Radetzky's Marches

by Michael Embree

  8

  Ferrero, p. 54.

  9

  Grüll, p. 241.

  10

  Ibid, p. 249.

  11

  Bortolotti, p. 159.

  10

  Radetzky’s first move

  Reinforcement, Supply, and Planning an Offensive

  On May 25th, FML Thurn’s very tired Corps returned to Verona, after its second failed swipe at Vicenza. This placed Radetzky’s Army there to almost 50,000 men, only 20% of whom were necessary to garrison it. The major consideration now was the critical supply position. With Durando firmly across the Austrian supply lines, it was imperative that something had to be done rapidly. In addition, the Marshal was fully aware of the equally critical state of Peschiera’s food supplies. On the other hand, with about 40,000 men available, a major offensive move was now possible.1

  Weighing up the options with his Chief of Staff, Baron Hess, it was decided that an attack would be made against Carlo Alberto, rather than Vicenza, since defeating the former would mean relieving Peschiera, and might end the war. In any case, whatever the risk, some move had to be made. The plan formulated by Radetzky and Hess was risky. The army would leave Verona, and march south to Mantua, increase the garrison of that city, and then, with the main force, attack the enemy right flank rolling it up from the south. The key phase would be the march to Mantua, since this involved the marching columns moving right across the front of the deployed enemy army.

  Detailed plans were swiftly drawn up, with the operation to begin on the evening of the 27th. The march would take place in three columns. I Corps had the most dangerous route, along the direct road from Verona to Mantua, closest to the enemy. It comprised only two brigades, as that of Colonel Benedek was already in Mantua. The other two columns would move south a little further to the east, on two separate roads, before both then headed west on the main Legnago-Mantua Road. For the moment, the troops were allowed rest.

  Austrian Concentration in Mantua

  The Austrian advance began at 20:30 on April 27th, the three columns taking their diverse routes to Mantua. The order of march was as follows:

  I Corps took the road through Tomba and Vigasio, halting to eat at Castelbelforte. From here, the march continued, and the column entered Mantua at 14:30 the next day. This movement was covered, on its vulnerable right, by a small flank-guard consisting of one company and a troop of cavalry.

  II Corps moved south along the main road to Isola della Scala, moving through that town, and then turning west at Nogara, before halting for a meal at Castellaro. Their march was then continued west, and the column reached Mantua at 19:00 on the 28th. Behind these, following the same road, marched Infantry Brigades Maurer and Rath, of the Reserve Corps, along with the Bridging Train and the Reserve Artillery. Brigade Schulzig, also from the Reserve Corps, screened the Rideau whilst the main force moved. It did not leave Verona until daybreak on the 28th, and reached Mantua overnight.

  The third column, comprising III Corps and the Cavalry Division, initially took the Legnago Road, turning south at Pozzo, and then, after a meal, also moved west from Nogara, and on to Mantua. This column also arrived in the city overnight on the 28/29th, having moved the greatest distance of all.2 These movements were all successfully screened, partially by diversion on the western shore of Lake Garda by the brigade of Colonel Zobel.

  The Action at Bardolino, 28th May (see Rivoli Plateau map)

  To draw enemy attention away from the main advance, Brigade Zobel, on the 27th, was ordered to make a feint attack towards Garda and Bardolino on the following day, in order to try and pull more Piedmontese troops to the right bank of the Mincio. Then, on the 29th, an attempt was to be made to push through Cavalcaselle, and if possible, re-provision Peschiera.3

  At 16:00, on the 28th, Colonel Zobel moved against the village of Garda with III/ Kaiser-Jäger, Major Burlo, two companies, IR Baden, and two rocket tubes. Finding it unoccupied, the force moved on, and at 19:00, the advance guard developed hostile troops at the village of Bardolino, which was defended by a very weak company of Pavian Student volunteers, about 40 men, and a few National Guards.4 The streets had been barricaded, and the church made the focus of the defence.

  After a short bombardment by the rocket detachment, Baron Zobel personally led the assault. Two platoons of 14 Kaiser-Jäger, led by Lieutenant Röth, advanced on the left, whilst the other two platoons, under Lieutenant Ritter von Mastwyk attacked the church, on the right. The struggle was brief, the outnumbered students being driven from the settlement. One man of 14th Company was lightly wounded. The defenders suffered seven or eight dead, and possibly some wounded.5

  Actions of Calmasino and Cisano, 29th May

  Next morning, around 11:00, Zobel, hoping to repeat the previous day’s success, issued orders to Major Burlo to advance his battalion and 11 and 12/IR Baden against Lazise, on the lake shore, nine kilometres south of Bardolino. Zobel himself, with two battalions of IR Schwarzenberg, and Six Pounder Battery Nr. 1, advanced south from Cavajon. In this very hilly terrain, the heights run parallel to the lake shore, and because of this, the road which ran from the lake shore village of Cisano, just under two kilometres south of Bardolino, inclines, twists, and turns according to the hills and ravines it passes through.

  Along this road, was posted Colonel Wehrlin’s 3rd Infantry Regiment. The main force, seven companies of the I and III Battalions were in position south of Cavajon, near the village of Calmasino, blocking Zobel’s advance. The Student Bersaglieri were strung out in front. II/3rd Infantry, temporarily under the command of Major di Capriglio, was positioned at Cisano, with one section of artillery. The remaining company of the regiment served as the link between the two groups.

  At about 12:15, Zobel encountered Wehrlin’s troops. He detached two companies, under Captain Moga, to attempt an envelopment west of the road from Cavajon to Calmasino. Moga was able to push the Pavian Students from their position in Calmasino Cemetery back into the village, but was then halted by the three companies of I/3rd Regiment, which came forward to support.

  On the Piedmontese right, east of Calmasino, Captain Moser, with two Schwarzenberg companies, attacked the heights there. The assault was thrown back by II/3rd Regiment, and Moser was killed. Another company was committed, but second attack also failed, costing another company commander his life, Captain Leimel. A further attempt was made by Captain Holzhausen, who managed to reach the summit, but was then fired upon from the right flank, and pushed back. At this point, Zobel decided that enough was enough, and ordered a withdrawal to Cavajon, which was kept in good order by Major Scharinger.

  As these events took place along the lake shore, Major Burlo’s column encountered the Pavian Students, pushing them back through Cisano, before encountering II/3rd Regiment. The Piedmontese were deployed on heights protected by earthworks and a deep ravine. The 3rd and 5th Fusilier Companies were in action until their ammunition was running low, and withdrew a short distance, but were then reinforced, checking the Austrian advance. At this point, Burlo, too, decided that nothing could be gained here, and withdrew towards Bardolino.

  Reporting the day’s events to Headquarters, Lieutenant-General De Sonnaz stated that he did not feel that the enemy was very strong on that flank, but he nevertheless requested not to have any of the troops under his command to be transferred to another sector. This was granted.

  Casualties in these various actions were as follows:

  Austrian (Grüll)

  Kaiser Jäger – One officer and seven men killed, one officer and 15 men wounded, seven men missing

  IR Schwarzenberg – Two officers and 13 men killed, two officers and 33 men wounded

  IR Baden – Two men killed, and 11 wounded

  Piedmontese (Fabris)

  One killed, and 35 wounded 6

  The Battle of Curtatone – Montanara (also refer to map on page 178)

  As the various actions on the Rivoli Plateau unfolded, the Corps of Observation of Mantua r
emained deployed only about eight kilometres from the city. The constant patrolling and skirmishing of the past few weeks had sharpened their senses, and readied them for further fighting, although no-one in the Tuscan Division realised how drastically the situation had changed in only a few days. The Tuscan troops would not be the only ones who would be surprised by the Austrian build-up. Josef Bruna, already in Mantua, for one, was certainly unaware of the major operation to come, as he related. “One can imagine my happy surprise as, on the evening of the 28th, I was returning from duty at Fort Pietole, and found the Field Marshal’s army encamped on the glacis and the road from Mantua.”7

  The first Piedmontese information relating to a possible enemy move was anecdotal. First, on the morning of the 28th, Major-General Passalacqua, commander of the Casale Brigade, sent a message to Baron Bava from his Headquarters in Villafranca, to the effect that a doctor in the town of Trevenzuolo, around 12 kilometres south-west of Villafranca, had actually witnessed an Austrian column moving towards Mantua at midnight. This column included between 16 and 20 pieces of artillery. Further, the man asserted that he had heard that another column had been seen in the town Isola della Scala, about 16 kilometres from Villafranca, also heading in the direction of Mantua. This information reached Bava around noon.8

  The General was not overly concerned, but during the afternoon, he received a missive from the War Minister. General Franzini had also heard of the rumour, and, once more interfering in operational matters, he wrote in the following terms to Bava:

  I request Your Excellency to order the Tuscan Corps to pay due notice to the situation, and inform them that they were, after a decent defence, to retire along the Mincio towards Goito, where it will be more conducive for our reinforcements to appear in time, and repulse the enemy. His Majesty trusts completely in Your Excellency, and will provide you with all necessary reinforcements.9

  Neither man as yet considered the matter to be of great importance. Bava duly informed De Laugier that he considered the reports exaggerated, and that, should the latter be attacked, he could rely upon Bava’s full and prompt support. De Laugier received this at around 19:00, and he then issued his own orders that, should his division be attacked, it would hold its positions until Piedmontese reinforcements arrived. His superior’s awareness of the situation, though, was about to change.

  During that evening, following a second report from Passalacqua, Bava ordered a reconnaissance in the direction of Mantua. This reported large numbers of Austrian troops encamped around the city. Now thoroughly grasping the danger to the Tuscans, Bava sent a second order to De Laugier, informing him that substantial numbers of Imperial troops had, indeed, moved from Verona to Mantua, and that, in case of attack, he should stand his ground, and should he request support, Bava would immediately move to his assistance. In extreme circumstances, De Laugier was authorised to withdraw northwards to Goito, and defend that place until joined by the Piedmontese. He received these instructions at 01:30. Most unfortunately, the General interpreted this as an order to stay put.

  Two hours after the second despatch, Bava sent another. Now realising that a major enemy offensive was indeed under way, he wrote to De Laugier:

  To the commander, Tuscan troops at Le Grazie.

  Custoza, 28 May 1848

  According to more recent news, the Austrians who moved out of Verona are carrying bridging equipment. Based on this piece of information, I suppose that they are going to throw a bridge between Goito and Rivalta, thereby attempting to attack your troops from the rear.

  Battle of Curtatone/Montanara, May 29 1848

  Therefore, I hasten to inform you of this, so that you may send your cavalry to thoroughly scour the Mincio River bank and discover any such enemy move; and that you can try to stave it off, for which it would be expedient for you to place a body of troops, with some artillery, in a good location for them to rush to stop the enemy attempt.

  If, in spite of everything, the enemy crossing succeeds, then you will no longer carry out the retreat to Goito as I had outlined in my previous letter, but you will instead fall back to Gazzoldo, so as to avoid to be trapped between two enemy pincers; and, taking advantage of the broken terrain, you will gradually withdraw to Volta, where you will find our army in orderly array.

  I also inform you that by means of this same courier, that I send some opportune instructions to Colonel Rodriguez at Goito.10

  He then had gone to Royal Headquarters in Sommacampagna, and discussed the situation with The King and the War Minister. In a conversation lasting until midnight, it was finally agreed that a defensive position, facing south, should be occupied at Goito. If there was not enough time for this, the fall-back position was Volta. On this basis, initially the troops were ordered to Volta

  Bava was back in Custoza by 01:00, on the 29th, sending out orders for a concentration at Goito. He also sent two further messages to De Laugier. In the first of these (the fourth in total so far) he told De Laugier that the enemy had concentrated in Mantua, and that, should he unable to maintain his positions against them, he should now make for Volta, where Bava himself would be. This extremely helpful advice arrived at Tuscan Headquarters as the battle was being fought. Finally, at 15:30, a fifth, and final communiqué was received. It was as pointless as the previous one. In fact, all talk of making a fighting withdrawal was actually pointless, since De Laugier’s force had neither the experience nor the training to do so. They could only stand and fight, hoping for some support.11

  On the morning of May 29th, The Tuscan Division was mainly deployed in four groups (See Appendix XII). Around 750 men were at General De Laugier’s Headquarters at Le Grazie. At Curtatone were some 2,000 men, with four guns, and at Montanara, a further 2,700 men, also with four guns. To the north, ironically where Bava was concentrating his forces, were 950 men, with two guns. Small detachments were scattered elsewhere.

  At 10:00, on a bright and warm day, the Austrian advance began. There were three attack columns. First, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, with Brigades Benedek and Wohlgemuth, 8,600 men, and 12 guns, whose objective was Curtatone, along the main road. In the centre, Prince Carl Schwarzenberg, with the Brigades of Clam and Strassoldo, 5,200 men, and 12 guns, was to move along the road to Montanara. On the Austrian left, the Brigade of Prince Friedrich Liechtenstein, 4,300 men, and six guns, had the task of making a flanking move to come up against Monanara from the south. This brigade was the only formation from II Corps to be committed to the operation.12

  Curtatone

  Ready to receive the attack at Curtatone, Colonel Campia had about 1,000 regular troops, and slightly fewer volunteers and Civic Guard. The defences at Curtatone consisted of some 300 metres of entrenchments, extending south and west from the lake shore. At this point, there was also a large defensible country house, as there also was at the other end. In the centre, where the works crossed the road, were emplaced two 6 pounder cannon, and a howitzer. Behind these, to the north of the road were the small houses of Curtatone. Behind both Curtatone and Montanara, was a canal, with a bridge at each place.

  Colonel Benedek, being the first to begin the march from Mantua, had already put his troops in combat formations. In the first line, north of the road, he placed II/IR Paumgarten, with I/IR Paumgarten behind them. South of it, stood I/IR Gyulai, with II/IR Gyulai to the rear. At the front, were deployed four companies of Szluiner Grenzer in open order astride the Curtatone Road. The advance against the entrechments at Curtatone then started, at about 10:00.13

  Cadet Corporal Bruna was in the ranks of I/Paumgarten that morning:

  Several hundred paces distant from that place, we left the road, which lay under the cannon fire of the enemy, and Colonel Benedek sent our regiment to the banks of the lake, with the order, at the signal, to storm the left flank of the enemy’s entrenchments. While our artillery and the skirmishers of the Szluiner Grenzer sought to shake the enemy, our regimental commander, Colonel von Döll, positioned both of his battalions in a depression, in or
der to avoid any unnecessary casualties, as he climbed to a higher-lying building, from where he could observe the progress of the battle and await the order to attack. We lay flat on the ground in battalion columns, our weapons in hand, hundreds of bullets whizzing over our heads, and the water of the lake kicked up into foam by this deadly iron rain.14

  As soon as the Szluiners had approached the Tuscan positions, a brisk exchange of fire broke out. This action was most protracted. Two guns of the 1st 12 Pounder Battery, under Oberlieutenant Schneider, were brought forward on the road, to engage the Tuscan guns, as was a rocket battery, moving to only some 900 paces from the defences.

  About noon, Benedek ordered the infantry forward, Bruna amongst them:

  The noon hour must have passed, when it was believed that the enemy was crumbling, and the signal to attack was given. The closed masses sprang up, the drums beat the assault. The columns moved with rapid steps through the thick hail of bullets, my company on the left-most of the closed battalion columns. Our regimental adjutant, Oberlieutenant Zaremba – one of the bravest and most beloved officers of the regiment, dismounted and placed himself voluntarily at the head of my company, as our Captain had, shortly before, been pensioned, and Zaremba had – as the oldest Oberlieutenant – his orders already in his pocket, and wished to show here that he deserved the command of a company. There appeared to be many sharpshooters in the enemy entrenchments, since we approached these by a barricaded house, and were about 400 paces away; among the many men we lost, were no fewer than 10 officers killed or wounded. Our brave officers were always in the lead, but were also, unfortunately, recognisable by their dark uniforms, so that the enemy could easily put them in their sights. Despite the murderous fire, we pushed irresistibly forwards. I was driven to be the first on the crest of the entrenchments, but reaching there, I saw that already, several others, braver and more favoured by fate, had already come before me. Colonel Döll also, armed with a club – or more accurately, half a tree – had already climbed onto the entrenchments and appeared not dissimilar to an angry Mars. The first, however, who had mounted the entrenchments was a daring and roguish fellow from the 8th Company, an Israelite named Traube. During the quiet period before the actual battle he made his bet with his jovial Captain, as to which of the two would storm the works first – ‘What do you want to bet?’ – asked the Captain, who was brave as well as funny – ‘I only have four twenties’ – to which Traube replied, and this was rarely the case with him – ‘I want to bet that.’ – ‘we’re agreed’, called the Captain. Traube won the bet, and more; he won the Medal for Bravery. Admittedly, a canister shot had taken his captain’s eagerness as its goal; he had already come near to the enemy entrenchments, but there, the deadly shot had laid him on the ground; after the battle, we found him, badly wounded, in the military hospital. 15