Nevertheless, Bolza, at the rear, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sunstenau, his secondin-command, at the front of the column, did so rapidly. On the left wing, nearest to Sommacampagna, von Bolza pushed 11/IR Prince Emil forward against the Piedmont Brigade. On the far right, Sunstenau advanced the 1st division to engage the attackers, one company in skirmish order, and the other as a formed support. He also deployed the three guns of the 9th Horse Artillery Battery to the left. At the front of the Austrian column, two squadrons of the Savoy Cavalry, which had been sent by General Bava to pursue Simbschen’s force as it retreated from Monte Croce, were fired upon by the Austrian vanguard, and driven back.
As this incident occurred, Bava ordered the Guards forward. The Duke of Genoa, on Bava’s right, was also on the move. With this, two full brigades were advancing, between the Staffalo Valley and Ganfardine, against four battalions. Particularly vulnerable, was IR Prince Emil.
As the enemy threat grew, Lieutenant-Colonel Sunstenau was forced to commit more troops to both right and left. Step by step, the formed companies were dissolved into the firing line. As this occurred, the left-most battalion of the Guards I/2nd Grenadiers, Major Scozia, moved into the Staffalo Valley, around Sunstenau’s right flank. He was forced to lead the 4th division of the regiment against this threat. When this was not enough, he had to feed his only remaining reserve, the 3rd division, into the skirmish line. Soon after, Sunstenau was wounded in the foot. Before agreeing to have the wound treated, he ordered Captain Milde to retake Monte Bosco. This, Milde was able to achieve, though only briefly.
By the time Sunstenau returned from the aid station, the situation was beyond retrieval, although countermoves were still being made. The Colonel mounted a horse, and led 5 and elements of 2/IR Emil in a counterattack, but quickly fell dead, hit by two musket balls.33 Resistance waned after this, as groups of officers and men sought refuge to the north. Command devolved on Captain Reiß, who organised the withdrawal inasmuch as this was possible. He was, however, after great efforts, able to save two of the three artillery pieces.34 The Guard Grenadiers and Cacciatori took many Austrian prisoners. Both of the battalion colours were also taken. To the right of the Guards, as mentioned, the Piedmont Brigade had also been engaged with elements of IR Emil.35
Sommacampagna
General Bes’ Piedmont Brigade, upon its arrival in Ganfardine, had been placed west of the Sommacampagna Road, astride a feature known as the Fossa Berettara, 3rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Wehrlin, on the east bank, and 4th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Cucchiari, on the west. Extending Wehrlin’s line to the right, were the Pavian Volunteers and the Lombard Carabinieri. Their advance was coordinated with that of the other formations. Colonel Cucchiari’s report described the action:
On July 24th, at about 3 PM, three brigades (Guard Grenadier, Piedmont, and Cuneo), the Novara Cavalry, and three artillery batteries attacked these positions. The frontal attack was performed by the Piedmont Brigade, while the other brigades were operating on the left. A column of volunteers under the command of Colonel Marcello and his adjutant, Lieutenant Chiabrera, advanced in open order towards Sommacampagna, driving back the enemy everywhere, and mainly from the Fredda farm house, where they had been entrenched. However, the Austrians, with superior numbers, repulsed the bersaglieri, as well as the 3rd Battalion, which had sent in their support. It was then that General Bes ordered Major Capriglio to move to the rescue, with his battalion; the task was accomplished with the best possible discipline. In that moment, Messrs. Belli and Saettone, of the 3rd Battalion, and Captain Denegri, of the 1st Fusilier Company, I Battalion, fell mortally wounded.
The valour shown by the Polinge and Della Tour companies caused the Austrian retreat. As soon as he noticed that the enemy had ceased fire, General Bes ordered the entire line to attack them with a bayonet charge. This attack caused the enemy retreat from Berettara and Staffalo, and the withdrawal towards Sommacampagna; the Austrians were pursued by the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment, and were forced to take the road to Verona, after having left many dead on the ground, and more than 1,200 prisoners. During this action Captain Scofferio, commander of the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion, was badly wounded.36
The Piedmontese infantry at Sommacampagna, July 24th 1848 (Grimaldi)
The fighting at Fredda farm house, against elements of IR Emil had been prolonged. Bes now sent forward a section of the 1st Field Battery, which began to shell the heights east of Berettara, and next pushed II/4th Regiment, Major Ferraris, and the two unengaged companies of I/4th Regiment directly against those heights. Ferraris advanced through dense vineyards, under heavy fire from II/Deutsch Banater posted there. Major Spech, the battalion commander, deployed his entire command in skirmish order. Spech was killed early on, and his battalion lost all cohesion, and rapidly fell apart.
Further to the Piedmontese right, Colonel Wehrlin’s 3rd Infantry Regiment advanced against the village of Sommacampagna itself. The village was defended by four companies of I/IR Nugent, Lieutenant-Colonel Rosenbaum. The battalion’s other two companies held two fortified houses, Villa nuova and Corobiol, southwest of Sommacampagna, at the foot of the heights. The Duke of Genoa placed the 1st Field and 2nd Horse Artilley Batteries just north of Pallazina, and bombarded the village from about 17:00. A section of the 9th Field Battery pounded the two houses above mentioned, and Wehrlin was reinforced by II/Guard Cacciatori, Major Paderi.
I/3rd Regiment, Major Capriglio, together with the Pavian Volunteers and the Lombard Carabinieri, assaulted the east of the village, while two companies of II/3rd, Major Barone came up from the south. III/3rd, Major Baudi di Selve, attacked from the southwest. Major Paderi’s troops reinforced the effort on the right. The two fortified houses at the base of the hills were taken, and the village penetrated in several places. Nevertheless, as darkness approached, fighting continued. The Duke of Genoa then brought forward the remaining two companies of Baudi’s battalion, and the two companies guarding the artillery were also thrown into the struggle. This tipped the balance, and the main strongpoint of resistance, the Church of San Rocco was taken, together with numbers of prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel Rosenbaum’s troops withdrew in disarray towards Mancalacqua and Verona.
Simbschen’s brigade had been crushed like an eggshell, and was badly scattered. His losses totalled 48 officers and 1,269 men.37 These were:
Piedmontese casualties for the 24th are unclear. Colonel Fabris gives the total as 16 killed and 54 wounded.38. 3rd Regiment lost five killed and 34 wounded, and the Guard Cacciatori report lists one killed, and four wounded. 4th Regiment had three officers wounded, and another one killed, but no men are mentioned in Colonel Cucchiari’s report as lost that day. The Pavian Volunteer Company reported one quarter of its strength as wounded. This company’s strength, on July 24th, given by Troubetzkoi was 124, so this would mean roughly 30 men. 7th Regiment likewise mentions one officer and one man killed, but gives no further details. These figures alone are greater than the total of Colonel Fabris, and do not, of course, include losses on the west bank of the Mincio. Referring to the 24th, in a letter written the next day, Major-General Carlo Emanuele Ferrero Della Marmora stated that, “We have, I think, 250 wounded and a few dead.”39
POSITIONS AND PLANS FOR THE 25TH (see map in colour section)
Carlo Alberto
On the night of the 24th, the Piedmontese Army was placed as follows:
East of the River Mincio
Headquarters – Villafranca.
At Sommacampagna, and nearby heights – 4th Division
Piedmont Brigade, 1st Field Artillery Battery, half of 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, and three squadrons of the Aosta Cavalry.
From the Tione, through Staffalo, and around Custoza, Monte Torre and Monte Godio – 1st Reserve Division
Guards Brigade, minus I/Guard Cacciatori (in Goito), and II/Guard Cacciatori (guarding prisoners in Villafranca), 9th Field Artillery Battery, minus one section in Villafranca, Cuneo Brigade, 1/2nd Bersaglieri, 3rd Fie
ld Artillery Battery.
At Acquaroli – 1st Division
Aosta Brigade, 3/2nd Bersaglieri, 8th Field Artillery Battery, and three squadrons of the Aosta Cavalry.
Near Villafranca – Cavalry Division
Savoy Cavalry Regiment, Royal Piedmont Cavalry Regiment, Genoa Cavalry Regiment, 1st Horse Artillery Battery, and half of both the 2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries.
Villafranca – various
II/Guard Cacciatori, II and III/13th Infantry Regiment, three sections of 4th Field Artillery Battery, one section, 9th Field Artillery Battery,10 Tuscan field guns, four squadrons, Novara Cavalry.
Roverbella – 17th Infantry Regiment
Goito – various
Regina Brigade, I/Guard Cacciatori, one battalion, 2nd Provisional Regiment, 6th Field Artillery battery, two sections of the 1st Position Battery.
Piedmontese Headquarters was understandably jubilant at the success of the attack, mistakenly thinking that they had defeated the entire Austrian I Corps. Also unaware that his own II Corps had been forced to retreat, Carlo Alberto ordered a further attack for the next day.40 It was a bold plan, and by no means foolish, particularly since neither Bava nor the King could forsee how quickly Radetzky would react. Its main flaw was that Headquarters had no idea as to De Sonnaz’ second defeat, and consequent withdrawal.
Lieutenant-General Bava’s intention was to swing to his left, anchored there by the fresh Aosta Brigade. Major-General Sommariva’s six battalions would flank the brigade of Major-General Clam, and take Valeggio, whilst the Duke of Savoy’s 1st Reserve Division advanced on Salionze. His brother, with the Piedmont Brigade would move through Oliosi, and towards the Mincio. II Corps was to support the action on the east bank, and attack Valeggio, from the west. Oddly, either from a breakdown in communications, or simple error, no specific orders were given to the 17th Infantry Regiment, in Roverbella, or to the troops at Goito.41
West of the River Mincio
On the evening of the 24th, II Corps was split into two parts.
A.
Within the walls of Peschiera (exclusive of the garrison) were the following: 14th Infantry Regiment, I/13th Infantry Regiment, three guns of the 2nd Position Battery, a section of the 4th Field Artillery Battery, two companies of the Savoy Brigade, Captain Cassinis’ Student Bersaglieri, the Tuscan Infantry, and the 4th Provisional Regiment.
B.
On the march to Volta from Monzambano and Borghetto, were: The Savoy Brigade (minus two companies), the Parmesan and Modenese Artillery, the Composite Brigade, 7th Field Artillery Battery, five guns of the 2nd Position Battery, three companies of I/Bersaglieri, two squadrons of Aosta Cavalry.
In addition, the following units of 2nd Reserve Division were moving on Volta. I/3rd Provisional Regiment, was coming from Monzambano, III/3rd from Ponti, and 1st Provisional Regiment, from a support role behind the other troops. Also, II and III/2nd Provisional Regiment were marching from Valeggio and Borghetto. These seven battalions had suffered considerably from straggling and desertion. By late evening, the 3rd Division was concentrated around Volta, joined by the seven battalions of the 2nd Reserve Division.
Radetzky
Overnight, the Austrian forces were disposed in the following manner:
III Corps – Colà and Sandrà
II Corps
Main Body – In and around Catelnuovo
Brigade Schwarzenberg – At Cavalcaselle
I Reserve Corps
Brigade Haradauer – Near Ponti
Brigade Maurer – Near Ponti
Cavalry Brigade Archduke Ernst (Minus Detachment Wyß) – Salionze
Brigade Archduke Sigismund – Oliosi
Cavalry Brigade Schaaffgotsche – Oliosi
Reserve Artillery – Oliosi
I Corps
Brigade Wohlgemuth – West of Monzambano
Brigade Supplikatz – West of Monzambano
Brigade Strassoldo – Monte Vento, with vanguard at Valeggio
Brigade Clam, Feniletto, Gardoni, and San Zeno
Detachment Wyß – San Zeno
The key event of July 24th is not the impressive overwhelming of Simbschen’s brigade. This was a singular achievement, but it was rendered unimportant by the defeat, and utter demoralisation of De Sonnaz’ II Corps, as well as by Radetzky’s amazingly quick reaction to Simbchen’s rout. In the battle of the following day, the Piedmontese I Corps and 1st Reserve Division would be heavily outnumbered, unless II Corps and 2nd Reserve Division were in a state to intervene in a major way.
JULY 25TH
Radetzky had positioned his forces so that they could react to an attack on either bank of the Mincio. His own intentions were, firstly, to form I Reserve Corps between Salionze and Oliosi. These three infantry and two cavalry brigades would then be available to support other formations, as required. This achieved, the following would take place:
On his Left:
A.
To attack Sommacampagna with Brigade Perin, from the east, supported by the cavalry.42
B.
Advance elements of III Corps south from Colà and Sandrà.
C.
Send Brigades Gyulai against Sommacampagna, and Liechtenstein against Monte Godio.
In the Centre:
D.
To advance Brigades Kerpan and Schwarzenberg against Staffalo and Monte Torre. This attack would be supported by Brigade Maurer from the reserve, if necessary.
On his Right:
E.
To advance Brigade Clam against Monte Mamaor, and the area between it and the Mincio
F.
To maintain the right flank at Valeggio, with Brigades Strassoldo and Wohlgemuth.
General Nava succinctly comments that the result was that in a commanding position were, “the three Austrian Corps, in possession of the heights from Valeggio to Sommacampagna, and the crossing of the Mincio at Salionze.”43
As these preparations took place, Carlo Alberto’s troops readied themselves for their own offensive. It was to be another stifling hot day, with temperatures of up to 38C/100F, and at certain times and places, perhaps higher.44 Unfortunately, that day, neither staff work nor the Commissariat would be at their best. Almost immediately, Prince Ferdinando’s attack was delayed by the fact that his men had not been fed. This, of course, had an equally swift knock-on effect upon his brother’s actions, since Vittorio Emanuele was to support Ferdinando’s advance. Not until 11:00, were their troops on the move. In the meanwhile, the Duke of Savoy sent a reconnaissance west of Staffalo. The patrol returned to report no enemy activity. In fact, three Austrian brigades were marching against the positions of the Piedmont Brigade.
Sommacampagna
Advancing on the positions of the Duke of Genoa from the plain east of Sommacampagna, came Brigade Perin, moving in three columns, with an additional reserve. The four companies of II/Vienna Volunteers were designated as the storm column, with I/IR Reisinger in support. II/IR Reisinger formed the reserve. Half of the 9th Rocket Battery advanced on the right.
The main body of Brigade Gyulai approached from the north in two columns, marching from Madonna Del Monte towards San Piero. The 11th Feld-Jäger Battalion formed the left wing, and II/Warasdiner St. George Grenzer and I/IR Archduke Ernst, the right. These were followed by II/IR Archduke Ernst, and a squadron of uhlans. The brigade battery moved in two sections.
On Gyulai’s right, came Brigade Liechtenstein, moving towards la Berettara. II/Kaiser Jäger, with half of the brigade battery, and on their left, 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion, were in the lead. A half squadron of Reuss Hussars acted as a link between Liechtenstein and Gyulai. The main body, I and II/IR Kaiser, I and II/IR Fürstenwärther, Combined/IR Haugwitz, and Foot Artillery Battery, were held in reserve a little further north.
From the heights of Sommacampagna, Perin’s advance was in plain sight, his objective clear. Gyulai’s main force was also in sight. The cannonade began at about 10:00, during which one of Liechtenstein’s guns wa
s dismounted. Near 12:00, Gyulai’s advance guard, having driven in the Piedmontese vedettes, came into contact with the Cacciatori of Colonel Cucchiari’s 4th Infantry Regiment. The Colonel’s report describes the fighting here:
The Duke of Genoa ordered the 2nd Cacciatori Company (Lieutenant Celebrini), which was already encamped in the outposts behind the palace of Count Veneri, to occupy the barricades of the chapel, and the nearby wall pierced by loopholes. The Duke also ordered the 1st Battalion to occupy the road towards Villafranca. The 2nd Cacciatori Company opposed the enemy for two hours, but then was forced to fall back to Sommacampagna, and there it resisted the enemy (who had been reinforced at about midday) with the support of the 2nd Battalion and the three other cacciatore companies.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had left its position along the road to Villafranca, and went into the hills of Custoza. From there, the 1st Battalion, along with 3rd Regiment, opposed the Austrians who were trying to conquer that position; the 2nd Cacciatori Company and a platoon of the 3rd Fusilier company reached the 1st Battalion after a fighting retreat; the 2nd Battalion, with some cacciatori companies, took the road to Villafranca instead of joining the other troops on the Custoza hills. Had those companies joined the other troops on the hills, the outcome of the battle would have been very different for the Piedmontese troops.
The 1st Grenadier Company, under the command of Captain Beraudi, held its position for two hours, and showed the steadiness which was its main feature during the whole campaign. But, despite the gallant defence of both the artillery, under the command of Casati, and of the infantry troops, our troops were eventually forced to give ground to the superior enemy, who had received reinforcements.45
In fact, Cucchiari was attacked by the columns of Gyulai and Perin at more or less the same time. The heights he was defending were steep and difficult to ascend, which in itself took considerable time. Gyulai’s advance, as related above, slowed to a crawl. As there was a gap between the two brigades, an additional column was formed with two IR Reisinger companies, and two companies of Vienna Volunteers.
Radetzky's Marches Page 33