Preceeding General D’Ussilon’s troops were a half company of Bersaglieri, and the Parmesan Volunteers. The Savoyards deployed with I/2nd, Major de Saxel, nearest the road, and I/1st, Major de Saxel, to their right. Behind these, II/2nd, Major Crud, and behind this battalion were III/1st, Major Mudry, on the left, and II/1, Major George, to the right. The Brigade’s sixth battalion, III/2nd Regiment, Major de Regard de Villeneuve, was engaged in escorting the artillery. North of the road, in the first line, stood I/16th Regiment and II/16th Regiment, and behind them, III/16th, Major Villanova, and the Parmesan Infantry, Colonel Pettenati.
While the deployment took place, a section of 7th Field Artillery Battery moved forward to support the advance of a skirmisher screen. Caught in the open by Austrian fire the artillery around Croce Bianca, Lieutenant Carretto, commanding, was killed, along with both gun-captains, three or four men, and several of the escorting infantry platoon, and the section beat a hasty retreat. The infantry attack now started. The advance was slow, often caused by crossing ditches and walls, while under effective artillery fire from 12 Pounder Battery Nr. 2, Oberlieutenant Borzaga, and Horse Artillery Battery Nr. 2, Oberlieutenant Pauer. On the right, the Savoyards advanced resolutely, and battled for an hour against an equally resolute defence. Mollard attempted to flank the enemy, but was halted by fire into his own flank, and forced to pull back. Lieutenant Ferrero, serving in the 2nd Infantry Regiment, took part in the attack, later describing it in his diary,
Two battalions of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 1st, commanded by Colonel Mollard, were sent to attack the village of Croce Bianca, which was fortified and defended by artillery. My company was at the head of the column. We crossed some fields planted with mulberry trees bisected by dry stone walls, over which we constantly had to climb. Once within musket range of the enemy, we received a dreadful discharge of grapeshot. We remained under this fire for more than an hour, calm and unmoved, without any chance to advance, since we were without artillery support. Finally, orders arrived to withdraw and abandon such a murderous endeavour, in which we must certainly have perished.
The Third Battalion of the Second Regiment, guarding a battery which had been placed on the main road from Verona to Peschiera, also suffered considerably. We had about 30 dead and 150 wounded, amongst them Captains de Concy, d’Yvoly, and Faverge, and Lieutenant Orsier.11
On the left, matters had gone no better. The advance, as with the Savoyards, disordered by the terrain, was hit by heavy and accurate artillery and small arms fire, and badly shaken, I/16th losing 33 men. No further advance was possible in these circumstances, and the Composite Brigade, too, withdrew. After this, since the operational orders stipulated a return to camp, at around 14:00 General Broglia ordered just that. However, before this materialised, General Robilant’s Cavalry Brigade arrived. Although not supposed to be involved in the operation, Colonel Alfonso La Marmora had urged Robilant to move forward. Encountering Broglia in these circumstances, the charismatic La Marmora persuaded Broglia that, with Robilant’s support, something could be achieved. Though the column moved east again, its advance guard, a squadron Royal Piedmont Cavalry, and two horse artillery pieces, encountered a much larger Austrian force. There was no choice but to withdraw.
Battle of Santa Lucia 1430, May 6 1848
Piedmontese Artillery, Santa Lucia, May 6th 1848 (unknown artist)
Pinelli, who was present, gives a stinging criticism of Broglia over his conduct of this attack:
The poor conduct of the general, who always threw himself in the ditch with his chief of staff every time they spotted the smoke coming from the Austrian guns, deeply affected the morale of the green troops. After a 45 minute long wait, the columns were advanced a further 400 metres, and some battalions were moved over to the left. After that, the general, standing on the edge of the ditch, announced that he was going to dine at the Pontara Farm House.12
The failure of the attack on Croce Bianca brought a lull to the battlefield. The Austrians did not know the further intentions of the Piedmontese. Neither did the Piedmontese. In the north, D’Aspre was firmly in control of San Massimo and Croce Bianca. Having remained entirely of the defensive, in prepared positions, Liechtenstein and Gyulai had lost comparatively few men. The Brigade of Strassoldo, driven back from Santa Lucia, was reorganising, along with the D’Anthon Grenadier Battalion, along the high ground near the Main Road from Verona. The Clam Brigade, deployed in columns of divisions, was positioned to cover the Verona-Villafranca Road. Additional troops from within Verona were being made available.
In the area of Santa Lucia, the Piedmontese now had 15 battalions and 24 guns (the Guard and Aosta Brigades, and the 11th Infantry Regiment). 12th Infantry Regiment, having not received orders to advance along with the 11th, had remained further back.
The Cuneo Brigade (minus one battalion), by 14:00 had arrived in support, and now formed a second line behind the units around Santa Lucia.13 On the right of the line was the Acqui Brigade, which had not thus far been engaged.
In this situation, Carlo Alberto made the decision to terminate the operation. There had been no hint of a possible uprising in Verona, and the King felt that enough information had been gathered as to the city’s defences. The withdrawal was to be covered by the Cuneo Brigade. 8th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Fenile, was ordered to deploy west of Santa Lucia, and the two battalions of the 7th Regiment, to take the place of the Guards and Aosta Brigades. First to withdraw was the Aosta Brigade, which had suffered the greatest loss, at about 15:00.
Marshal Radetzky had followed the action from the San Spirito Bastion of the city walls. Perceiving the start of some significant enemy move, he ordered that Santa Lucia be retaken. On the Austrian left, Count Clam, whose brigade had been least engaged, advanced in a flanking move, I/IR Prohaska, Colonel Reischach on the left, and I/IR Reisinger on the right. On Clam’s right, Major-General Baron Salis-Soglio personally accompanied III/IR Archduke Sigismund, I/IR Geppert, Lieutenant-Colonel Leutzendorf, and two companies of IR Prohaska marched directly on Santa Lucia. In reserve were Kopal’s Jäger battalion, Grenadier Battalion D’Anthon, and two more Prohaska companies.
On the Piedmontese right, Colonel Montale’s 17th Infantry Regiment was deployed roughly half way between Tomba and Santa Lucia. Reischach’s attack first encountered a platoon of the regiment’s 2nd Grenadier Company, commanded by Lieutenant Rebaudengo, the escort to three guns. A firefight quickly developed, and Rebaudengo was rapidly reinforced by the regiment’s 3rd Fusilier Company, Captain Benedetto Molinari. Reischach continued to advance, the band playing, and Molinari was wounded in the leg. The situation was retrieved for the Piedmontese by the arrival of two companies of the 17th’s Cacciatori Battalion, Major Castinelli, and the Austrian advance halted.
The attack against Santa Lucia from the north likewise failed. A countermove of I and II/7th Infantry Regiment, personally led by the Duke of Savoy, pushed back Baron Salis-Soglio’s column, mortally wounding the general himself, and leaving a gap in the Austrian line, which Prince Schwarzenberg was forced to fill with the two remaining companies of IR Prohaska, and a troop of uhlans. Leutzendorf’s attack had also been stopped, and he and his adjutant both killed.
Radetzky, unaware that the enemy were withdrawing, now released his last disposable reserves, Grenadier Battalion Weiler, and I/Archduke Sigismund. The grenadiers took the place of III/IR Sigismund, the latter being put in reserve. Clam’s attack resumed with I/ IR Sigismund deployed between his other two battalions. Both attacks proceeded, but met with no opposition. Baron Clam-Gallas described this second advance, in his report:
I encountered no more resistance to my second advance, since the enemy was in full retreat at all points, and penetrated Santa Lucia without difficulty from several sides. On the road to Villafranca individual shots still fell, and on that to Sommacampagna, one saw fleeing enemy soldiers. 14
The Piedmontese withdrawal took place completely unhindered. All troops were back in their bivouacs by
18:0015. There was no follow up by the Austrians, whose outposts reoccupied their positions held prior to the attack. The battle of Santa Lucia was over.
Given the overall situation, it seems eminently sensible to have undertaken a reconnaissance in force to test and gauge the defences of Verona. With hindsight, it is simple to condemn the plan from the outset. Without doubt, given the size of the operation, more time should have been taken in preparing it. Perhaps the ease of the victory at Pastrengo only a week earlier, where the Austrians had been driven from their hilltop positions at trifling cost, made a difference. Whatever the reasoning, what occurred was neither an attack, nor a reconnaissance. The result was a bloody nose, and morale suffered badly.
16th Regiment’s poor showing was particularly singled out. Colonel Ruffini was replaced the following day by Major Cauda.16 On the other hand, Major-General Marquis Carlo Emanuele Ferrero La Marmora, on the Headquarters staff, considered that others were also to blame. In a personal letter, written the next day, he expressed his view:
The Broglia Division, which formed a fourth column on the extreme left, was unable to take S. Massimo, which was where the main forces were to converge. However, circumstances had taken Aosta, the Guards, and the Regina towards Santa Giustina which should have been covered by Casale and Acqui, and then turned to complete the engagement. Thus, we were separated from, and out of communication with, the Broglia Division. They faced large numbers and suffered greatly, especially Savoy and the poor Parmesans. The former, I should add, between ourselves, gave way, compromising the rest of the division, and was unable to bring away its wounded.17
Piedmontese losses are difficult to pinpoint. Certainly, the initial official figure of 98 killed and 659 wounded is much too low. Colonel Fabris gives the following18:
Killed Wounded
1st Division
5 officers, 19 men 6 officers, 219 men
2nd Division
19 men 4 officers, 131 men
3rd Division
1 officer, 29 men 10 officers, 269 men
Reserve Division
37 men 10 officers, 116 men
Totals
6 officers, 104 men 30 officers, 735 men
These figures are also much too low. The 11th Infantry Regiment (2nd Division), for example, had 117 killed and wounded (Brigata Casale, p. 54), which, using Fabris, means that the rest of the division suffered only 37 losses. Equally, as stated above, the Savoy Brigade (Reserve Division) alone lost some 30 killed and 200 wounded. Pinelli states that 16th Regiment lost 150 killed and wounded.
The question of prisoners and missing is also unclear, but was most probably between 750 and 1,000.19 200 prisoners were taken by the Austrians20, and the rest missing, the majority of whom probably deserted. Losses as a whole are likely to have been between 1,500 and 2,000, probably nearer to the latter.
Austrian casualties were very much lower, as a result of mainly defending generally strong positions. They were:
Killed – One general, six officers and 65 men
Wounded – Seven officers and 182 men
Prisoners & Missing – 87 men
Total – One general, 14 officers, and 334 men.
Unsurprisingly, Colonel Kopal’s 10th Feld-Jäger Battalion suffered the greatest loss of an individual unit, two officers and 16 men killed, 50 men wounded, and 30 men missing.
The reconnaissance had developed into a battle, a battle for which the attackers had no plan. Consequently, little could be gained but a feel for the strength of the defences. This was certainly effected. For Carlo Alberto and his generals, waiting for the siege train’s arrival at Peschiera had been a costly interlude.
The entire Sardinian army was demoralised by the defeat. General Rossi, the army artillery commander, bluntly refers to, “The disaster of Santa Lucia”. Nevertheless, the battle had no strategic importance. As the then Cadet-Corporal Bruna later added in his memoirs, “The victory at Santa Lucia, glorious though it was for Austrian arms, had no decisive consequences.”21
Minor Actions around Verona, mid to late May
Skirmish of Casella (May 9th)
On the morning of May 9th, a little towards noon, a skirmish erupted near the village of Dossobono. Troops of the 5th Piedmontese Regiment, and a squadron of Genoa Cavalry, a company of Bersaglieri, and two guns, engaged an indeterminate number of Austrian troops, forcing them back. Piedmontese losses were one officer and four men killed.
Badia Calavena –against San Andrea, 19th-20th May
A flying column consisting of 21/Kaiser Jäger, Captain Baron Pirquet, and two rocket tubes, under the command of Captain Schindler, was dispatched into the mountains north-east of Verona, after reports of a force of Crusaders being in the area of Badia Calavena, some 25 kilometres from the city. The volunteers were hunted through the rugged terrain for three days, but without success.
Skirmish of Dossobono (May 26)
General Passalacqua having decided to push a reconnaissance beyond Peschiera with Captain De Biller’s Bersaglieri company and a squadron of the Aosta Cavalry, Cavaliere di Pralormo, this was undertaken on May 26th. Captain De Biller proceeded to Dossobono, moving alongside a pathway to the left of the main road to Verona. Finding the Austrian in greater strength, De Biller and Pralormo withdrew in haste, losing one man.
_______________________
1
Memorie Inedite, p. 231.
2
Bava, p 12.
3
Pinelli, p. 323, Fabris, Vol II, pp. 204-206, Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, pp. 4-5, and Grüll, pp 176-177.
4
Ibid, p. 13, says that the meeting ended at 18:00. See Rüstow, p 102, for the inevitable inadequacy of the orders. To be fair to both Bava and Salasco, Bava’s ‘sketch’ had to be transformed into these orders.
5
Ibid, and Della Rocca, p. 63-64.
6
Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, ÖMZ, 1865, Volume 1. For the full Order of Battle for the Austrian Army on May 6th, see Appendix VI.
7
Zwierzina, Johann, (Bei Santa Lucia, Vol. I, 1898, pp. 1-3). Zwierzina is too early in his timing of the episode.
8
Fabris, Vol II, p. 222, comments that perhaps it was the last time when an advance in the style of Frederick the Great was made. Sadly, it was not.
9
Pimodan, pp. 63-64.
10
Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1865, Vol II, p. 21.
11
Ferrero, p.46. Major-General d’Usillon gives his brigade’s loss for the day as about 30 killed, and 200 wounded, of whom 20 were officers, Relazioni e Rapporti, Volume II, p.65.
12
Pinelli, Volume III, p. 338.
13
This brigade had had a difficult march, and was deploying facing San Massimo, when ordered south by the Duke of Savoy.
14
‘Gefechts–Relation Ueber die Vertheidigung und den Angriff aus St. Lucia den 6. Mai’, KA AFA, May 1848, Document 193.
15
Rüstow, p. 121.
16
Cauda himself refers to May 6th in his official report, as an ‘unfortunate day’ for the regiment, Relazioni e Rapporti, Volume II, p.267. Pinelli also states that the regiment had 200 missing, many of whom deserted on the night of the 6th.
17
Alberti, Mario Degli, Alcuni episodi del Risorgimento Italiano illustrato con lettere e memorie inedited del generale Marchese Carlo Emanuele Ferrero Della Marmora Principe de Masserano (Biblioteca di Storia Italiana Recente (1800-1850), Volume I, Turin 1907).
18
Fabris, Volume II, pp. 244-245.
19
Pinelli, Volume 3, p. 351, questions the official figures, and concludes that the most likely total is about 1,500. Prince Ferdinando in Relazioni e Rapporti, Volume I, p. 198, gives a figure of 2,000 killed and wounded, but this must include the prisoners and missing. Scalchi, p. 124, also says 1,500 killed and wounded.
20
Hille
prandt, ‘1848’, p. 25. He considers that the total Piedmontese missing were 1,000, which would bring the total close to Prince Ferdinando’s.
21
Rossi, Relazioni e Rapporti, Volume III, p. 10, and Bruna, p. 68.
8
Rome and Naples falter as the Kingdom of Upper Italy is created
The End of The Holy War – The Papal Allocution of April 29th
With units of his army already committed to what many regarded as a Holy War, Pope Pius was coming under increasing pressure to declare it as one. Indeed, one order of the day issued on April 5th, by General Durando’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Marquis D’Azeglio, had specifically stated the Divine nature of the conflict, and instructed the Papal troops to wear a small cross on their uniforms.1 Although the Pope agonised over the committal of his troops to the conflict, convinced that only he would still make the final decision on their use, he had already effectively allowed their commitment by placing them subject to the orders of Carlo Alberto.
By now, political Liberalism was inseparable from the movement for Italian unification. Throughout April, the Pontiff was lobbied by his Ministers to fully join the war, and he was in consequent turmoil over his position as the spiritual father of all Catholics. The possibility of a schism in Germany immediately became apparent once it became known that the Papal forces were on the march. When, on April 26th, Durando crossed the Po on orders from Carlo Alberto, the Pope cannot have been surprised, but it certainly concentrated his mind. Politically, his own proposed league of Italian states was now being overshadowed by Carlo Alberto’s own plans for northern Italy. One of Pius’ ablest Ministers, the Minister of the Interior, Pellegrino Rossi, stated at this time that, “The national sentiment, and its ardour for war, are a sword, a weapon, a mighty force: either Pius IX must take it resolutely in hand, or the factions hostile to him will seize it, and turn it against him, and against the Papacy.”2
Radetzky's Marches Page 17