With the slight increase in MNF and ISF units operating across al-Anbar, there is more presence in insurgent-dominated terrain; increased presence provides an increase in targets and opportunity. Continuation of the mass prisoner release program feeds the cycle of recidivism across western Iraq, repopulating insurgent groups at regular intervals and preventing tactical progress against their force structure. Although it is likely that attack levels have peaked, the steady rise in attacks from mid-2003 to 2006 indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar Province.
Way Ahead: Barring the deployment of an additional MNF division and the injection of
billions of dollars of reconstruction and investment money into the Province, there is nothing MNF can do to influence the motivations of al-Anbar Sunni to wage an insurgency. Federalism provides a possible solution:- Federalism is legally possible under the current constitution. Creating a successful federated Sunni state in al-Anbar would require considerable political and legal wrangling by a unified political block.
- A federated state might provide the Sunni of western Iraq with the general sense of “buy-in” lacking under the centralized, Shi‘a-dominated government. This in turn may tempt expatriate Anbari elites, exemplitied by the Central Council of al-Anbar, to return to the province or at least increase their support and involvement In al-Anbar economic development.
- Successful federation, providing al-Anbar with a specified and locally controlled budget, Could lead to a broad revival in Ramadi. This would in turn necessitate the formation of effective local governments to appeal to the Governor for resources.
- Atthough a centralized budget carries considerable temptation and risk in such a corrupt and criminal environment, ownership of the budget might encourage an increase in local responsibility and accountability in Ramadi.
- In Iraq, all politics are local, and local politics and government in al-Anbar is anemic or dysfunctional due to insurgent intimidation - Fallujah being a notable exception. That many local officials remain in office despite threats from insurgents and little support from Baghdad is a testament to their resilience and forbearance. This natural impetus to create effective government at the local level will help address a wide range of social and economic problems that feed the insurgency. Unlike a MNF sponsored government, a self-generated government with a real and accountable budget holds promise for long-term success.
- AI-Anbar potentially could control a sizeable and legally approved paramilitary force, offsetting the fears of Iranian domination or Shi’a pogroms. This force would have a better chance of encouraging local recruitment than a national, Shi’a-dominated military force likely to station Sunni recruits far from their homes.
- Despite a vicious insurgent intimidation campaign, the Iraqi Police in al-Anbar have proven remarkably resilient in most areas, especially when they can rally around an effective leader. When fully formed and properly supported, the Iraqi Police can pose a credible challenge to AQI in al-Anbar.
However: - Currently, there is no unified Sunni political block interested in establishing a federal state in al-Anbar. The majority of Sunni politicians vocally oppose federalism, primarily based on the fear of economic/budgetary isolation.
- Federalism brings with it a host of potential social problems, including forced migration, sectarian cleansing, and the very real chance of national isolation.
- Iraqi federation could spark a wider conflict between Iran and Sunni Arab countries and interests within the MEF Area of Interest.
- Despite recent friction, there is very little long-term, grass roots friction between Iraqi Sunni and Shi‘a. Most al-Anbar Sunni see Iran, not the Iraqi Shi’a, as their most pressing threat. At a visceral level, many Anbaris may not support federalism based on sectarian considerations.
- Federalism will not eliminate AQI or immediately address most of the underlying social issues that feed the insurgency.
Final Consideration: The insurgency in al-Anbar and the suffering of al-Anbar citizens undoubtedly would be far worse now if it was not for the very effective efforts of MNF operations. That we cannot end the insurgency in al-Anbar within the present political conditions is not an indication that our efforts have not had a very real suppressive effect on the insurgency.
B. THE ORDERS LT. GEN. ODIERNO RECEIVED IN DECEMBER 2006
C. HOW ODIERNO CHANGED THE MISSION
D. GEN. PETRAEUS SUMMARIZES HOW TO OPERATE IN IRAQ
HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400
21 June 2008
Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance • Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive “terrain.” Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.
• Live among the people. You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.
• Hold areas that have been secured. Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon their neighborhoods. When reducing forces and presence, gradually thin the line rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.
• Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Identify and pursue AQI and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.
• Generate unity of effort. Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.
• Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the “reconcilables” from the “irreconcilables” through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.
• Defeat the network, not just the attack. Defeat the insurgent networks to the “left” of the explosion. Focus intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, financiers, suppliers, and operators.
• Foster Iraqi legitimacy. Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.
• Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents. Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat Al-Qaeda and the other extremists; success requires all forces and all means at our disposal—non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available multipliers. Integrate civilian and military efforts to cement security gains. Resource and fight decentralized. Push assets down to those who most need them and can actually use them.
• Employ money as a weapon system. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each “round” expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Emplo
y a “matching fund” concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.
• Fight for intelligence. A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a “need to share” rather than a “need to know” basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.
• Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.
• Understand the neighborhood. Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work—including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy—and how they really work.
• Build relationships. Relationships are a critical component of counter-insurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.
• Look for Sustainable Solutions. Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work.
• Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions. Start to build the information you’ll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to virtually “look over your shoulder” while they’re still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.
• Manage expectations. Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.
• Be first with the truth. Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don’t put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we’ve learned and how we’ll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.
• Fight the information war relentlessly. Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.
• Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.
• Exercise initiative. In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint “white lines on the road,” but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn “big ideas” into specific actions.
• Prepare for and exploit opportunities. “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity” (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of “reconcilables” and “irreconcilables”) in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.
• Learn and adapt. Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq.
NOTES
The foundation for this book, and the source of most of the quotations that appear in it, is a series of interviews I did in Baghdad and Washington, D.C., over the course of 2007 and 2008 with Gen. Petraeus, Gen. Odierno, and scores of their key staffers and commanders. I also interviewed many officers at the ends of their tours after they returned home. Where quotations are not cited below, they are either from public hearings, press conferences, and briefings or from those hundreds of hours of interviews and subsequent e-mail exchanges.
I also benefited from reading recent books on Iraq by Francis West, Kimberly Kagan, and Peter Mansoor. As is evident in the notes below, I also have relied on work by colleagues at the Washington Post, as well as reporters at other news organizations.
Epigraph
vii The quotation is from book 6, chapter 3, of Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).
Chapter 1: Things Fall Apart
3 “It was a mediocre morning”: Lance Cpl. Sharratt’s comments were made in a transcript posted by Frontline, the Public Broadcasting System’s invaluable documentary series.
4 “They didn’t even try to run away”: Sgt. Mashoot’s comment to investigators was reported in a Washington Post article that appeared 6 January 2007.
4 “The American fired”: The comments by Salem are quoted in the Washington Post, 9 May 2007.
4 “While in the house which I identified as House #2”: Lance Cpl. Tatum’s comment is contained in a signed statement given to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service on 3 April 2006, correcting a statement he had given on 19 March 2006.
4 “I heard Younis speaking”: Fahmi’s recollection is an article in the Washington Post, of 27 May 2006.
5 “‘Hey, where are the bad guys?’”: Lt. Kallop’s testimony is quoted in the Washington Post, 9 May 2007.
5 “Even though there was no investigation at the time”: Lance Cpl. Wright’s comment to investigators was quoted in the Washington Post, 7 January 2007.
6 “I thought it was very sad”: Lt. Col. Chessani’s recollection is contained in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006.
6 “There was nothing out of the ordinary”: The comments by Col. Davis are quoted in the Washington Post, 9 May 2007.
6 “no bells and whistles went off ”: Maj. Gen. Huck’s comment is in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 4 April 2006.
7 “You are not going to like this”: Lt. Gen. Chiarelli’s exchange with Gen. Huck is related in a signed statement given by Huck to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 18 August 2006.
7 “indiscriminately”: This and subsequent quotations from Bargewell are from his eighty-eight-page report marked “15 June 2006 (Final).”
7 Underscoring Bargewell’s findings: The data cited in this paragraph are from a document titled “Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, FINAL REPORT, 17 November 2006, Office of the Surgeon General, Multinational Force-Iraq, and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command.”
8 “God damn, 15 civilians dead”: Col. Ewer’s exclamation is in a tran
script of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006.
9 “There’s an undeniable sense”: Senator McCain’s comment was made in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, 10 November 2005.
10 “It sucks”: Spec. Ivey was quoted in the Washington Post, 27 July 2006.
10 “corrupt, . . . tied to being involved in extra-judicial killings”: Maj. Williams’s comment is in an interview conducted by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for its studies of “Operational Leadership Experiences.”
10 “The truth is that many commands”: Capt. Martin’s assertion is made in his article “Tempo, Technology and Hubris,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 2007.
11 “I’d never seen it at this level before”: Maj. Mendelson’s observation is in his interview for the Leavenworth series “Operational Leadership Experiences.”
12 “By and large, the battalions continued to do what they knew best”: West’s comment is in his book The Strongest Tribe (Random House, 2008).
13 “The costs of failure are likely to be high”: This appears in “The War in Iraq: An Interim Assessment,” by Andrew Krepinevich, prepared for OSD/Net Assessment, November 2005.
14 “Haziness about ends and means”: Cohen’s comment is in “No Way to Win a War,” the Wall Street Journal, 7 December 2006.
15 the United States needs a real strategy: Krepinevich’s article “How to Win in Iraq” appeared in the September/October 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs.
16 “To be effective, the so-called pacification program”: Kissinger’s article was “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs, January 1969.
The Gamble Page 45