by T E Crowdy
‘The Fontanone ditch was reached. Its considerable depth and swampy state did not check our battalion. Fired by the example of their superiors, they respected no danger, and rushed from the high banks into the ditch.’9
At this point, the brook was at its shallowest, probably waist-deep in water; but the mud and the intense volume of fire stopped the regiment in its tracks. Trying to urge his men across the ditch, the commander of the Oberst Battalion, Major Lalance, fell seriously wounded from his horse and was taken captive. The next senior officer, Captain Emerich Marx, took command of the battalion and tried to rally his men. Further up the line, IR 47 Franz Kinsky also reached the banks of the Fontanone under heavy fire. Their regimental history records:
‘At the head of their unit, Colonel Vermatti, and all the officers of the staff, boldly made their way towards the enemy’s fire, and they repeatedly attempted to attack: the brave colonel, as well as the Lieutenant-Colonel Kövesdy, were wounded with many officers and a large number of men in the murderous struggle close to the brook.’10
In the face of the French musketry, Hadik realized his attack had lost impetus and cohesion. His men were being gunned down relentlessly for no gain. The Austrian accounts use words like ‘disastrous hail of bullets’, ‘terrible fire’ and ‘violent fire’; Stutterheim described the attack as ‘one of the bloodiest ones which one saw in this war’. Hadik felt there was no choice but to order the withdrawal and regroup. No sooner had Hadik given the order to withdraw when he was struck in the ankle by a cannonball. With his leg shattered, he had to be carried from the field. As his line withdrew, FML Kaim advanced his line to provide cover. It was now approximately 10.00 am.
The full importance of O’Reilly giving up Marengo the evening before was now realized. The French were clearly in larger numbers than expected; and the first line of the main column had been shattered by enemy fire before it had even reached the starting point of its advance on San Giuliano. Did it not occur to Zach the French might have moved from their position at Sale? Clearly not. When he later discussed the opening hour of the battle with Faverges, he set out the reasons for failure in that first hour as follows:
‘Although the enemy, from the first hour, was everywhere driven in, the attack was only weakly pursued … The miserable ditch which separated us, almost dry usually, flowed this day with seven or eight feet of water, thanks to a clumsy bleeder ditch made in the Bormida.’
Nowhere in this account does Zach take any responsibility for ensuring Marengo had been properly defended the day before, nor for the fact he had not scouted out the terrain the day before the battle and had not identified the hazard presented by the Fontanone, should Marengo have fallen into enemy hands. He clearly knew about the ditch, and unless he was completely locked away in his bureau all day, he presumably knew it had been raining very heavily the day before and the waterways were swollen. As Neipperg declares:
‘It was impossible for our general staff not to know the ground and the ditch which cut it, the plans of the whole country having been drawn, and the army having been manoeuvring there continually for nearly a year.’
Added to the problem of having only a single exit from the bridgehead, the Austrian chief of staff had already made critical errors.
As if this was not enough, at 9.00 am, Rittmeister Civrani arrived from Acqui and told Melas his outpost had been attacked by Suchet that very morning. Although he had in fact only been probed by a small force of French dragoons, Civrani imagined he had come under infantry attack (probably some of the dragoons had dismounted and used their muskets to skirmish with the Austrian outposts). In the face of this perceived onslaught, Civrani had fled to Alessandria convinced that Suchet’s main force was about to arrive. When Melas heard this, it played up to his fears of being encircled by the French. The Austrian commander was in no mood to take chances, so he ordered GM Nimbsch to recross the Bormida with his entire cavalry brigade and a battery of artillery, then to take up a new position at Canteloupo and watch developments. Thus, 2,341 hussars were removed from the battlefield, and had to file back through the bridgehead, thus delaying the crossing of Ott’s column.
We must now review the first phase of battle from the French perspective. Victor had placed his headquarters at the presbytery of Spinetta the evening before, but he had gone out in the night to attempt to discover what the Austrians were planning to do. The night was clear and peaceful. The slightest noise could be heard, and so, around 1.00 am, Victor heard the unmistakable sound of the enemy army stirring and preparing to give battle. Victor ordered his men to stand to. Back towards Spinetta, Grenadier Coignet was with the 96th Half-Brigade. When Victor’s order to stand to arms was received, he remembered the effect it made on him:
‘One cannot form an idea of the effect which the sound of drums at this early hour produced upon us. It was a thrill like the one the soldier feels at the first cannon shot. Everyone rushed upon the stacks of arms. It seemed as if the enemy was within a stone’s throw of us. One did not believe that one was safe except with a musket in his hand, and in the ranks of his companions. The lines were formed throughout the plain; it was a general make ready. In my life I will not forget that moment. I was still a young soldier, and I was only half seasoned. Besides, I do not pretend to maintain that the first moments of a battle have always left me indifferent and calm; I claim, on the contrary, that the bravest soldier feels, on this solemn occasion, an emotion close to fear.’
As twilight gave way to dawn, Victor recalled that ‘one of the most radiant Italian suns illuminated the scene’. Looking over towards Alessandria, Victor could see Melas’ army before him:
‘We perceived then all the Austrian army under arms: a third was ranged up between Bormida and Alessandria; two other thirds were held at the back of this place. To the eye it appeared to be 25,000 infantry and from 6 to 7,000 cavalry; its artillery was great.’
Victor fully expected this great host to put itself in motion and attack him, but nearly four hours passed before the advance began. This prolonged inactivity was a cause of surprise to the French soldiers watching. When the attack came, it was Gardanne’s advanced guard which bore the brunt of it. This ‘division’ (really no more than a weak brigade) had formed a line perpendicular to the main road, level with the farmhouse of Pederbona. According to Dupont, Gardanne was called ‘Grenadier’ by the First Consul, on account of his size and courage.11 His after-action report has a certain laconic style to it:
‘The advanced guard was attacked on the 14th, at nine o’clock in the morning, by the first line of the enemy army, about 15,000 strong, advancing in good order, under the protection of a numerous artillery. I have nothing to add to what General Victor ought to have said about the manner in which the vanguard disputed the ground step-by-step with such a superior enemy.’
Prior to the Austrian attack, Adjutant General Achille Dampierre had placed his small detachment in front of the farmhouse of Stortigliona, 900 metres to the south-west of Gardanne’s position at Pederbona. Already weak, this detachment had been further reduced by the ‘desertion’ of around 100 men from the 101st Half-Brigade, who decided to return to their parent unit. This left Dampierre with less than 300 men from the 44th, one cannon (with no ammunition) and a platoon of light infantry chasseurs. Dampierre watched the Austrian attack begin at 9.00 am and said the firing was along all the line half an hour later. He placed half his men in a sort of entrenchment near the farmhouse, with the other half in a series of gullies on the right. These gullies allowed the men to be hidden up to head height. Dampierre was more conspicuous, sat on his horse between the two groups. It was not long before the Austrian deployment brought imperial troops within musket range of Dampierre’s men. They fired into the flank of the Austrians and saw men falling in the ranks after every discharge. Although the Austrians were more preoccupied with attacking Gardanne, Dampierre’s detachment did not go unnoticed, and he was about to experience a very long day.12
The real mastermind
of the defence of Marengo was Victor. Some of the commentators on the Austrian side criticized the French for not attempting to dispute their exit from the bridgehead. However, this would have brought Victor’s troops within range of the fourteen guns in the earthwork, and of artillery fire from guns located on the opposite bank of the Bormida, just as had occurred the previous evening. Victor had something far more subtle in mind, and more deadly. He had fought on this ground a year before, and where Zach had neglected to properly inform himself of the ground, Victor was alive to all the possible advantages the terrain provided. In his memoirs, he described the importance of the position, with Marengo and the Fontanone forming a ‘very sharp angle in the plain’ and affording good communications and outlets onto the plain. If the line of the Fontanone could be held, with the strongpoint of Marengo being the central point of defence, then Victor hoped to hold the Austrian advance long enough for support to arrive from the divisions stacked up on the main road to Tortona behind him. In fact, given the Austrians’ superiority in cavalry, keeping the imperial troops bottled up to the west of Marengo was Victor’s only hope of salvation. If he had retreated, he would have surrendered the road network and faced the risk of being encircled.
At the moment the Austrians began to advance out of the bridgehead at 8.00 am, Victor sent Captain Deblou to warn the First Consul that ‘a decisive battle was to take place’. He sent his artillery in front of Gardanne and instructed Gardanne to take the ‘first shock’ of the enemy in his current position. At the same time, he placed the 8th Dragoons to the left of Marengo and supported this regiment with Brigadier General Kellermann’s brigade of heavy cavalry when it arrived at 9.00 am. Chambarlhac was instructed to line his division in reserve so its right was at Marengo, its centre in front of Spinetta and its left at the Fontanone.
Victor watched as the Austrians advanced without any skirmishers, instead being preceded by artillery, all of which advanced with a firm and rapid step. It was as if the Austrians would simply overwhelm Gardanne with a combination of artillery fire and their huge superiority in numbers. However, Victor was too canny a general to allow this to happen. Before the Austrians could make contact, he instructed Gardanne to withdraw by echelons, refusing his right flank so that he would come to stop with his right at Marengo, forming a line oblique to the Austrian column and taking it in the flank.13 This meant the right-hand battalion of Gardanne’s line withdrew first, then, once it had retired 100 paces, the next battalion on the right would fall back. At the same time, each battalion would have to pivot to form the new line. To execute such a manoeuvre under fire, while pressed by a superior enemy, shows the French Army of 1800 was perhaps much more tactically sophisticated than usually supposed.
We also know from Rivaud’s report that Gardanne’s troops executed controlled volleys when firing at the approaching Austrians. It is often said the French Army of the 1790s was incapable of anything but a feu de billebaude – an undisciplined voluntary fire. However, Rivaud described textbook battalion and platoon firing systems being employed at this stage of the battle. In the first, each battalion would fire a massive single volley in turn. In the second species of firing, each platoon within the battalion would fire in turn, alternating between odd numbered platoons, and then the even numbered ones. This would create a ‘rolling fire’ along the front of each battalion. It meant the enemy line would receive a constant rain of hits while advancing. Even if we concede that muskets were inaccurate at the best of times, and soldiers delivering the volleys would have barely had the chance to aim, Gardanne’s fire must still have delivered a stinging effect.
While Gardanne executed his withdrawal, Brigadier General Olivier Rivaud prepared to defend Marengo. Victor had instructed Rivaud to place his brigade under arms with the right at Marengo, the centre opposite Spinetta and the left approaching a stream known as the Orba. On his left, Rivaud saw a regiment of dragoons, approximately 400 strong (this was the 8th Dragoons). He had no artillery, and even before the Austrians reached the Fontanone, his men were being killed by the great weight of fire coming from the approaching Austrian guns. In his own words:
‘General Victor, like myself, felt the importance of the village of Marengo, which, forming a very sharp angle in the plain, afforded the enemy the advantage of uncovering our whole army without being perceived, and of directing against us a portion of his strength which he would have thought necessary to overwhelm us on a weak point.
‘Scarcely had the attack commenced for half an hour, when the little division of Gardanne was already overwhelmed by numbers, and yielded step-by-step to the enemy. To maintain Marengo’s important position, I placed in the front of the village the 1st Battalion of the 43rd, and I ordered the commander to defend himself with determination. Scarcely had this battalion been placed, than the troops of Gardanne, repulsed, threw themselves in disorder upon this village, and this battalion had to support the whole effort of the enemy. Melas had directed his principal forces on this village, which formed the centre of his line, and which afforded him three fine roads to debouch into the plain.’
Victor described how the earth trembled at the approach of the Austrians. The whole Austrian line, he wrote, was enveloped with ‘whirlwinds of bluish smoke’, out of which vomited fire and iron cannonballs.
When Gardanne’s men reached the Fontanone they redeployed on the other side. A single company of grenadiers from the 101st Half-Brigade, under the command of Captain Depoge, remained on the road and is said to have protected the withdrawal of Gardanne’s troops and the deployment of the reserves.14 Once this last company was clear of his front, Rivaud’s battalion in front of Marengo opened a devastating fire on the head of Hadik’s troops. Gardanne’s troops redeployed along the line of the Fontanone and fired into the flank of the Austrian troops. It was carnage and, as we have seen, this caused the unfortunate Hadik to break off the attack. With the first phase of the battle at an end, the advantage remained with Victor. He had taken the shock of the first attack; he had thus far only committed one battalion of Chambarlhac’s division to the fray; and he had also blocked the march of FML O’Reilly’s column, by placing Dampierre’s detachment at Stortigliona. Better still, Lannes had begun the battle just two hours’ march away at San Giuliano. His troops were already on the way to support Victor, as he had supported Lannes at Montebello. If the Austrians continued to press a frontal assault, there would be time for further reserves to come forward.
MAP 7: Tactical situation: 9.00‑10.00 am
(Austrians) A – Hadik’s Corps; B – Kaim’s corps in second line.
(French) 1 – Gardanne’s fighting withdrawal from Pederbona; 2 – Dampierre’s detachment; 3 – Rivaud deploys one battalion at Marengo; 4 – Chambarlhac’s division; 5 – Kellermann’s brigade (and 8th Dragoons); 6 – Champeaux’s cavalry brigade.
There were just two problems. Dupont points out in his memoirs that the key to the Marengo position was Castelceriolo, approximately 3km to the north-east. Like Marengo, this village offered numerous routes onto the plain, and if it fell into Austrian hands, the imperial army could fall onto the rear of the French position at Marengo. Although this threat appears to have been identified, Victor could do nothing about it. He could not weaken his position at Marengo in the face of the formidable Austrian forces before him. Reserves needed to be committed as soon as possible, and therein lay the other problem. At the time of the attack, Bonaparte’s headquarters were more than 11km from Marengo. He would have heard firing at 9.00 am; he would then have received Captain Deblou’s message not long after. Did the First Consul believe Victor was being attacked by Melas’ entire army? It appears not.
In the aftermath of the battle, Bonaparte would have been sensitive to accusations he allowed himself to be taken by surprise by Melas. We must be mindful, therefore, of what is written on the subject, and seek only to establish the facts. Let us first retrace the First Consul’s steps since the battle on the evening of 13 June. It is said that Bonaparte retired for
the night believing the Austrians had retreated from Marengo beyond the bridgehead and had destroyed the bridges across the Bormida. According to Marmont, General Gardanne was the source of this intelligence, the general telling Bonaparte he had cut the bridge. His stepson, Eugène Beauharnais, also protested that Bonaparte had received false intelligence:
‘The day was very stormy and we had a lot trouble passing the Scrivia, whose waters had become very strong. I was witness to the reports that several officers came to make to the First Consul at his bivouac that evening. All agreed in saying that the enemy had retired in haste and that it had broken all its bridges over the Bormida. The First Consul made them repeat this several times to be surer.’15
Quite who these officers were is unclear, and we know this information simply was not true. They were clearly not sent by the generals in command of the situation at Marengo. Brigadier General Rivaud at Marengo knew the Austrians ‘preserved not only a bridgehead on the Bormida but maintained the outposts between the Bormida and our vanguard very close to the Bormida’. Dupont’s unpublished memoir concurs with this: ‘The obscurity of night had not allowed reconnoitring completely the ground and the position of the enemy, which covered Bormida.’16
So what was the effect of Deblou’s message? Marmont had left Marengo and spent the night in a farm, continuing onto Torre Garofoli at daybreak. He was present in headquarters when Deblou arrived. He states they first heard the sound of gunfire (erroneously he says 6.00 am – it would have been 9.00 am when Hadik’s artillery opened fire), then: