by Riazanovsky
The Poles, who had but a small garrison in Moscow, retreated under pressure, burned most of the city, and entrenched themselves principally in the Kremlin. The large Russian army appeared to be in control of the situation. But once more social antagonisms asserted themselves. The cos-sacks, furious because certain legislative measures in the interest of the gentry were passed, especially on the subject of land, fugitive serfs, and cossack brigandage, and also possibly believing a false document manufactured by the Poles, killed Procopius Liapunov in July 1611. Deprived of its leader and unwilling to co-operate with the cossacks, the gentry army disbanded. The men of Trubetskoy and Zarutsky, on the other hand, stayed around Moscow to continue the siege and seized the government machinery of the defunct first national army. In June 1611 the main Polish army finally captured Smolensk, the population of the town having been reduced from 80,000 to 8,000 in the course of the siege. In July the Swedes took Novgorod by a stratagem. And in Pskov, a new pretender appeared, sometimes called the third False Dmitrii. In Kaluga Marina Mniszech and her son by the Felon of Tushino, known as the Little Felon, constituted another center of attraction for dissatisfied elements.
Yet the Russians did not collapse under all these blows; instead they staged another rally. They profited from a certain lack of energy and initiative on the part of their enemies: instead of advancing with a large army, Sigismund III sent merely a cavalry detachment to the relief of the Poles in Moscow, and that detachment was blocked by the cossacks; the Swedes, after the capture of Novgorod, appeared to rest on their laurels. Still, the magnitude of the Russian recovery should not be underestimated. Stimulated again by the appeals of Patriarch Hermogen, of Abbot Dionysus of the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery, and of others, the new liberation movement began in the town of Nizhnii Novgorod, on the Volga. It found a remarkable leader in Kuzma Minin, a butcher by trade, who combined exalted patriotism and the ability to inspire others with level-headedness and organizational and other practical talents. The people of Nizhnii Novgorod donated a third of their possessions to the cause and, together with other northeastern towns, soon organized a large army that was entrusted to a veteran warrior, Prince Dmitrii Pozharsky. Minin became its quartermaster and treasurer. The entire movement marked a religious, as well as a national, revival, accompanied by fasting and prayer. The second national army, just like its predecessor, acted as the government of the Muscovite state as well as its military force. It too apparently contained an assembly of representatives from different localities, something in the nature of a traveling zemskii sobor.
In early September 1612, the second national army reached Moscow and besieged the Poles. The cossacks blockading the city remained passive;
eventually one part of them joined Minin and Pozharsky, while another, with Zarutsky, went to the borderlands to continue their rebellion. In early November the Russians stormed Moscow and, after bitter fighting, captured Polish positions in the heart of the city, in particular in the Kremlin. Moscow was free at last of the enemy. All Polish efforts, finally led by Sigismund III himself, to come to the aid of the Polish garrison in Moscow failed.
The first aim of the victors was to elect a tsar and thus establish a firm, legitimate government in Russia and end the Time of Troubles. The specially called zemskii sobor which met for that purpose in the beginning of 1613 consisted of 500 to perhaps 700 members, although only 277 signatures have come down to us on the final document. It included the clergy, the boyars, the gentry, the townspeople, and even some representatives of peasants, almost certainly of the state peasants of northern Russia rather than of serfs. Twelve of the signatures belonged to peasants. While we have no records of the assembly and very little information about its deliberations, we know that the number of possible candidates for tsar was first reduced by the decision to exclude foreigners. From a half dozen or more Russians mentioned, the assembly selected Michael Romanov to be tsar, and the Romanov family ruled Russia for over 300 years, from 1613 to 1917.
Historians have adduced a number of reasons for this choice. Through Ivan the Terrible's marriage to Anastasia Romanova, Michael Romanov was related to the old dynasty. The family enjoyed popularity with the masses. In particular, the people remembered Anastasia, Ivan the Terrible's good first wife, and her brother, Nikita Romanov, who dared defend some of the victims of the violent tsar. Metropolitan Philaret, Nikita's son and Michael's father, who was a prisoner of the Poles at the time of the zemskii sobor, added to the advantageous position of the family. In particular, Miliukov and others have stressed that he stood closer to the Tushino camp and had much better relations with the cossacks than other boyars. Michael's youth too counted in his favor: only sixteen years old, he had not been compromised by serving the Poles or the pretenders, and he generally remained free of the extremely complicated and painful entanglements of the Time of Troubles. Michael Romanov also gained stature as Patriarch Hermogen's choice, although the patriarch himself did not live to see the election, having perished as a prisoner of the Poles shortly before the liberation of Moscow.
Thus, in February 1613, the zemskii sobor decided in favor of Michael Romanov. Next, special emissaries were dispatched to different parts of the Muscovite state to sound local opinion. When they reported the people's strong endorsement of the decision, Michael Romanov was elected to rule Russia as tsar, and the title was to pass on to his future descendants. It took additional time to persuade his mother and him to accept the offer.
Finally, Michael Romanov was crowned tsar on July 21, 1613. In Platonov's words: "According to the general notion, God himself had selected the sovereign, and the entire Russian land exulted and rejoiced."
The Nature and Results of the Time of Troubles
Platonov's authoritative evaluation of the Time of Troubles contains several major points: the explosive crisis which Russia experienced represented the culmination and the overcoming of a dangerous disease, or perhaps several diseases. It ended with a decisive triumph over Polish intervention, over the aristocratic reaction inside Russia, over the cossacks and anarchy. The result meant a national victory for Russia and a social victory for its stable classes, that is, the service gentry, the townspeople, and the state peasants of the north. The state gained in strength, and the entire experience, which included popular participation in and indeed rescue of the government, contributed greatly to the growth of national sentiment and to a recognition of public, as against private, rights and duties by sovereign and subject alike.
Many other historians, both before and after Platonov, noted positive results of the Time of Troubles. S. Soloviev, for example, claimed that it marked the victory in Russia, at long last, of the concept of state over that of family and clan. The Slavophiles - whom we shall consider when we discuss Russian thought in the nineteenth century - were probably the most enthusiastic of all: to them the Time of Troubles represented a revelation of the greatness of the Russian people, who survived the hardest trials and tribulations, overcame all enemies, saved their faith and country, and re-established the monarchy.
Critical opinions too have not been lacking. Kliuchevsky, for one, stressed the social struggle, the abandonment of the tradition of patient suffering by the masses, and the legacy of devastation and discord which pointed to the great popular rebellions of later years. He also emphasized the peculiar role and importance of the pretenders which demonstrated the political immaturity of the Russians. Michael Romanov himself could be considered a successful pretender, for his main asset lay in his link with the extinct dynasty. It might be added that Basil Shuisky, for his part, pointed out in his manifestoes that he belonged to an even older branch of the princely house of Suzdal and Kiev than the former Muscovite rulers and thus possessed every claim to legitimacy.
" Soviet historians devoted considerable attention to the Time of Troubles, which they often characterized as a period of peasant revolts and foreign intervention. They concentrated on the class struggle exemplified by Bolotnikov's rebellion, on the role
of the poorer classes generally, and sometimes on the role of the non-Russian nationalities. In contrast to Platonov they fa-
vored the revolutionary not the "stable" elements. Among the weaknesses of Soviet interpretations was an underestimation of the significance of the Church.
In conclusion, we may glance at the Muscovite government and society as they emerged from the Time of Troubles. In spite of everything that happened between 1598 and 1613, autocracy survived essentially unimpaired. In fact, at the end of it all, autocracy must have appeared more than ever the only legitimate form of government and the only certain guarantee of peace and security. Centralization, too, increased in the wake of social disorganization. In particular, local self-government that had developed in [van the Terrible's reign did not outlast the Time of Troubles. The Church, on its side, gained authority and prestige as the great champion of the interests of the country and the people and the most effective organization in the land that had survived the collapse of the secular order.
The service gentry also won. We know something about the aspirations of that class from such documents as the invitation to ascend the Muscovite throne sent to Wladyslaw by the service gentry in Tushino. The conditions of the offer included full protection of the Orthodox Church in Russia and freedom of religion, for Wladyslaw was a Catholic; rule with the help of the boyar duma and the zemskii sobor; no punishment without trial in court; the preservation and extension of the rights of the clergy, the service gentry, and to a degree the merchants; the rewarding of servitors according to merit; the right to study abroad; and at the same time a prohibition of serfs leaving their masters and a guarantee that slaves would not be freed. This attempt by the Tushino gentry to establish a government failed, but, in a broader sense, the Muscovite gentry succeeded in defending its interests during the Time of Troubles and in preserving and in part re-establishing a political and social order in which it occupied the central position. The Muscovite system, based on a centralizing autocracy and the service gentry, thus surmounted the great crisis and challenge of the Time of Troubles and continued to develop in the seventeenth century as it had in the sixteenth. It is this fundamental continuity that makes it difficult to find any lasting results of the Time of Troubles, anything beyond Platonov's "disease overcome."
The losers included, on one hand, the boyars and, on the other, the common people. The boyars attained their greatest power in the reign of Basil Shuisky and the period immediately following his deposition. Yet this power lacked popular support and failed to last. In the end, autocracy returned with its former authority, while the boyars, many of their families further decimated during the Time of Troubles, had to become unequivocally servants of the tsar. The desires of the boyars found expression in the remarkably mild "conditions" associated with the accession of Basil Shuisky, that is in his
promise not to purge the boyars arbitrarily, and in the Muscovite invitation to Wladyslaw, which changed the earlier Tushino stipulations to exclude promotion according to merit and the right to study abroad and insisted that foreigners must not be brought in over the heads of the Muscovite princely and boyar families.
The common people also suffered a defeat. They, and especially the serfs, slaves, fugitives, vagabonds, and uprooted, together with the cossacks, fought for Bolotnikov, for the various pretenders, and also in countless lesser armies and bands. Although they left little written material behind them, their basic demand seems clear enough: a complete overturn, a destruction of the oppressive Muscovite social and economic order. But the order survived. The decades which followed the Time of Troubles saw a final and complete establishment of serfdom in Russia and in general a further subjugation of the working masses to the interests of the victorious service gentry.
The legacy of the Time of Troubles, good and bad, was the point of departure for the reign of Michael Romanov.
XVII
THE REIGNS OF MICHAEL, 1613-45, ALEXIS, 1645-76, AND THEODORE, 1676-82
The seventeenth century cannot be separated either from the preceding or the succeeding epoch. It is the continuation and the result of the past just as it is the preparation for the future. It is essentially an age of transition, which lays the groundwork, and rapidly, for the reforms of Peter.
MILIUKOV
In Kostomarov's words, "Few examples can be found in history when a new sovereign ascended the throne in conditions so extremely sad as those in which Mikhail Fedorovich, a minor, was elected." And indeed Michael Romanov assumed power over a devastated country with the capital itself, as well as a number of other towns, burned down. The treasury was empty, and financial collapse of the state appeared complete. In Astrakhan, Za-rutsky, who had Marina Mniszech and the Little Felon in his camp, rallied the cossacks and other malcontents, continuing the story of pretenders and social rebellion so characteristic of the Time of Troubles. Many roaming bands, some of them several thousand strong, continued looting the land. Moreover, Muscovy remained at war with Poland and Sweden, which had seized respectively Smolensk and Novgorod as well as other Russian territory and promoted their own candidates to the Muscovite throne, Prince Wladyslaw and Prince Philip.
Under the circumstances, the sixteen-year-old tsar asked the zemskii sobor not to disband, but to stay in Moscow and help him rule. The zemskii sobor, while its personnel changed several times, in fact participated in the government of Russia throughout the first decade of the new reign. Platonov and others have pointed to the naturalness of this alliance of the "stable" classes of the Muscovite society with the monarchy which they had established. Michael worked very closely also with the boyar duma. Some historians even believe that at his accession he had given the duma certain promises limiting autocracy - an interesting supposition that has not been corroborated by the evidence. The tsar's advisers, few of whom showed ability, at first included especially members of the Saltykov family, relatives on his mother's side. In 1619, however, Michael's father, Metropolitan Philaret, returned from imprisonment in Poland, was made patriarch, and
became the most important man in the state. In addition to his ecclesiastical dignities, Philaret received the title of Great Sovereign, with the result that the country had two great sovereigns and documents were issued in the names of both. But Philaret's real power lay in his ability and experience and especially in his forceful character that enabled him to dominate his rather weak son. Philaret died in 1633, almost eighty years old.
In 1613 and the years following, the most pressing problems were those of internal disorder, foreign invasion, and financial collapse. Within some three years the government had dealt effectively with the disorder, in spite of new rebellions. Authorities made certain concessions to the cossacks and amnestied all bandits, provided they would enroll in the army to fight the Swedes. Then they proceeded to destroy the remaining opponents, group by group. The especially dangerous enemies, Zarutsky, the Little Felon, and Marina Mniszech, were defeated in Astrakhan and captured in 1614. The first two were executed, while Marina Mniszech died in prison.
Everything considered, Tsar Michael's government could also claim success in checking foreign aggression and stabilizing international relations, although at a price. Sweden, with its new king Gustavus II, or Gustavus Adolphus, occupied elsewhere in Europe, concluded peace in Stolbovo in 1617. According to the agreement, the Swedes returned Novgorod and adjacent areas of northern Russia, but kept the strip of territory on the Gulf of Finland, thus pushing the Russians further from the sea. In addition, Sweden received twenty thousand rubles. The Poles had greater ambitions; however, an understanding was attained after Wladyslaw's campaign of 1617-18 reached but failed to capture Moscow. By the truce of Deulino of 1618, which was to last for fourteen years, Poland kept Smolensk and certain other gains in western Russia. It was by the terms of this agreement that Russian prisoners, including Philaret, were allowed to return home. At the termination of the treaty in 1632, hostilities were resumed. But in 1634 peace was made: Poland again kept its gains in western R
ussia and, besides, received twenty thousand rubles, while Wladyslaw finally withdrew his claims to the Muscovite throne.
During Michael's reign important events also occurred south of the Muscovite borders. In 1637 Don cossacks, on their own, seized the distant Turkish fortress of Azov by the sea of the same name. In 1641 a huge Turkish army and navy returned, but in the course of an epic siege of four months could not dislodge the intruders. Having beaten back the Turks, the cossacks offered Azov to Tsar Michael. Acceptance meant war with Turkey. At the especially convened zemskii sobor of 1642 the delegates of the service class opted for war, but those of the merchants and the townspeople argued that financial stringency precluded large-scale military action. The tsar endorsed the latter opinion, and the cossacks had to abandon
Azov. In the Azov area, as in the area of the Gulf of Finland, the next Russian effort was to be led by Peter the Great.
Financial stability proved to be more difficult to attain than security at home or peace abroad. Miliukov and others have pointed out that the catastrophic financial situation of the Muscovite state resulted from its overextension, from the fact that its needs and requirements tended to exceed the economic capacity of the people. The Time of Troubles caused a further depletion and disorganization. In a desperate effort to obtain money, Tsar Michael's government tried a variety of measures: collection of arrears, new taxes, and loans, including successive loans of three, sixteen, and forty thousand rubles from the Stroganovs. In 1614 an extraordinary levy of "the fifth money" in towns, and of corresponding sums in the countryside, was enacted. While specialists dispute whether this impost represented one fifth of one's possessions or one fifth of one's income, its Draconian nature is obvious. On two later occasions the government made a similar collection of "the tenth money." On the whole, enough funds were obtained for the state to carry on its activities; but at the end of Michael's reign, as in the beginning, the financial situation remained desperate. Finances were to plague the tsar's successors with further crises.