Castle Bevilacqua, April 20/21st
The same day that Bava effected his reconnaissance west of Mantua, the Alto Reno Battalion, a Bolognese volunteer unit some 500 strong, commanded by Colonel Livio Zambeccari, which was moving north before the rest of General Durando’s forces, occupied the castle of Bevilacqua, about eight kilometres north-east of Legnago, on the Padua Road, potentially interfering with the communications and provisioning of that fortress. Reports of this quickly spread, and a patrol of 20 uhlans, commanded by Oberlieutenant Appel, was despatched to investigate. Appel came under fire, which wounded two horses, and immediately pulled back to report.
As a result of this reconnaissance, Count Gorczowski ordered a larger force, from Verona, commanded by Major-General Baron Wuesthoff, assembled to remove the ‘insurgents’ from the castle. The detailed units moved off towards Bevilacqua in three columns. The 1st, or right hand column, under Colonel Heytzel, consisted of three companies of his own IR Archduke Sigismund, one and a half companies of the 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion, a platoon of pioneers, two rocket tubes, and 60 men of the Radetzky Hussars. This force moved off at 22:00. The centre column, one and a half companies of Brooder Grenzer and 18 uhlans, commanded by Oberlieutenant Berlković, marched along the post-road, starting an hour later. The left hand column, three companies of IR Sigismund, the regiment’s pioneers, half a company of jäger, two howitzers, and 40 hussars, commanded by Captain Mollinary, commenced their move at Midnight.
In the event, the action was limited mainly to a brief shelling. Without any artillery, and heavily outnumbered, Zambeccari’s troops, having exchanged a few shots, with some luck managed to recross the Adige and fall back to the Po, having suffered noticeable losses. The castle was left in flames, and the Austrian column marched back to Verona.9
Castellaro, April 23rd
General Gorczowski now learned of enemy troops at Castle Belforte and Castellaro, the first about nine kilometres from Mantua, and the second 15, to the north-east and east respectively. Once again he perceived that his communications with Legnago were threatened, and ordered Major Martinich to lead a force against both. Martinich, with his 11 and 12//Kaiser Jäger, three companies, IR Rukawina, a troop of Bayern Dragoons, and two guns, appeared before Castellaro at about 05:00, on the 23rd. The town, which had been barricaded, was held by 130 Modenese volunteers. Captain Slawitz’ Rukawina company was sent against the barricade, whilst Major Martinich threw his Kaiser Jäger around the flank. The defenders were soon driven from the place, suffering a number of killed and wounded, as well as prisoners. The attackers suffered two jäger wounded.
Castle Belforte, where Captain Ambrogio Longoni, commanding the 200 Mantuan volunteers there, was then assailed in the flank by 12//Kaiser Jäger, Captain Hauser, and a company of Rukawina. Driven out of the town, Longoni withdrew to Governolo on the north bank of the Po, a little under 30 kilometres south-east of Mantua, where the Modenese also assembled. Martinich, meanwhile, had marched his troops back to Mantua.
Governolo, April 24th
After hearing that the defeated volunteers had retired to Governolo, Count Gorczkowski decided that they must be expelled from there also. Colonel Castellitz, with seven companies of his own IR Ferdinand d’Este, two of Kaiser Jäger, a half-squadron of uhlans, and a 6 pounder battery, left the city at Midnight on the 23rd. Castellitz’ column was covered on its left by two companies and a troop of dragoons, and on its right, by another company.
At two places along the road, at Barbasso and Garolda, the latter five and a half kilometres from Governolo, the column met resistance from enemy pickets, and stormed four barricades. This was done without firing on the part of the attackers, in the hope that the main force at Governolo would not be forewarned, but this proved to be a forlorn hope. Castellitz arrived there to find his enemy ready and waiting, in a good position.
Not only were the troops driven back the previous night present, but also the contingent of the Duchy of Modena, some 800 men with four guns, commanded by Major Ludovico Fontana, presently attached to the Tuscan Division of General D’Arco Ferrari10. Castellitz wished to attempt the assault anyway, and prepared it with artillery fire. Because of the inundated fields in this very wet Spring, his artillery had to be placed on an embankment; in the resulting duel, one of his guns was dismounted. Twice, his Hungarians were able to advance on the village along a small dyke. However, the stubborn defence of the barricades prevented any further progress, and they were pushed back. After an hour and a half, Castellitz ordered a withdrawal, leaving behind the dismounted gun, a caisson, and those wounded who could not be moved. His loss had been nine dead, two officers and 16 men wounded, and three men missing. The Italian loss was two dead and four wounded at Governolo, and one or two men wounded in the previous skirmish, along with four prisoners. 11
Minor Operations around Verona (refer to map of Rivoli Plateau)
While both Mantua and Verona loomed high in the plans of the King and his staff, neither could be ignored, and constant probes were made in regard to both. With the time for a major effort felt to be approaching, information was required. Carlo Alberto left the Austrian lines of communication through the Veneto to be severed by Durando, Ferrari, and Pepe. He had already sent General Alberto La Marmora to the Venetian Government to organise and train their forces, and now concentrated his thoughts upon two principal objectives, Peschiera and Verona. At a conference on April 24th, held in Volta, it was decided to besiege the former, and subsequently undertake operations against the latter.
Piedmontese reconnaissance against the heights of Sommacampagna and Custoza, 23rd and 25th April
The first of the moves to test the defences of Verona took place on April 23rd. Substantial elements of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, 14 battalions, two bersaglieri companies, 12
squadrons, and three batteries, some 10,000 men in all, under the command of General de Sonnaz crossed the Mincio at Monzambano and Valeggio. Accompanied by the King, this large probe proceeded to occupied the heights of Oliosi and Montevento, and carefully reconnoitre the area between Peschiera, Villafranca, and Sommacampagna. All of the terrain concerned was found to be unoccupied by the enemy. Two days later, Prince Ferdinando conducted a repeat performance with his Reserve Division, crossing the river at Pozzolo, 13 kilometres south of Monzambano and scouring the country on the east bank, equally without result.
Affair of outposts, Castel d’Erbe, 26th April
On the 26th, the outposts of Brigade Strassoldo sent a patrol over Sommacampagna against Villafranca, consisting of two platoons IR Reisinger and a troop of Radetzky hussars. In a Piedmontese sweep west of Verona that same day, I/1st Infantry Regiment, Major Saxel, the Parmesan Volunteer Company, and one squadron of Novara Cavalry encountered the small Austrian force near the village of Ganfardine, southeast of Sommacampagna, just under 10 kilometres from Verona. The Austrians were lucky to escape with a loss of four killed, and 34 taken prisoner, 11 of the latter wounded. No Piedmontese loss is recorded. 12
Actions around Pastrengo at the End of April
For the Austrians, although the integrity of the Quadrilateral was now maintained, the question of supply was paramount. Radetzky, in his haste to link up with Welden in the South Tirol, on April 24th, ordered Wohlgemuth’s brigade across the Adige to occupy the hilltop settlement of Pastrengo, 15 kilometres from Verona13. Wohlgemuth’s instructions were to operate on the Piedmontese left and lines of communications, in the case of an advance by them against Verona. In his understandable concern for his only current line of communication, the Marshal was placing a single brigade in an isolated and most vulnerable situation. Since, in the face of a superior enemy, a secure escape route would be needed, on the morning of the 25th, a pontoon bridge across the Adige was constructed at Sega, north of Pastrengo. Wohlgemuth moved to occupy the area around Pastrengo, placing outposts in the villages of Sandrà and Colà, both some three kilometres to the south and south-west respectively. Unknown to Wohlgemuth, the Piedmontese inte
nded the settlements for the very same purpose.
April 28th
In accordance with orders appertaining to the opening of a formal siege of Peschiera, two Piedmontese columns advanced towards the unsuspecting command of General Wocher. The northernmost column, commanded by Major-General Bes, and consisting of his Piedmont Brigade, the Pavian Volunteer Company, and the 1st Field Artillery Battery, had the objective of securing the villages of Pacengo and Colà. The second column, commanded by the Duke of Savoy, was composed of Major-General Conti’s Composite Brigade, and had the mission of occupying Sandrà.
Around 08:00, the operation began, as Bes stated in his own report, “…on arrival at the intersection of the roads to Pacengo and Colà, I quickly ordered forward the 4th Regiment with two guns to the former, while keeping six pieces and the 3rd Regiment to move on Colà with me, since specific information I had received convinced me that I would contact the enemy more easily there than at Pacengo.”14 Pacengo was occupied without incident. Bes himself moved in the direction of Colà, preceded by an all-volunteer advance guard of 500 men of 3rd Regiment and the Pavian Volunteer Company. At about 14:00, a very lively firefight developed with the Oguliner Grenzer division near Colà; the Austrian outposts retreated slowly to Monte Raso.
Here, the Grenzer held fast, and they and the Piedmontese, occupying an adjoining height, Monte Letta, maintained an intermittent fire. An attempt to flank and climb Monte Raso, by elements of I/3rd Regiment, Major Cavaliere Capriglio, was annulled by the arrival of the rest of Major Knezich’s I/Oguliner Battalion. The fighting in this area was very slow and drawn out, largely because of the morainal landscape with its great number of drumlins. Eventually, coming under the fire of Lieutenant Della Valle’s artillery section, covered by Capriglio’s 1st Grenadier and 1st Fusilier companies, and concerned for their left flank, which was being threatened by III/3rd Regiment, Major Barone, the Austrians on Monte Raso withdrew. II/3rd Regiment, Major Count Baudi di Selve, remained on Monte Letta.
To the east, Sandrà was occupied without incident by a troop of Royal Piedmont Cavalry, escorting Major Alfonso La Marmora. From there, they heard firing from the direction of Colà. La Marmora sent word of this to the Duke of Savoy, who immediately brought forward the Composite Brigade and also pulled II/7th from the remains of Castelnuovo, but only a bickering fire between pickets took place until dark. The latter battalion was then returned to its previous position. All Austrian troops west of the Tione River were withdrawn to the east bank. The day ended with the Piedmontese having achieved their objectives, and they now occupied a line from Pacengo through Colà to Sandrà. Piedmontese losses for the day are given by Colonel Wehrlin, commander of the 3rd Regiment, as three or four dead, and one officer, one NCO, and 36 men wounded, all from his regiment. Austrian losses for the day are uncertain, as the casualties for the 28-30th are collated together (see below). Pinelli gives them as 53 killed and wounded, including a dead officer. This is very likely somewhat high, and certainly no officer was killed that day. Schneidawind, p. 276, comments that the loss was, “…not insignificant…”.15
That evening, the Marshal having been apprised of events on the west bank, he ordered Major-General Archduke Sigismund with his brigade to march immediately from Verona towards the Adige. Crossing the pontoon bridge, the column reached Piovezzano at 04:00 the next morning, concentrating FML Wocher’s division.
April 29th
At daybreak on the 29th, Brigade Taxis, temporarily commanded by Prince Friedrich Liechtenstein, was directed towards Bussolengo, in support of Wocher’s division. At around 08:30, informed of the brigade’s arrival in that area, Wocher decided upon an attack against Monte Romaldo, to assess the general situation, supported a demonstration by Liechtenstein against Bussolengo.
At 09:00, Major-General Wohlgemuth led a force of five and a half companies (two Kaiser Jäger, two Oguliner, and six platoons of Gradiscaner) against the heights, preceded by a dense skirmish line, against Major Mudry’s III/1st Infantry Regiment, Mudry constantly fed his skirmish line, compelling the attackers to do the same. Progress for them in the very steep and broken terrain was extremely difficult, and the attack dissolved into a prolonged firefight. Two platoons of 24/ Kaiser Jäger, led by the company commander, Captain Nagel, attempted to infiltrate through a small valley between Pastrengo and Bussloengo, but Nagel was killed, and the attempt failed. 16
To the east, 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, Major Weiß, moved to attack the eastern slopes of Monte Romaldo, supported by three guns, and the two battalions of IR Haugwitz against Bussolengo and and San Giustina. Bussloengo was easily occupied, but no progress could be made against the latter objective, against heavy canister fire. Colonel Pergen, the regiment’s commander, was wounded in the chest. At Monte Romaldo, the Austrian artillery were unable to support effectively, and the advance of Major Weiß’s battalion up the steep, broken slopes was extremely slow and difficult. The summit changed hands twice, but at around 14:00, with a further (equally difficult) counter-attack by Major Mudry’s Cacciatori, and II/2nd Infantry Regiment, Major Crud, Wocher decided upon a withdrawal. By the end of the day, neither side held the summit of Monte Romaldo, but it was Wocher who had to pull back. Around this same time, the brigade of Prince Liechtenstein was itself ordered by the Field Marshal towards Bussloengo, with a 12 pounder battery, and later followed by four squadrons of Division Schaffgotsche, with a horse artillery battery, and later still, by three squadrons of dragoons.
Specific known losses for the day were:
Austrian
9th Feld-Jäger Battalion – 15 badly wounded, five lightly wounded, and two missing
IR Haugwitz – One officer (Colonel Pergen) and one man wounded, five corporals and 36 men missing.
Battle of Pastrengo 1400, April 30 1848
Piedmontese
III/1st Infantry Regiment – three killed, and 21 wounded17
By now fully aware of the relative size of the Austrian forces on the west bank of the river, Carlo Alberto now ordered a full scale attack upon the Pastrengo position for the following day.
Action of Pastrengo, April 30th
Deployment and Plans
By early morning, General De Sonnaz had some 18,000 men in the area. He and his commanders were preparing orders for two simultaneous attacks on the forces at Pastrengo and Bussolengo. The King, however, had again changed his mind, and only the Pastrengo positions were to be assaulted. Furthermore, His Majesty was to lead the operation in person. It was thus dictated that action would commence at 11:00.
That morning, Division Wocher, 7,228 strong, was deployed thus:18
Brigade Wohlgemuth – Left Flank
I/Oguliner Grenz IR, two guns, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 4 – Between the Adige River, and the Colombara-Pastrengo Road (1,180 men)
IV/ Kaiser Jäger, two guns, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 4 – M. San Martino, southeast of Pastrengo (680 men)
I/ Gradiscaner Grenz IR, two guns, Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 4, half rocket battery – Monte Bionde (1,200 men)
Radetzky Hussar Regiment, two squadrons – South of Piovezzano (230 men)
Brigade Sigismund – Right Flank
Four companies, II/Banal Grenz IR, and two guns – Monte Le Broche and Le Costiere (800 men)
I&II/IR Piret, and 6th Six Pounder Foot Artillery Battery (Reserve) – Piovezzano (2,090 men & 133 men, six guns))
8th Feld-Jäger Battalion – Sega, and Ronchi, to the north of Sega (690 men)
Wocher’s own deployment was the best that could be achieved with the available troops. Hilleprandt commented that, “Wocher’s dispositions on the 30th were so appropriate, as to make a large expansion of the position possible.” Perhaps so, but he was nevertheless in a difficult and exposed position, with too few men, and certainly could not long stand against the force arrayed against him.
In the area of Bussolengo were the troops of Brigades Taxis, and F. Liechtenstein, and those elements later sent after them. This force numbered some 3,
500. The brigade of Major-General Rath was also moved forward from Verona to Lugagnano, some five kilometres south-east of Bussolengo.
In the presence of the King, the advance on the Pastrengo Hills began19. The Piedmontese advanced in the three columns. The force designated for the attack numbered some 13,500 men, and was deployed as follows…
On the left, Lieutenant-General Federici led General Bes and his Piedmont Brigade, Count Zanardi’s Piacenza Volunteers, 3/Bersaglieri, Captain dell’Isola, and 1st Field Artillery Battery, Captain Lurago, directly towards Pastrengo. This column totalled 5,139 men and eight guns.
South of this, the central column, under the command of the Duke of Savoy, was composed of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Ruffini, the Parmesan Infantry, Colonel Pettenati, Major-General D’Aviernoz’ Cuneo Brigade, 7th Field Artillery Battery, Captain Gazzera, and the Parmesan Artillery section. This force, 3,500 men and 10 guns, was to advance on M. Brocche and M. Bionde, in support of the right-flank column.
On the right, Lieutenant-General Broglia moved with Major-General D’Ussillon’s Savoy Brigade, 1 and 4/Bersaglieri, Lieutenants Prola and De Biller respectively, and 2nd Position Battery, Captain Boero, a total of 5,069 men and eight guns. Broglia’s orders called for him to move north from S. Giustina, cross the Bussolengo Road, and attack the M. San Martino, and the flank of M. Bionde in support of the Centre Column.20
The Advance
D’Usslion’s men, on the right, because of the difficult nature of the ground, assumed their formations at the outset, in anticipation of early contact with the enemy. This concern proved to be incorrect, and the progress was extremely slow. The road-bound artillery had to call repeatedly for the help of the engineers. With numerous delays and obstacles, Colonel Boyl soon found himself with only three companies of his I/1st Regiment, the Second and Third Battalions having become separated. Behind him, as the column became more elongated, the 2nd Infantry Regiment found itself still between the Santa Giustina Hills and the Bussolengo Road. Captain Boero’s battery, with two sections between Boyl’s 1st and 2nd Battalions, the third between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and fourth behind the latter battalion rapidly became detached. The two ammunition caissons also became separated from the guns.
Radetzky's Marches Page 14