killed
five men
wounded
three officers and 27 men
missing
eight men
IR Sigismund
wounded
one man
Foot Battery Nr, 8
wounded
two men
12 Pound Battery Nr. 1
killed
one man
wounded
two men
Rocket Battery Nr. 1
wounded
one man
II Corps
Brigade Friedrich Liechtenstein
8th Feld-Jäger Battalion
killed
one officer and 13 men
wounded
three officers and 34 men
missing
14 men
9th Feld-Jäger Battalion
wounded
two men
IV Kaiser Jäger Battalion
wounded
two officers and 24 men
IR Franz Carl
killed
two officers and 13 men
wounded
one officer and 12 men
missing
13 men
Horse Battery Nr. 2
wounded
one man
Brigade Taxis
Staff
killed
one general
wounded
one officer
IR Kaiser
killed
six men
wounded
one officer and 35 men
IR Haugwitz
killed
three men
wounded
one officer and 12 men
missing
three men
Foot Battery Nr. 4
killed
two men
wounded
three men
Brigade Gyulai
11th Feld-Jäger Battalion
wounded
two men
missing
one man
Brigade Culoz
IR Reisinger
killed
15 men
wounded
four officers and 57 men
missing
15 men
IR Latour
killed
one officer and 27 men
wounded
five officers and 121 men
missing
15 men
2nd Banal Grenzer
killed
one officer and nine men
wounded
38 men
missing
58 men
Brigade Schaaffgotsche
Archduke Carl Uhlans
wounded
one officer and five men
Horse Battery Nr. 5
wounded
two men
12 Pounder Battery
Schneider
wounded
five men
Support Reserve
wounded
one officer
Volunteers
killed
one officer
wounded
one officer
The Pontifical Army was now out of the war. As the troops left Vicenza, there was a slight delay, and the commander of the Foreign Brigade, Brigadier-General Latour, was forced to request more time. Count Pimodan was a witness to this:
The Marshal courteously granted this delay, and complimented him on the valour of his soldiers. I heard M. de la Tour say, ‘For our part, we have done our duty. I have lost fourteen officers and six hundred men in this place.17
Ironically, that same day, the Piedmontese finally made a definitive move against the Rivoli Plateau. Although recognised as a vital position by the King and all of the senior generals, no serious attempt to occupy it had previously taken place.
Radetzky Returns to Verona
Four days after the attack, Lieutenant Ferrero, fully understanding the importance of the battle, wrote, “The capture of Vicenza permits the enemy access to the heart of Venetia, and adds to the difficulties of this war. It is an almost irreparable loss.”18 The realisation at Carlo Alberto’s headquarters was equally pessimistic, with the correspondent of The Times writing to his editor that, “…we have suffered a great moral and physical defeat, and that the whole weight of the war is thrown on Charles Albert (sic).”19. How, they wondered, since the victories at Goito and Peschiera, had this happened? The Marshal, meanwhile, had returned to Verona, with I Corps, on June 12th. He was, literally, just in time to forestall a move by Carlo Alberto.
_______________________
1
Lütgendorf, pp. 44-45, and Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1865, Vol IV, pp. 193-194. The reports of an attack on Zobel may have been premature, but a week later this did occur.
2
These figures are compiled from Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. I, pp. 245-247 and Troubetzkoi, Plan VIII, in which the latter gives the total force as 31,687. Hilleprandt gives the total as 30,500 on the evening of the 9th. Rüstow, p. 223, calculates the force as over 34,000, but this is certainly too high.
3
Ravioli, pp 80-83, and 104-107. The total does not include either the Vicenza volunteers or the Venetian artillery, for whom no personnel figures are given. Austrian figures overestimate Durando’s strength, Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, for example, giving a figure of 18,000, pp. 248-249.
4
Anon, Evening Edition, Wiener Zeitung, June 21st 1848.
5
For the battle, see Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part II, pp. 34-48, Grüll, pp. 267-293, Ravioli, pp. 85-97, and Fabris,Vol. III, pp. 89-116.
6
Ravioli. P. 85, and Sporschil, p. 85. Some accounts say 06:00.
7
Ibid, p. 86.
8
Grüll, pp. 271-273, Fabris Vol III, pp. 107-108 and Ravioli, pp. 86-88.
9
Lichtner, Anton Edler von Elbenthal, ‘Der Tambour von Reisinger’, Unter Habsburgs Kriegsbanner, Vol I, 1898.
10
Kopal’s arm had to be amputated, and due to complications, he died several days later, Oesterreichischer Soldatenfreund, Nr.1, 1st July 1848, p. 4.
11
Schönfeld, p. 39.
12
Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Galetti to General Durando, quoted in Maioli, ‘La prima Legione Romana alla difesa di Vicenza’, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, March-April 1934, p. 334.
13
Ravioli, p. 94, and KA AFA, June 1848, Document 127½.
14
Ravioli, p. 105. Local volunteers, other than the artillery, are not included.
15
Pimodan, pp. 110-111.
16
Kriegsbegebenheiten 1848, Part II, pp. 69-73.
17
Ibid, p. 116.
18
Ferrero, p. 75.
19
The Times, London, June 21st, 1848.
13
Verona or Mantua,
June-July 1848
The victory at Goito and the capture of Peschiera had, of course, raised Piedmontese spirits high. Unfortunately, expectations elsewhere were raised even higher. The constant badgering from the newspapers, especially those in Turin, was especially galling, with demands for action, and more victories. There must have been many occasions on which the King had regretted his reforms.
After Radetzky withdrew from Goito, he had pulled his troops into Mantua by the night of June 3rd. Piedmontese, if not Tuscan, morale was now at its highest point. An important fortress had fallen to them, and an attempted relief of it defeated in the open field. After following Radetzky to Mantua, picking up Austrian stragglers and deserters along the way, the King ascertained that the Austrians had now left Mantua for Legnago. Upon receipt of this news, he returned to Valeggio. The War Minister, General Franzini, was certain that the Marshal was aiming for Vicenza, and this hunch was shortly afterwar
ds confirmed, as explained by Captain Ravioli:
As soon as we knew that the whole of Field-Marshall Radetzky’s Corps was retreating by forced marches, and that it had crossed Adige River at Legnago, towards Montagnana, notwithstanding the uncertainty of this movement, could let us believe either that he wished to go to Verona along the left bank of Adige, or to try a surprise against Vicenza, in order to support the coming of Welden’s Reserve Corps, which was already at Bassano, Durando issued his orders for the defence (of the city), and hastily called back Colonel Cialdini from Venice. Also, the King’s HQ in Valeggio was sharply informed, with another message on the 7th, that the enemy, ‘…was marching towards Legnago with the intention of acting against Vicenza’. Cialdini didn’t hesitate as he was called and could reach us in time; while a little later we got the news that Marshal D’Aspre with his Corps, at daybreak on the 8th, moved towards Monte Galdella, placed many bridges across the Bacchiglione River, destroyed the railway halfway between Vicenza and Padua, placed himself at Zocco, Grisignano and Barbano, and then sent a part of his men to Torri di Quartesolo, where they entrenched. Immediately, we reconnoitered to ascertain whether communications with Padua were possible; we found enemy cavalry units in wait on all sides.
Carlo Alberto, however, was also preoccupied with several other projects. He considered that the absence of Radetzky was an excellent opportunity to make another attempt upon Verona. Whilst General Bava was not against such a move, he was also insistent that the key position around Goito must be retained. Equally, the other Corps Commander, Count De Sonnaz, was adamant that the Rivoli Plateau must be occupied before any move upon Verona took place. The latter was the first undertaking to be approved.1
Additionally, the King was partly distracted by constitutional matters. After he had made a formal visit to take possession of the Fortress of Peschiera, he spent several days at Lake Garda. Here, he received a delegation from the Provisional Government of Milan, headed by Count Casati. This body announced to Carlo Alberto that an overwhelming majority had voted for the immediate fusion of Lombardy, Modena, and Parma with Piedmont. This was, indeed, momentous news, but coming at this time, served only to divide his attention enough to lessen his focus on operational matters.
Rivoli Plateau, June 10th
The same day that the King met the Lombard delegates, the Piedmontese move to occupy the Rivoli Plateau took place. The 4th Division, now commanded by the Duke of Genoa, was assigned the mission, while General Broglia’s 3rd Division demonstrated on the right.2 A troop of the Novara Cavalry, and a half battery accompanied 3rd Division. Originally planned to take place on the 9th, General Bava ordered that it be pushed back to the following day, possibly due to the heavy rain of the preceding two days, which caused the upper Adige to flood.
The Austrian force in the area was the single brigade of Colonel Zobel, with no support immediately available. Zobel concentrated his three battalions (III/Kaiser Jäger, and I and II/IR Schwarzenberg), one squadron, a half foot battery, and a half rocket battery, perhaps 2,200 men, and proceeded to block and barricade roads and tracks, to delay the Piedmontese. He had no intention of attempting to contest the position, and withdrew in the face of the subsequent incursion by the much larger hostile force.
At 06:00, on the 10th, Prince Ferdinando commenced his advance, delayed by the many obstacles left by Colonel Zobel, but not encountering any resistance. Zobel, having concentrated at Rivoli, now retreated north of Dolcè. On the Prince’s left, of a force consisting of the 4th and 14th Regiments, and I/13th Regiment, one battalion was left in Bardolino, another to the heights of Costermano, about three kilometers north of Bardolino, and a third to Albarè, on the right. The other four battalions halted at Garda. The cavalry and artillery was also placed at Costermano. The Prince’s right flank, 3rd Infantry Regiment, occupied Cavajon and the neighbouring heights without difficulty. General Bes’s division took post on the right. Following these operations, further advances were made, until the entire position was occupied. None of these moves were contested, though a few stragglers were taken prisoner. The various obstacles and roadblocks, however, did cause the Piedmontese problems, as stated in Memorie Inedite – “The return to Garda was most difficult, because the main road was full of earthworks and impediments, which we had to remove.”3
The Action of Corona, June 18th 1848 (unknown artist)
Dolcè, Corona, and Spiazzi, June 11th
The next day, Prince Ferdinando, still not knowing the whereabouts of the enemy, decided upon a further reconnaissance. The Piedmont Brigade made sweeps towards Dolcè, Madonna della Corona, and Spiazzi. At Corona stood two companies of IR Baden, under the command of Captain Leitner. Two companies of IR Archduke Ludwig were posted at Spiazzi. Both of these detachments, too weak to seriously oppose the move, withdrew before the advancing Piedmontese, who then occupied these important positions. Dolcè was also occupied by II/3rd Infantry Regiment, Major Count Baudi di Selve, and traded a bickering fire with Austrian pickets on the opposite bank of the Adige. Small clashes would continue here over the next few days. However, the Duke of Genoa’s mission had been accomplished with little loss on either side. One Piedmontese officer, Captain Barandier, was mortally wounded. The left flank of the army was now secure.
The March on Verona
With the Rivoli Plateau safely in the hands of General De Sonnaz, the King’s thoughts returned to Verona. The same day that Rivoli was occupied, he received a message from General Durando, requesting assistance, but stating that the situation in Vicenza, ‘…could be maintained for several days’.4 Carlo Alberto, however, could muster little enthusiasm among his staff for a second attack on the Verona. Nevertheless, there seemed little else on offer, and Durando’s request for help could not be ignored.
Information had come to the King’s Headquarters that, in the event of an advance on the city by the Piedmontese, a rising would take place in Verona. It was decided, then, to march against Verona, and try the chance, hoping that even without success, this manoeuvre would compel the Marshal to return towards the city, with the possibility to cut him off before he was able to reach it. Orders were quickly drawn up, and issued.
By the morning of the 13th, 1st Division and Brigade Acqui were assembled on the Villafranca-Verona Road. After what seems to have been a completely unnecessary review, at about 13:00, in a drenching rain, they commenced the march. II Army Corps continued along its road from the outskirts of Calzoni, passing towards Sommacampagna. Whilst the troops were en route, word arrived of Radetzky’s return to the city, necessitating a rapid change of plan. On hearing this, the War Minister, who had been in favour of an immediate attack whilst Verona was, in his view, at least vulnerable, now commented to the King simply, “It’s too late, Sire; it’s too late!” Franzini then took himself back to Turin, which is probably where he should have been in any case.
Nevertheless, with Baron Bava still in favor of a move, the concept was not dead. In addition, also around this time, a Veronese presented himself at Royal Headquarters, stating that his brother had gathered 600 volunteers in Verona who would be at the King’s orders, and that others would join them when the Piedmontese Army attacked the city. It was agreed that a ‘large bonfire’ would be lit near Villafranca at 22:00, that evening, as a signal to the Veronese that an advance was underway.
In the event, no signal was made, as the commander at Villafranca, who had not been informed of any of this, would not allow it. How much reality was involved in this plan is debatable, but the troops, tired and soaking wet, were finally stood down. There would be no March on Verona.5
La Corona, June 18th
Although matters on the major fronts were far from ideal for them, the Piedmontese retained firm control of the Rivoli Plateau. For Count Thurn, appointed as commander of III Corps on June 15th, the recovery of the point of the high pass of Monte della Corona was a priority. This pass, the key point of Monte Baldo, and abandoned by Colonel Zobel without resistance a week earlier, was vi
tal for any future Austrian offensive on the right bank of the Adige. Thurn consequently ordered it to be retaken.
Defending these important heights were III/14th Infantry Regiment, Major San Vitale, and the Turin University Bersaglieri Company of Captain Cassinis, a total of between 900 and 1,000 men, with two 4 pounder cannon.6 San Vitale occupied a very strong position, and was determined to hold it.
From 03:00 on June 18th, Zobel made his advance in three columns. The colonel himself, with four companies of III/Kaiser Jäger, four companies, IR Baden, and a half rocket battery moved against Madonna della Corona, as did Colonel Melczer, with four companies of IR Schwarzenberg, and two rocket tubes. The third detachment, 11 and 12/IR Baden, Captain Steiber, were to advance upon the heights beyond. His command numbered some 2,500 men.
After a short and completely ineffective rocket bombardment, Zobel commenced his attack. Hopes that surprise had been achieved were quickly dashed, as the Piedmontese outposts, commanded by Lieutenant Menada, slowly pulled back firing as they did so. Soon, the attackers encountered a thick skirmish line, with formed supports visible behind. The two Piedmontese guns also engaged. The fighting was confused in the broken terrain, and steep, dark valleys.
Radetzky's Marches Page 28