuous for about an hour. Some of us drift back to our dugouts or bivvys. Mick Kenelly, Alf Andrews & I stand talking for a few seconds; then Mick & I get into our bivvy leaving Alf on guard. About 2 seconds later a shell bursts right alongside. I get outside to see if anyone is hurt, Mick follows can’t see for smoke. Call out to the occupants of another bivvy a few ft along the trench. One of them answers saying, Alf is knocked. Mick & I grope our way around to where he is lying. Get him up & help him round to our bivvy. Another shell bursts close by blowing the 3 of us over. Get Alf into our bivvy. Mick tries to light a candle just succeeds, when another shell burst puts it out. Suddenly discover that the place is rotten with gas. Say to Mick, come on we will have to get out of this. Can’t wear our respirators, we have inhaled too much gas . . . We go about 50 yds; Alf is exhausted & lays down. We call out for a stretcher. 2 infantry SB’s come along immediately get Alf onto a stretcher & take him to a dressing station 100 yds further along the trench. He is attended to at once by the doctor. Bad stomach wound, a small piece of shell went right through him, entering on right side of stomach & coming out through the back. Alf seems to know that he is done for & asks Les Byrnes to write & tell his mother all about it. He is taken out as soon as possible. Dr says that there is absolutely no hope of him getting over it. Mick & I are pretty bad with gas. Nose, throat & lungs seem to be on fire.57
In a letter home to his parents in Adelaide, Lance-Corporal Len Clarkson described the impact of Mont St Quentin:
The whole business horrifies a chap with any feelings at all. Of course, out in Australia you never hear of OUR losses; do you remember reading of the capture of Mont St. Quentin by the Australians? The papers reported our losses as comparatively light, but I saw our dead lying in HEAPS on the German barbed wire entanglements and was employed on burial duties.58
In his Official History, Charles Bean lists the Australian Corps casualties between 31 August and 2 September as: 2nd Division 84 officers and 1286 other ranks; 3rd Division 43 and 554; and 5th Divisio
n 64 and 1066. Thus the total infantry casualties in the Corps amounted to some 191 officers and 2906 other ranks.59 Three points should be made. First, given previous Great War casualties and the tactical and strategic premium placed by the Germans on the Mont St Quentin and Péronne battlegrounds, those losses were ‘acceptable’ given their significance. Second, it might be argued that had Monash paused for any significant period of time before assaulting those objectives, the Corps may well have taken higher casualties. Third, it is of interest to note that the 14th Brigade sustained by far the heaviest casualties—44 and 797—grim evidence of its degree of difficulty in capturing Péronne, where close-quarter street fighting among narrow streets and numerous buildings always invites painstaking fighting and heavy casualties.
The battles fought between 31 August and 3 September 1918, when General Sir John Monash’s Australian Corps captured Péronne, St Denis, Mont St Quentin and Haut Allaines—and the British III Corps took the Bouchavesnes Spur and St Pierre Vaast Wood—constitute some of the most striking victories of the Great War. After the war, General Rawlinson’s Chief of Staff pointed out that the Australians had captured their objectives against picked German troops and had maintained those gains against fifteen enemy counter-attacks. Further, he pointed out that the enemy had deployed some nine divisions in his attempts to stem the Australian and III Corps advance.60
As with most battles through history, not all went according to plan and mistakes were made. From the onset of the Battle of Amiens through to the capture of Mont St Quentin and Péronne, the significance of the Fourth Army’s left or northern flank across the Somme was not given the emphasis that it deserved. In terms of the ground and the enemy’s employment of it, that flank warranted the best of commanders, infantry and support. It was allotted none of these. The two Dominion Corps had proved that in every respect they were at the peak of their fighting ability. Unfortunately, the British III Corps, as has previously been explained, was indifferently commanded and administered, and had not been battle-hardened.