Radetzky's Marches
Page 32
For Marshal Radetzky, the success of the day’s events focused him firmly on the heights on the west bank of the River Mincio. Possession of these guaranteed the safety of the crossing points, would offer a threat to Peschiera, and keep the enemy army split. The decision was made to force the river line next morning. For this purpose, brigades of I Corps were to be employed.
Both commanders thus embarked upon bold moves. Neither expected the other to do so.
As both would be surprised by his opponent, the outcome would depend upon which demonstrated both flexibility and determination. Who would be surprised most?
JULY 24TH (see map in colour section)
Operations on the West Bank of the Mincio
Salionze
De Sonnaz’ withdrawal from Cavalcaselle began at 02:00. Since he was without orders, his intention was to cross the river at Peschiera, and then make his way south to Volta, by way of Ponti, and Monzambano. Immediately after leaving the town’s main square, he encountered Lieutenant Cocconito, an officer on the staff of I Corps, who informed him that Austrian pressure at Salionze was growing, and that reinforcements were needed there, particularly artillery. Indeed, the action could be heard from Peschiera, as Captain Della Seta informed his brother, “Already, when I had crossed the river around Peschiera, I could hear the guns roaring beyond Ponti.”18
Convinced that the enemy action was not a genuine attempt to cross the Mincio, De Sonnaz continued his march towards Volta. The main column continued southwards. The bulk of his men had not eaten, because although rations had been issued at around 23:00, there had been no time to prepare the food.
First to strike on July 24th, was Radetzky. While his II Corps covered the right flank, I Reserve Corps advanced on Salionze, which had already been occupied by two battalions of Brigade Wohlgemuth, I/Oguliner Grenzer, and III/IR Archduke Albrecht, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fliess. Overnight, a bickering fire was kept up across the river, with the Tuscan outposts. The Oguliner lost six men killed and one officer and five men wounded. Any opposing loss is not known.
Next morning, at Salionze, 12 Pounder Battery Nr. 1, personally sited by Colonel Baron Stwrtnik, with half near the village church, and the other half on a hill south of it, opened fire upon the opposite bank. Up to this point, General De Sonnaz had considered the enemy operation to be a mere demonstration. After an appeal by Major Basso, General Visconti’s Chief of Staff, De Sonnaz had earlier ordered the Parma and Modenese artillery sections to Salionze, together with I/1st Infantry Regiment, Major de Saxel. These, however, in thick fog, took the wrong road, and instead moved towards Monzambano. Finally grasping the gravity of the situation, the general subsequently ordered I/13th Regiment, Major Bonafox, and the whole of Colonel Damiano’s 14th Infantry Regiment to move there, together with 1st Section of the 4th Field Battery, Lieutenant Balbo. The guns were escorted by Captain Cassinis’ Student Bersaglieri. The unfortunate Captain Della Seta’s Tuscan Artillery section was also sent to Salionze.
Della Seta once again found himself not only badly outgunned, but in an untenable position, as he wrote to his brother two days later:
My words cannot express how much pain I suffered when I noticed that the position assigned to me was unfit for my artillery. I had 6 pounder guns, while the enemy had 12- and 16-pounders, and the Piedmontese, even 24-pounders. My artillery was much too exposed to the enemy’s fire, and I also noticed that some of the enemy had crossed the river on a fourth bridge, unnoticed by our comrades. Despite this, we fired where we could do some damage: but, we did not remain in that position any longer.19
About 09:00, Brigade Haradauer, personally accompanied by FML Wocher, the Corps Commander of I Reserve Corps, arrived in Salionze, to relieve Wohlgemuth, whose brigade now withdrew to the Prentina heights, opposite Monzambano. Wocher had come to observe Haradauer’s crossing of the Mincio. As engineer Captains Maidich and Grünbühl made preparations for the bridging of the river, two platoons of I/IR Deutsch Banater Grenz Regiment, and half a rocket battery were ferried across, and took up a position at a mill. During the cannonade, all the men one of Lieutenant Balbo’s two gun crews were either killed or wounded.20
With the covering fire from the east bank, and that from the mill, Maidich and Grünbühl were able to complete the bridges over the two arms of the river by around 11:00. Under fire, I/IR Wocher began to cross. Corporal Bartholomäus Reindl was among them:
Due to the quick advance, and the vegetation blocking our sight, the units became intermingled; this is why elements of the fourth company became entangled with a detachment of the first company, in which I served as a corporal. They met on the road to Ponti and rushed forward together, in skirmish formation. We wanted to reach the heights of Ponti, where three enemy guns were deployed. We went forward, crossing ditches and walls in spite of the heat and fatigue,
Suddenly, we heard the signal “Rest”. The regimental adjutant, Count Feldegg, arrived at our position, and this moment was used by Captain Gelling to regain contact with 1st Deutsch-Banater, which had been lost due to our rash advance. Then, we saw Piedmontese less than 100 paces distant, behind a bush. As soon as Feldegg noticed them, he took the musket of a nearby skirmisher; Lieutenant Fröhlich, leading the skirmishers, followed his example, and, led by these two brave officers, we stormed with 10-15 men against the enemy shouting, ‘hurrah!’, whom we then chased up the road to Ponti. We then noticed that the Piedmontese had rallied behind a bend in the road, near a mill. At once, we jumped across the ditch and opened fire – the enemy fled.21
Following Reindl’s battalion, II/IR Wocher and the main body of the Deutsch-Banater also crossed the bridge. Matters were rapidly becoming serious for the defenders. Attempting to cover both Balbo and Della Setta, Captain Cassisnis’ Student Bersaglieri suffered from the enemy fire. Della Seta saw that he would soon be overrun, if he did not withdraw:
As soon as I saw that the Piedmontese were giving up the battle, I ordered my own men to fall back. Now, my misadventures began. The horses, exhausted, were not able to pull the vehicles; the narrow and bad road was bordered by a barrier on one side, and a precipice on the other. My old fashioned caissons couldn’t turn, and I wasn’t able to move one of them. The Piedmontese artillery was retreating rapidly; I asked some soldiers to help me, but to no avail. A gun, cut off from the retreat because of the above mentioned, was carried on the meadow, but finally, eight horses were not enough to move it. The other piece was retreating when suddenly it was overturned on the ground, also carrying along the men and horses. Only a horse was injured. Now, as well, the Piedmontese paid no more attention to my requests. The enemy’s light infantry now attacked us, and I managed to save the horses, losing only three of them. Every man was safe except one gunner and Cadet-Sergeant Poggi, who, while trying to move the vehicles, was run over by a Piedmontese wagon. He was carried away, but soon died.22
Corporal Reindl also witnessed the loss of these guns, from the opposite point of view:
Just as I was running through a garden, with Corporal Probst and a couple of men, I saw a cannon through a gap. There was no stopping now! Electrified, I told my comrades to follow me, to secure the spoils. I had not quite reached the gun, when I spotted the other two cannon, and several ammunition wagons 20-30 paces distant, hidden among the vines. At the foot of the hill, I could see the gun teams and horses fleeing in panic in the direction of Ponti. Although we were very tired, we at once turned one of the guns, an eight pounder, towards the retreating enemy. I loaded it with canister, fired, and hit the fleeing group, so that it dispersed in all directions.
I fired two rounds at the Piedmontese. On the third shot, I was so excited that I stayed put behind the gun, which threw me over when it recoiled, and the wheel hurt my left foot so badly that I was unable to continue the fight, and had to watch the battle for the rest of the day as a spectator. Corporal Probst then ran back to get support, and told Feldegg and Fröhlich about the captured guns.23
The four batta
lion infantry column of the 13th and 14th Regiments, coming up as the other troops were being pushed back into them, was also thrown into confusion, and fell back. Colonel Damiano, commanding officer of the 14th Infantry Regiment, wrote in his report that, “As soon as I arrived in Monzambano, I was ordered to pull the troops back to Ponti, and give them some rest. But, the enemy was not building a bridge near Monzambano; on the contrary, he was around Salionze, and, with a brisk fire, and superior artillery odds, forced our few guns to cease fire. Eventually, the lack of coordination at the higher level, the absence of mutual support between the units around Ponti, the rout of the Tuscan artillery, the clogged road, and the increasing enemy fire resulted, after a strong but short defence, in the lack of confidence amongst the troops around Ponti, and in a retreat to Peschiera.”24 The defenders withdrew in complete confusion, some, as just described, to Peschiera, and some to the south.
Before De Sonnaz reached Monzambano, the promised orders were delivered to him personally by I Corps’ Chief of Staff, Colonel Carderina. Bava instructed that the enemy was not to be allowed to cross the Mincio at any cost. It was now obvious that the paltry reinforcements first sent were far fewer than necessary. By this time, though, it was too late. De Sonnaz ordered a concentration around Volta, for those troops who had not retreated to Peschiera.
Although a major river had been successfully crossed against opposition, losses in this operation were far from high, on either side. The few Austrian casualties can be seen reasonably accurately. Between July 23rd, and August 6th, I Reserve Corps had a total of only 17 casualties, four men killed, two officers and nine men wounded, and two men missing. Of these, five were from I/Deutsch-Banater, and four from IR Wocher. Most probably, all of these occurred on the 24th. To these, must be added the loss of the Oguliner Grenzer, of Brigade Wohlgemuth, before they were withdrawn from Salionze, that morning, one officer and 11 men. This gives a total of 29.25
Precise details of De Sonnaz’ losses are not available. Reports are vague, or make no mention of anything other than the confusion. This is understandable. Major-General Bussetti reports his 2nd Provisional Brigade as having 22 killed and wounded, with one of its units, 3rd Provisional Regiment, suffering ‘a few’ wounded. I/1st Provisional Regiment is described as defending the river line with valour, and must therefore have had some loss. Captain Cassisnis’ Student Bersaglieri certainly suffered some casualties, Schneidawind stating that, “The enemy fled in disorder after his student company had been shattered by canister fire.”26 Some loss also occurred in Lieutenant Balbo’s artillery section, and Captain Della Seta had two dead. What is certain is that there were many missing, due to both straggling and desertion.27
The results of these small engagements left Piedmontese II Corps still split into two groups, both very hungry, and demoralised. For Radetzky, the Mincio had been crossed with minimal loss, against weak and disorganised opposition. His plan to push the army across the river, however, was about to be completely altered by events to his left rear.
Operations on the East Bank of the Mincio
Brigade Simbschen, which would be tasked with covering the Austrian army’s left flank, left Buttapietra, 10 kilometres south of Verona, at 02:00, on July 24th. Approaching Povegliano, Simbschen became aware that Villafranca was strongly held by the Piedmontese, and therefore detoured around it to the north. At Calzoni, east of Sommacampagna, he received the Marshal’s orders to replace Brigade Clam in the area between Sommacampagna and Custoza. He then marched west, arriving in Sommacampagna at around noon. Upon his arrival there, the outposts of Archduke Sigismund’s brigade posted there, returned to their parent unit.
Badly affected, like everyone else, by the stifling heat, and tired by the long marches they had already made, Simbschen’s men were now granted a rest. This, and subsequent delays were to prove fatal. At about 13:00, observing dust clouds on the plain, Simbschen ordered his men to arms.28 He, with the two battalions of IR Haynau, five guns of Foot Artillery Battery Nr. 6, and 16 wagons of munitions, moved off immediately towards Custoza, followed by one and a half squadrons of the Archduke Carl Uhlans. He left orders for the two battalions of IR Prince Emil, together with three guns of the 9th Horse Artillery Battery, to proceed to Staffalo and Monte della Croce, and for the Deutsch-Banat Grenzer battalion to occupy the heights between Boscone and Sommacampagna. I/IR Nugent was to occupy Sommacampagna itself, while the remaining half squadron of the brigade cavalry acted as outposts near the village.
After Simbschen’s departure, not until 15:00, did Colonel von Bolza’s Prince Emil Regiment (1,140 all ranks) and the Deutsch Banater get underway. Around 16:00, clouds of dust were seen in the direction of Villafranca.29 Unfortunately, the column, upon moving towards Monte Croce, took a wrong turning, and proceeded to march back towards Villafranca.. Once the mistake was discovered, the march was reversed, but by the time the force was approaching its intended positions on the left of IR Haynau, at about 16:30, firing began.
The Piedmontese Attack
Given the distances required for the troops to complete their marches, Carlo Alberto had planned to launch his attack on the afternoon of July 24th. By 15:00, the last units had closed up around Villafranca, and the troops had been fed. The advance then began, the available force being divided into six columns. These were:
A.
On the right of the line, with the objective of protecting the right flank, stood the Cavalry Division, the Genoa and Savoy Cavalry Regiments, three squadrons of the Aosta cavalry, and the 2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries. This totalled 15 squadrons and 16 guns.
B.
The Right Column (The Duke of Genoa). Objective; the area between Ganfardine and Sommacampagna This consisted of the Piedmont Brigade, the Pavia Volunteer Company, the Lombard Carabinieri Company, and the 1st Field Artillery Battery, six and a half battalions, and eight guns.
C.
The Centre Column (Lieutenant-General Bava. Objective; to advance on and to the right of Staffalo. It comprised the Guards Brigade, and the 9th Field Artillery Battery. The column numbered five battalions and eight guns.30
D.
The Left Column (The Duke of Savoy). Objective; to advance on Monte Torre and Monte Croce. The column comprised the Cuneo Brigade, 2/I Bersaglieri, and the 3rd Field Artillery Battery: six and a quarter battalions, with eight guns.
E.
The Extreme Left Column was composed of the Cavalry Brigade of Major-General Robillant, the Royal Piedmont Cavalry, three squadrons of the Genoa cavalry, and the 1st Horse Artillery Battery. Nine squadrons, and eight guns. Objective; Cover the left flank.
F.
Reserve Column (Major-General Sommariva) Brigade Aosta, 3/II Bersaglieri, 8th Field Artillery Battery, and three squadrons of the Aosta Cavalry Regiment. Six and a quarter battalions, three squadrons, and eight guns.
G.
General Reserve, in Villafranca. This consisted of II and III/13th Infantry Regiment, six companies of the Tuscan 1st Line Regiment, six guns of the 4th Field Artillery Battery, 10 Tuscan field guns, and one squadron, Novara Cavalry. Total, three and a half battalions, one squadron, and 16 guns.31
Monte Torre and Custoza
Baron Simbschen had deployed Colonel Wolf’s I/IR Haynau between Custoza and Monte Torre, placing three guns on the Custoza Heights, and the other two on Monte Torre itself. Wolf’s other battalion, II/IR Haynau was left in reserve, on heights just to the north.
Although the distance from Villafranca to Monte Torre is only some three kilometres, the stifling heat of the day made the march very demanding. The rugged terrain only added to the utter exhaustion of the troops on both sides. As the head of the Duke of Savoy’s column approached Monte Torre, the two guns placed there by Simbschen opened fire upon it.
The Duke deployed the 7th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Callabiana, with two sections of the artillery, and 1/II Bersaglieri on the left, and 8th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Tharena on the right, towards the eastern slopes. Two sections of Ca
ptain Grésy’s 3rd Field Artillery Battery supported Callabiana’s advance, bombarding the two Austrian guns on Monte Torre. As they approached the top, Captain Lions’ Bersaglieri soon became involved in skirmishing with the two IR Haynau companies there. As the three battalions of the 7th Regiment ascended the hill, however, the Austrians pulled back upon their second line, and Monte Torre was taken. This made Custoza untenable, and this was also abandoned.
Major-General Simbschen himself came up with seven further companies to help. Colonel Callabiana’s 7th Regiment now changed front, to meet the new threat, as 8th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Tharena, led by the Duke of Savoy, and Major-General Boyl, the brigade commander, moved against the Austrian left. Simbschen retired to Monte Molimento, where he was able to maintain his position until the evening, when he withdrew to San Giorgio in Salice. During the fighting here, Major-General Boyl was wounded.
Staffalo
As Bava’s skirmishers entered the Staffalo Valley, at around 16:30, the forward elements of Regiment Emil reached the height of Casetta Rosa. Here, Lieutenant-Colonel Sunstenau, with the vanguard, ordered a halt, to await the widely spaced marching columns. As he did so, the Piedmontese attack began.
The Guards Brigade was now deployed in two lines against the deep Staffalo Valley. Their advance had, as seen, the great good fortune to catch Colonel von Bolza’s two battalions of IR Prince Emil and the Deutsch-Banater Battalion, on the march. The former, having finally followed the route which they had been assigned, were approaching their destination, as they came under a major attack. The whole force stretched from the Staffalo Valley, to within about 2,000 paces of Sommacampagna.32 Behind Sunstenau, the Deutsch-Banat Grenz Battalion scrambled to take up a position on the heights of la Berretara. Neither unit had much time to react.