The surrender of most of the castles made Rukn al-Din unnecessary to the Mongols; the resistance of Lamasar and Girdkuh showed that he was useless. Orders were sent to the Mongol officers in Qazvin to kill the Imam’s family and attendants; he himself, at his own request, went on the long journey to the Mongol capital at Karakorum, where the Khan refused to receive him. ‘There was no need to bring him on so long a journey,’ said the Khan, ‘for our laws are well-known.’ Let Rukn al-Din return, and see that the remaining castles were surrendered and dismantled; then he might be permitted to make obeisance. In fact he was not given the opportunity. On the edge of the Khangay range, on the way back to Persia, he was led away from the road, on the pretext of going to a feast, and was murdered. ‘He and his followers were kicked to a pulp and then put to the sword; and of him and his stock no trace was left, and he and his kindred became but a tale on men’s lips and a tradition in the world.’38
The extirpation of the Ismailis in Persia was not quite as thorough as Juvayni suggests. In the eyes of the sectaries, Rukn al-Din’s small son succeeded him as Imam on his death, and lived to sire a line of Imams from which, in due course, the Aga Khans emerged in the nineteenth century. For a while the Ismailis remained active, and in 1275 were even able briefly to recapture Alamut. Their cause was however lost, and from this time onwards they survived only as a minor sect in the Persian-speaking lands, scattered through eastern Persia, Afghanistan, and what is now Soviet Central Asia. In Rudbar they have disappeared entirely.
The destruction of Alamut, and the final humbling of Ismaili power, are vividly depicted by Juvayni. ‘In that breeding-ground of heresy in the Rudbar of Alamut the home of the wicked adherents of Hasan-i Sabbah . . . there remains not one stone of the foundations upon another. And in that flourishing abode of innovation the Artist of Eternity Past wrote with the pen of violence upon the portico of each one[’s dwelling] the verse: “These their empty houses are empty ruins” [Qur’an, xxvii, 53]. And in the market-place of those wretches’ kingdom the muezzin Destiny has uttered the cry of “Away then with the wicked people!” [Qur’an, xxiii, 43]. Their luckless womenfolk, like their empty religion, have been utterly destroyed. And the gold of those crazy, double-dealing counterfeiters which appeared to be unalloyed has proved to be base lead.
‘Today, thanks to the glorious fortune of the World-Illuminating King, if an assassin still lingers in a corner he plies a woman’s trade; wherever there is a da‘i there is an announcer of death; and every rafīq has become a thrall. The propagators of Ismailism have fallen victims to the swordsmen of Islam. . . . The kings of the Greeks and Franks, who turned pale for fear of these accursed ones, and paid them tribute, and were not ashamed of that ignominy, now enjoy sweet slumber. And all the inhabitants of the world, and in particular the Faithful, have been relieved of their evil machinations and unclean beliefs. Nay, the whole of mankind, high and low, noble and base, share in this rejoicing. And compared with these histories that of Rustam the son of Dastan has become but an ancient fable.’39
‘So was the world cleansed which had been polluted by their evil. Wayfarers now ply to and fro without fear or dread or the inconvenience of paying a toll and pray for the [continued] fortune of the happy King who uprooted their foundations and left no trace of any one of them. And in truth that act was the balm of Muslim wounds and the cure to the disorders of the Faith. Let those who shall come after this age and era know the extent of the mischief they wrought and the confusion they cast into the hearts of men. Such as were on terms of agreement with them, whether kings of former times or contemporary rulers, went in fear and trembling [for their lives] and [such as were] hostile to them were day and night in the straits of prison for dread of their scoundrelly minions. It was a cup that had been filled to overflowing; it seemed as a wind that had died. “This is a warning for those who reflect,” [Qur’an, vi, 116], and may God do likewise unto all tyrants!’40
5
The Old Man of the Mountain
While Hasan-i Sabbah was still ruling in the castle of Alamut, and the words and weapons of his emissaries were bringing his message to the people and princes of Iran, a few of his followers set out on a long and hazardous journey, through enemy country, to the West. Their destination was Syria; their purpose to take the New Preaching to the old Ismailis in that country, and to extend the war against the Seljuq power, which had recently enveloped all the lands from Asia Minor to the borders of Egypt.
The New Preaching had arisen in Iran, and its exponents had won their first great success in lands of Iranian speech and culture – in western and eastern Persia, and in Central Asia. For their first attempt at expansion to the West, Syria was an obvious choice, Iraq, immediately to the west of Persia, held few opportunities. No doubt there were Ismaili sympathizers in the Iraqi cities, but the flat river valleys offered little scope for the Ismaili strategy of penetration, entrenchment and attack. Syria, however, was a different matter. Between Taurus and Sinai, a broken landscape of mountains and valleys and deserts sheltered a population of great diversity, with strong local traditions of independence. Unlike the neighbouring river-valley societies of Iraq and Egypt, Syria had rarely known political unity. The pattern was one of fragmentation – of sectarian and regional particularism, and of recurring conflict and change. Though their common speech was Arabic, the Syrians were divided into many faiths and sects, including several with extremist Shi‘ite beliefs. The first Shi‘ite pretender had appeared in Syria in the eighth century; by the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century the hidden Imams of the Ismailis could count on sufficient local support to make Syria the seat of their secret headquarters and the scene of their first bid for power. The establishment of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, and its expansion into Asia, brought Syria under intermittent Ismaili rule in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, and opened the country to Ismaili propaganda and instruction.
Besides the overt Ismailis, there were other sects near enough to Ismailism in doctrine and outlook to make them a promising recruiting ground for the emissaries from Alamut. Such for example were the Druzes of Mount Lebanon and the adjoining areas, a dissident Ismaili sect which had only recently broken away from the main body, and had not yet fallen into the ossified exclusiveness of later times. Another group of potential supporters was the Nusayris, also called Alawis, Twelver Shi‘ite in origin, but much affected by extremist ideas. These were established in the hill country east and north-east of Lattakia, and perhaps also, at that date, in Tiberias and the Jordan valley.
The time, as well as the place, was propitious. The first Turcoman bands are reported to have entered Syria in 1064. During the seventies of the eleventh century first Turkish freebooters, and then regular Seljuq armies invaded the country, and soon the whole of Syria, apart from a coastal strip retained by the Fatimids, was under Seljuq rule or suzerainty. The overlord was Tutush, the brother of the Great Sultan Malikshah.
In 1095 Tutush was killed in battle in Persia in the course of a fraternal struggle for the supreme Sultanate. The Syrian pattern of regional fragmentation and the Seljuq tradition of dynastic dispute combined to shatter his kingdom in pieces. Syria was again split into small states, now ruled by Seljuq princes and officers; the most important were Tutush’s sons Ridwan and Duqaq, who held the rival cities of Aleppo and Damascus.
It was at this moment of disarray and mounting conflict that a new force entered the country – the Crusaders. Coming through Antioch in the North, they advanced swiftly down the Syrian coast, where there was no power capable of resisting them, and established four Latin states based on Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem.
The extension of Seljuq power to Syria brought with it many of the problems of social change and tension already familiar in the East. The shock of Latin invasion and conquest can only have added to the distress and discouragement of the Syrians, and made them more ready to welcome the bearers of a message of messianic hope – especially those whose existing beli
efs prepared them for the acceptance of such a message. The Fatimids of Cairo still had followers in Syria, who held to the Old Preaching of Ismailism – but the ignominious weakness of the Cairo regime, and its failure to resist either the Turkish or the Latin menace, must have led many to transfer their allegiance to the more active, more militant and, so it seemed, more successful branch. Some of the Shi‘ites and most of the Sunnis seem to have remained faithful to their old loyalties; but there were many who rallied to the new force, which alone seemed to offer an effective challenge to the invaders and rulers of the country.
From the start, the agents of Alamut in Syria tried to use the same methods and achieve the same results as their comrades in Persia. Their aim was to seize or otherwise acquire fortresses, for use as bases in a campaign of terror. To this end, they tried to invoke and direct the zeal of the faithful, especially in mountain areas; at the same time, they did not disdain the discreet cooperation of princes, where a limited and temporary alliance seemed expedient to both sides.
Despite such help, and despite occasional successes, the Ismailis found their task in Syria much harder than it had been in Persia – perhaps in part because they were Persians, working in an alien surrounding. Almost half a century of determined effort was needed before they were able to attain their first objective, and consolidate a group of strongholds in central Syria, in the mountain area known then as the Jabal Bahra’, and today as the Jabal Ansariyya. Their leaders, as far as they are known, were all Persians, sent from Alamut and acting under the orders of Hasan-i Sabbah and his successors. Their struggle to establish themselves falls into three main phases. During the first two phases, ending in 1113 and 1130, they operated successively from Aleppo and Damascus, with the connivance of the rulers of those cities, and tried to establish themselves in adjoining areas. Both ended in failure and disaster. During the third, which began in 1131, they were at last able to gain and fortify the bases which they needed.
The history of the Syrian Ismailis, as recorded by the Syrian historians, is chiefly the history of the assassinations which they perpetrated. The story begins on 1 May 1103, with the sensational murder of Janah al-Dawla, the ruler of Horns, in the cathedral mosque of the city during the Friday prayer. His assailants were Persians, disguised as Sufis, and they fell upon him on a signal from a shaykh who accompanied them. In the melee several of Janah al-Dawla’s officers were killed; so too were the murderers. Significantly, most of the Turks in Horns fled to Damascus.
Janah al-Dawla was an enemy of Ridwan, the Seljuq ruler of Aleppo, and most of the chroniclers agree that Ridwan was implicated in the murder. Some gave further details. The leader of the Hashishiyya or Assassins, to use the name by which they were called in Syria, was a personage known as al-Hakim al-Munajjim, ‘the physician-astrologer’. He and his friends had come from Persia and settled in Aleppo, where Ridwan had allowed them to practice and propagate their religion, and to use the city as a base for further activities. Aleppo had obvious advantages for the Assassins. The city had an important Twelver Shi‘ite population, and was conveniently near the extremist Shi‘a areas in the Jabal al-Summaq and the Jabal Bahra’. For Ridwan, a man of notoriously lax religious loyalties, the Assassins offered the possibility of mobilizing new elements of support, and compensating for his military weakness among his rivals in Syria.
The ‘physician-astrologer’ survived Janah al-Dawla only by two or three weeks, and was then succeeded as leader of the Assassins by another Persian, Abu Tahir al-Sa’igh, the goldsmith. Abu Tahir retained the favour of Ridwan and the freedom of Aleppo, and now made a séries of attempts to seize strategic points in the mountains south of the city. He seems to have been able to call on local assistance, and may even have held some localities, though only for a short time.
The first documented attack was made in 1106, against Afamiya. Its ruler, Khalaf ibn Mula‘ib, was a Shi‘ite, probably an Ismaili – but of the Cairo, not the Alamut allegiance. In 1096 he had seized Afamiya from Ridwan, and demonstrated the suitability of the place by using it as a base for successful and wide-ranging brigandage. The Assassins decided that Afamiya would meet their needs very well, and Abu Tahir devised a plan to kill Khalaf and seize his citadel. Some of the inhabitants of Afamiya were local Ismailis, and through their leader Abu’l-Fath, a judge from near-by Sarmin, were privy to the plot. A group of six Assassins came from Aleppo to carry out the attack. ‘They got hold of a Frankish horse, mule and accoutrements, with a shield and armour, and came with them . . • from Aleppo to Afamiya, and said to Khalaf . . .“We have come here to enter your service. We found a Frankish knight and killed him, and we have brought you his horse and mule and accoutrements,’ Khalaf gave them an honourable welcome, and installed them in the citadel of Afamiya, in a house adjoining the wall. They bored a hole through the wall and made a tryst with the Afamians . . . who came in through the hole. And they killed Khalaf and seized the citadel of Afamiya.’1 This was on 3 February 1106. Soon after, Abu Tahir himself arrived from Aleppo to take charge.
The attack on Afamiya, despite its promising start, did not succeed. Tancred, the crusading prince of Antioch, was in the neighbourhood, and took the opportunity to attack Afamiya. He seems to have been well informed of the situation, and brought with him, as a prisoner, a brother of Abu’l-Fath of Sarmin. At first he was content to levy tribute from the Assassins and leave them in possession, but in September of the same year he returned and blockaded the town into surrender. Abu’l-Fath of Sarmin was captured and put to death by torture; Abu Tahir and his companions were taken prisoner, and allowed to ransom themselves and return to Aleppo.
This first encounter of the Assassins with the Crusaders, and the frustration of their carefully laid plan by a crusading prince, does not seem to have led to any diversion of Assassin attention from Muslim to Christian objectives. Their main struggle was still against the masters, not the enemies of Islam. Their immediate aim was to seize a base, from whatever owners; their larger purpose was to strike at the Seljuq power, wherever it might appear.
In 1113 they achieved their most ambitious coup to date – the murder in Damascus of Mawdud, the Seljuq emir of Mosul, commander of an eastern expeditionary force that had come to Syria ostensibly to help the Syrian Muslims in their fight against the Crusaders. To the Assassins, such an expedition represented an obvious danger. They were not alone in their fears. In 1111, when Mawdud and his army reached Aleppo, Ridwan had closed the gates of the city against them, and the Assassins had rallied to his support. Contemporary gossip, as recorded by both Christian and Muslim sources, suggests that the murder of Mawdud was encouraged by the Muslim regent of Damascus.
The danger to the Assassins of eastern Seljuq influence became clear after the death of their patron Ridwan on 10 December 1113. Assassin activities in Aleppo had made them increasingly unpopular with the townspeople, and in 1111 an unsuccessful attempt on the life of a Persian from the East, a man of wealth and an avowed anti-Ismaili, had led to a popular outburst against them. After Ridwan’s death, his son Alp Arslan at first followed his father’s policy, and even ceded them a castle on the road to Baghdad. But a reaction soon came. A letter from the Seljuq Great Sultan Muhammad to Alp Arslan warned him against the Ismaili menace and urged him to destroy them. In the city, Ibn Badi’, the leader of the townsfolk and commander of the militia, took the initiative, and persuaded the ruler to sanction strong measures. ‘He arrested Abu Tahir the goldsmith and killed him, and he killed Isma‘il the da‘i, and the brother of the physician-astrologer, and the leaders of this sect in Aleppo. He arrested about 200 of them, and imprisoned some of them and confiscated their property. Some were interceded for, some released, some thrown from the top of the citadel, some killed. Some of them escaped, and scattered throughout the land.’2
Despite this setback, and their failure to secure a permanent castle-stronghold so far, the Persian Ismaili mission had not done too badly during the tenure of office of Abu Tahir. They had made contacts with lo
cal sympathizers, winning to the Assassin allegiance Ismailis of other branches and extremist Shi‘ites of the various local Syrian sects. They could count on important local support in the Jabal al-Summaq, the Jazr, and the Banu Ulaym country – that is, in the strategically significant territory between Shayzar and Sarmin. They had formed nuclei of support in other places in Syria, and especially along their line of communication eastwards to Alamut. The Euphrates districts east of Aleppo were known as centres of extremist Shi‘ism in both earlier and later periods, and although there is no direct evidence for these years, one may be certain that Abu Tahir did not neglect his opportunities. It is remarkable that as early as the spring of 1114 a force of about a hundred Ismailis from Afamiya, Sarmin and other places was able to seize the Muslim stronghold of Shayzar by a surprise attack, while its lord and his henchmen were away, watching the Easter festivities of the Christians. The attackers were defeated and destroyed by a counter-attack immediately after.
The Assassins: A Redical Sect in Islam Page 12