by T E Crowdy
The sudden arrival of the 9th Light came as a complete surprise to IR 11 Wallis – a blue wall several hundred metres long appearing as if from nowhere, racing towards them. Zach tried to get the regiment to deploy, but, as they did so, they simply provided a larger target for the skirmishers. Some French guns on the main road began firing. The balls crashed into IR 11 Wallis, which was becoming completely disordered. Finally, the Austrians broke off and ran for the safety of Lattermann’s grenadier brigade behind.
While Boudet led the 9th Light forward to attack the Austrian column, Desaix joined the First Consul and held a council of war. This appears to have been held behind Guénand’s brigade, to the north of the main road. Having observed the deployment of Boudet’s division, Bonaparte was surrounded by his senior generals and the staff. He climbed down from his horse and looked towards a figure approaching on horseback. He raised his riding crop over his brow to shield his eyes from the bright sun; he recognised Desaix, who, as was his habit, was dressed in civilian clothes with no badges or marks of distinction:
‘Well-well, General Desaix, quite a skirmish!’
‘Well, General,’ replied Desaix as he dismounted. ‘I have arrived; we are all fresh, and if we must, we will go and get killed.’8
Much has been written about this meeting under artillery fire, and matters have been clouded by subsequent writings which describe a pre-ordained change of frontage in the French army, often described as the Castelceriolo pivot. All serious commentaries of the battle dismiss this as a post-battle attempt to rationalize the French tactics, or in the words of Zach: ‘It was long after the deed that one invented the famous line of Castelceriolo, Villanova and San Giuliano. The truth is that the French held on nowhere and went away in disarray towards the Po.’9 That said, we know the First Consul had been aware of Desaix’s location and probable time of arrival since 2.00 pm. When he consented to withdraw from Spinetta at 4.00 pm to avoid being outflanked, he must have known Desaix could not have been far from San Giuliano. Although his army was in retreat, his situation was far from desperate, and there were opportunities to be exploited. Of all the accounts, the one which best summarizes the tactical situation as it stood at 4.30 pm is again found in Petit:
‘General Melas, then finding too many obstacles in the centre, thought that, by extending his wings, he might surround us, and thereby entirely cut us off. He therefore directed [the] great part of his force to these points, imagining he had sufficiently concealed his movements, and that he should be quite able to check us by his artillery. Thus, not being able to discover what passed with us, and ignorant of these reinforcements which had just arrived, he laid the foundation of his own disaster. In fact, Bonaparte, always placed in the post of honour, and to whose perspicacious eye nothing escaped, seized this favourable opportunity: his orders flew everywhere in a moment.’
It appears that some French generals saw the arrival of Desaix as an opportunity to protect the withdrawal of the army across the Scrivia. There were merits in this, because it would draw the French closer to Lapoype, and they could also summon assistance from Duhesme. However, with so many wounded at San Giuliano, and with Austrians in Tortona behind them, a retreat could be perilous – which is to say nothing of the impact a retreat would have on Bonaparte’s reputation. Having said he would make good the calamities of 1799, Bonaparte could not afford the loss of a major battle in Italy. Some, including his ADC Rapp, have said Desaix was in favour of a retreat; others, like Bourrienne, have Desaix pulling out his pocket watch and declaring there was still time enough to win another battle. Of all the descriptions of the council of war where these matters were debated, perhaps the most interesting is found in the unpublished memoirs of Dupont. Witness his observation of the dynamic between Bonaparte and Desaix:
‘[Bonaparte] consulted Desaix on the new dispositions. We saw he attached a great price to the opinion of this general who answered him with a noble frankness, such as the gravity of the circumstances required of him … This sort of council of war was very remarkable for me. I saw for the first time Bonaparte on a battlefield. Clothed in power and surrounded with a long prestige of glory, he grappled at the moment with fortune and all the luck seemed against him. No emotion however showed itself in him. He struck the sand with his riding crop, as if playing, a distraction which was familiar to him, and he calmly addressed his questions to Desaix. General Desaix was also for me a new and precious object to observe. One of the lieutenants of Moreau in the army of the Rhine, he had left this great banner of the Germanic glory for that of Bonaparte, the fame of which had entrained him. He arrived from Egypt a few days before, and I knew him only of this moment. I appreciated with a deep interest all I saw in him; his words and his bearing, in that sudden crisis, deserved his reputation. Never has so prompt a concert preceded such a fortunate change in the fate of the fighting.’
The account continues, and it appears Desaix advised against some of the First Consul’s suggestions. More than anything, it indicates the two men were happy to talk as equals in military matters, perhaps in a way the likes of Murat, Lannes and Victor would not have done. Dupont continues:
‘Several plans of operation were successively designed by Bonaparte, but to these diverse plans his severe council always opposed this reflection that we had no artillery, the ammunition was spent: “Let us do like at Tagliamento”, added the First Consul finally, and he asked for his horse.’
This statement is intriguing. At the Battle of Valvasone (16 March 1797), the French were attempting to cross the Tagliamento River. After feigning an attack, the French performed something of a ruse on the Austrians, pretending to withdraw and to begin forming a camp. Assuming the French were bedding down for the night, the Austrians did the same. Once the Austrians were thus occupied, the French launched a sudden and decisive attack. We can deduce from this that Bonaparte and Desaix’s plan was to recall Boudet’s first brigade, and trick the Austrians into thinking the French were continuing their retreat, drawing the Austrians onto Guénand’s infantry brigade, which would launch a decisive counter-attack.
The actions of Guénand’s brigade have been overlooked too long. While the council was taking place, Guénand’s brigade was deploying north of the road. This brigade is traditionally depicted as forming in a ‘mixed order’ of columns and lines. Guénand described it as having formed in ‘columns by echelons, mixed with some deployed battalions’. It is possible, therefore, that the brigade formed something of a diagonal line, the right-hand battalion foremost and the left rearmost. In terms of the division’s strength, there is something which has been previously overlooked. The 30th Line was formed only of two battalions (the third was with the Army of Italy), although it is possible Guénand brigaded his five grenadier companies to form a sixth battalion – something which was quite common in the wars of the revolution. What has not been previously noted is that upon arrival at San Giuliano, Desaix’s troops encountered the two battalions of the 72nd Line which Monnier had left in reserve, probably 800 men strong. These joined Boudet’s division, as confirmed by Guénand, who wrote: ‘It is to be noted that two battalions of the 72nd, which were detached from the division of General Monnier, perfectly assisted the right wing of the division Boudet.’ This brigade was therefore somewhere in the region of 3,500‑4,000 men strong at 5.00 pm. This brigade was further strengthened by having all the remaining French artillery placed in front of it. It was therefore at least as strong, if not bigger than, either the divisions of Gardanne or Monnier were at the outset of the battle.
The concentration of the artillery into a single large battery was to prove an important factor. The commander of the artillery, General Marmont, was present at the council of war, and had a discussion with Desaix about how best to use it:
‘It was about five o’clock, and the division Boudet, on which rested our safety and our hopes, had not arrived. Finally, shortly after, it joined us. General Desaix preceded it by some moments, and came to join the First Consul. He
found the affair in this annoying state, [and] he had bad opinion of it. We held on horseback a sort of council which I attended; he told the first consul: “There must be a lively artillery fire imposed on the enemy, before attempting a new charge; otherwise it will not succeed: it is thus, general, that one loses battles. We absolutely need a good cannonade.” I told him I was going to establish a battery with the pieces still intact and to the number of five; by joining five pieces left on Scrivia, and newly arrived, and, furthermore, eight pieces of his division, I had a battery of eighteen pieces. “That’s good,” Desaix told me; “see, my dear Marmont, some cannons, some cannons, and make the best possible use of them.” Eighteen pieces were soon put in battery. They occupied the right half of the front of the army, so much was this front reduced. The pieces on the left were to the right of the road to San Giuliano.’10
While the council had been deliberating, the Austrians had not remained inactive. In front of Guénand’s brigade was a belt of vines in which the Austrian artillery line had taken position. His report describes the Austrians in front of him:
‘On the right of the road, a formidable artillery, some infantry in the vines, supported by cavalry. The enemy artillery, perfectly served and that we estimated as fifty guns, continued its devastation on all the line.’
Guénand’s account of the battle states his men were appealing to him for the order to attack so they could close on the enemy from which they were taking fire, with no reply.11 Boudet reported: ‘Every instant saw files of our troops cut down, which increased the impatience to get to close quarters.’ Guénand in turn petitioned Desaix, who was at that moment still with Bonaparte. The First Consul told Guénand: ‘Order the attack’, and Desaix rode off to rejoin Boudet and to order him to bring his troops into line.
As Desaix had urged, Guénand’s attack was preceded by an artillery bombardment. This lasted for twenty minutes, according to Marmont. Although a formidable escalation in the battle, the sheer number of guns on the Austrian side meant the contest was unequal.12 When Guénand began his advance towards the vines, forming his battalions into a line of closed columns, Marmont ordered his gunners to cease fire, and to turn their pieces round so they could march forward with the advancing columns. The gunners ignored him and continued to fire through the intervals in the French battalions. For Guénand’s soldiers, many of whom were conscripts seeing a large-scale action for the first time, having balls coming at them from in front and behind must have been terrifying, but they did not waiver. Marmont had to ride down the line of the battery and, piece by piece, order the gunners to follow their instructions. Even then, the ones near the main road continued to fire.
On entering the vines, Guénand’s brigade found itself engaged in a short but violent combat. He described the Austrian infantry there as being ‘entrenched to the teeth’ in the vines. There was nothing for it but a bayonet charge to clear them out. However, just 100 paces into the vines, Guénand was struck in the right groin. Wincing in pain, he was amazed to discover the enemy ball had struck his pocket and had flattened and bent the coins it contained. Although heavily bruised from the strike, he was able to continue, albeit extremely lucky to have survived. As he recovered from the shock, Boudet arrived with new orders from Desaix. Boudet put himself at the head of the 59th Line and spurred on the brigade.
The bravery citations of the men in Guénand’s brigade bear witness to the intensity of the fighting. On the right, the Austrians managed to get themselves and a few guns inside some of the farm buildings there. One group of Austrians actually made a dash at the 59th Line’s flag; Sergeant-Major Aiginy only managed to save it at the price of a nasty sabre cut. Chief of Battalion Pastre of the 59th Half-Brigade led his men into the fray. He was on the left of Guénand’s line and encountered some fierce resistance. In quick succession, three balls hit him as he exhorted his men to charge. The Austrians lost two more flags to this brigade. Sergeant-Major Blien of the 30th led a charge on one, accompanied by two sergeants, Corporal Promel and a few of the men. In the scramble that followed, it was a conscript named Georges Amptil who seized the trophy and got it into the clear. Captain Jolle of the 59th led the way and fought his way to another standard, seconded by Lieutenant Robin. As Jolle grabbed the pole, a larger than usual Austrian tried to prevent him; in spectacular fashion, Robin threw himself at this man, knocking him to the floor, where he was obliged to surrender.
Opposed to this advance was Captain Rauch. His account describes the terrible momentum of Guénand’s attack columns:
‘Kaim came riding up to IR23 Toscana and shouted, “Men! Up to now, we have attacked; make yourselves ready to be attacked in response.” With these words, he rode off and everyone prepared themselves for an attack. Immediately after that, the French smashed into us with a terrible shout. In these moments, which were otherwise only filled with the shock and dreadful scenes of killing, I felt the purest joy, which could only come over me as a soldier in this situation; for as the enemy attack happened, which overthrew our entire deployed line as far as my eye could see and forced everyone to turn back, my company stood its ground isolated there for a few minutes, against the whole mass of French, who stormed in on us, and I and my Oberleutnant [Vuchetich] directed half-company volleys at them several times, then I set off on the retreat with my men in close order, ignoring the superior enemy numbers, as though I was manoeuvring on the drill square. This fact is evidenced and is no boast. The steadiness of isolated small groups of troops and their confidence in their officers has certainly only rarely been displayed as it was here … Their brave resistance against the above-mentioned attack by enemy lasted, as stated, only a few minutes, also as long as was humanly possible, they then closed up on the other companies of the regiment, which were engaged in establishing a new position to the rear.’13
Once Marmont’s battery had opened fire and Guénand’s brigade began preparing for the attack, attempts were made to rally the remainder of the army which had fought in the morning. The fields around San Giuliano were awash with soldiers who had lost their corps for one reason or another. According to Petit:
‘The consul, the commander-in-chief [Berthier], the generals, the officers of the staff, ran through the ranks, and everywhere inspired that confidence which precedes and creates great successes. This work took up an hour, which was a terrible one to pass; for the Austrian artillery was bearing cruelly upon us. Every discharge mowed down whole ranks. Their ricochet bullets carried away with them, both men and horses. They received death amidst them in this manner, without moving a step, except to close their ranks over the dead bodies of their comrades. This thundering artillery reached even the cavalry who rallied in the rear of us, as well as a great number of foot-soldiers of different corps, who, encouraged by Desaix’s division, which they had seen pass, ran anew to the field of honour.’
True enough, the generals were everywhere, recalling the men to their ranks. There was a great unity of purpose, and despite their fatigues and wants, the French soldiers showed remarkable resilience in gathering themselves back into ranks to support Desaix. Dupont had already considered the need to rally these men. He had ordered Chief of Brigade Rigaud, the commander of the headquarters, to gather all the troops he could and to lead them in support of Boudet’s division. When Berthier instructed Dupont to form a reserve, he was able to announce the command had already been executed. Bonaparte then began touring the lines, haranguing the troops as he went: ‘We have gone back far enough today. You know that my custom is always to sleep on the battlefield.’ Another account has the First Consul turning to his soldiers while pointing at the Austrians: ‘My friends! There is peace, go and fetch it!’14
We must now retrace our steps and rejoin the 9th Light Infantry. After the retreat of IR 11 Wallis, Lattermann’s grenadier brigade had deployed and set its sights on fighting the newly arrived French infantry. The memoirs of Faverges state:
‘Zach stayed to direct the charge of the grenadiers but now, whereas the
se moved forward in fine order, a terrible musketry came from the nearby vines taking them suddenly in the flank. The grenadiers forgot San Giuliano and threw themselves on their aggressors.’
At this critical moment, Boudet now received the order to pull back into line with Guénand:
‘I was far more advanced than the rest of my line with my first brigade, and I would not have been delayed long before the 9th Light became engaged along its entire front, when General Desaix sent me the order to retire my troops by echelons. This manoeuvre would have become, in truth, essential, if the general attack was delayed; but it also compromised the skirmishers I had out in front. I ordered the movement however, executing it at a very slow pace, and I went very quickly to Lieutenant General Desaix to present my observations to him.’
Boudet reached Desaix and told him what was taking place in front, and that his skirmishers were heavily engaged. He would lose as many men retreating as he would advancing because of Austrian fire. Boudet insisted the order to attack had to be given then, before it was too late. Desaix agreed. He told Boudet to halt the 9th Light at once. Satisfied, Boudet swung his horse about and galloped back to them.15
Desaix, meanwhile, turned to his aide de camp, Savary, and told him:
‘You see how matters stand. I can no longer put off the attack without danger of being myself attacked under disadvantageous circumstances: if I delay I shall be beaten and I have no relish for that. Go then in all haste and apprise the First Consul of the embarrassment I experience; tell him that I cannot wait any longer; that I am without cavalry and that he must direct a bold charge on the flank of that column whilst I charge it in front.’