Having occupied the Belvedere, Schwarzenberg deployed his brigade battery, 4th 6 Pounder Battery, there. These guns then began to bombard the village. Subsequently, the infantry advanced through the fields, gardens, and houses, against a stubborn resistance. Although progress was slow, it was also unrelenting. By around 19:30, with the village almost lost, the Duke of Savoy ordered a withdrawal. Initially, the 1st Guard Regiment and the artillery withdrew, covered by the other units. These subsequently retreated towards Villafranca, reaching there about midnight. Some detachments, which were cut off, were forced to surrender. One gun of Captain Grésy’s 3rd Field Battery was also lost when a rocket exploded nearby, stampeding the horses, and throwing the gun into a ditch, where it had to be abandoned.56
With this retreat, what would come to be called the Battle of Custoza came to an end. For Carlo Alberto, there could be no question of continuing the struggle the next day in the current circumstances. The decision was made to withdraw from the east bank of the Mincio, with a view to maintaining the river line. Tactically, the battle had little in the way of finesse, and consisted of a series of hammer blows, delivered until something was broken. Nevertheless, Carlo Alberto was unquestionably worsted. The question was now; could the line of the Mincio be held? The key to that question lay at Volta.
Details of the losses on July 25th of July, of course, vary. The figures below are from General Nava:
Austrian
Killed –
Nine officers, and 166 men
Wounded –
35 officers and 688 men
Prisoners/Missing –
422 men
Total –
44 officers and 1,276 men
Piedmontese
Killed –
Three officers, and 209 men
Wounded –
30 officers and 627 men
Prisoners/Missing –
270 men
Total –
33 officers, 1,106 men 57
Grüll gives the Imperial losses as:
Killed
Five officers, and 128 men
Wounded
32 officers, and 559 men
Missing
One officer, and 340 men58
He gives the highest unit loss as IR Kinsky, with two officers, and 36 men killed, 10 officers and 165 men wounded, and 13 men missing. Indeed, the Corps Commander, FML D’Aspre himself paid honour to the regiment, as he and his staff removed their hats in salute, and D’Aspre stated that in future, he would always bare his head in the regiment’s presence.59
One aspect of the losses is that there must, without question, have been very many stragglers on both sides, largely due to the intense heat, and this may not be adequately reflected by any of the figures.
_______________________
1
Lorenzini, pp 106-107.
2
It should be noted that Imperial brigades frequently changed composition.
3
For re-organisation and numbers, see Grüll, pp. 327-330, Schneidawind, pp. 493-494, and Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol I, pp.415-417. The deployment shown is that from Hilleprandt, Grüll gives the columns some differing composition.
4
These two guns had been found in Peschiera, when the fortress fell. Nava, Luigi, ‘Campagna di Guerra del 1848. La Giornate di Custoza’, Memorie Storiche Militari, Rome 1911. Nava gives a figure of 3,500. Fabris, however, itemises the figures, giving a total of 3,663, Vol. III, p. 247.
5
Some accounts state one 18 pounder, and two howitzers.
6
There is disagreement here. De Sonnaz says six companies, but General Broglia states the remaining two battalions. Colonel Cauda, Relazioni e Rapporti, Vol. II, p. 269 says only that ‘part of the regiment’ was sent. See the discussion in Nava, p. 11, where he comes down on the side of six companies. Certainly, whoever was sent, they were in addition to Major Danesi’s III/16th.
7
Austrian accounts stress that nothing was seen of the main column, which made the withdrawal inevitable. It seems unlikely that Thurn had already been held back. See Grüll, p. 335, and Strack, p. 162.
8
AKA AFA, July 1848, Document 355. Note that the Brigade Simbschen shown here was temporarily under the command of Colonel Kerpan, and that this change is reflected in the text, to avoid confusion. Major-General Simbschen, as discussed, had temporary command of a much larger brigade, and this latter brigade therefore bears his name in the text.
9
Nava, pp. 244-245.
10
Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part III, p. 24.
11
Ferrero, pp. 98-99. His account appears to be the first mention of the affair in print.
12
Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part III, pp. 29-30. Feldwebel Wasiljevic, of I/IR Latour, won the Gold Medal for Bravery for his conduct here.
13
Della Seta, pp. 80-81.
14
Ibid, pp. 81-82.
15
Grüll, pp. 359-360. Hilleprandt, on the other hand, states that most of the missing were Italian deserters, ‘1848’, p. 435. However, since neither of the units with the most men missing were Italian, 9th Feld-Jäger Battalion (55), and IR Kinsky (51), Grüll would appear to be correct.
16
Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol II, p. 97, Memorie Inedite, p. 401. and Considerazioni sopra gli avvenimenti militari del Marzo 1849, p. 187. Pinelli also gives the figure of 80, Vol III, p. 560, although he appears to have forgotten it by page 563. Pinelli’s totals are 26 killed, 80 wounded, and 117 prisoners.
17
Nava, pp. 26-27.
18
Della Seta, p. 83.
19
Ibid, p. 84.
20
Fabris, Vol III, p. 300. For his courage and leadership, Balbo was awarded Gold Medal for Bravery.
21
Deitl, Feldegg und Fröhlich, Unter Habsburgs Kriegsbanner, Vol. VI, pp. 219-220.
22
Della Seta, pp. 84-85.
23
Feldegg und Fröhlich, pp. 222-223. Both officers were awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Maria-Theresa. Corporal Probst received the Gold Medal for Bravery, and the Russian Cross of St. George.
24
Report of Colonel Damiano, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. II, p. 258.
25
Kriegsbegebenheiten, 1848, Part 3, p. 168.
26
Schneidawind, p. 521.
27
See the reports of Colonel Ansaldi, 1st Prov. Regiment, General Bussetti, 2nd Prov. Brigade, and Colonel Lopez, 3rd Prov. Regiment, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. II, pp. 299-315. I would emphasise here, once again, the heat of these few days, with temperatures of 35C/95F.
28
Anon, Studie über den Feldzug des Feldmarschalls Grafen von Radetzky 1848, comments acidly that, ‘The 24th of July is, however, a day on which cooperation did not materialise.’ Grüll, p. 374, and Rüstow, pp. 261-262 give Simbschen’s start time as 13:00, and are followed by Prybila, Geschichte, p. 45, and Schneidawind, Feldzug, p.531. Kriegsbegebenheiten 1848, Part 3, p. 49, only says that the brigade had a few or a couple (‘einige’) of hours rest. Hilleprandt, however, gives Simbschen’s move time as 14:00, 1848, 1866, Vol. I, p. 293, as does Fabris, Vol. III, p. 309, and Neuwirth, p. 292.
29
Neuwirth, p. 292.
30
The brigade was short of I/Cacciatori, which was at Goito.
31
Nava, pp. 263-265.
32
Grüll, p. 375.
33
Neuwirth, p. 294.
34
Ibid. The third was dismounted by the Piedmontese bombardment.
35
For the fighting here, see Grüll, pp. 375-380, and Fabris, pp. 309-317.
36
Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. II, pp. 162-163.
37
> Kriegsbegebenheiten 1848, Part III, pp. 165-166. Of the men listed as missing, some were killed or wounded, and the majority, prisoners.
38
Fabris, Volume III, p. 317.
39
Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol, II, pp.58, 154, 163, 194, and 440, and Degli Alberti, Alcuni Episodi del Risorgimento, p. 359. Colonel Cucchiari reports that for both the 24th and 25th of July, 4th Infantry Regiment lost a total of one officer and 33 NCOs and men killed, and six officers and 93 NCOs and men wounded, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol II, p. 164.
40
Pieri, Storia militare del Risorgimento, p.242, and Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, p. 297.
41
Nava, pp. 282-283.
42
Brigade Perin, part of the Verona garrison, was originally ordered from the city to Castelnuovo. This was altered by the garrison commander, FML Haynau, who, having witnessed the defeat of Simbschen, from a city Bell Tower through his telescope, ordered Perin to march directly against Sommacampagna.
43
Fabris, Volume III, p. 358.
44
Grüll, p. 384.
45
Report of Colonel Cucchiari, Relazioni e Rapporti, Vol. II, pp. 163-164.
46
Grüll, pp. 384-386, Schneidawind, Feldzug, pp. 548-549, Nava, pp. 298-303, and Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 336-339.
47
Colonel Cauda’s report in Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol II, p. 271, Schönhals, p. 244, and also mentioned in Ellesemere, pp. 190-191.
48
Torelli, pp. 282-284, Fabris, Vol. III, p. 346, and Nava, pp. 316-317.
49
Schneidawind, Feldzug, pp. 551-553, Fabris, Vol III, pp. 340-341, and Nava, p. 298. Interestingly, unlike other Austrian sources, Grüll plays down the part played by IR Kinsky, making only passing reference to the regiment on pages 390 and 398.
50
Fabris, Vol. III, p. 344, Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. III, p. 29, and Windisch-Graetz, G.d.K. Prince Ludwig, Ludwig Windisch-Graetz’s Kindheit und Jugendzeit 1839-1850, p. 241.
51
Willisen, p.180, Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 342-344, Schneidawind, pp. 558-559, and who also quotes Willisen.
52
Hilleprandt, ‘1848’, 1866, Vol. II, pp. 307-308, Nava, pp. 302-305, and Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 342-345.
53
Fabris, Vol. III, pp. 348-350, and Talleyrand-Périgord, pp. 207-210. Pinelli, p. 602, times Torelli’s arrival at 15:30.
54
Montù, p. 406.
55
Relation 2, of FML Count Franz Schaaffgotsche, KA, AFA, 1848, dated Milan, 12th August 1848.
56
Report of Captain Grésy, Relazioni e Rapporti, 1848, Vol. III, p 92, and of Colonel Tharena, Vol II, pp. 202-204. Nava, pp. 311-316, Grüll, pp. 390-392, Schneidawind, pp. 555-556.
57
These figures from Nava, p. 316. Rüstow, p. 273, gives the combined Piedmontese losses for the 24th and 25th, on the east bank of the Mincio, as between 1,500 and 1,600. This may well be accurate.
58
Grüll, pp.409-410. The missing officer was Captain Rappel, of the Vienna Volunteers.
59
Ibid, p. 410, and Schneidawind, p. 556.
15
Volta, Milan and the First Armistice
Carlo Alberto withdraws to Goito
At about 23:30 on the 25th, orders were issued to begin a withdrawal to Goito. These moves were intended to take place as follows:
The Army Trains, all Army baggage, and the Artillery Reserve were to depart at 02:00, on July 26th, to be followed by the baggage trains of the Guards and Cuneo Brigades. These were to move south along the road to Goito, through Mozzecane and Roverbella. Those of the Piedmont and Aosta Brigades were to travel on the road to the right of this route, to the point where it reaches the Mincio, and then move south to Goito.
The fighting troops were to follow on, utilising the same roads. Brigades Piedmont and Aosta, together with the Royal Piedmont and Novara Cavalry Regiments, were instructed to follow their own baggage trains, and the Guards and Cuneo Brigades, with the Savoy, Genoa, and Aosta Cavalry Regiments, were to follow the lead of the Army Trains.
These movements were to be screened; A, by the Cavalry Division, deployed at Rosegaferro and Quaderni, about two kilometres further south; B, by the 17th Infantry Regiment, in Roverbella, facing south, and; C, by the Regina Brigade, deployed east of Goito, and also facing south towards Mantua.1
In the event, the actual movements bore no relation to these orders, for reasons not explained in any report or relation.2 The actual withdrawal took place in five distinct groups, and with considerable delays and interruptions. These various groups were:
A.
III/13th Infantry Regiment, four companies of Tuscan Infantry, and five guns of the Tuscan Artillery, commanded by the Tuscan General De Laugier. These troops departed from Villafranca first, although not until 01:00, on the 26th, escorting the wounded, the baggage, and about a thousand prisoners. The column reached Goito at approximately 08:00, and rested there until 14:00, before continuing westwards.
B.
The 1st Reserve Division and the Aosta Brigade. This force left Villafranca at 08:00, marching towards Goito by the more southerly route.
C.
The Piedmont Brigade, and four squadrons of the Novara Cavalry. These troops left Villafranca at 05:00, moving towards Goito by the northerly route.
D.
II/13th Infantry Regiment, the remaining Tuscan infantry, and five Tuscan field guns. These troops did not leave Villafranca until 07:30, and then followed the same route as the Piedmont Brigade.
E.
Finally, the last column, formed by the Cavalry Division, and subsequently joined by the 17th Infantry Regiment, and the Regina Brigade. This column had crossed the Mincio at Goito, by 15:00, on July 26th.
This withdrawal was achieved with only one slight hitch. As the marching columns of the Piedmont Brigade, following the northerly route, approached Quaderni, which had already been left by the cavalry screen deployed there, it was harassed by Austrian cavalry. First, Colonel Wyß, with 1/Radetzky Hussars, 2/Archduke Carl Uhlans, and two guns, launched a series of pin-prick moves against the brigade, as did Colonel Count Stadion, with 1/Archduke Carl Uhlans, and three troops of Radetzky Hussars.
Although not a serious threat, this did hamper the brigade’s withdrawal. Somewhere between 60 and 70 men were taken prisoner, with the Austrians having hussar Major Széchényi killed, and one uhlan wounded. After this, the brigade’s march was not again impeded.3 By 15:00, the withdrawal was complete, with all of the Army on the west bank of the Mincio.
De Sonnaz also Concentrates at Goito
In accordance with the options allowed to him in the instructions sent by the King the previous afternoon, and delivered by Captain, The Duke de Dino, Lieutenant-General De Sonnaz commenced his withdrawal to Goito overnight. Just after Midnight, on the morning of July 26th, the main body of General Visconti’s 2nd Reserve Division commenced its march, reaching Goito without incident at around 06:00. There, it was joined by I/2nd Provisional Regiment, bringing its strength up to eight battalions. The 3rd Division, in turn, marched from Volta at 02:00, arriving in Goito at just after 07:00. Here they also found I/13th Infantry Regiment, and the whole of the 14th Infantry Regiment. II Corps was once more united.
De Sonnaz, himself, had arrived in Goito at about 05:00. Waiting for him, he found a new order from Headquarters that he should, “…hold firm in Volta….”. The General was, understandably shocked by this, and struggled to comprehend this instruction in the light of his previous one. Since this latter had been delivered by the Duke de Dino, it was surely impossible that the King was unaware of it. To confuse matters further, before 06:00, De Sonnaz was informed of lifting of the siege of Mantua, and the King’s decision to concentrate the army in the area of Volta. He was further instructed to push the 3rd Division towards Volta with ala
crity, before the enemy was able to occupy it. Since he had, in the meanwhile, already ordered rations to be issued, and also felt that his men needed some rest, the General postponed his move until 16:00. In addition, he wished to personally clarify the King’s actual intentions, in the light of the various, and sometimes contradictory orders of the past two days.
Carlo Alberto and Lieutenant-General Bava arrived in Goito at 14:00.4 The King, most displeased to see 3rd Division still at Goito, severely criticised General De Sonnaz for this fact. The latter protested the inconsistency of his orders. Carlo Alberto’s mood may be judged from the description of his aide, Captain Talleyrand-Périgord, the Duke de Dino:
On 26th July, the two army corps met at Goito. Hunger, thirst, endless marches, and continuous fighting had exhausted the troops. The retreat, the (our) first, had deeply affected their morale despite the good order with which it had been conducted.
I came to the King to report on the outcome of my mission. His Majesty graciously expressed his satisfaction at seeing me safe and sound. Straight away, I informed him of the complete evacuation of Volta. The King expressed his deep regret. He questioned me on the motives of General Sonnaz, for not leaving several battalions at this important position. I replied truthfully what the General had said to me on the subject, when I had raised the issue on leaving Volta.
The King said nothing, but his dissatisfaction was plain. He summoned General Sonnaz and ordered him to return to Volta without delay, and to retake it in the event that it was already held by the enemy.5
Radetzky's Marches Page 35