Afghanistan

  Currently, Kabul is still seen as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, but it is being slowly undercut by perceptions of corruption and its failure to improve the quality of life (power, roads) for the average Afghan. The lack of economic success throughout much of Afghanistan, the failure to create a viable national economy and the jobs that would go with it has proven as critical, if not more so, as the challenges posed by the insurgency, narcotics, and corruption. There is deep ambivalence toward cultural issues and the foreign presence, though attitudes on the whole remain favorable, especially as the perception remains widespread that the foreigners are preventing another round of Afghan civil war enabled by Pakistan and other regional powers. This means that any solution has to be seen as an Afghan solution; whether the foreigners are happy with it must be subordinated to what will work between Afghans. But the Afghans are going to have to rely on the foreigners to provide security until their own forces are ready and provide aid until they have achieved a national economy. In the longer term, any Afghan solution will have the potential to be disrupted by Pakistan or other neighbors. A US security commitment will be required to mitigate this. In the final analysis, the US needs to help bring about a future where Pakistan is stable, democratic, and at peace with its neighbors and where its national security is not defined by the military. That is truly a long-term objective, but both the nuclear security issue and the security of Afghanistan mean it is one worth pursuing.

  The Afghans had hoped for a better life in the wake of 2001 and bitterly resent it being available only to a few. There emerged few Afghan leaders or institutions that were willing to moderate these desires and convey the fact that it would not happen overnight, reminding elites and grassroots alike that while defeating the Al Qaeda and the Taliban militarily may have taken weeks, rebuilding Afghanistan would take decades. Fewer still Afghans were willing to take responsibility for the condition of their country, instead focusing on their own ethnolinguistic group or benefiting themselves and their kin. The over-centralized Kabul government created by the 2004 constitution has proven to be an unwieldy vehicle. Changes—through constitutional amendment or, once a consensus exists, a Loya Jirga—are needed to give the Afghan people more control over their government at the lowest possible level, in order to get them to take personal ownership and responsibility for their future. A more parliamentary and less centralized government in Kabul could possibly have something like a British-style war cabinet that meaningfully engages major opposition figures. This would prevent Karzai’s previous policies of aiming to sideline the opposition, denying them access to resources and so choke off their ability to provide patronage. There is a need to reduce the size of the Afghanistan cabinet, enlarged previously to provide patronage opportunities for Karzai. Decision making should be decentralized, increasing district and local authority and, through that, responsibility. There is a need to speed up reconstruction in stable provinces. Major drug traffickers and some senior corrupt officials need to receive high-profile trials and exemplary sentences. All the while, Afghanistan needs to give more power to the provinces, district, and villages. The Afghan people, above all, need to be made responsible for their own future, which must include empowering (and arming) them to defend it. Just as government cannot be limited to Kabul, security cannot be limited to the ANSF alone. In the short term, this policy will require village-based militias with their own weapons. It has to involve the Afghan people, the same ones that defeated the Soviets and endured the 1992–2001 civil wars. They are tremendously tired and war-weary, but they can do it, if allowed to do it in their own way.

  Enabling change in Afghanistan requires a form of policy “judo.” Rather than resisting with sheer force, pull with the strength of those parts of Afghanistan derived from its social structure and culture and then try and direct it in the desired direction. This works better than opposing what is strong and trying to build up what is weak. But change in Afghanistan will not result from top-down foreign-directed initiatives. It will require a generation to build Afghanistan’s institutions and create constituencies, and what foreigners can do best is help provide security and aid to see this needed generational change completely through.

  Afghans, when they are not being polarized by foreign supporters, have been capable of working things out themselves, and this can be capitalized on today. In the past two years, the Afghan government’s best senior officials—a mixture of anti-Soviet guerillas, former Najibullah supporters, returning exiles, and educated Kabulis with roots in state service—together present a formidable group that cuts across ethnolinguistic lines and has real potential. Outside of Kabul, those Afghans willing to provide a bulwark against collapse, at least in the short term, may not have the qualifications and skills of those in Kabul, but they demonstrate that the strengths of the old Afghanistan still exist and they need to be on the “team” as well. The challenge will be to pull together these divided Afghans in both Kabul and the grassroots and cut out those that are there for their own power or enrichment.

  Without any doubt, there is a substantial price tag on a sustainable Afghanistan, in terms of money, commitment, and troops. But not paying this price now will likely lead to failure, exacting an even higher price in the future, be it a renewed terrorist haven for new attacks on US soil, threats to shaky neighbors, or something else we dare not dream of. The insurgency in Afghanistan will not be won by foreign troops or aid, but they are needed to build up and reform Afghanistan’s governance and enable the ANSF to hold the line until there is a chance for a modicum of peace and economic growth.

  As it currently stands, the security situation in Afghanistan will require additional outside troops to prevent further deterioration or even compensate for earlier actions not taken, be it actions to build an unitary security and development campaign, have an effective strategy for military operations, development and reconstruction; or help create legitimate Afghan governance for both the government and the grassroots. There was no alternative to increased reliance on foreign troops and money by the time of Obama’s December 2009 speech, but unless effective and legitimate Afghan governance can follow, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the population lives, these troops will provide only a temporary solution. Troops from additional coalition partners, especially from Muslim countries, are part of this requirement. While Turkey has been reluctant to commit additional ground forces,669 those countries that originally offered troops to ISAF, such as Jordan and Oman, may be willing to reconsider following the US withdrawal from the unpopular conflict in Iraq. An increased role for Islamic coalition members would be diplomatically difficult to achieve, but would also help with the cultural dimensions of the conflict.

  The increased number of US and coalition ground troops will be able to defeat and clear insurgent forces from an increasingly large area. The weakness is the absence of a capability to fill this power vacuum in the wake of the troops and create governance that will negate the insurgents’ lingering threat that they will eventually return to kill all who collaborated. The Afghan government has, in the past, not been able to perform this vital, final act. When Musa Qala in Helmand province was reoccupied by coalition forces late in 2007, the Afghan government personnel that moved into the heavily fortified district headquarters reportedly spent most of their time in the basement waiting for a helicopter back to the provincial capital at Lashkar Gar, hardly confidence-inspiring. In 2009, the US was training the ANSF to follow up coalition forces as they move into areas such as the Helmand valley, where these Afghan forces can fill the power vacuum and provide security at the least. Building up the ANSF will be only part of increasing Afghan security responsibility. What is needed in places like Helmand are respected Afghans who will resolve land and water disputes and mullahs that will preach peace and not jihad in the mosques. These are going to be harder to create than competent Afghan security forces, but are no less important, and the US needs to make sure that they, and the Afghan civil society they rep
resent, are able to be reestablished where security permits. In the words of one veteran observer of Afghanistan, “More soldiers are not the solution without good governance to fill in behind them,” even when the soldiers are Afghans.

  In addition to strengthening Afghan civil society, the coalition and Kabul need to de-legitimate—through the battle of ideas—what the insurgents have to offer: the suicide bombs, the rough justice of the Qazi courts applying a brand of Sharia unlikely to be recognized by genuine ulema, the maximalist practice of Islam, and the continued alliance with narcotics traffickers. All these things are unpopular with the Afghan people. What has been lacking is a way to leverage this unpopularity so that the population will resist the insurgents. The negative message against all these things is important, but it will lack credibility unless it is matched by a positive message, of demonstrating to the people that the Afghan government is competent, effective, and able to make their life better and not make them targets for insurgents or coalition collateral damage alike. Any insurgency is more a political than a military conflict, and in democracies people daily have evidence of the importance of effective communications to political success. Yet it remains that the coalition and Afghans alike have often been less successful in getting their message out to the Afghan people than the terrorists and insurgents.

  “The Taliban is fighting for their ideology, even one not acceptable to Afghans. What is our ideology?” asked Engineer Mohammed Es’haq, comrade-in-arms of Ahmad Shah Massoud and a veteran of Afghanistan’s conflicts since the Panjshir Revolt of 1975.670 His question highlights the disturbing fact that Afghanistan and its allies have been losing the battle of ideas to their enemies since 2001. Just as those standing against the terrorists, insurgents, and narcotics traffickers in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan could become a strong world-class team, so too is there a potential to pull together an ideology to unify them. An Afghan national vision (embraced by Ahmad Shah Massoud), Afghan Islam, a willingness to embrace democracy down to its roots in the Afghan jirga and Islamic requirement for majlis-e-shura, and a commitment to better the quality of life could, together, offer a future more appealing than any the insurgents could envision. It is here that the battle for hearts and minds can be won.

  Afghans have earned the right to live as a nation, in peace and freedom, the same way Americans did, by fighting for it and voting for it. The Afghans remain independent in their thinking and committed to freedom. For all their many shortfalls, Afghans of all political allegiances remain proud of what they have successfully accomplished since 2001, from holding the Loya Jirgas, creating the constitution, and providing free elections, even if the most recent of these was tainted by corruption. The Afghans define nation, peace, and freedom differently from the Americans, seeing true freedom as only partly a secular concept. “Freedom” lacks meaning without also including submission to Islam and living life in accordance with Sharia law and the “Afghan way.”

  Pakistan and the Future

  The future of Afghanistan is also being shaped by decisions made over the border in Pakistan, be it by the government, the military, or the insurgents. The February 2008 Pakistani elections and the peaceful demonstrations against Zardari and even Musharraf before him show that there is widespread support for rational, competent, and effective civil society in Pakistan. In the past, when the military has stepped in to take power, rationality and competence was what they offered, but the latter years of the Musharraf government discredited them, especially when the economy declined, and Pakistan experienced the rise of insurgency, and terrorism appeared to be a response to cooperation with US policies. Even though, by 2009, the concern over the insurgency and dissatisfaction with the civilian government and the economy made the military look better in comparison, they have been reluctant to take over again. There are too many intractable problems for which the military has no solution, and neither Pakistan’s electorate nor its foreign friends want to see them back in power.

  Pakistan’s radical Islamic parties and the insurgents offer another alternative to Pakistan’s often-dysfunctional politics, but through the path of Sharia law, which they claim would bring about long-denied social justice for all Pakistanis, not simply the “feudal” political leaders and their patrons. But in the FATA, Swat, and elsewhere, it is becoming obvious that they offer beheadings and beatings rather than a better life.671 There has been no groundswell of popular support for the radicals, despite the widespread disillusionment and dissatisfaction.

  The insurgent takeover in Swat was eventually met by military action in 2009 only when the TNSM’s Maulana Sufi Mohammed used this success to challenge the legitimacy of Pakistan’s constitution and to condemn democracy as a way of life counter to Islam.672 This energized Pakistan and persuaded the military that the insurgency was actually a threat to the future of the country. The need is for policies that will show Pakistanis that there is a way to achieve a better life. South Waziristan remains no one’s model of a good life, and the Pakistani state needs to build on that hard truth to deny the appeal of the radicals and insurgents, especially in the FATA, where they were able to use the “Taliban culture” to become entrenched.

  In Pakistan, countering the insurgency needs to work on a number of levels. The bottom line is strengthening civil society. Until then, foreign aid will be required. All the armed Predator UAVs in the world would not be able to prevent the reestablishment of terrorist infrastructure nor, more to the point, can they enable the establishment of a legitimate Pakistani authority, one that can gain popular support, run a school system, or collect taxes. Pakistan-India rapprochement would make the needed internal changes in Pakistan easier, as with everything else in the subcontinent. Peace would undercut the Pakistani military’s current claim to determine national security policy and government spending priorities. But India has shown itself unwilling to effectively compromise on issues such as Kashmir, and the US has been unable to raise any benefits to Pakistan accruing from its better security relationship with India. So while such action remains a long-term goal, meanwhile steps to strengthen Pakistani civil society such as aid to education, or development and political integration in the FATA, must help stem the long-running crisis of governance in Pakistan that neither military nor civilian governments have succeeded in addressing.

  Pakistan’s military and elites fear India and distrust the US, the perceived leader of a world in which their country is increasingly unable to cope with mounting challenges. The Pakistan military does indeed oppose terrorists that set off bombs in their cities or insurgents that occupy their territory, but Al Qaeda, other terrorists, and the Afghan insurgents are not among those whom they perceive to be the true enemy, which remains India and, to an extent, the US, now seen as India’s supporter in its quest for regional power. Pakistan’s strategy of supporting Afghan insurgents and tolerating Pakistani terrorist groups stems from its belief that it can control these groups, despite the fact that blowback from their actions could cause national disaster, as when India threatened military action after high-profile attacks there in 2001 and 2008 were linked back to Pakistan-based groups. But in attempting to persuade the government of Pakistan of this fact, the US is effectively asking them to turn away from their primary policy tool in Afghanistan, namely a proxy war through Pushtun insurgents, while, at the same time, demonstrating that these polices may lead the US (and its coalition partners) to withdraw from Afghanistan, creating a vacuum that Pakistan may regret.

  Pakistan’s objective of putting a “moderate” Pushtun-dominated government that would be responsive to its security into power in Kabul cannot be achieved by tolerating insurgent sanctuaries. If the Afghan Taliban is ever able to regain power in Kabul, the impact on Pakistan will be devastating. Pakistan will be less able to control a Taliban regime than it was pre-2001. The blowback, in terms of refugees and radicalization, will likely outstrip anything seen in previous decades, and so the rational choice for Pakistan is to align with Kabul and the coalition and
look at Afghanistan as a potential site for economic growth. While Pakistan has done this in the past, as when it refused to act as a spoiler to the Bonn agreement in 2001, persuading them to do this as a fundamental part of their national security policy, however, is still a task that remains, and will be difficult as long as Afghanistan is perceived in terms either of India-Pakistan competition or Pakistan’s internal politics, especially the role in them of the military, ethnic Pushtuns, and Islamic radicals.

  Future US and Coalition Actions

  Unless current trends are turned around, the future for Afghanistan may turn out to be worse than its already grim past. If the US and other foreign supporters disengage from Afghanistan or withdraw their troops in the near future, it will not bring peace. Nor will it remove the motivation for continued violent attacks by the insurgents. Disengagement from Afghanistan is likely to seem an attractive option as casualties and expenses mount. If those Afghans working for the government in Kabul or those standing against the insurgents in their home districts see that they are going to be triaged away again by the same foreign countries that supported them against the Soviets and then walked away in the 1990s, many will end up fleeing or cutting a deal with the enemy. Some will stay and fight another round in Afghanistan’s civil wars. The foreign supporters will have then ended up undercutting rather than enabling Afghan self-determination.

  The US and the West have tried disengagement (effectively giving Pakistan a free hand) as their Afghanistan policy before, starting in 1989, and results were 11 September 2001 for the US, misery and destruction for Afghans, blowback and insurgency for Pakistan. Even today’s Afghanistan is much preferable to leaving the future to a new, more brutal, Afghan Taliban and their allies. That would mean another generation of conflict in Afghanistan and, instead of a beacon, a torch to the dry tinder of the surrounding regions of central Asia, the subcontinent, and Iran and the Gulf. The rise of the Pakistani and Punjabi Talibans are an indication that the Taliban brand name remains a beacon to increasingly radicalized Muslims frustrated by current regimes and looking for the answer in fundamentalist religious politics.