Marengo
Page 32
Savary went off to find the First Consul. In so doing he passed a wounded artillery lieutenant named Conrad, who had been struck in the leg by an Austrian cannonball. Refusing to be taken to the rear, Conrad had crawled forward to observe the effect of his battery’s fire. Savary saw the poor man was calling out to him. Thinking he was asking for assistance to the rear, Savary replied: ‘Have patience, we will come back for you later.’
‘It’s not that,’ replied Conrad. ‘Please do me the pleasure of telling my gunners to aim a little lower!’
Savary continued his mission and found Bonaparte, passing on Desaix’s request for cavalry support. After reflecting for a moment, the First Consul replied: ‘Have you well examined the column?’
‘Yes General.’
‘Is it very numerous?’
‘Extremely so, General.’
‘Is Desaix uneasy about it?’
‘He appeared uneasy as to the consequences that might result from hesitation. I must add his having particularly desired I should tell you that it was useless to send any other orders than that he should attack or retreat – one or the other; and that the latter movement would be at least as hazardous as the first.’
‘If this be the case, let him attack: I shall go in person to give him the order. You will repair yonder [pointing to a black spot in the plain] and there find General Kellermann, who is in command of that cavalry you now see; tell him what you have just communicated to me and desire him to charge the enemy without hesitation as soon as Desaix shall commence his attack.’
When Boudet reached the Ninth it had retired, according to Boudet, no more than 200 paces. Seeing the French pull back, the grenadiers had indeed become over-confident and were pressing forward. Desaix then arrived with the 9th Light and ordered Boudet to go to his second brigade. He was given specific instructions to pierce the enemy line and ‘to drive it in with enough rapidity to separate it entirely and to thereby disrupt their plan of operations’. By this Desaix wanted Boudet to aim at the Austrian centre, driving through it and ensuring the columns on the wings were unable to link up. Boudet arrived at Guénand’s brigade shortly after the latter was struck in the groin. He directed the brigade through the vines and out beyond to the other side. In his letter of 25 June 1800, Guénand writes:
‘At the exit of the vines the terrain offered nothing but an open plain. On our flanks there were some houses where the enemy was taking action with a perfectly served artillery and infantry well under cover. Opposite was a numerous cavalry in the finest order of battle. On debouching, we had gone at least a mile beyond the rest of the line. It was a feat of strength to rally my troops, I succeeded there beyond my hopes and in an instant they were re-established in their original order, in column by echelons mixed with a few battalions deployed.’
The cavalry Guénand could see before him was the 9th Liechtenstein Dragoons, which had deployed north of the road, having followed Lattermann’s grenadier brigade from Spinetta. His main concern was on his left flank, where the 9th Light and Lattermann’s grenadiers were coming to blows. He described the situation as ‘up in the air’, and admits hesitating ‘for a few seconds’ before Boudet authorized him to resume the advance.
Shortly before Guénand broke out into the plain, Savary arrived at Kellermann’s brigade and conveyed Desaix’s instructions to launch a cavalry attack on the flank of the Austrian column. The various charges in the morning and the artillery fire during the retreat had severely reduced Kellermann’s brigade. At 5.00 pm, there were just 150 men left on horseback, and of the twenty-eight officers only eight were still in the saddle.16 In his 1828 account, Kellermann said he had 300 cavalry, indicating he may have been joined by the 3rd Cavalry, which had ridden ahead of Desaix. Their regimental history is silent on the matter, except for pointing out that the unit did suffer casualties, and therefore must have been engaged at some point.
Savary relayed the instructions of Desaix and the First Consul, which were (according to Kellermann): ‘To march level with the corps of General Desaix and support him in the new battle that was about to be engaged.’
‘I have been fighting since six in the morning,’ replied Kellermann. ‘I have made six charges, I have lost half my men, my troop is exhausted, replace us with some others.’
‘There is only you,’ Savary replied. ‘All have disappeared or are too far away; you must go.’
The ADC then pointed at the remains of Champeaux’s brigade: ‘There is the debris of two regiments of dragoons, rally them to your column.’17
These dragoons (they came from half a squadron of the 1st Dragoons, two squadrons of the 8th Dragoons and the remainder from the 6th Dragoons) increased Kellermann’s strength by another 150‑200 sabres. In total, then, there were 400‑500 men.
As the two men spoke, they heard the din of musketry open up on the left of the French line. Kellermann set his brigade in motion. His after-action report says he followed Desaix’s division in a single line, 200 fathoms (approximately 400 metres) to the right of the main road – in other words he was behind Guénand. In later accounts, Kellermann changes this, saying he was level with the infantry – but in fact this would have made him nearer 800 metres from the road. In other accounts, he says he was in a column because he had to pass through vines. Importantly, he also says his forward movement was masked by the vines, which were suspended from mulberry trees.
Given his distance from the road, and from comments Kellermann later made to Guénand (saying his attack was facilitated by Guénand’s advance), it appears Kellermann was in fact following the infantry brigade, and probably in column to better move through the broken ground. He would have then exited the vines and entered the open plain. Kellermann would have seen what was occurring on the left as he drew level with the troops commanded by Desaix. His battlefield account records what he saw and did:
‘I perceived that the infantry which marched on the left of the road to Marengo, level with Cascina Grossa, began to give way, and that the enemy grenadiers charged it at the run. I thought there was not a moment to lose, and that a speedy movement could bring the victory back to our standards. I stopped the line, and commanded: “Platoons to the left and forwards!”’18
Kellermann’s brigade turned to the left and formed a narrow-fronted column.19
Kellermann looked at the unprotected flank of Lattermann’s grenadiers and the re-formed IR 11 Wallis. There was a loud discharge as the grenadiers fired at Desaix’s troops, seconds after which Kellermann gave the order to charge. At this same moment, on the main road, General Marmont was having something of a disagreement with the gunners of the Consular Guard. With some difficulty, he had the rest of his battery cease fire and follow Guénand’s brigade forward. The gunners of the Guard had continued firing. His account tells the following:
‘I had arrived at the left near the road where were three guns, two 8-pounders, and a howitzer served by the gunners of the Guard of the Consuls; by means of threats, I put them to movement, and the horses were harnessed to the pieces, to the gun carriages, to make the about-turn, when suddenly I saw in front of me and to the left the Thirtieth Half-Brigade in disorder and in flight. I promptly [had] the three guns put back into battery and loaded with canister; but I waited to open fire. I perceived at fifty paces from the Thirtieth, in the middle of the thick smoke and dust, a mass in good order; at first I believed it French, soon I recognized that it was the head of a big column of Austrian grenadiers. We had time to fire on them four shots of canister with our three guns, and, right after that, Kellermann, with four hundred horses, the rest of his brigade, passed in front of my pieces, and made a strong charge on the left flank of the enemy column, which laid down its arms. If the charge had been made three minutes later, our pieces would have been taken or withdrawn; and maybe that, not being any more under the influence of the surprise caused by the rounds of canister, the enemy column would have better received the cavalry. It would maybe have been the same if the charge had preceded the
salvo; thus it was needed this precise combination to assure a success so complete, and, it is necessary to say it, unhoped-for. Never had fortune intervened in a more decisive way; never had a general showed more coup d’œil, more vigour and presence of mind than Kellermann in this circumstance.’20
We must suspend time at this moment and analyze Marmont’s account. There is no other reference to the 30th Line fleeing in disorder. At this moment, the 30th Line would have been to the right of Guénand’s brigade, nearly half a kilometre from the road. Nor does Boudet or Guénand have anything but praise for this half-brigade. If anyone was running in disorder, the soldiers had to have come from the 9th Light Infantry. Kellermann has indicated this half-brigade was retreating and was apparently hard-pressed. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.
There is one last element to describe before the sabres of Kellermann’s cavalry brigade begin hacking down on the Austrian infantry. When Boudet left the 9th Light, it had begun a movement of withdrawal. Boudet states they had fallen back only 200 paces, but having earlier claimed the Ninth were far in advance of the rest of the line, one imagines they had indeed retreated further. The Austrians saw them falling back and became encouraged. Desaix arrived and decided to lead the charge himself, sending Boudet with instructions for Guénand’s brigade. Having prepared the action with an artillery bombardment, and requested a cavalry charge against the Austrian flank, Desaix had set in motion one of the greatest combined arms attacks of the Napoleonic Wars. Alas, he did not survive long enough to witness the effect of it.
We might imagine Desaix, near the road, at the head of the carabiniers of the 9th Light. Lejeune has painted this scene for us. We see the carabiniers in their shakos with tumbling red horsehair plumes; their light cavalry-style trousers, with a red stripe down the outer leg, tucked into short gaiters. We see a shell explode, having just killed six men on the right of the line. We see the young drummer boys standing next to their captain, no more than 14 years old – children of the corps, beating the charge. We see the light infantrymen stamping down the poles of the recently planted vines. Behind them we see the tree-lined road to Cascina Grossa. Bayonets are lowered. The officers are pointing forwards; and, illuminated by the flash of musketry, we see the figure of Desaix in a general’s uniform, falling mortally wounded from his rearing horse, with an ADC behind, arms outstretched to catch him. The reality was somewhat different.
Perhaps the most authentic account of Desaix’s final moments is found in an unsigned letter dated Milan, 19 June 1800. The letter has been attributed by de Cugnac to 32-year-old Chief of Brigade Jacques Jean Alexandre Bernard Law de Lauriston. Serving as an ADC to the First Consul, Lauriston was present at the fatal moment:
‘The enemy, animated by its success, drove at us sharply. All the generals were behind the line to make it advance. Our fire was very murderous and forced it to stop. General Desaix had gone to his column and had put himself at the head of the 9th. General Bonaparte had ordered me to accompany him. General Boudet and Dalton made our left [sic] with two half-brigades. I preceded General Desaix. We marched with the 9th. A regiment placed in some vines, was at no more than ten paces, and received us with a very lively musket fire; behind these was the enemy army’s chief of staff. It was then, and on beginning the charge, that General Desaix was struck by a ball that was coming obliquely. It hit him above the heart and exited though the right shoulder; if it had come directly, it is I that would have received it, for I was in front of him, on horseback. I turned round and I saw him fall. I approached; he was dead. He only had time to say to Lefèbvre [Desnouettes], who was near to him: “Dead!” As he had no uniform, the soldiers did not notice. Lefèbvre had him carried away, and I continued to advance with the 9th. At that moment General Kellermann made, from the left, a cavalry charge on the troops we were opposed to.’
Several remarks can be made on this episode. In the 1830s, a Captain Dubois compiled all the surviving correspondence in the French war archives relating to the 9th Light Infantry during the Revolution and First Empire. Dubois then went on to write a manuscript history of the regiment, in which he was a serving officer. As part of his research, Dubois interviewed a number of survivors from the regiment, including the former Sergeant Major Nicolas Fouquet, who took the regiment’s eagle from Napoleon’s hands in 1804, and became guardian of a flag awarded to the 9th Light in reward for its bravery at Marengo. We do not have Dubois’ original correspondence, but we can treat his account of the battle as part of the oral history of the regiment.21 Taken from the words of veterans of the battle, the following account is a very convincing one:
‘The fusillade was engaged in the vineyards by the skirmishers. General Desaix having approached them to reconnoitre the enemy, was shot in the chest, and fell among the skirmishers of the half-brigade. This loss only served to excite the ardour of the officers and soldiers who rushed furiously upon the Austrian grenadiers.’
Desaix was a brave general and carried the scars of many engagements; however, he was a famously calm general. Although he perhaps had a presentiment of death before the battle, it does not make any sense for him to have ridden at the head of an infantry charge like some medieval paladin, sacrificing himself to enemy fire for no useful gain. The Dubois account at last gives context to his actions. Arriving at the 9th Light, the view in front of him would have been obscured by gunpowder smoke. Unlike Boudet, he had not seen the Austrian forces himself. So, while the main line of the 9th Light advanced, it appears he rode ahead to get up among the skirmishers and look out beyond them. Alas the smoke was so thick he perhaps did not realise the grenadiers were so close. He was struck and killed, suffering the fate of General Joubert at Novi the year before – shot through the heart in the skirmish line.22
After Desaix fell, the Ninth continued to advance and, after exchanging a point-blank volley with the grenadiers, launched a furious bayonet charge. Victor’s memoir fast-forwards the action:
‘The 9th Light shouted “vengeance!” and rushed with rage upon the grenadiers of Lattermann. The shock is terrible! Kellermann sees it, and he feels that the decisive moment has come. He set off at a grand trot with his line of cavalry, and when he drew level with the enemy: “Halt” he commands; then, immediately afterwards: “Platoons to the left and to the front!” The movement is executed, and our platoons of cavalry fall, one after the other, like a thunderbolt, on the flank of the Austrian battalions, which, attacked in front and with fury by the 9th Light, [was] stunned, terrified, losing all energy, and engaged almost without resistance to the bayonets and sabres of our soldiers.’
Indeed, when Kellermann’s heavy cavalry struck, the grenadiers’ muskets would have been unloaded. The French horsemen would have sped through the intervals between the companies, slashing and stabbing as they went. Men would have been knocked to the ground by the horses. Already shaken from its first encounter with the 9th Light, the Wallis Regiment probably took the brunt of the cavalry charge (it suffered a 70 per cent casualty/prisoner rate). In the chaos, Zach was captured by Cavalier Le Riche of the 2nd Cavalry, who unceremoniously grabbed him and called on him to surrender while pressing the point of his sword into his back. The 2nd Cavalry’s 1801 history, signed by Chief of Brigade Yvendorff, has the following to say on the affair:
‘The enemy infantry lost its artillery in an instant, General Kellermann perceived this, he ordered the 2nd and 20th cavalry to charge the flank of a corps of grenadiers: Quicker than lightning, four hundred cavalrymen made six battalions captive. The first flag was taken by Chief of Squadron Alix, the second by Citizen Cavalier Beouf. Cavalier Le Riche made a prisoner of General Zach, chief of the enemy army’s general staff, and Cavalier Pasteur seized two cannons.’23
The 20th Cavalry’s version of events is similar:
‘The enemy was stopped by some pieces of light artillery and by Desaix’s division which had already set off. Having the head of the column, the regiment charged in concert with the 2nd Cavalry level with Casci
na Grossa, amid a hail of balls and canister, [and] the Hungarian grenadiers lowered their arms to the number of six thousand. For its account, the regiment took six hundred prisoners, four cannons, a caisson and a flag.’24
These two unpublished documents are interesting because they clearly indicate where the charge took place (‘level with Cascina Grossa’) and that it was after Desaix’s troops had stopped the Austrians.25 Given Guénand and Kellermann’s description of having passed through vines and opened into a plain, we can see this cavalry charge was executed in the location shown in Lejeune’s famous painting of the battle, to the west of the tree-lined road.
Having completed the charge against the Austrian infantry, Kellermann rallied 200 horsemen and launched a charge at the Liechtenstein Dragoons, who had deployed into line and were now facing Guénand’s advancing brigade. Kellermann does not say he crossed swords with the enemy horse, only ‘it was restrained; it even began to withdraw’. A footnote perhaps, but Berthier’s 1805 history indicates Kellermann held half of his brigade back from the charge ‘to block the corps of enemy cavalry opposite him and to mask the brave blow which he was going to make’. All of this happened so quickly that it is unsurprising to find so many contradictory accounts.
For further clarity, we should now consult the Austrian accounts to discover their opinion of the disaster which bore down upon them. Melas’ report of the battle described a ‘violent and accelerated fire’ which dismantled their artillery and caused the troops to hesitate. The report describes how General Zach advanced ‘the three battalions of the Wallis Regiment, with the hope of being able, by this means, to re-establish order; but this regiment itself yielded’. The grenadiers then advanced ‘with the greatest enthusiasm and courage through the broken lines of the Wallis regiment and renewed the attack’. However, at the moment the grenadiers’ fire was at its most intense, the ‘French cavalry appeared’.