Marengo

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Marengo Page 18

by T E Crowdy


  Looking ahead from the Fontanone, one would see the high, red brick walls of the farm at Marengo about 300 metres away, with a brick tower rising up behind it. The road into the hamlet of Marengo was on the other side of the farm, turning left from the main road. In 1800, the hamlet consisted of half a dozen buildings, in the middle of which was a tall brick tower said to have been built by Theodoric, King of the Goths. In 1800, the tower is believed to have housed silk worms. The farm was surrounded by high walls with an internal yard and numerous barns and buildings. It belonged to the hospital of Alessandria and was used to generate revenue for the poor.

  At the time of the battle, the hamlet’s inn consisted of two floors, each of which had three small rooms. The first accommodated the innkeeper and his family. The ground floor consisted of a kitchen with cooking stoves and spits; this led into a communal dining room, followed by a final room which was reserved for travellers of distinction measuring about 3.5 by 5m. The ground floor windows were protected by rusting iron bars. At the front of the inn was a small garden, in the middle of which was a well. Near to the well was a granite bench. A small branch of the Fontanone brook came into the garden. Adjacent to the inn was a long stable covered with a roof of red tiles. On the northern side, illustrations show there were great open sheds. The hamlet was more or less surrounded with ditches and gullies which emptied into the Fontanone and helped to make the village something of a citadel. The land around the farm was uneven, partly wooded and cut with ditches. These ditches were necessary because the ground around Marengo is the drainage site for all the surrounding fields. The water table is very low, perhaps not much more than a metre below the surface.

  The ground between Marengo and the farmhouse of Barbotta a kilometre away appears flat today, with large open fields. Tenement maps from the eighteenth century show the land either side of the road parcelled into small allotments, so the ground would have actually been much more broken up at the time of the battle. There is also a large pond behind Marengo which has long since vanished. Two kilometres further, the Barbotta road reached Castelceriolo. This was a larger village with the castle of Ghilini on its western side. Dating from the twelfth century, this castle was a brick-built, fortified manorial home of the Ghilinis, a local noble family. Castelceriolo was as much a key possession as Marengo, because from there one could head east towards San Giuliano Nuovo or northwards towards the village of Sale.

  Returning to the main road, just beyond Marengo were a series of junctions. The first was on the right, heading southwards towards Frugarolo some 6.5km distant. A few hundred metres more and one came to an important crossroads. The Alessandria‑Sale road headed north-eastwards for 3km to Castelceriolo. To the south was the village of Spinetta and its church of the Birth of Holy Mary. This route was known as the ‘new road’ and passed in a south-easterly direction for 1.8km to the village of Longo Fame. From here, the traveller could turn eastwards and walk all the way to Tortona approximately 15km away. The road heading eastwards from the crossroads was known as the ‘old road’. This road by-passed Spinetta and joined the main road after 4km, just to the west of the town of Cascina Grossa. The junction of the old and new roads has now been more or less obliterated by the construction of the railway in the nineteenth century.

  The plain also appears reasonably flat today, but there is a noticeable rise and fall towards the centre of the plain. At the western junction of the old and new roads, the ground is approximately 95m above sea level. However, from the junction of the old and new roads it began to rise gently, reaching a high point of 105m above sea level at the Rana farm, 2km behind Marengo. This rise stretched from the old road southwards to the new road, at Pistona. On this westward-facing slope of this small hill was a belt of vineyards starting at the farm of Fournace, extending down past the old road, past Spinetta and over the new road to Lunga Fame. This belt of vineyards was approximately a kilometre wide. Between the vineyards would have been fields of wheat and other agricultural produce. Wheat in those days could be grown to a height of 6ft. Thus, although the terrain east of Marengo might now appear reasonably flat, in 1800 an officer on horseback at Marengo studying the field through a telescope would have been unable to perceive anything beyond 2km ahead of him. This ridge of high ground running northward from the main road towards the Rana and Fournace farms is almost imperceptible today, because a modern main road has been driven through it and an industrial estate placed squarely on the high ground. In 1800, the mulberries, vines and the rise in the ground would have created a defile, or bottleneck, for an army to negotiate.

  On the reverse of this slope were a number of farm buildings to the north of the old road, including Li Poggi, Buzana and Guasca. To the south, between the old and new roads, was the farm of Valle, with Pistona below that. Although the French 1810 map does not show the farmhouses at Pistona, Captain Pittaluga’s 1896 study does, and in the battle of 1799, there are Austrian references to the small rise at Pistona.5

  East of this line of farmsteads was an open space approximately 3km long and 2km deep, with a gentle gradient falling eastwards. The old and new roads intersected at a point between the Ventolina farm to the north and Cascina Grossa to the south. The latter was a village clustered around the church of San Rocco. It was connected to the main road by a long, straight, tree-lined road 700m in length. On the east side of this road was a small field about 100m wide, after which came a great belt of vineyards which rose from behind Cascina Grossa, up between the farms of Ventolina and Piccinina, then beyond Villanova.

  Continuing eastwards from the tree-lined road at Cascina Grossa one arrived at the village of San Giuliano after 3km. Halfway to San Giuliano there was a clearing in the vines, approximately 1.5km wide and extending 800m north and south of the road. There were more vines beyond San Giuliano, and the road continued for 3.5km to the enormous farm complex of Torre Garofoli. In the same way that Marengo guards the entrance to the western half of the plain, Garofoli dominates the eastern side. The farm is approximately 150m in length and consists of numerous buildings, barns and granaries grouped around two large courtyards, with a large gatehouse at its eastern end. In places it is three stories high, and a tower on the north side of the complex affords excellent views back towards San Giuliano and the plain to the north. Stutterheim says there was a mill stream on the eastern side of Torre Garofoli, and that beyond this point the ground became broken up and was difficult for manoeuvre, much the same as the countryside between the Bormida and the Fontanone.

  Three kilometres along the main road from Garofoli, one reaches the eastern extent of the plain. The Scrivia appears as something of a wide scar running north‑south through the landscape. Ordinarily the river is quite shallow. At certain times of the year, in some places one might simply walk across it. However, after heavy rain in the mountains beyond Novi and Serravalle, the Scrivia quickly floods and forms a torrent, the waters flowing with unstoppable force. The river then presents somewhat more of an obstacle. The safest crossing points were on the main road, due east of Garofoli and to the north of the road from Sale opposite San Giuliano Vecchio. A kilometre further and one reaches the city of Tortona, dominated by a fortress on the heights overlooking the town.

  It was over this plain on 12 June that columns of white-clad soldiers marched steadily westwards, finally fulfilling the order to concentrate the Austrian army at Alessandria. That bloody episode had cost Ott the loss of 4,275 men, including six staff and ninety-eight line officers, killed, wounded and captured. Had Ott left Genoa earlier, perhaps he could have saved Piacenza, or maybe he would have been cut off altogether. It is difficult to guess the outcome of historical ‘maybes’.

  Elsewhere that day, more problems were arising. The outpost commander at Acqui, Rittmeister Civrani of the 1st Kaiser Dragoons, had become apprehensive of his position. He only had a small force of forty-five troopers and had heard reports that General Suchet would soon be upon him, following up on the retreat of Elsnitz. He sent out some patrol
s, and when they returned he wrote about his misgivings to the commander of the Alessandria garrison, GM Skal:

  ‘The enemy still has his position at Dego; yesterday evening they sent a patrol to Spigno, where provisions were requisitioned. Yesterday, the enemy also sent a patrol to Squaneto in the valley towards Cartosio; where some head of cattle were taken from a peasant; after that, the patrols returned to their positions again. My bugler came back, together with the corporal and put the enemy strength at 700 men. The local Piedmontese troops have established a picket at my request towards Cartosio, where my left flank can be better guarded, because I cannot occupy all the mountains with my cavalry and could easily be outflanked from that side.’6

  This letter might not appear alarmist in tone, but Dego was only a day’s march from Acqui, itself just a day’s march from Alessandria. Did this mean Suchet was only two days away, with nothing but forty-five dragoons and some Piedmontese to protect the route to Alessandria? It was yet another eventuality for Zach to consider – the Army of the Reserve, reinforced by the Army of the Rhine, and the Army of Italy were about to converge on Alessandria any time from 14 June. The moment of decision was near.

  Chapter 9

  ‘This time we have this Bonaparte’

  On the morning of Friday 13 June, Melas contemplated the events to come. His men had achieved great things under his command, but on the eve of the great decisive battle, he had misgivings. The shock of seeing Elsnitz’s command so poorly handled, and the negative effect of the battle at Casteggio, had dented his troops’ confidence. Melas also knew he was up against Bonaparte, a young man of considerable talents and energy; a new sort of general – a grand risk-taker. Behind him, advancing swiftly, were the forces under Suchet – the reinvigorated Army of Italy - and no doubt Massena was not far from rejoining them. Caught between two armies, cut off from home, low on supplies: how had this come to be?

  Sat in his headquarters, Melas drafted several letters, almost as if he wanted to perform some sort of confessional act. At the very least it was an attempt to limit the damage. The first letter was addressed to Thugut, Zach’s cherished sponsor and the key exponent of war against the French. Ultimately, the letter was never posted - it was too pessimistic, even by Melas’ standards – but it perhaps serves as a window on the mind of the Austrian commander that day:

  ‘Because of the two enemy armies, which are far superior in the number of troops, the army which has landed up here, greatly reduced by the Riviera expedition, finds itself extremely limited.

  ‘Courage and determination, the former comrades to our successful advance, will now also be companion of our fierce attack, in order at least to reopen the lost communications with the hereditary lands.

  ‘Should in spite of this, the superiority of the two enemy armies bring it the defeat of an army so reduced only by constant hard-fought battles, then I ask that its worth not then be undervalued, if stripped of any expectation of help and only sure of six days’ provisions, this army then will be bound to be rendered the unfortunate victim of the stronger force.’1

  A second letter was drafted, this time to the president of the Hofkriegsrat, Tige. Melas admitted this message would probably be captured, and therefore gave away very little operational detail. After mentioning a ‘decisive action’ was about to take place, he wrote:

  ‘Should luck mark this step with success, then I hope to advance along the right bank of the Po and to recover the line of communication to the Hereditary Lands.

  ‘Should however the close proximity of the two enemy armies shatter the persistent courage and steadiness of the troops under my command and thereby tip the scales to an unexpected outcome of the battle, then the complete defeat of the army is all the more certainly the sad fate, when only six days’ of supplies secures them from complete destruction.

  ‘I must endeavour to bring this to higher attention most quickly, so that even the defeat of the army can be viewed only as a consequence of the far superior forces of the enemy.’2

  Zach was apparently in an equally fatalistic mood. He called together the staff officers for their instructions. Stutterheim was present and remembered how Zach spoke to them like ‘a priest, who was preparing the convict for his imminent death’. Zach also detached the 2nd Erzherzog Josef Hussar Regiment to Casale, just in case the French attempted to force a crossing there. This just lost the army 1,097 men, along with those already committed to Asti and Acqui.

  However, Zach’s unhappy spirit began to lift by the early afternoon. Carlo Gioelli returned to Austrian headquarters and confirmed he had delivered the deception to Bonaparte. Gioelli also gave Zach an update on the French movements. The main thrust of their advance appeared to be towards Sale, while only Gardanne had been directed to San Giuliano in the middle of the plain. The key piece of information was that Bonaparte had detached some of his army towards Novi in order to intercept Hohenzollern’s fictitious march from Genoa. So that was it; Bonaparte had fallen for Zach’s ruse. He had sent away part of his force to Novi on a fool’s errand. Zach erupted in joy. He was heard excitedly shouting at the top of his voice: ‘This time we have this Bonaparte!’3

  Digesting Gioelli’s intelligence, Zach sat down to write the final battle orders for the following day. Such was Gioelli’s importance to Zach, he even referenced the intelligence provided by ‘the spy’ in this document:

  ‘The main column, where I will position myself, will be assembled in the following way:

  ‘Advanced Guard:

  ‘From the General Staff: Hauptmann Quosdanovich, Oberleutnant Wittgens, Oberleutnant Bechini, Oberleutnant Richard.

  ‘Oberst Frimont of the Bussy-Jäger zu Pferde:

  3rd Bach Light Battalion 1 battalion

  4th Am Ende Light Battalion 1 battalion

  1st Kaiser-Dragoons 2 squadrons

  Bussy-Jäger zu Pferde 2 squadrons

  Cavalry artillery 1 battery

  Pioneers: 1 company

  ‘Main Column:

  ‘From the General Staff: Oberstleutnant Piking, Major Volkmann, Major Neipperg, Major Mecsery, Hauptmann Martini, Hauptmann Fürstenberg, Hauptmann Troyer, Hauptmann Hirsch, Kapitänlieutenant Neugebauer, Oberleutnant Postel, Oberleutnant Meninger.

  FML Hadik

  GM Pilatti:

  1st Kaiser-Dragoons 4 squadrons

  4th Karaczay Dragoons 6 squadrons

  GM Frederich Bellegarde:

  IR 53 Jellacic 2 battalions

  IR 52 Erzherzog Anton 2 battalions

  GM Saint Julien:

  IR 11 Michael Wallis 3 battalions

  Brigade GM de Briey:

  IR 47 Franz Kinsky 2⅓ battalions

  FML Kaim:

  GM Knesevich

  IR 23 Grossherzog Toscana 3 battalions

  GM Lamarseille

  IR 63 Erzherzog Joseph 3 battalions

  FML Morzin:

  GM Lattermann:

  Grenadiers 5 battalions

  GM Weidenfeld:

  Grenadiers 6 battalions

  At this point are all the unallocated pioneer companies.

  FML Elsnitz:

  GM Nobili:

  3rd Erzherzog Johann Dragoons 6 squadrons

  9th Lichtenstein Dragoons 6 squadrons

  GM Nimbsch:

  7th Hussars 8 squadrons

  9th Erdödy Hussars 6 squadrons

  The Artillery Reserve

  ‘The second, or left column: consists of the force under FML Ott and will be assembled in the following way:

  ‘From the General-Staff: Major Stutterheim, Hauptmann Habermann, Hauptmann Reinisch, Hauptmann Babel, Oberleutenant Crossard, Oberleutenant Esbeck, Oberleutenant Nageldinger, Oberleutenant Gatterburg.

  ‘Advanced-Guard:

  GM Gottesheim

  10th Lobkowitz-Dragoons 2 squadrons

  IR 28 Fröhlich 1 battalion

  Cavalry artillery 1 battery

  ‘The Column:

  FML Schellenberg

  GM Retz:

&nb
sp; Two twelve pounder cannons together with an ammunition wagon

  Pioneers 1 company

  IR 28 Fröhlich 2 battalions

  IR 40 Mittrowsky 3 battalions

  GM Sticker:

  10th Lobkowitz-Dragons 4 Squadrons

  IR 51 Splényi 2 Battalions

  IR 57 J. Colloredo 3 Battalions

  FML Vogelsang

  GM Ulm:

  IR 18 Stuart 3 Battalions

  IR 17 Hohenlohe 2 Battalions

  Then the necessary artillery reserve

  ‘This column will pass over the lower, local boat bridge over the Bormida and take their line of march along the shortest road to Sale.

  ‘The third, or right column: ‘consists of the following troops:

  ‘From the General-Staff: Major De Brez (Piedmontese), Major Nugent, Hauptmann Odelga, Hauptmann Voith, Hauptmann Bittner, Oberleutnant Häring, Oberleutnant Erben.

  FML O’Reilly

  GM Rousseau:

  8th Nauendorf-Hussars 3½ squadrons

  5th Hussars 2 squadrons

  Cavalry artillery 1 battery

  4th Banater Grenzer 1 battalion

  1st Warasdin-Kreuz Grenzer 1 battalion

  3rd Ogiliner Grenz Regiment 1 battalion

  3rd Ottocac Grenz Regiment 1 battalion

  8th Würtemberg Dragoons 1 squadron

  ‘This column will pass over the upper pontoon bridge over the Bormida and take their line of march through Frugarolo and Bosco towards Novi.

  ‘The attack being undertaken is based on the following reports:

  ‘1) That the enemy main column, between 12 and 15,000 men strong, has moved forward to the Tanaro and is advancing along it;

 

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