PART SECOND. OF THE NUMBER AND ORDER OF THE PASSIONS AND AN EXPOSITION OF THE SIX PRIMITIVE PASSIONS.
ARTICLE LI.
What are the first causes of the passions.
We know from what has been said above that the ultimate and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is none other than the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland which is in the middle of the brain. But that does not suffice to distinguish one from another; it is necessary to investigate their sources, and to examine their first causes: and, although they may sometimes be caused by the action of the soul which determines itself to conceive of this or that object, and also simply by the temperament of the body or by the impressions which are fortuitously met with in the brain, as happens when we feel sad or joyous without being able to give a reason, it yet appears by what has been said, that in all cases the same passions can also be excited by the objects which move the senses, and that these objects are their most ordinary and principal causes; from which it follows that in order to find them all, it is sufficient to consider all the effects of these objects.
ARTICLE LII.
What is their mode of operation and how they may be enumerated.
I notice besides, that the objects which move the senses do not excite diverse passions in us because of all the diversities which are in them, but only because of the diverse ways in which they may harm or help us, or in general be of some importance to us; and that the customary mode of action of all the passions is simply this, that they dispose the soul to desire those things which nature tells us are of use, and to persist in this desire, and also bring about that same agitation of spirits which customarily causes them to dispose the body to the movement which serves for the carrying into effect of these things; that is why, in order to enumerate them, we must merely examine in their order in how many diverse ways which are significant for us, our senses can be moved by their objects; and I shall here make an enumeration of all the principal passions according to the order in which they may thus be found.
THE ORDER AND ENUMERATION OF THE PASSIONS.
ARTICLE LIII.
Wonder.
When the first encounter with some object surprises us, and we judge it to be new or very different from what we formerly knew, or from what we supposed that it ought to be, that causes us to wonder and be surprised; and because that may happen before we in any way know whether this object is agreeable to us or is not so, it appears to me that wonder is the first of all the passions; and it has no opposite, because if the object which presents itself has nothing in it that surprises us, we are in nowise moved regarding it, and we consider it without passion.
ARTICLE LIV.
Esteem and disdain, generosity or pride and humility or poorspiritedness.
To wonder is united esteem or disdain according as it is at the greatness of an object or its smallness that we wonder. And we may thus esteem or despise ourselves, from which come the passions, and then the habitudes, of magnanimity or pride, and of humility or poor-spirit.
ARTICLE LV.
Veneration and disdain.
But when we esteem or think little of other objects which we consider as free causes capable of doing good or evil, from esteem proceeds veneration and from simple absence of esteem, disdain.
ARTICLE LVI.
Love and hatred.
And all the preceding passions may be excited in us without our in any way perceiving if the object which causes them is good or evil. But when a matter is presented as relatively to us good, i.e. as agreeable to us, that causes us to have love for it, and when it is represented as evil or hurtful to us, that excites hatred in us.
ARTICLE LVII.
Desire.
From the same consideration of good and evil all the other passions originate; but in order to place them in order I make distinctions as to time, and considering that they lead us to regard much more the future than the present or the past, I commence with desire. For not only when we desire to acquire a good which we do not yet have, or avoid an evil which we judge may occur; but also when we only anticipate the conservation of a good or absence of an evil, which is as far as this passion may extend, it is evident that it ever regards the future.
ARTICLE LVIII.
Hope, fear, jealousy, confidence and despair.
It suffices to reflect that the acquisition of a good or removal of an evil is possible in order to be incited to desire it. But when besides that we consider whether there is much or little prospect that we shall obtain what we desire, that which represents to us that there is much probability of this excites in us hope, and that which represents to us that there is little, excites fear, of which jealousy is a species. When hope is excessive it changes its nature and is called confidence or assurance. Just as on the other hand extreme fear becomes despair.
ARTICLE LIX.
Irresolution, courage, bravery, emulation, cowardice, and terror.
And we can thus hope and fear although the issue of what we expect in no way depends on us; but when it is represented to us as dependent there may be a difficulty in the selection of the means or in carrying them into execution. From the first proceeds the irresolution which disposes us to deliberate and take council. To the latter courage or bravery is opposed, of which emulation is a species. And cowardice is contrary to courage, as fear or terror is to bravery.
ARTICLE LX.
Remorse.
And if one is moved to act before irresolution has passed away, that causes remorse of conscience to arise, which does not concern the time to come like the preceding passions, but the present or the past.
ARTICLE LXI.
Joy and sadness.
And the consideration of the present good excites joy in us, and that of evil, sadness, when it is a good or an evil which is represented as belonging to us.
ARTICLE LXII.
Mockery, envy, pity.
But when it is represented to us as pertaining to other men, we may esteem them either as worthy or unworthy of it; and when we esteem them worthy, that does not excite in us any other passion but joy, inasmuch as it is some satisfaction to us to see that things happen as they should. There is only this difference, that the joy that comes from what is good is serious, while what comes from evil is accompanied by laughter and mockery. But if we esteem them unworthy of it, the good excites envy and the evil pity, which are species of sadness. And we must notice that the same passions which relate to present good or evil things may often likewise be related to those which are to come, since our belief that they will come represents them as if they were present.
ARTICLE LXIII.
Self-satisfaction and repentance.
We may also consider the cause of the good or evil, present as well as past. And the good which has been done by ourselves gives us an internal satisfaction which is the sweetest of all the passions; while the evil excites repentance, which is the most bitter.
ARTICLE LXIV.
Favour and gratitude.
But the good which has been done by others causes us to regard them with favour although it is not to us that it has been done, and if it is to us, we join to the favour gratitude.
ARTICLE LXV.
Indignation and anger.
In the same way the evil done by others and not having any relation to us, only causes us to be indignant with them; and when it is so related it likewise arouses anger.
ARTICLE LXVI.
Pride and shame.
Further, the good which is or has been in us, being referred to the opinion which others may have of it, excites a feeling of glory or pride in us, and the evil, shame.
ARTICLE LXVII.
Disgust, regret, and gaiety.
And sometimes the duration of the good brings about tedium or disgust, while that of evil diminishes sadness. And finally from past good, regret proceeds, and this is a species of sadness; and from past evil comes gaiety, which is a species of joy.
ARTICLE LXVIII.
Why this enumeration of the passions is different from that which is commonly received.
Here we have the order which seems to me to be the best for the enumeration of the passions. In this I know well that I am parting company with all those who have written on this subject before, but it is not without great reason that I do so. For these derive their enumeration from the fact that they distinguish in the sensitive part of the soul two appetites which they name the concupiscent and irascible respectively. And because in the soul I recognise no distinction of parts, as I have said above, this seems to me to signify nothing but that it has two faculties, the one of desire, and the other of anger, and because in the same way it has the faculties of wondering, loving, hoping, fearing, and thus of receiving in itself every other passion, or else bringing about actions to which these passions urge it, I do not see why they have desired to refer them all to concupiscence or anger. And besides their enumeration does not comprehend all the principal passions, as I believe this one does. I speak only of the principal, because we may further distinguish many other more particular ones, and their number is indefinite.
ARTICLE LXIX.
That there are only six primitive passions.
But the number of those which are simple and primitive is not very large. For, in making a review of all those which I have enumerated, we may easily notice that there are but six which are such, i.e. wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness; and that all the others are composed of some of these six, or are species of them. That is why, in order that their multitude may not embarrass my readers, I shall here treat the six primitive passions separately; and afterwards I shall show in what way all the others derive from them their origin.
ARTICLE LXX.
Of wonder; its definition and cause.
Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul which causes it to apply itself to consider with attention the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary. It is thus primarily caused by the impression we have in the brain which represents the object as rare, and as consequently worthy of much consideration; then afterwards by the movement of the spirits, which are disposed by this impression to tend with great force towards the part of the brain where it is, in order to fortify and conserve it there; as they are also disposed by it to pass thence into the muscles which serve to retain the organs of the senses in the same situation in which they are, so that it is still maintained by them, if it is by them that it has been formed.
ARTICLE LXXI.
That in this passion no change occurs in the heart or in the blood.
And this passion has this particular characteristic, that in it we do not notice that it is accompanied by any change which occurs in
ARTICLE LXXII.
In what the strength of wonder consists.
That does not prevent its having much strength because of the surprise, i.e. the sudden and unexpected arrival of this impression which changes the movement of the spirits, which surprise is proper and peculiar to this passion; so that when surprise is met with in other passions as it is usually met with in almost all, thus increasing them, what happens is that wonder is united to them. And the strength depends on two things, i.e. on the novelty, and on the fact that the movement which it causes possesses its entire strength from its commencement. For it is certain that such a movement has more effect than those which, being feeble to begin with, and only increasing little by little, can easily be turned aside. It is likewise certain that the objects of sense which are new, affect the brain in certain parts in which it is not usually affected, and that the fact that these parts are more tender or less firm than those which a frequent agitation has solidified, increases the effect of the movements which they there excite. And we shall not find this incredible if we consider that it is a similar reason which brings it about that, the soles of our feet being accustomed to a contact which is rough enough owing to the weight of the body which they bear, we feel this contact but little when we walk, while another much slighter and more gentle touch, when they are tickled, is almost insupportable because it is unusual to us.
ARTICLE LXXIII.
What astonishment is.
And this surprise has so much power in causing the spirits which are in the cavities of the brain to take their way from thence to the place where is the impression of the object which we wonder at, that it sometimes thrusts them all there, and causes them to be so much occupied in preserving this impression that there are none which pass from thence into the muscles, nor even which in any way turn themselves away from the tracks which they originally pursued in the brain: and this causes the whole body to remain as immobile as a statue, and prevents our perceiving more of the object than the first face which is presented, or consequently of acquiring a more particular knowledge of it. That is what we commonly call being astonished, and astonishment is an excess of wonder which can never be otherwise than bad.
ARTICLE LXXIV.
The end which the passions serve, and to what they are detrimental.
And it is easy to understand from what has been said above, that the utility of all the passions consists alone in their fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good it should preserve, and which without that might easily be effaced from it. And again, all the harm which they can cause consists in the fact that they fortify and conserve these thoughts more than necessary, or that they fortify and conserve others on which it is not good to dwell.
ARTICLE LXXV.
In what wonder particularly consists.
And we may say more particularly of wonder that it is useful, inasmuch as it causes us to learn and retain in our memory things of which we were formerly ignorant; for we shall only wonder at that which appears rare and extraordinary to us, and nothing can so appear excepting because we have been ignorant of it, or also because it is different from the things which we have known; for it is this difference which causes it to be called extraordinary. Now although a thing which was unknown to us, presents itself anew to our understanding or our senses, we do not for all that retain it in our memory, unless the idea which we have of it is strengthened in our brain by some passion or else by the application of our understanding which our will determines to a particular attention and reflection. And the other passions may serve to make us remark things which seem good or evil; but we have only wonder for those which appear but seldom. We also see that those who have no natural inclination towards this passion are usually very ignorant.
ARTICLE LXXVI.
In what it may do harm, and how we may make good its deficiency and correct its excess.
But it much more frequently occurs that we wonder too much, and that we are astonished in perceiving things which deserve little or no consideration, than that we wonder too little. And this may entirely prevent or pervert the use of the reason. That is why, although it is good to be born with some inclination towards this passion, because that disposes us for the acquisition of the sciences, we must at the same time afterwards try to free ourselves from it as much as possible. For it is easy to supplement its defects by special reflection and attention which our will can always oblige our understanding to give on these occasions when we judge that the matter which presents itself is worth the trouble. But there is no other remedy to prevent our wondering to excess than that of acquiring a knowledge of various matters and exercising ourselves in the consideration of all those which may appear the most rare and strange.
ARTICLE LXXVII.
That it is neither the most stupid nor the most clever who are most carried away by wonder.
For the rest, although it is only those who are dull and stupid who are in nowise impelled by their nature to wonder, that is not to say that those who are best supplied with wits are always those who are most disposed to it. As a matter of fact it is principally those who, although they have a fairly good supply of common sense, have at the same time no high opinion as to their sufficiency.
ARTICLE LXXVIII.
That its excess may pass in
to a matter of habit when we fail to correct it.
And although this passion seems to diminish with use, because the more we meet with rare things which we wonder at, the more we accustom ourselves to cease to wonder at them, and to think that all those which may afterwards present themselves are common, still, when it is excessive, and causes us to arrest our attention solely on the first image of the objects which are presented, without acquiring any other knowledge of them, it leaves behind it a custom which disposes the soul in the same way to pause over all the other objects which present themselves, provided that they appear to it to be ever so little new. And this is what causes the continuance of the malady of those who suffer from a blind curiosity — that is, who seek out things that are rare solely to wonder at them, and not for the purpose of really knowing them: for little by little they become so given over to wonder, that things of no importance are no less capable of arresting their attention than those whose investigation is more useful.
ARTICLE LXXIX.
The definition of love and hate.
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